Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


[german]  

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 25 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Appearance Leibniz
 
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Holz I 128
In itself/Appearance/Leibniz/Josef König: their relationship with Leibniz is a dialectical one. It again corresponds exactly to the scheme of the "Overlapping General": The in-itself is the genre of itself (!), The in-itself, and its opposite, of the phenomenon.
---
I 129
This does not mean the fact that the phenomenon is always the appearance of an in-itself (which is the meaning of the word). KantVsLeibniz: for then the phenomenon could still be different from that whose appearance it is, and hence no knowledge of the object is possible. (This is how Kant sees the relationship).
LeibnizVsKant: insists that the phenomenon is the same as the in-itself, which manifests itself in the phenomenon.
The world does this in perception. This it how it duplicates itself in two respects.
1. As a whole, however, from a different perspective
2. It appears spatially as the dissociation of the various substances,
3. It appears as a temporal succession of different perceptions.
The system of perceptions is "well-founded," because it is nothing but the self-restraining activity of the original power of the in-itself.
The difference between the in-itself and the appearance is the difference of the in-itself itself! This is the totality and principle of its difference.
---
I 130
Hence the phenomenon is not standing out from the in-itself, but a kind of the same, and as such something quite real. Appearance/world/Leibniz: the world always appears only insofar as it is expressed as being-such of a single monad.
Phenomenality/Leibniz: the way in which the thing-to-be-expressed is contained in the expressed. Every expression is a phenomenon. It is well founded because, the in-itself, the phenomenon is identical with it and establishes it as a appearing in-itself.
The phenomenon is not opposed to reality (VsKant), but precisely its specific mode of being in the process of universal representation.
Therefore, all perceptions in all individual substances must correspond to one another.
---
I 131
Unity/Leibniz: only in this way can all the different monads perceive one and the same appearance. This is the "harmony universal" (universal harmony, see above) in process form, in which all appearances are linked, because they are appearances of the same in-itself.
Phenomenon/Representation/Leibniz: that means, however, that all beings are phenomenal. (Just as it is at the same time in-itself).
Since representation with Leibniz is a universal and general process, every being must be a phenomenon for every other being.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Brain/Brain State Bieri
 
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Metzinger II 65
Gehirn/Bieri: Bsp Angenommen, es gibt einen Fremdenführer durch unser Gehirn, der uns bei einer Besichtigung alles erklärt. "Es ist eine Gesetzmäßigkeit der Natur, dass dann, wenn hier bestimmte Prozesse ablaufen, der Mensch eben bestimmte Dinge empfindet".
Bieri: das ist gar nicht unser Problem, wir bezweifeln nicht. dass es Gesetzmäßigkeiten und Notwendigkeiten gibt. Was wir nicht verstehen ist, warum es sie gibt. Wir können nicht erkennen, was im Gehirn es notwendig macht, dass der Mensch etwas erlebt.
Der Fremdenführer fragt, was wollen sie wissen? a) warum ein bestimmtes Geschehen hier drin gerade dieses Erleben nach sich zieht, oder b)warum sich überhaupt ein Erlebnis einstellt?
Bieri: bei den beiden Fragen handelt es sich um ein und dasselbe Problem!
II 69
Gehirn/Bewusstsein/Bieri: unser Führer könnte uns einen detaillierten Schaltplan des Gehirns überreichen. "funktionale Architektur"., "Sie könnten auch mit einem anderen Material verwirklicht werden". (Turing Maschine). Also:
II 70
Zwischen Funktion und Erlebnisqualität gibt es nicht mehr inneren Zusammenhang als zwischen materieller Struktur und Erlebnisqualität.
Fremdenführer: "man darf das Gehirn nicht isoliert vom Körper betrachten"
Bieri: dann könnte man VsLeibniz sagen:
1. das Geschehen in der "Fabrik" bekommt einen kognitiven Gehalt dadurch, dass es gesetzmäßig mit Geschehnissen draußen verknüpft ist, die es kraft dieser Verknüpfung repräsentiert
2. dadurch, dass das fragliche Geschehen dem ganzen Menschen zu einem situationsangemessenen Verhalten verhilft.
Aber: unser Problem ist ja nicht Bedeutung, nicht kognitiver Gehalt, sondern Erlebnisgehalt!
Metzinger II 71
Gehirn/Bewusstsein/Erleben/Bieri : können wir uns nicht mit dem zufrieden geben, was wir haben: Kovarianz, Abhängigkeit, Determination? Nein: wenn wir das fragliche Verstehen nicht erreichen, dann verstehen wir auch nicht, wie unser Erleben in unserem Verhalten kausal wirksam werden kann, damit verstehen wir unser eigenes Subjektsein nicht.
Das physiologische Geschehen ist kausal lückenlos. Es gibt in dem Uhrwerk keine Stelle, an der Episoden des Erlebens nötig wären, damit es weiterläuft.
D.h. es gibt eine vollständige komplette Kausalerklärung für alles, was in unserem Gehirn stattfindet, in der wir als Subjekte bzw. Menschen überhaupt nicht vorkommen!
Daher scheint das Bewusstsein ohne Bedeutung für irgendeine Verursachung zu sein. Es könnte ebenso gut fehlen, und wir würden genauso durch die Welt stolpern, wie wir es tun.
((s) Wir müssten das Bewusstsein an irgendetwas anderem erkennen).
Unser gesamtes Verhalten könnte entfremdet sein. Das kann wegen der kausalen Lückenlosigkeit nicht ausgeschlossen werden.
II 72
Kausalität/Bieri: wenn wir sie rein physiologisch aufbauen, wissen wir, wie wir sie fortsetzen können, d.h. immer kleinteiliger werden. Das geht aber nicht, wenn die Erklärung mit einem Erlebnis beginnt. Dann müssen wir irgendwo auf die physiologische Ebene wechseln. Aber dann haben wir das Thema gewechselt!
II 74
Gehirn/Bieri: das Problem ist nicht, dass wir in der "Fabrik" etwas nicht sehen. Daraus könnte man nun folgern, dass es an irgendetwas anderem liegt... Vs: es ist aber nichts anderes denkbar! Aber das ist ja gerade die Hypothese, daß wir nichts anderes denken können. Diese Hypothese können wir nicht widerlegen.
Es klänge aber abenteuerlich, daß diejenige Tatsachen, die fürs Erleben relevant sind, nichts zu tun haben mit den Tatsachen, die sonst fürs Funktionieren des Gehirns relevant sind.
Wir haben in Betracht gezogen:
kausales Verstehen,
strukturelles Verstehen, funktionales Verstehen,
Verstehen des Ganzen aus Teilen.


Bieri I
P. Bieri
Analytische Philosophie des Geistes Weinheim 2007


Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996
Completeness Hacking
 
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I 162
Description / StrawsonVsLeibniz: monads: "complete description" is pointless! - VsPutnam: Internal Realism: requires the idea of ​​a "full description" because of ideal acceptability.

Hack I
I. Hacking
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Contingency Leibniz
 
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Stegmüller IV 388
Contingency/Leibniz: Every thing is contingent - if another thing were different, it would not be thus - all things are causally connected - causes: their number can be unlimited - there is not necessarily a temporal beginning. - Sufficient reason: must then lie outside the world - therefore there must be a necessary being - VsLeibniz: How do we know that everything needs a sufficient reason? - KantVsLeibniz: the cosmological proof of God is based on the implicit (disproved) ontological argument.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998

Cross World Identity Hintikka
 
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I XV
Cross-world identity/Hintikka: cross-world identity remains a crucial problem. Thesis: it is to trace an object (or its trace) in the worlds that it has in common. That is, it boils down to a re-identification, between time slices of the same event development. It is a matter of continuity.
The problem corresponds to the stability theory of sets of differential equations.
---
I XVI
Catastrophe theory/René Thom/Hintikka: the problem is closely related to the catastrophe theory. Cross-world identity/Hintikka:
Quine: considers it a hopeless problem.
HintikkaVsKripke: he underestimates the problem and considers it to be guaranteed. He cheats.
Worldline/Cross-World Identity/Hintikka: 1. We must allow that some objects not only exist in certain possible worlds, but that their existence is unthinkable there! That is, world lines can cease to exist - even worse: it may be that they are not defined in certain possible worlds.
Problem: this is not permitted in the usual knowledge logic (religious logic).
2. World lines can be drawn in two ways:
A) object-centered
B) agent-centered.
Analogy: this can be related to Russell's distinction between knowledge through acquaintance and description.
---
I 78
Cross-world identity/Hintikka: Problem: e.g. the problem can be an intentional (opaque) context (belief contexts). Here the existential generalization (EG) fails. That is, if a sentence A[b] is true for a subject, we cannot conclude that there is an object from which the sentence A is true (Ex) A [x]. ---
I 79
Solution/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: the solution is to accept different individuals in different worlds. If the semantics of possible worlds is right, we somehow manage to determine the cross-world identity. Knowledge/knowledge-who/knowledge-what/semantics of possible worlds: E.g.
(4) (Ex) Victoria knows that Lewis Carroll is x.
Model-theoretically, this means that "Lewis Carroll" picks out the same individual in all the worlds that are compatible with Victoria's knowledge.
This is synonymous with
(5) Victoria knows who Lewis Carroll is.
---
I 80
Possible Worlds/Universe/Cross-World Identity/HintikkaVsLeibniz/Hintikka: Problem: when worlds are whole universes, the framework between them changes too often that it is questionable how to re-identify individuals. ---
I 80
Cross-world identity/cross-world identification/Hintikka: normally we hold a large part of the world fixed when we identify two individuals. Comparability Hintikka/(s): thus alternatives become comparable. To make alternatives to different parts comparable, we extend them. The extensions should have a part in common.
In an extreme case, they share their story. Identical: two individuals are indentical when their story coincides. This leads to the fact that cross-world identification is partially reduced to re-identification. That is, it becomes the problem. How space-time can be traced back to a common basis.
Advantage: we do not have to consider every single possible world.
---
I 81
Cross-world identification/cross-world identity/Locke/Kripke/Hintikka: Thesis: Causation plays an important role. ---
I 205
Cross-world identification/cross-identification/perception/Hintikka: here we have to assume a situation when it comes to perceptual identification. For there must be in them a perceptible, and the different situations (worlds) must share the perception space of the subject. Semantics of possible worlds/perception/HintikkaVsSemantics of possible worlds: Hintikka has overlooked this point.
Situation/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: Furthermore, the semantics of possible worlds should investigate relations between smaller and larger situations.
---
I 206
Descriptive cross-world identification/descriptive/Hintikka: descriptive identification should take place between parts of the world that are larger than the actual perceptual cross-identification. So a comparison between "bigger" and "smaller" situations.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Description Hacking
 
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I 162
Description/StrawsonVsLeibniz: monads: complete description pointless! - VsPutnam: Internal realism requires the idea of ​​a "complete description" because of ideal acceptability.

Hack I
I. Hacking
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Dissimilarity Democritus
 
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Adorno XIII 202
Dissimilarity/Democritus/Adorno: How is the dissimilarity in things created? The problem of all ancient philosophy was to state a unified principle, from which everything could be explained, and with which one could react against the infinite variety of natural mythology. ---
XIII 203
Atoms/Democritus/Adorno: atoms do not have internal states, but only mechanical states. This notion that the essence of things can only be grasped from the outside and not from the inside, and that there is in fact no inner being, had a tremendous consequence for the entire history of the sciences. ---
XIII 204
AristotleVsDemocritus/Adorno: Thesis: the objectivity and reality of forms is immanent to the things themselves. Natural science: modern science has criticized this Aristotelian and medieval view, and has no longer attempted to comprehend the matter from within, from these forms. One has simply observed and registered from the outside.
This is VsKant, VsLeibniz, VsWolff.
Group: Leibniz, Wolff pro Aristotle.


A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Identification Strawson
 
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I 57
Identification/Strawson: if directly due to localization then without mentioning of other particulars - E.g. death depends on living things - e.g. but flash not from something flashing. ---
I 64
Identification/Strawson: observable particulars can also be identified without mentioning their causes or the things on which they depend, - conceptual dependency does not matter - but one cannot always identify births without identifying them as the birth of a living being. ---
I 65
Asymmetry: we do not need necessarily a term in language for births as particulars - but for living beings, because we are living beings ourselves. ---
I 66
Identifiability/particular/Strawson: minimum condition: they must be neither private nor unobservable. ---
I 87
Identificaion/Strawson: we cannot talk about private things when we cannot talk about public things. ---
I 153
Identification/StrawsonVsLeibniz: identification requires a demonstrative element: that contradicts Leibniz monads for which there should be descriptions alone in general term - Then, according to Leibniz, identification (individuation) is only possible for God: the "complete term" of an individual - that is at the same time a description of the entire universe (from a certain point, which guarantees the uniqueness). ---
I 245
Identification/Universal/names/particulars/Strawson: speaker/listener each must know a distinctive fact about Socrates. - But it must not be the same - E.g. "That man there can lead you" - crucial: that someone stands there - N.B.: no part introduces a single thing, but the statement as a whole presents it -> "incompleteness". ---
VII 124
Identification/reference/Strawson: E.g. "That man there has crossed the channel by swimming through it twice" - it has the (wrong!) appearances, that one "refers twice", a) once by stating nothing and consequently making no statement, or b ) identifying the person with oneself and finding a trivial identity. StrawsonVs: this is the same error as to believe that the object would be the meaning of the expression. - E.g. "Scott is Scott". ---
Tugendhat I 400-403
Identification/Strawson: a) Showing - b) Description, spacetime points - TugendhatVsStrawson: because he had accepted Russell's theory of direct relation unconsciously, he did not see that there are no two orders - Tugendhat like Brandom: demonstrative identification presupposes the spatiotemporal, non-demonstrative - (deixis presupposes anaphora) - difference: specification/Tugendhat: "which of them all?" - Identification: only kind: by spacetime points.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981


Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Identity Quine
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
I 208ff
Identity/Davidson/Quine: we are unable to pick out the relationship that is constitutive for the knowledge of the identity of an object. The reason is that every property can be considered as relevant. If the mind can only think if it establishes a clear relationship to the object, then thought is impossible. (QuineVsRussell). Identity: does not work without conceptual scheme.
Identity: QuineVsHume, QuineVsLeibniz: Confusion of word and object: there is no relation between different objects but relationship between singular terms - a = b different names.
---
I 211
Copula forms indefinite singular term: no longer Fa but a = b = E.g. Agnes = a lamb - but: Agnes bleats: Fa. ---
I 211
Synonymy and analyticity is graded, identity is absolute. ---
I 365
Identity conditions strong/weak/(s):> E.g. Paul and Elmar. ---
II 23
Identity/absolutely distinguishable: open sentence only fulfilled by an object. - Relatively distinguishable: only fulfilled in the given order. - Identity: Objects that are not relatively distinguishable, not all objects that are not absolutely distinguishable. ---
I 397
Theseus ship: it is not about the term "the same" but the term "ship" - each general term has its own individuation principle. ---
II 156ff
Individuation: in our world moment-to-moment individuation by predicates - for objects at random (everything can be the object), for predicates crucial truth value. - Identification between possible worlds: is dependent on predicates - for body also from space displacement, composition, etc., therefore not cross-worlds- "The same object" is meaningless -> single Term, instead predicate. ---
Geach I 238
Identity/GeachVsQuine: Thesis: identity is relative - if someone says x is identical to y, this is an incomplete expression - it is an abbreviation for "x is the same A as y" - (weird that Frege has not supported this) - Identity/tradition/Geach: can be expressed by a single scheme: (1) l- Fa (x) (Fx ux = a) - in everyday language: whatever is always true of something that is identical to an object y, is true of a and vice versa - from which we derive the law of self-identity from: l- a = a if we take Fx for x unequal to a then scheme (1) provides us with: (2) l- (a unequal a) Vx (x unequal a u x = a) - the results in l a = a. ---
Geach I 240
But Geach pro relative identity. ---
Quine V 86
I/Quine: initially only means for extending the time pointing - then itself relative mass term: E.g. "the same dog as" - used for individuation of absolute general term E.g. "dog" - Geach: this is a reduction to a relative term - Quine. : that does not work when objects overlap. ---
V 89
Identity/Geach: only with respect to general terms, the same thing. ---
V 161
Identity: restricted: in terms of general term: "the same apple" - unrestricted: Learning: 1. anyone who agrees with the sentences [a = b] and [a is a g] also agrees to [b a g] ((s) transitivity) - 2. disposition, to agree on [a = b] , if it is recognized that one can agree [b is a g] due to [a is a g] for any g. - Relative identity: also these I. is relative, because the identity scale depends on words - [a = b] can get wrong when adding new terms. ---
I 162
Definition identity/Set Theory/Quine: x = y as the statement y is element of every class, from which x is element - characterization of the identity by using all relative clauses. ---
V 162
Definition identity/Set Theory/Quine: with quantification over classes is x = y defined as the statement y is a member of each class, from which x is element. - Language learning: here initially still substitutional quantification - then no class, but exhaustion of relative clauses. ---
VII 65 ~
Identity/Quine: important: the demand for processes or temporally extended objects - by assuming identity rather than flow kinship, one speaks of the flow instead of stages. ---
IX 24
Definition identity/Quine: we can now simplify: for y = z - y = z stands for x (x e y x e z) - because we have identified the individuals with their classes. ---
X 90
Definiton identity/Quine: then we define "x = y" as an abbreviation for:. Ax ↔ Ay (z) (bzx ↔ bzy. Bxz ↔ Byz .Czx ↔ Czy .Cxz ↔ Cyz (z') (Dzz'x ↔.... .. Dzz'y .Dzxz'↔ Dzyz' Dxzz '↔ Dyzz')) - i.e. that the objects u x. y are not distinguishable by the four predicates, not even in terms of the relation to other objects z and z'. ---
X 99
Identity/Quine: only defined (in our appearance theory of set theory) between variables, not defined between abstraction expressions or their schema letters. ---
XII 71
Relative identity/Quine: results from ontological relativity, because no entity without identity - only explicable in the frame theory. - E.g. distinguishability of income classes.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Identity Wessel
 
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I 220
Identity/Wessel: identity statement: Abbreviation of a statement about the importance of equality of two terms: mutual meaning inclusion - ta tb = definition (ta > tb) and (tb> ta) - but that is only correct for individual subject termini. ---
I 220f
Identity/Hegel: a = a: E.g. Socrates is Socrates: demands that Socrates does not undergo any changes in time - WesselVsHegel: confusion of word and object - identity and difference two-digit predicates (relation) - not one-digit predicate. - x = y is existentially charged.
I 221
Identity/WesselVsLeibniz: suggests an incorrect comparison of separate objects. ---
I 227
Identity/logic/Wessel: x = x: existentially charged: only true if one thing x exists - not logically true, not a tautology, empirical fact (> Russell). ---
I 335
Definition identity/Wessel: i1 = i2 = definition S(i1, ti2). (s) S: the fact that i1 is designated by the name i2? - That a is designated with the name b? b stands for a? - Definition diversity/Wessel: -i (i1 = i2) = definition E(i1) u E(i2) ~ u (i1 = i2) - ((s), there are two expressions i1 and i2, which do not stand for the same object.) - identity/Wessel: we use the axiom: l- i1 = i2> ti 1 ti2. <((S) if the objects are identical, it follows that the corresponding expressions are equivalent in meaning.) ---
I 379f
Identity/Science Logic/Wessel: 1) at any time is the object a identical with the object b in any spatial order with respect to any method for determining the order - 2) always, if one of a and b exists, the other also exists - structure must take into account the relations of objects - there is nothing in nature that justifies the preference for one or another relation (not a fact). Identity in time/Science Logic/Wessel: if t2 after t1, one can no longer speak of identity - T1 and t2 are then only representative of the same class of objects a, if the objects were defined using time.

We I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999

Leibniz Principle Adams
 
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Millikan I, 261
VsLeibniz' Principle/Law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: Thesis: the principle that is used when such symmetrical worlds are constructed, the principle that an individual cannot be distinguished from itself, so the two world parts of the world cannot be the same half. Leibniz' law/VsVs/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of Hacking): the objections do not consider the fact that this could be about a curved space instead of a doubling.
Curved Space/Hacking/Millikan: here one thing and the same thing emerges again, it is not a doubling as in the Euclidean geometry.
MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question.
---
I 262
But there are still two interesting possibilities: > indistinguishability. Leibniz' Law/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Millikan:
1. symmetrical world: one could argue that there is simply no fact here that decides whether the space is curved or doubled. ((s)> nonfactualism).
N.B.: this would imply that Leibniz' principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention.
2. Symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very well be a fact whether the space is curved or not. A certain given space cannot be both!
N.B.: then Leibniz' principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary.
N.B.: but in this case this is not a question of convention, but a real fact!
MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsArmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor Armstrong take that into account.
Curved space/Millikan: here, what is identical is necessarily identical ((s) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if the one half had been different, then also the other. Here the space seems to be only doubled.
Doubling/Millikan: if the space (in Euclidean geometry) is mirrored, then the identity is random, but not necessary. Here one half could change without changing the other half. ((s) No counterfactual conditional).
Identity: is given if the objects are not indistinguishable because a law applies in situ, but a natural law, a natural necessity.
---
I 263
Then, in the second option, identity is derived from causality. (x)(y){[NN(F)Fx equi Fy] equi x = y}
NN/Notation: nature-necessary under necessary circumstances.

Leibniz Principle Millikan
 
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I 259
Leibniz’ Gesetz/Prinzip/Identität/Ununterscheidbarkeit/Leibniz/Millikan: These: ich behandle sein Prinzip so, dass es eine implizite Behauptung über grammatische Kategorien ist. (x)(y)[(F)(Fx äqui Fy) > x = y]
Problem: was ist der Bereich des Quantors „(F)“? ((s) > Logik 2. Stufe).
Hier können nicht einfach Elemente des Bereichs mit grammatischen Prädikaten gepaart werden. Die Menge der grammatischen Prädikate mag nicht von ontologischem Interesse sein. Bsp weder „…existiert“ noch „… = A“ noch „…bedeutet rot“ ist mit irgendetwas gepaart, was denselben Sinn hätte wie dass „…ist grün“ gepaart ist mit einer Variante eines Weltzustandes.
Quantifikation/Eigenschaften/Logik 2. Stufe/Millikan: vielleicht können wir sagen, dass der Quantor (F) über alle Eigenschaften geht, aber müssen wir diese Menge anders charakterisieren als durch Paarung mit grammatischen Prädikaten.
falsch: Bsp der Versuch von Baruch Brody These: „mit x identisch sein“ sollte man als eine Eigenschaft von x“ in dem Bereich des Quantors „(F)“ verstehen, ist ganz falsch! ((s) „mit sich selbst identisch sein“ als Eigenschaft.)
Wenn es so wäre, dann wäre jedes Ding, das alle Eigenschaften von x hat, mit x identisch. ((s) Auch wenn es zusätzliche Eigenschatten hätte).
Problem: unter dieser Interpretation ist Eigenschaft keine kohärente ontologische Kategorie.
Wie können wir Leibniz’ Prinzip behandelt, und den Begriff „Eigenschaft“ so behalten, dass er ontologisch kohärent ist?
I 260
Leibniz’ Gesetz/Prinzip/Identität/Ununterscheidbarkeit/Millikan: wird normalerweise als eine Behauptung über die Identität individueller Substanzen angesehen. Substanzen, bei denen es sinnvoll ist, ihnen Ort und Zeit zuzuschreiben. D.h. „x“ und „y“ gehen über Individuen. Quantor: (F) wird allgemein so aufgefasst, dass er nur über „allgemeine Eigenschaften“ geht. Oder über „rein qualitativen Eigenschaften“.
rein qualitative Eigenschaften: d.h. dass sie nicht im Hinblick auf bestimmte Individuen definiert sind: Bsp „die Eigenschaft „größer als Mt Washington zu sein“
Pointe: wohl aber: „die Eigenschaft, größer als etwas zu sein, dass die und die Eigenschaften hat, wobei diese die Eigenschaften von Mt. Washington sind.
individuenbezogene Eigenschaften/Millikan: werden normalerweise ausgeschlossen, weil sie Eigenschaften erlauben würden wie „identisch mit x sein“. Was zu einer leeren Lesart führen würde von Leibniz’ Gesetz.
MillikanVs: aber es ist gar nicht so, dass „ist identisch mit x“ keiner vernünftigen Eigenschaft entsprechen würde.
Leibniz’ Gesetz/Millikan: wird aber meist untersucht im Kontext der Relation des Bereichs allgemeiner Eigenschaften zu
I 261
dem Bereich der Dinge, die diese Eigenschaften haben. Also Frage: müssen wir einen Bereich solcher Dinge jenseits des Bereichs dieser allgemeinen Eigenschaften postulieren, oder können wir die Selbstidentität (Selbigkeit) eines Individuums in rein qualitativen Ausdrücken definieren können. Leibniz’ Gesetz/Millikan: in diesem Kontext scheint die Relation zu einem bestimmten Individuum ((s) und damit auch des Dings zu sich selbst) als eine unreine oder gemischte ontologische Kategorie zu sein.
VsLeibniz/VsLeibniz’ Gesetz/Prinzip/Identität/Ununterscheidbarkeit/Ununterscheidbares/Millikan: der klassische Einwand VsLeibniz ist, auf die Möglichkeit hinzuweisen, dass das Universum perfekt symmetrisch sein könnte, wobei dann ein perfekt identisches ((s) ununterscheidbares) Individuum an einem anderen Ort wäre. ((s) D.h. es gäbe etwas von x Ununterscheidbares, das dennoch nicht identisch mit x wäre, gegen Leibniz Prinzip). (Siehe auch Adams).
Varianten: Bsp ein sich zeitlich wiederholendes Universum usw. Bsp zwei identische Wassertropfen, zwei identische Billardkugeln an verschiedenen Orten. ((s) Wieso dann identisch? Weil der Ort (die Koordinaten) nicht in die Identität einfließt!)
Eigenschaft/Leibniz: These: ein Bezug auf Raum und Zeit führt zu einer Eigenschaft, die nicht rein qualitativ ist.
Millikan: wenn man nun solche „unreinen“ Eigenschaften außer Acht lässt ((s) also nicht auf Raum und Zeit Bezug nimmt) haben die zwei Billardkugeln dieselben Eigenschaften!
VsLeibniz’ Prinzip/Gesetz/R. M. Adams/Millikan: These: das Prinzip, das gebraucht wird, wenn man solche symmetrischen Welten konstruiert ist, das Prinzip, dass ein Individuum nicht von sich selbst unterschieden (getrennt) werden kann, daher können die zwei Welthälften nicht ein und dieselbe Hälfte sein.
Leibniz’ Gesetz/VsVs/Hacking/Millikan: (jüngste Verteidigung von Hacking): die Einwände gehen nicht darauf ein, dass es sich um gekrümmten Raum statt um eine Verdoppelung handeln könnte.
Gekrümmter Raum/Hacking/Millikan: hier taucht ein und dasselbe Ding nochmals auf, es ist keine Verdoppelung wie in der Euklidischen Geometrie.
MillikanVsHacking: aber das würde eben die Frage nicht beantworten.
I 262
Es gibt aber immer noch zwei interessante Möglichkeiten: > Ununterscheidbarkeit. Leibniz’ Gesetz/Prinzip/Identität/Ununterscheidbarkeit/Millikan:
1. symmetrische Welt: man könnte behaupten, dass hier einfach keine Tatsache gibt, die darüber entscheidet, ob der Raum gekrümmt ist oder verdoppelt. ((s) >Nonfaktualismus).
Pointe: das würde beinhalten, dass Leibniz Prinzip weder metaphysisch noch logisch notwendig ist, und dass seine Gültigkeit nur eine Frage der Konvention ist.
2. symmetrische Welt: man könnte sagen, dass das Beispiel keine allgemeine Lösung anbietet, wohl aber die Annahme einer bestimmten gegebenen symmetrischen Welt: hier gäbe es dann sehr wohl einen Tatsache, ob der Raum gekrümmt ist oder nicht. Ein bestimmter gegebener Raum kann nämlich nicht beides sein!
Pointe: dann ist Leibniz Prinzip weder metaphysisch noch logisch notwendig.
Pointe: aber in diesem Fall ist das dann keine Frage der Konvention, sondern eine wirkliche Tatsache!
MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsArmstrong/Millikan: weder Adams noch Armstrong berücksichtigen das.
Gekrümmter Raum/Millikan: hier ist das, was identisch ist, notwendig identisch ((s) weil es nur gespiegelt ist). Hier gälte das kontrafaktische Konditional: wenn die eine Hälfte anders gewesen wäre, dann auch die andere. Hier scheint der Raum überhaupt nur doppelt zu sein.
Verdoppelung/Millikan: wenn der Raum (in Euklidischer Geometrie) gespiegelt ist, ist die Identität eine zufällig, nicht notwendige. Hier könnte die eine Hälfte sich ändern, ohne dass die andere Hälfte sich ändert. ((s) Kein Kontrafaktisches Konditional).
Identität: ist dann gegeben, wenn die Gegenstände nicht deswegen ununterscheidbar sind, weil ein Gesetz in situ gilt, sondern ein Naturgesetz, eine naturnotwendige Übereinstimmung.
I 263
Dann gilt in der zweiten Option Identität aus Kausalität. (x)(y){[NN(F)Fx äqui Fy] äqui x = y}
NN/Schreibweise: naturnotwendig unter natürlich möglichen Umständen.
Millikan: das ist schon eine ziemlich extreme Auffassung, denn sie behauptet, dass wenn es zwei Mengen von äquivalenten Gesetzen gäbe, die alle Ereignisse erklären, eine dieser Mengen, aber nicht die andere wahr wäre, selbst wenn es gar keine Möglichkeit gäbe herauszufinden, welche der beiden Menge es ist, die wahr wäre.
Das würde dem entsprechen, dass man eine nur scheinbar symmetrische Welt bewohnte. Entweder das eine oder das andere wäre wahr, aber man würde nie herausfinden, was.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Order Leibniz
 
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Holz I 76
Order/structure/world/Leibniz: the assumption of an invariable lawfulness of the material world presents us with the task of a priori establishing the being of nature as a whole before a single natural being. The whole must be certain before the formulation of its partial course rules, so that the intelligibility of the individual is guaranteed.
Thus the axiom "Only one being is necessary" gains its importance.
---
I 77
For it follows from it: "The necessary being contains in itself all the conditions of things." A finite being cannot be understood from within itself.
But the whole is absolutely necessary because there is nothing else besides it.
---
Holz I 95
World/Order/Leibniz/HolzVsLeibniz: precisely the specificity of the context of the world remains unclear in Leibniz, since the "unmoved mover" must be thought of as located outside. Leibniz/Holz: they develop a unity of metaphysics and physics.
---
I 96
Order/World/God/Leibniz: God does nothing except order. It is not even possible to devise events that are not according to the rule! The mechanism is sufficient to explain the emergence of all animals. Organic preformation in the seed.
Mechanism, however, must be presupposed, and this can only be determined a priori by means of metaphysical reasoning.
---
97
The world is from the beginning a system of interactions.
The principle of the particularity of each individual is at the same time the principle of the universality of the connection of all beings.
Universal Harmony/Leibniz: universal harmony is the structural title for the system of substances. Not later, but from the nature and concept of the monads.
Pre-stabilized harmony/Leibniz: pre-stabilized harmony is in contrast to a widespread misunderstanding the special case of consistency between physical and mental aspects of substantial being.
---
I 98
Thus between "body" and "soul", between material processes in the res extensa and representations in the res cogitans. Holz: one could also speak of pre-stabilized harmony between extensional and intensional aspects of the logical mapping of ontological relationships.
For the world concept, the more general version of the universal harmony is decisive.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Possibilia Hintikka
 
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I 40/41
Non-existence/non-existent objects/localization/possible worlds/Hintikka: thesis: any non-existent object is in its own world. Possible worlds/Leibniz/Duns Scotus/Hintikka: such considerations led Leibniz and Duns Scotus before him to distribute the unordered set of non-existent individuals to divided worlds.
The totality of all non-existent objects is a non-well-formed whole.
Non-existent objects/possible objects/unrealized possibilities/Hintikka: but are not some of these non-existent objects in our own actual world? Hintikka: thesis: yes, some of these barely possible objects are in the actual world.
Bona fide object/Hintikka: a bona fide object can exist in a possible world and be missing in another.
World line/Hintikka: when it comes to which world line can be drawn, existence is not the most important problem. Rather being well-defined.
HintikkaVsLeibniz: we also allow that an object can exist in several worlds.
Question: if inhabitants of two different worlds can be identical when are they identical then?
---
I 73
Possibilia/Hintikka: Thesis: the speech about human experience makes the assumption of Possibilia necessary. (Unrealized Possibilities). HintikkaVsQuine. Intentionality/Husserl/Hintikka: according to Husserl, the essence of human thought is in a relationship to unrealized possibilities.
Possibilia/Hintikka: we need possibilia to deal with logically incompatible entities of the same logical type.
Semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: the semantics of possible worlds is the corresponding model theory.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Possible Worlds Hintikka
 
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I 74
Possible Worlds/VsSemantics of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: Problem: Possible worlds seem to take the worlds and complete sets of Possibilia as ((s) self-evident). Possible worlds/Leibniz: thesis: there is a determined set of worlds among which God makes a selection. HintikkaVsLeibniz: that is extremely doubtful.
Possible worlds/Hintikka: we should rather call it world stories or scenarios.
---
I 75
We can limit the set of worlds to those that are conceivable. Semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: one can build a theory of questions and answers on the semantics of possible worlds.
---
I 76
This is about what is possible in more than one world. For this we must assume much more than is assumed in an extensional language. Reference/semantics of possible worlds: here it is not enough to accept only the referents which have our expressions in the actual world.
---
I 196
Possible world/individual area/HintikkaVsKripke: one should not demand that the individuals must remain the same when changing from world to world. The talk of worlds is empty, if there are no possible experiences that could make them different. Possible worlds/Hintikka: possible worlds hould be best determined as by the connected possible totals of experience.
And then separation cannot be ruled out.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Possible Worlds Leibniz
 
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Hintikka I 74
Possible Worlds/VsSemantic of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: Problem: it seems to make the worlds and complete sets of Possibilia absolute ((s) to assume them as self-evident). Possible worlds/Leibniz: Thesis: there is a fixed set of worlds from which God makes a selection. HintikkaVsLeibniz: this is extremely doubtful.
Possible worlds/Hintikka: we should rather call it world stories or scenarios.
---
I 75
We can limit the set of worlds to those that are conceivable. ---
Holz I 120
Possible worlds/Leibniz/Pape/Holz: is for Leibniz the negative background of a positive world. The background, by virtue of which the positivity of the one realized world first acquires its justification. Namely, in a comprehensive sense of a logical, ontological and moral justification! The force of the negation is stronger than that of the position.
Possibility/Reality/Leibniz: a world is always the totality of everything real and possible, and this possible is the real possible (puissance) of which the real is a selected partial quantity.
Possible worlds/LeibnizVsKripke: other possible worlds cannot be worlds of other possibilities (otherwise this (our) world (the actual world) would not be a world, but only a partial quantity).
---
I 122
One must not multiply the world's things by several worlds, for there is no number that is not in this one world, or even in each of its parts. To introduce another species of existing things is to misuse the concept of existence.
World/Leibniz: not the sum of the parts, but their ordered connection. The world is the world law composing the individuals.
Order/Leibniz: does not arise from the world, but the world itself is the order, the order is the world-creating one.
Now however, due to the a priori necessary principles (see above) no other order than the existing one is to be thought of!
Possible worlds/Leibniz: therefore, worlds, which are structurally different from ours, remain undefined in content and unthinkable. They would be mere shadow worlds.
It is, however, impossible for a priori thinking to exclude the possibility of such differently ordered worlds.
Leibniz: the conceivability of possible worlds is a necessary possibility of thinking.
---
I 122/123
Solution/Leibniz: and these possible worlds would still be formally possible as actual non-worlds even if there were no world at all, but nothing. Possibility/Reality/Leibniz: as worlds, however, they are only possible when they are not nothing.
This is due to the fact that the (definition) possible ontological cannot be determined otherwise than as force, which urges to utter.
The nothingness of possibility, however, would not be conceivable because it would not be a possibility and thinking is always thinking of at least possible. (If necessary, the possible nothing!)
Nothing/Leibniz: is then a possibility among other things. In the infinitesimal sense, the minimization of the possible or a world whose content tends toward zero, whose possibilities mutually cancel each other out.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Proofs Vollmer
 
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I 234
Science/proof/physics/Kant/early/precritical: Newton's theory cannot be proven logically - that have seen KantVsLeibniz and KantVsWolff - but it also cannot be empirically verified - Kant had learned that from Hume.

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

Vo II
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd II Stuttgart 1988

Rationalism Leibniz
 
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Holz I 50
Definition evidence/certainty/a priori/Leibniz: the certainty (the necessity of identical propositions A = B) is based neither on empiricism nor on deduction, but on an a priori insight. ---
Holz I 50
Rationalism/HolzVsLeibniz: Problem for a philosophy that understands itself "scientifically": this "immediate insight" of so-called final justification leads to a different epistemological level. Danger of an irrationalistic change. ---
I 51
Thus the certainty of the axioms is no longer assured. Leibniz, however, insists on proving them from the "evidence of identity" (with themselves).

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Realism Kant
 
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Strawson V 230
Realism/KantVsLeibniz assumes truths about independent objects. - Kant: we may only speak of terms instead. - - -
Stroud I 134
Realism/Kant: a) metaphysical realism: that things exist independently of us in the room - b) epistemic realism: contains something about our approach to things. - Thesis: Perception: is directly and unproblematic - hence knowledge of external things (the outside world) is possible. -
Scandal/Kant: that the realism was never proved before.
- - -
I 135
Moores hands/Kant/Stroud: Kant cannot complain that Moore would assume things only by belief itself. - - -
I 136
It is not about lack of generality- ((s) The proof is quite general (s.o. chapter 3)!. - - -
Stroud I 162
Definition Transcendental Realism/Kant: understands the external things as something separate from the senses - KantVs: that leads to the empiricist idealism. - Problem: we are aware of our representations but do not know whether they corresponds with something that exists.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Reality Leibniz
 
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Holz I 61
Reality/Leibniz: what is possible to think of is reasonable and could be, purely logical, possible as well. ---
Holz I 125
Perfection/existence/Leibniz: e.g. suppose A, B, C, D are equal, but D is incompatible with A and B, the others are all compatible with each other except D, then it follows that A, B, and C exist if D is excluded. This is the principle of composibility.
Reality/Leibniz: reality always has the highest degree of factual content (realization): "perfectio".
Best world/best of all possible worlds/Leibniz: that is the meaning of the thesis that we live in the best of the worlds: it is simply the realization of most possibilities, which results from the fact that all possibilities are realized which do not mutually prevent each other.
To this extent, this world is by no means accidently the same as it is.
Translating this into theology, it means that God has created the world neccessarily according to his own rationality because it is the optimization of the processes caused by this rationality.
VoltaireVsLeibniz: "Candide". Vs "Best of the Worlds". Ironization of Leibnizian Theory.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Science Kant
 
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Vollmer I 234
Science / proof / Physics / Kant/ early/ precritical: Newton s theory can not be logically proved - that had KantVsLeibniz and KantVsWolff realized - but it can not be empirically verified - that Kant had learned from Hume.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

Vo II
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd II Stuttgart 1988
Space Kant
 
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I 85
Space/relativism/rationalism/Leibniz: (according to Kant): only capability exists of the mutual relationship of the things in it. - KantVsLeibniz: counter-example: incongruity of left and right hands or mirror image - an inversion does not restore the identity here. ((S) It would have to, if only the relations played a role.) - ((S) chirality/VsRelationismus). ---
Strawson V 28
Space/Time/Kant: totality seems to impose a disjunction on us: either limited, there is one last element, or unlimited. - Since the antinomies are not empirically decidable, it thus confirms that space and time only exist as phenomena, and not as things in themselves. StrawsonVsKant: it is not clear if there is no empirical solution. ---
Stra V 48
Space/Time/Kant: not produced by things, but by the subjects - space and time are states of consciousness - state of consciousness: not of high importance, merely effects of things, not their states. ---
V 49
Space does not arise from experience, but experience presupposes space.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Substitution Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
VII 29
Substitutability/substitution/QuineVsLeibniz: the strength of this requirement varies with the richness of the language -we need both single- and multi-digit predicates, truth functions (not, and, or, etc.), classes, classes of classes, descriptions, singular term - this language is then extensional: any two predicates that match extensionally (are true for the same object) are substitutable salva veritate - but that does not secure cognitive synonymy. ---
VII 56
Substitutability/Quine: question salvo quo? Something is always changed. ---
IX 9
Replace/substitution/Quine: if in a statement that has been substituted for "Fx" free variables other than "x" occurr, then they may not be such that fall under the scope of quantifiers that occur in the scheme in which the substitution was made.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Thing in itself Kant
 
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I 17
In itself Kant: question: what is in itself, namely beyond me or without me, but that I behold myself as in itself? - So: what on me is in itself? - - -
Strawson V 33/34
Thing in itself/Kant/StrawsonVsKant: that things in themselves should not be in space and time, is making the whole doctrine incomprehensible. - - -
Stra V 95
Thing in itself/Kant: must not meet the conditions of subjectivity itself - it has to meet only the appearance . Then the knowledge of things could be owed to more than a pre-stabilized harmony. - (KantVsLeibniz) ---
Sra V 168
Thing in itself/idealism/Kant: if we assume that things exist independently of our perceptions, then they must also exist independently of us (> Realism). - But Kant does not accept this! - Kant: they exist only through our minds and sensuality. - - -
Adorno XIII 40
Ding an sich/VsKant/Adorno: man hat gegen Kant eingewandt, dass wenn die Dinge an sich und damit die Ursachen der Erscheinungen gänzlich unbekannt sind, woher wir dann überhaupt von ihnen reden und von ihnen wissen können.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Ultimate Justification Leibniz
 
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Holz I 50
Definition evidence/certainty/a priori/Leibniz: the certainty (the necessity of identical propositions A = B) is based neither on empiricism nor on deduction, but on an a priori insight. ---
Holz I 50
Rationalism/HolzVsLeibniz: Problem for a philosophy that understands itself "scientifically": this "immediate insight" of so-called final foundations leads to another epistemological level. Danger of irrationalistic change. ---
I 51
Thus the certainty of the axioms is no longer assured. Leibniz, however, insists on proofing them from the "evidence of identity" (with itself). ---
Holz I 51
Final justification/proof/axioms/evidence/Leibniz/Holz: here the validity of the identity theorem (A = B or A = A) is taken as an empirical value. It is not a matter of the fact that the predicates are inherent in the subject. This assumption can no longer be deduced in itself. Evidence is not a logical category.
Thus, the validity of the identity theorem must not be justified purely logically. It has a pre-predicative origin.
Logic/Husserl: logic has strongly rejected the abstinence of logic from its cognitive content.
---
I 52
Final justification/proof/axiom/evidence/Leibniz/Holz: Finally, we need a different type of proposition than the open or virtually identical. ---
Holz I 75
Reason/Leibniz: reason can only be found by traversing the whole series rerum. It is not, however, to be found outside the series rerum, but completely within, but not at the beginning, but as the series as a whole! Difference: while the infinite mind must stand outside the whole (as an imitator) (perhaps also an "unmoved mover", etc.), the reason (as totality of the series) must be within the series.
Reason/Leibniz: the universal ultimate reason (the totality of the series of things, the world, ultima ratio) is also necessary for the finite mind because otherwise there would be nothing at all
---
Holz I 83
Final Justification/LeibnizVsKant: the final justification does not take part in the subject-philosophical radicalism. Like Spinoza before him and Hegel after him, he had wanted to find from the, since Descartes' indispensable subject reflexion, a non-subjective reason of being, expressed in the truths of reason. Two principles are sufficient:
1. Principle of contradiction
2. The principle of sufficient reason. (Can be traced back to the principle of contradiction).
Moreover, since the principle of identity is viewed from sensory perception, we can attribute to the principles of the things themselves (that is, their ontic reality) the reason (their logic) presupposed in our thinking.
This is just as illogical as the system by Hegel.
---
I 84
In the universe and its parts, logic is thus suppressed and embodied. Metaphysics/Logic/Leibniz: therefore, all relations between realities, phenomenal and metaphysical ones, can be expressed in logical form.
Final justification/LeibnizVsKant: the world does not appear logical because the subject conceives it in the logic form of its thinking, but the logic form of thinking is compelling because the world is shown as a logically constituted.
Leibniz: the world does not show itself to the subject as a world but as an additive series, as an aggregate.
---
Holz I 123
Final justification/existence/Leibniz: to justify why there is anything at all means, therefore, to indicate in the essence of possibilities the principle which counteracts the minimization of the tendencies of realization. Now it turns out that the two principles:
1. Identity principle (Everything is identical with itself)
2. Variety principle ("various things are perceived by me) are logical, but not ontological sufficient, to justify the existence of the world at all.
One can in this way deduce from the individual something different and a certain connection, and therefore explain why there is something definite (and not something else in its place).
---
I 124
But it remains unfounded why there is anything at all. The missing ontological intermediate member is found by Leibniz in a third axiom, which he counts to the absolute first truths:
Thesis: Everything possible strives for existence and therefore exists, if not something else, which also strives for existence and prevents it from being incompatible with the first.
According to Leibniz, this is provable under the assumption of the truth of fact that we perceive something at all.
In addition, we make the experience of change that something begins to exist that was not there before. (But was previously possible).
A priori, however, no reason can be given for why something is strives more than another, so the reason must therefore be sought in the system of co-ordination (of mutual inhibitions).
From this, it follows that there always exists the connection of the things in which there exists the most.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992

The author or concept searched is found in the following 36 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Descartes, R. Locke Vs Descartes, R.
 
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I 27
angeborene Ideen/LockeVsScholastics/LockeVsDescartes: es gibt keine angeborenen Ideen! Weder im spekulativen noch im praktischen (moralischen, theologischen) Denken, auch nicht in Form von "Maximen", also unmittelbar einleuchtenden Prinzipien. 1. spekulative Prinzipien: wären sie angeboren, müssten sie bei noch nicht durch Vorurteile verbildeten Menschen nachweisbar sein, als z.B. bei Kindern oder Geistesschwachen, und das sind sie nicht!
2. wären Wahrheiten in Form von Sätzen angeboren , so müssten dies auch die dazugehörenden Begriffe sein, sogar die Folgerungen aus diesen Sätzen! Derartige Annahmen dehnten den Bereich angeborener Begriffe und Sätze aber ins Unübersehbare aus.
3. Maximen: die spontane Zustimmung zu ihnen bedeutet, dass sie zuvor nicht gewusst wurden! Angeborenes müsse aber immer präsent sein.
ChomskyVsLocke/(s): würde einwenden, dass Grammatikregeln auch erst ins Bewusstsein treten. Da geht es um die Leichtigkeit des Lernens).
angeborene Ideen/Locke: die Annahme, Denken beginne mit der Anwendung angeborener Denkgesetze oder erster Prinzipien, die mehr seien als bloß instrumentales Denkvermögen, ist eine Täuschung.
I 45
Körper/Ausdehnung/res extensa/LockeVsDescartes: Ausdehnung und Körper sind daher nicht identisch! Es ist auch gar nicht ausgemacht, dass sie der Geist vom Körper unterscheiden lassen muss. (Riskierte den gefährlichen Vorwurf des Materialismus). Die Idee der Ausdehnung und die Idee des Körpers sind verschieden.
Ausdehnung: schließt weder Festigkeit noch Widerstand gegen Bewegung (Trägheit) ein.
Raum: kann nicht geteilt werden, weil sonst Oberflächen entstünden!
VsCartesians: diese müssen zugeben, dass sie in Anbetracht der Unendlichkeit des Raums entweder Körper als unendlich denken, oder aber zugeben müssten, dass Raum nicht mit Körper identifiziert werden kann.
I 52
res cogitans/LockeVsDescartes: Descartes: Welt der Körper und des Denkens strikt zu trennen.
Locke: gibt zu bedenken, ob es nicht ausgedehnte Dinge, also Körper geben könnte, die denken, etwas fließende Materiepartikel. Jedenfalls ist nicht auszuschließen, dass Gott in seiner Allmacht "Materiesystemen" die
I 53
Kraft der Wahrnehmung und des Denkens gegeben oder "übergestülpt" habe. Dadurch fühlten sich zeitgenössische Theologien, besonders sein Kontrahend Stillingfleet provoziert.
LockeVsDescartes: führt auch zu Problemen mit der menschlichen Identität (s.u.).
I 54
Identität/LockeVsDescartes: Problem: das Verhältnis von Substanz und Person, wenn die Denkfähigkeit allein einer immateriellen Substanz zugeschrieben wird. Bsp so wäre es denkbar, dass jemand die Überzeugung vertreten könnte, er sei dieselbe Person wie Nestor. Wenn man nun die Richtigkeit der Cartesianischen These voraussetzt,
I 55
so sei es denkbar, dass ein zeitgenössischer Mensch tatsächlich die Person Nestor sei. So sei er deshalb aber doch nicht der Mensch Nestor, eben weil die Idee des Menschen nicht von seiner körperlichen Gestalt ablösbar sei.
Das ist für uns heute abstrus. (> Geach).
Locke relativiert die These damit, dass es für das Bewusstsein auf die Beschaffenheit der Substanz gar nicht ankomme, weshalb er diese Frage offen lassen wolle - er vermittelt dabei den Eindruck, dass er der materialistischen Sichtweise zugeneigt ist.
- - -
II 189
Klarheit/LockeVsDesacrtes: kein Wahrheitskriterium, sondern weiterer Sinn: auch im Bereich bloß wahrscheinlichen Wissens.
II 190
Deutlichkeit/LockeVsLeibniz/LockeVsDescartes: bei ihm an Benennbarkeit gebunden. Setzt die Möglichkeit eindeutiger Bezeichnung voraus. (>Sprache).
II 195
Erkenntnis/Locke: intuitive und demonstrative Erkenntnis bilden nach Locke eine vollständige Disjunktion der möglichen sicheren Erkenntnis. VsDescartes: diese besteht nicht in einem Erkennen vorgegebener begrifflicher Gehalte, das sich in deren Anschauung vollzieht, sondern konstituiert sich erst auf der empirischen Grundlage einfacher Ideen in der Verstandestätigkeit.

Loc II
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Kant, I. Leibniz Vs Kant, I.
 
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Frege III 31
Numbers/LeibnizVsKant: Has claimed the provability of the numerical formulas. "There is no immediate truth that 2 and 2 are 4. Assuming that 4 indicates 3 ​​and 1, one can prove it, in a way:
  Definitions:
1st 1 and 1 are 2,
2nd 2 and 1 are 3
3rd 3 and 1 are 4
  Axiom: If a similar number is inserted, the equation remains.
  Proof: 2 + 2 = 2 + 1 + 1 = 3 + 1 = 4
  So by axiom: 2 + 2 = 4
- - -

Leibniz I 83
Ultimate Justification/LeibnizVsKant: Does not take part in the radical philosophy of subject. Like Spinoza prior to him and Hegel after him, he wanted to find a not subjective reason of being which can be expressed in truths of reason [vérités de raison] since Descartes' indispensable reflection on the subject. For this, two principles are sufficient.
1. Principle of contradiction
2. Principle of sufficient reason (can be traced back to the principle of contradiction).
Additionally,since the principle of identity is perceived through the sensory perception, we can ascribe reason -which is presupposed in our thought (the logicality of reason)- to the principles of the objects themselves (so their ontic reality).
as panlogically as Hegel's system.
I 84
In the universe and its parts, logic is existing and embodied like this. Metaphysics/Logic/Leibniz: This is why all relationships between realities - phenomenal as well as metaphysical ones- can be expressed in a logical form.
Ultimate Justification/LeibnizVsKant: The world does not seem logical because the subject understands it in the logical form of his/her thought; rather, the logical form of thought is imperative because the world shows itself as being logically created.
Leibniz: The world, however, does not show itself as world but as an additive series, i.e. an aggregate.
I 128
Phenomenon/LeibnizVsKant: Kant's idea that it is separated from the being is not to be applied! Rather, the "mundus intelligibilis" forms the basis for the "mundus sensibilis". The latter is also not a duplication but a "translation".
The phenomenal is the substantial itself but with the conditions of the imagination, for which spaciality and temporality are essential.
In-itself [Ansich]/Appearance/Leibniz/Josef König: For Leibniz, its relation is dialectical. It corresponds in turn exactly to the schema of the "Übergreifendes Allgemeines":
The in-itself [Ansich] is a category of itself (!), of the in-itself and its opposite, of the appearance. ((s) > „Das übergreifende Allgemeine“, >Paradoxies)
I 129
The fact that the appearance is always the appearance of a in-itself (which is the sense of the word) is not meant by it. KantVsLeibniz: Because the appearance could then still differ from the object, for which it is its appearance, and as such knowledge of the object would not be possible. (This is Kant's view of the relationship.)
LeibnizVsKant: Insists that the appearance is the same as the in-itself which shows itself in the appearance.
The world does so in the perception. As such, the world reproduces itself in two ways.
1. as a whole but each time under another perspective
2. the world appears spatially as the disunion of different substances,
3. the world appears temporally as succession of different perceptions.
The system of perceptions is "well-founded" ["wohl begründet"] because it actually is the self-restricting activity of the initial force of the in-itself.
The difference between the in-itself and appearance is the difference of the in-itself itself! This is the totality and the principle of its difference.
I 130
This is why the appearance is not unreal in comparison to the in-itself, but a sort of identical form, and as such quite real. Phenomenology/Leibniz: The way in which what needs to be expressed is comprised in the expressed. Everything that is expressed is a phenomenon.It is well-founded because the in-itself, by expressing itself, is the phenomenon. The in-itself is also identical to the phenomenon, and
constitutes the latter implicitly [Ansichseiendes].
The phenomenon is not reality's opposite (Vs Kant), but actually its specific being which is currently creating its universal representation.
This is why all perceptions in each substance need to correspond to each other.
- - -
I 133
Motion/Leibniz: Something takes the place of something else.
I 134
The "space" [Raum] is everything that encompasses all these places. For this, there is also no need to accept an "absolute reality" of the space. Space/Time/LeibnizVsKant: The epitome of possible relationships, not as forms of intuition, but as real ontological structures of the materially implicit relationships.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993
Kant, I. Quine Vs Kant, I.
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
Danto2 I 132
QuineVsKant, QuineVsAnalyticity: Kant’s conception of contradiction is quite unclear. It presupposes the notion of analyticity, instead of making it clear.   Quine: Def contradiction "P and not-P." But: "Bachelors are no unmarried, adult men" is not formally contradictory! This was not recognized by Kant.
- - -
Quine IV 407
Analyticity/QuineVsKant: talk of "containment" is a) metaphorical in terms of concepts. It is
b) too narrow, because it is tailored to subject-predicate sentences. It is not readily applicable to relations: E.g. "If Hans is the father of Peter, then Peter is not the father of Hans."
c) the indication that a proposition is analytic if its negation is contradictory does not help, since "contradictory" is just as much in need of explanation here.
Analytical/Kant/Quine: Kant does not even mention the meaning of concepts in this context!
- - -
Quine VII 20
Analyticity/Kant/Quine: derived from Hume's distinction between Relations of ideas and
Relations of facts.
Leibniz: distinguishing
Truths of fact and
Rational truths. (Of which we hear that their negation is supposed to be self-contradictory!)
VII 20/21
QuineVsKant: two shortcomings: 1) It is limited to statements of the subject-predicate form
2) It appeals to a concept of limitation, which moves on a metaphorical level.
Analytic/Quine: but can be reformulated as a true by virtue of the meanings and regardless of the facts.
- - -
Quine XI 72
Analytic/QuineVsLeibniz/Lauener: the concept of the possible world is itself in need of explanation. QuineVsKant: the self-contradiction we involve ourselves in, according to Kant, when denying analytic sentences is itself in need of explanation.
Stroud I 210
Experience/Empirical/Sensation/Sensory/Reality/World/Kant/Stroud: this is what it looked like for Kant: a completely general distinction between what we experience through the senses and truths about the world would exclude us forever from knowledge.
I 211
Stroud: perhaps these fatal consequences only exist within the traditional philosophical conception of the function of the epistemes. (>QuineVsTraditional Epistemology, QuineVsKant: no a priori knowledge). Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: would then only apply to the distant position (outside the frame of reference)! But then we could avoid skepticism and maintain the general distinction between the empirically given ((SellarsVs!) and what is true or false about the outside world.
All we would have to avoid, would be a "distant position" (outside the frame of reference).
Stroud I 214
Naturalized Epistemology/KantVsQuine/Stroud: Kant distinguishes philosophy from everything else (>"prima philosophia"). QuineVsKant: there is no a priori knowledge here.
Skepticism/Kant/Quine/Stroud: both accept the "Keptian Conditional" or the "conditional correctness" of skepticism. If the skeptic was able to ask a meaningful question, the skeptical conclusion (that we know nothing) would be correct.
I 215
Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: it is not clear whether Quine actually answers the skeptical question at all. Knowledge/Quine: asks how we obtain a theory of the world. This looks like a very general problem.
Input/Quine: is "lean": E.g. reflections of light, bright/dark contrasts, temperature variations, etc.
Output/Quine: in contrast, is extremely rich. This brings us to under-determination empiricism. We get an extremely sophisticated three-dimensional image and a history of the world only through the mediation of the surfaces of the objects and our nerve endings.
Reality/World/Knowledge/Quine: the relation between input and output itself is the subject of an investigation, it is itself a natural phenomenon.
- - -
Stroud I 248
Knowledge/Skepticism/Kant/Stroud: a completely general distinction between a) everything we learn through the senses on one side, and
b) what is true or false about the world on the other side
would forever exclude us from knowledge. (see above).
StroudVsQuine: that is fatal for the project of naturalized epistemology. Because it excludes us from our own knowledge of the world and leaves us no independent reason to accept that any of our projections are true.
I 249
QuineVsKant/QuineVsStroud: precisely this separation (differentiation) is a liberation of science. It shows us that all the information about external things I can get through the senses is limited to two-dimensional optical projections. Stroud: if this is really what "Science tells us" (NNK, 68), then how can the separation (differentiation) have the consequences that I draw from this? Would I not simply contradict scientific facts?
StroudVsQuine: No: nothing I say implies that I cannot observe any person in interaction with their environment and isolate some events on its sensory surfaces from everything else.
Important argument: we know - and he probably also knows - a lot of things that happen in the world beyond those events. He himself will also know little about the events that take place on his sensory surfaces.
Important argument: these events (which do not directly impact his senses) should be considered as part of what causes his belief ((s) and possibly generates knowledge).
Surely, without any sensory experience we would come to no belief about the world at all.


Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Leibniz, G.W. Berkeley Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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Ber I 228
BerkeleyVs Infinitesimalrechnung/BerkeleyVsLeibniz: Konsequenz seiner Leugnung der Teilbarkeit über das sinnlich Wahrnehmbare hinaus. Berkeley mußte aber zugegen, daß die Mathematik zu brauchbaren Ergebnissen führte. Lösung/Berkeley: die Mathematiker begehen dabei nicht nur einen Fehler, sondern zwei, die sich zufällig aufheben.
Der Gedanke der Fehlerkompensation wurde später von Lagrange aufgegriffen.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997
Leibniz, G.W. Field Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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I 39
Metaphysical Possibility/Essentialism/Modality/Leibniz/Field: Leibniz’s modal argument VsSubstantivalism: (see above: "empty space real", not merely a logical construction): E.g. question: it is useful to assume the possibility of a world that is just like our actual world, just shifted one mile throughout its entire history? (LeibnizVsAbsolute Space: No!). Every possible world that is qualitatively identical with our world would simply be the real world. LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: it must deny this: it must regard two such possible worlds as genuinely separate. And that seems absurd. FieldVsLeibniz: that seems convincing at first glance. But (Horwich, 1978) is it not quite as strong an argument against the existence of electrons? E.g.
(DS) There is a possible world, different from our actual world but qualitatively identical with it, merely shifted one mile in its entire history.
(DE) There is a possible world, different from our actual world but qualitatively identical with it, it only differs from it in that electron A and electron B were reversed during its entire history.
I 40
FieldVsLeibniz: that seems to be a difference! ((s) Vs: (> Feynman): the electrons must differ at least in the pulse (or one other parameter)). If they share all properties, it’s pointless. Field: But if the reality of spacetime regions implies (DS), does the reality of electrons not imply (DE) then? The "Leibniz argument against electrons" does not seem to be good! But why? Because the existence of electrons does not imply (DE) (Field pro), or because (DE) is ultimately not such a bad conclusion? (DE): can also be formulated without mention of possible worlds: it could have been possible in the actual world, that A and B had been reversed. (Similarly for (DS)). Leibniz Principle/Field: we accept that as a convention.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Leibniz, G.W. Fraassen Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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I 209
FraassenVsLeibniz: we have learned to acknowledge the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" as illegitimate. But we still consider to be legitimate to ask I 210 "Why is the world like this and not different?" But both of these questions may not be answered with "by chance", or "because that is the way it is".

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Leibniz, G.W. Frege Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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III 31
Numbers / LeibnizVsKant: because the provability of the numerical formulas has claimed. "There is no immediate truth that 2 and 2 are 4 Assuming that 4 indicates 3 ​​and 1 one can prove it, in a way.:
  Definitions:
1st 1 and 1 are 2
2nd 2 and 1 are 3
3rd 3 and 1 are 4
Axiom: If one inserts the same, the equation remains true.
III 44
  Proof: 2 + 2 = 2 + 1 + 1 = 3 + 1 = 4   So by Axiom: 2 + 2 = 4
FregeVsLeibniz: here is a gap that is covered by omitting parentheses. It should be called more precisely: each (1 + 1), (2 + 1), etc.
  Then we see that the set 2 + (1 + 1) = (2 + 1) + 1 is missing.
(see LeibnizVsKant, FregeVsKant)
FregeVsLeibniz: this tends falsely to regard all truths as provable.

- - -
Leibniz I 38f
Definition/Leibniz: always in the form of the identical sentence A = B, the predicate is identical to the subject. (FregeVsLeibniz) Substitutability/Leibniz: "Making obvious through the consequences".
Contrast: Prove by reason.
  I 46
  "Chain of definitions": reduction of complex concepts to simple ones.
  I 48
  "Chain of evidence": problem: where is the beginning?

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993
Leibniz, G.W. Heidegger Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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II 87
VsLeibniz: legitimizes metaphysics as subjectivity.

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Berlin 2006
Leibniz, G.W. Kant Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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Descartes I 139
Descartes/Holz: Hegel pro: Move back of thinking from the world to God himself. God is ambiguous according to him. Spinoza: continues radically Descartes but drops the substance of the manifold. Leibniz: comes back to pluralism (dialectic unity/plurality) - KantVsLeibniz: Only "logic of illusion": (per Descartes, but mediated by Hume’s skepticism) Hegel: ties back to Leibniz’s dialectic.
- - -
Descartes I 142
KantVsLeibniz: This is only a "logic of illusion".
Kant I 34
Critique of Pure Reason: VsLeibniz, VsWolff: Against "school philosophy". Starting point: Freedom notion of academic philosophy: contradiction: freedom (as soul and God) ought to be unthinkable, although they were made ​​the subject of metaphysical teachings.
I 85
Room/Leibniz: (according to Kant): Is only by virtue of the mutual relationship of the things in it. KantVsLeibniz: counterexample: Mismatch between left and right hands or mirror image. An inversion will not restore the identity. - - -
Strawson V 227
Body/idealism/realism/Kant: we do not have an external scale or an external system, in which concepts, we can give an esoteric (obvious for the initiated) meaning of the question if such objects really exist.
V 228
KantVsLeibniz: Vs pre-established harmony: we have no knowledge of the "real causes" of our perceptions. But we need it in order to decide whether those objects, which create our perceptions, really exist.
V 228
Terms/sense principle/Kant: Only when concepts are applied to objects of possible experience they really hold a meaning.
V 229
Due to the transcendental idealism we are now, however, obligated to create the objects,which exist in themselves, independently in the design of objects in general obligation objects as they exist in themselves, independently of our perception. But:
V 230
KantVsMetaphysics/KantVsLeibniz: these alleged truths about objects independent of time and space. ("intelligible" objects). Kant: that is only consistent with the assumption that one speaks not of objects themselves, but of concepts. - - -
I 234
Justification/Vollmer: is not even necessary. What should make us look for a justification? Kant/early/precritical: Newton’s theory cannot be proven logically. The KantVsLeibniz and KantVsWolff had realized this. But Newton’s theory can also not be empirically verified. This, Kant had learned from Hume. This is then in contradiction to the assumed "absolute truth" and "logical provability" of Newtonian theory.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Leibniz, G.W. Locke Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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II 190
Deutlichkeit/LockeVsLeibniz/LockeVsDescartes: bei ihm an Benennbarkeit gebunden. Setzt die Möglichkeit eindeutiger Bezeichnung voraus.

Loc II
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Leibniz, G.W. Quine Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
I 209
Identity/QuineVsLeibniz: confusion of characters and object: When Leibniz explains the relationship betw characters instead of as a relationship btw the named object and itself "Eadem sunt quorum potest substitui alteri, sava veritate".

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Leibniz, G.W. Russell Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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Bertrand Russell
Chisholm II 183/184
RussellVsLeibniz: his metaphysics has the same consistency as fairy tales: these also claim to be true. ---
Russell VI 72
Syllogism/Mode Darapti/Russell: E.g. All chimeras are animals
All chimeras breathe flames,
So some animals breathe flames.
---
VI 73
Mode Darapti: All A is B
All B is C
So some B are C.
RussellVsLeibniz: he could not eliminate this fallacy out of respect for Aristotle, although he has seen it.

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Leibniz, G.W. Strawson Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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Hacking I 162
Monads / StrawsonVsLeibniz: the idea of a complete description is at all useless! ---
VII 116
StrawsonVsLeibniz/StrawsonVsRussell: both assume that the conventions that apply to existence, must also apply to statements of facts.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Leibniz, G.W. Verschiedene Vs Leibniz, G.W. Metz II 70
Bieri: you could say VsLeibniz:   1. what is happening in the "factory" gets a cognitive content in that it is lawlike linked to events outside, it represents by virtue of this link
  2. the fact that the events in question give the whole person an adequate behavior in a certain situation.
  But our problem is not meaning, not cognitive content, but content of experience.
- - -

Leibniz I 125
Vollkommenheit/Existenz/Leibniz: Bsp Angenommen, A,B,C,D seien gleichrangig, aber D mit A und B unverträglich, die anderen aber alle untereinander verträglich außer mit D, dann folgt, dass A,B und C unter Ausschluss von D existieren. Das ist das Prinzip der Kompossibilität.
Realität/Leibniz: jeweils das höchste Maß an Sachgehalt (Verwirklichung): "perfectio".
Beste Welt/beste aller möglichen Welten/MöWe/Leibniz: das ist der Sinn der These, dass wir in der besten der Welten leben: es ist einfach die Verwirklichung der meisten Möglichkeiten, was daraus folgt, dass alle Möglichkeiten verwirklicht werden, die sich nicht gerade gegenseitig hindern.
Insofern ist diese Welt auch nicht zufällig so beschaffen, wie sie ist.
In die Theologie übersetzt heißt das, Gott habe die Welt nach seiner eigenen Rationalität notwendig erschaffen, weil sie die Optimierung der durch diese Rationalität bedingten Prozesse ist.
VoltaireVsLeibniz: "Candide". Vs "Beste der Welten".

- - -
Kripke I 9
Leibniz Prinzip der Ununterscheidbarkeit des Identischen/Kripke: kam mir schon immer evident vor. VsLeibniz: Wenn einige Philosophen es bezweifelten, stellte sich stets heraus, dass Bereiche verwechselt wurden, die Kontexte keine echten Eigenschaften ausdrücken, oder das Zusammenfallen von Individuen betreffen, mit der Identität zwischen Individuen verwechselt wurde.




Leibniz, G.W. Poundstone Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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I 343/344
Leibniz: E.g. enlargement of the brain to walk-in dimensions, or machine with gears and pistons, etc. PoundstoneVsLeibniz: the example is not mandatory. Modern versions: Office building full of employees talking on the phone, different states which correspond to feelings of motivation and disinclination would be impossible to determine.
W. Poundstone
I W. Poundstone Im Labyrinth des Denkens, Reinbek 1995
Leibniz, G.W. Hintikka Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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I 40/41
Non-existent Objects/Possible Objects/Unrealized Possibilities/Hintikka: But are not some of these non-existent objects in our own actual world? Hintikka: Thesis: Yes, some of these merely possible objects are in the real world. Bona Fide Object/Hintikka: can exist in one Possible World and be absent in another. World Line/Hintikka: when it comes to which ones can be drawn, existence is not the most important problem. Rather well-definedness. HintikkaVsLeibniz: we also allow that an object exists in several possible worlds. Question: if residents of two different possible worlds may then be identical, when are they?
I 74
VsPossible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: problem: it seems to absolutize possible worlds and complete sets of possibilia ((s) takes them for granted). Possible Worlds/Leibniz: Thesis, there is a fixed set of possible worlds, under which God makes a selection. HintikkaVsLeibniz: this is extremely doubtful.
I 80
Possible Worlds/Universe/Cross World Identity/HintikkaVsLeibniz/Hintikka: Problem: if possible worlds are entire universes, the frame between them changes too strongly so that it is questionable how individuals should be re-identified.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Leibniz, G.W. Berka Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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Berka I 7
Leibniz/Logik/Berka: drei Forderungen: 1. characteristica universalis: Zeichnsystem, dessen Grundzeichen Charaktere von Grundbegriffen sind und deren Kombination die Charaktere aller anderen Begriffe ergeben soll.
2. calculus ratiocinator: Kalkül, der eine rein rechnerische Behandlung aller in den Zeichen der characteristica universalis ausgedrückten Aussagen gestattet
3. ars iudicandi: ein Entscheidungsverfahren, um von den Aussagen festzustellen, ob sie wahr oder falsch sind. Dem entspricht heute:
"Leibniz Programm"/Moderne:
1. Aufstellung eines Systems von Definitionsregeln
2. Logikkalkül
3 Entscheidungsverfahren
VsLeibniz: das Programm ist nicht realisierbar, d.h. nicht in Anwendung auf eine Gesamtheit, ein als Totalität verstandenes Gebiet, sondern nur auf Teilgebiete. ((s) Sonst Zirkel, Paradoxien).
I 84
FregeVsLeibniz: sein Projekt des calculus philosophicus (ratiocinator) war zu riesenhaft. Er unterschätzte die Probleme. Lösung: sein Projekt läßt sich für einzelne Gebiete verwirklichen: z.B. Geometrie, Chemie, Arithmetik.
Begriffsschrift: soll dann die Lücken füllen.

Brk I
K. Berka/L. Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Leibniz, G.W. Hegel Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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Descartes I 47
Leibniz: Modell des Organismus als Mechanismus. HegelVsLeibniz: organische Modelle > romantische Naturphilosophie. Vorgeschichte: Descartes: die Bewegung emanzipiert sich, der Raum geometrisiert sich. es folgt die Ablösung des Raumbegriffs von den im Raum sich zueinander verhaltenden Körpern.
Newton: "absoluter Raum" als Voraussetzung der klassisch physikalischen Theorie.
Leibniz, G.W. Chisholm Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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III 86
Incompatibilities/Solution/Leibniz/Chisholm: E.g. "being red excludes being blue" ChisholmVsLeibniz: that leads to problems of a different nature than the ones above: some philosophers have tried to make it look analytical, but they failed.
Paranormal/Solution/Leibniz/Chisholm: "Paranormal element in knowledge": certain ethical sentences. Leibniz: "... because the senses could not bring to the knowledge what is supposed to be or could not be otherwise."
This would then have to be synthetic a priori:

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Leibniz, G.W. Simons Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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Chisholm II 186
SimonsVsLeibniz: we do not have a trace of evidence for his Monads. - - -
Simons I 319
Substance/Simons: we still do not know what substances are. Descartes' large rationalist successors differed in this as far as possible: Substance/Spinoza: there is only one substance that includes everything.
Substance/Leibniz: there are infinitely many substances, each is perfectly atomistic (monads).
Solution/Simons: actually the two already distinguished in the concept of dependence:
Dependence/Spinoza: strong rigid dependence (notation here: "7").
Dependence/Leibniz: weak rigid dependence: ("7").
This has severe consequences:
Monads/evidence/Leibniz: (Monadology §2): there must be simple substances because there is composite (masses). A mass is nothing more than an aggregate of simplicity.
Simons: problem: is the mass then an individual with the monads as parts or a class with the monads as elements?
If they are considered a class the monads are essential elements. Fortunately, we do not need to decide it because Leibniz accepted mereological essentialism for individuals:
Whole/Leibniz: cease to exist if a part is lost.
Weak rigid dependence/Simons: everything depends on its essential parts. Together with the essentialism of Leibniz this means that every thing depends on all real parts.
Part/Leibniz/terminology/Simons: with him always means "real part".
Foundedness/ontology/Leibniz/Simons: the second assumption is that everything that is dependent from everything else, depends on something that is itself independently.
That means that the chain of dependencies x 7 y 7 z ... has a last (first?) member.
Monad/Leibniz/Simons: with that we can reconstruct Leibniz's argument like this
(1) there are composites (that means objects with real parts)
(2) every part is essential
(3) therefore each composite depends on its parts
(4) if every object has real parts, then it is the beginning of an unfounded chain of parts.
(5) But each chain of dependencies is founded
(6) Therefore; if something is a composite, it has simple parts
(7) Therefore, there is simple (monads, atoms).
SimonsVsLeibniz: 1. Vs mereological essentialism:
2. VsFoundedness-Principle: why should we believe it?
Atomism: we find it in Leibniz and in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.
Continualism: we find it in Aristotle's theory of prima materia.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Leibniz, G.W. Holz Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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Leibniz I 50
Rationalismus/HolzVsLeibniz: Problem für eine sich "wissenschaftlich" verstehende Philosophie: diese "unmittelbare Einsichtigkeit" sogenannter Letztbegründungen führt auf eine andere epistemologische Ebene. Gefahr des irrationalistischen Umschlags.
I 51
Damit ist die Gewissheit der Axiome nicht mehr abgesichert. Leibniz insistiert aber darauf, sie aus der "Evidenz der Identität" (mit sich selbst) bewiesen werden müssen. - - -
I 95
Welt/Ordnung/Leibniz/HolzVsLeibniz: gerade die Spezifik des Zusammenhangs der Welt bleibt bei Leibniz ungeklärt, da der "unbewegte Beweger" (Aristoteles) außerhalb angesiedelt gedacht werden muss. Leibniz/Holz: entwickelt eine Einheit von Metaphysik und Physik.

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Leibniz, G.W. Meixner Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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I 27
Property/Meixner: according to Quine ("no entity without identity"), it could happen that it is found that there are no good identity conditions for properties and, as a consequence, the expression "property" is incomprehensible. But then we cannot judge that he "applies to nothing"! Identity/Identity Conditions/Meixner: there should be no too far-reaching conclusions drawn from the non-answerability!
After all, every entity in each category is identical with itself and with nothing else.
Identity/Meixner: can be conceived as "maximum similarity"!
Distinctness/Meixner: at least minimal dissimilarity. (Leibniz)
VsLeibniz: even maximum similarity is not conceptually sufficient for identity.
Def "Naked Distinctness"/Black: distinctness without even minimal dissimilarity.
Identity/MeixnerVsVs: The objection VsLeibniz is based on the non-consideration of the fact that the degree of similarity between the similars is not based only on aspects intrinsic to them (Leibniz: assumed that it was based only on intrinsic aspects), but also on extrinsic relational aspects.

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004
Leibniz, G.W. Millikan Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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I 261
VsLeibniz/VsLeibniz' law/principle/identity/indistinguishability/the indistinguishable/Millikan: the classic objection VsLeibniz is to point out the possibility that the universe might be perfectly symmetrical, in which case there would be a perfectly identical ((S) indistinguishable) individual at another place. ((S) That is, there would be something indistinguishable from x, which would still not be identical to x, against Leibniz principle). Variants: Ex a time-repetitive universe etc. Ex two identical drops of water, two identical billiard balls at various locations.
Property/Leibniz: thesis: a reference to space and time leads to a property that is not purely qualitative.
Millikan: if one disregards such "impure" properties ((S) does not make a reference to space and time), the two billiard balls have the same properties!
VsLeibniz' principle/law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: thesis: the principle that is used when constructing such symmetrical worlds, is the principle that an individual can not be distinguished (separated) from themselves, therefore, the two halves of the world can not be one and the same half.
Leibniz' law/VSVS/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of Hacking): The objections do not respond to the fact that there could be a curved space instead of a duplication.
Curved space/Hacking/Millikan: here emerges one and the same thing again, there is no duplication as in Euclidean geometry.
MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question.
I 262
But there are still two interesting options: Leibniz' law/principle/identity/ indistinguishability/Millikan:
1. symmetrical world: it could be argued that there is simply no fact here, which determines whether space is curved or doubled. ((S)> Nonfaktualismus).
Pointe: this would imply that Leibniz's principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention.
2. symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but rather the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very much be a fact, whether the space is curved or not. Because a certain given space can not be both!
Pointe: then the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary.
Pointe: but in this case this is then no matter of convention, but a real fact!
MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsArmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor Armstrong consider that.
Curved space/Millikan: what is identical is then necessarily identical ((S) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if one half would have been different, then the other one, too. Here space generally seems to be double.
Duplication/Millikan: when the space is mirrored (in Euclidean geometry) the identity is random, not necessary. Here one half could change without the other half changing. ((S) No counterfactual conditional).
Identity: is given when the objects are not indistinguishable because a law in situ applies, but a law of nature, a naturally necessary agreement.
I 263
Then identity of causality applies in the second option. (X) (y) {[NN (F) ⇔ Fx Fy] ⇔ x = y}
Natural necessity/notation: naturally necessary under naturally possible circumstances.
MillikanVsVerifikationismus: if my theory is correct, it must be wrong.
Truth/world/relationship/Millikan: thesis: ultimately, meaningfulness and truth lie in relations between thought and the world.
I 264
Therefore, they can not be in the head, we can not internalize them.
I 268
Properties/Millikan: thesis: Properties (of one or more parts) that fall into the same area, are properties that are opposites of each other. Certainly, an area can contain another area. Ex "red" includes "scarlet" instead of excluding it and Ex "being two centimeters plus minus 1 millimeter" includes "being 2.05 centimeters plus minus 1 millimeter" rather than excluding this property.
The assumption that two properties may be the same only if the complete opposite regions from which they come coincide, implies that the identity of a property or property area is linked to the identity of a wider range from which it comes, and therefore is bound to the identity of their opposites. Now we compare Leibniz' view with that of Aristotle:
Identity/Leibniz/Millikan: all single properties are intrinsically comparable. However, perhaps not comparable in nature, because God has just created the best of all possible worlds - but they would be metaphysically comparable.
complex properties/Leibniz/Millikan: that would be properties that are not comparable. They also include absences or negations of properties. They have the general form "A and not B".
((S) Comparison/comparability/comparable/Millikan/(S): composite properties are not comparable Ex "A and not B".)
Of course, it is incompatible with the property "A and B".
Pointe: thus the metaphysical incompatibility rests on the logical incompatibility. That is, on the contradiction.
I 269
Necessity/Leibniz/Millikan: then God has first created logical necessity and later natural necessity. ("In the beginning…"). opposite properties/opposite/property/Leibniz/Millikan: according to Leibniz opposite properties are of two kinds:
1. to attribute both contradictory properties to one thing then would be to contradict oneself ((S) logically) or
2. the contradiction between the properties would lie in their own nature. But that would not lie in their respective nature individually but would be established by God, which prevented the properties from ever coming together.
MillikanVsLeibniz.
Identity/Properties/Aristotle/Millikan: opposite properties: for Aristotle, they serve to explain that nothing can be created from nothing. Def opposite property/Aristotle: are those which defy each others foundation, make each other impossible. The prevention of another property is this property!
Alteration/transformation/change/Aristotle/Millikan: when a change occurs, substances acquire new properties, which are the opposites of the previous properties.
Opposite/Aristotle is the potentiality (possibility) of the other property. Then, these opposites are bound at the most fundamental level (in nature) to each other.
Millikan pro Aristotle: he was right about the latter. In Aristotle there is no "beginning" as in Leibniz.
Properties/Opposite/Leibniz/Millikan pro Leibniz: was right about the assertion that two opposite properties that apply to the same substance is a contradiction. But this is about an indefinite negation, not the assertion of a specific absence. Or: the absence is the existence of an inconsistency.
Ex Zero/0/modern science/mathematics: is not the assertion of nothing: Ex zero acceleration, zero temperature, empty space, etc. Zero represents a quantity.
Non-contradiction/law of non-contradiction/Millikan: then, is a template of an abstract world structure or something that is sufficient for such a template.
Epistemology/epistemic/Leibniz/Aristotle/Millikan: the dispute between Leibniz and Aristotle appears again at the level of epistemology:
I 270
Ex the assertion "x is red" is equivalent to the statement "x looks red for a standard observer under standard conditions". Problem: from "x is red" follows that "x does not look red for ... under ...".
ontologically/ontology: equally: not-being-red would be an emptiness, an absence of red - rather than an opposite of red.
But it is about "x is non-red" being equivalent to "x does not look red under standard conditions" is either empty or incorrect.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987
Leibniz, G.W. Genz Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999
VIII 57
Symmetrie/Gleichgewicht/Genz: eine Balkenwaage kann auch in einer schiefen Position stabil sein! – das Gleichgewicht ist indifferent. LeibnizVs: Bsp Buridans Esel: wenn es keinen zureichenden Grund für eine Abweichung gibt, wird keine auftreten –Leibniz: es gibt kein indifferentes Gleichgewicht >
LeibnizVsSubstantivalismus: es kann keinen unabhängigen Raum geben – sonst könnte das Universum darin verschoben werden (sinnlos) – heute:
VsLeibniz – Lösung: spontane Symmetriebrechung.
Satz vom zureichenden Grund/Leibniz: Bsp Buridans Esel: wenn es keinen zureichenden Grund für eine Abweichung nach rechts oder links gibt, wird keine auftreten.
VIII 59
Leibniz: es gibt niemals ein indifferentes Gleichgewicht. (heute: falsch!,(s.o.) Bsp (Leibniz) wenn zwei miteinander unvereinbare Dinge gleich gut sind, wird Gott keines von beiden erschaffen.
VIII 60
Raum/Leibniz: also kann es keinen selbständigen, von den Dingen unabhängigen Raum geben, weil die Welt sonst in ihm hier und dort angesiedelt sein könnte. Analoges gilt für die Zeit und den Zeitpunkt der Erschaffung der Welt.
spontane Symmetriebrechung: Bsp der Bleistift bleibt eben nicht auf der Spitze stehen, sondern fällt nach einer Seite.

Gz I
H. Genz
Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999

Gz II
Henning Genz
Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002
Leibniz, G.W. Saussure Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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I 21
SaussureVsLeibniz: der Sinn einer Sprachäußerung kann zwar mit Hilfe der Elemente einer Grammatik, nicht aber durch sie allein und ohne Zutun eines Sprechers hervorgebracht werden.
F. de Saussure
I Peter Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 (Junius)
Leibniz, G.W. Schurz Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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Gerhard Schurz
I 129
Representativity/strikter Fall/Mill/Schurz: die A sample soll die A individuals in der Population möglichst gut repräsentieren.
I 130
Falsifizierende Individuen sollen sich von verifizierenden in einer qualitativen Eigenschaft unterscheiden. Wenn wir nun die Begleitumstände möglichst stark variieren, maximieren wir unsere Chance, in der A sample falsifizierende Individuen aufzufinden. (> sufficient reason)
Principle of sufficient reason/Leibniz: hatte das als metaphysische Notwendigkeit betrachtet.
SchurzVsLeibniz: es ist jedoch nur in deterministischen Universen generell gültig. In indeterministischen Universen gibt es auch zufällige Ausnahmen ohne jeden Grund. Das Prinzip ist jedoch heuristisch nützlich.
Representativity/Popper: die representativity requirement gehört zu der von Popper so genannten strengen Überprüfung: man sollte die Ausdehnung bei Wärme nicht nur an Metallen untersuchen.

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Leibniz, G.W. Stegmüller Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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Stegmüller IV 388
Kontingenz/Leibniz: jedes Ding ist kontingent, weshalb es nicht so wäre, wenn ein anderes Ding anders wäre. Alle Dinge sind kausal verbunden. Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit dieser Dinge, weshalb die Welt als Ganzes ebenfalls kontingent ist!
Welt/Leibniz: es mag durchaus sein, dass die Reihe der Ursachen unbegrenzt ist. Leibniz nimmt nicht notwendig einen zeitlichen Anfang an!
zureichender Grund/Leibniz: muss dann außerhalb der Welt liegen! Es muss etwas anderes sein als die Welt!
IV 389
Er muss ein notwendiges Wesen sein. VsLeibniz: 1. Woher wissen wir, dass alles einen zureichenden Grund braucht?
2. Kann es ein notwendiges Wesen geben, das einen zureichenden Grund in sich selbst hat?
Sollte die zweite Frage negativ beantwortet werden, hat die Gesamtheit keinen zureichenden Grund!
KantVsLeibniz: der kosmologische Beweis beruht implizit auf dem (widerlegten) ontologischen Beweis. (s.o. KantVsDescartes).
IV 390
Existenz/StegmüllerVsKant/StegmüllerVsFrege/StegmüllerVsQuine: die Auffassung, der Begriff der Existenz gehe vollständig im Existenzquantor auf, ist umstritten! Existenz/Kontingenz/StegmüllerVsLeibniz: wir könnten notwendige Existenz als Negation von Kontingenz auffassen.
Problem: 1. Die Prämisse, die Welt als ganzes sei kontingent (es würde nicht existieren, wenn etwas anderes anders gewesen wäre), müsste fallengelassen werden: Selbst wenn jeder Teil der Welt kontingent ist, spricht nichts für die Annahme, dass die Welt als ganze nicht existieren würde, wenn nicht (sic?) etwas anderes anders wäre oder gewesen wäre.
Der Schluss von der Kontingenz jeden Teils auf die Kontingenz des Ganzen ist unzulässig.
2. Alternative: Kontingenz: etwas sei kontingent, wenn es auch nicht existieren könnte.
IV 392
Das muss man mit der obigen Bemerkung kombinieren, dass es nicht logisch unmöglich wäre, dass das behauptete notwendige Wesen auch nicht existieren könnte. Das aber ist unverständlich. zureichender Grund/VsLeibniz: (ad (i)): Woher wissen wir, dass alles einen zureichenden Grund haben muss? Bisher hat niemand eine Notwendigkeit a priori dafür zu zeigen vermocht. Das hätte auch keine Plausibilität:
1. Es ist richtig, dass wir immer nach Symmetrien suchen, aber es gibt keine Garantie, dass wir sie immer finden.
2. Wir halten uns immer innerhalb unserer Welt auf, Extrapolationen sind unzulässig!
Selbst wenn nun alles innerhalb der Welt einen zureichenden Grund hätte, hätten wir kein Recht, auf einen zureichend Grund außerhalb der Welt zu schließen.
Verbreitetes Argument: die Dinge müssen durch und durch verstehbar sein.
MackieVs: das stimmt überhaupt nicht!
IV 393
Wir haben keinen Grund anzunehmen, dass sich das Universum nach unseren intellektuellen Bedürfnissen richtet.

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Leibniz, G.W. Thomas Aquinas Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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Stegmüller IV 395
Ursache/Kette/Thomas AquinasVsLeibniz/ThomasVsLeibniz: die Kette der Ursachen kann nicht endlos sein.
Leibniz, G.W. Wessel Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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I 221
Def Identität/Leibniz: Übereinstimmung in allen Eigenschaften (Geht auf Aristoteles zurück). Identität/WesselVsLeibniz: unzweckmäßig, weil es die Suche nach zwei Gegenstände zum Vergleich und Überprüfung der Eigenschaften nahelegt.
In der modernen Mathematik umgeht man das Problem, indem man eine festen Bereich mit genau definierten Prädikaten vorgibt.
Beim Versuch, Leibniz’ Definition auf die Empirie anzuwenden, versuchte man, die Identitätsrelation unmittelbar ontologisch zu begründen, ohne ihren Ursprung in den Eigenschaften der Sprache zu sehen.
Falscher Ansatz: in der relativen zeitlichen Beständigkeit der Gegenstände:
Dilemma: aus a = a ergibt sich nicht viel mehr als "Sokrates ist Sokrates". Problem: man muss dann fordern, dass Sokrates zu allen Zeiten seines Leben die gleichen Eigenschaften gehabt haben muss.
Tatsächlich haben einige Autoren die Verneinung der Möglichkeit von Veränderung daran geknüpft.
I 228
Def Verschiedenheit/Leibniz: "was nicht dasselbe ist oder wobei die Substitution manchmal nicht zutrifft". Identität/Leibniz: Ersetzbarkeit salva veritate.
x = y =def AP(P(x) ↔ P(y)). (s) Alle Eigenschaften des einen sind auch die des anderen und umgekehrt).
WesselVsLeibniz: die entsprechende Bisubjunktion (= ohne def) ist existentiell belastet und deshalb nicht logisch wahr.
Identität/PeirceVsLeibniz: "sein Prinzip ist gänzlich Unsinn. Ohne Zweifel sind alle Dinge voneinander unterschieden, aber dafür gibt es keine logische Notwendigkeit".
Identität/Peirce:
x = y ↔ AP(P(x) u P(y) v ~P(x) u ~P(y)) WesselVsPeirce: das ist ebenfalls existentiell belastet!.
Identität/Ununterscheidbarkeit/Wessel: in der Literatur wird zwischen dem Prinzip der Identität des Ununterscheidbaren.
(x)(y)AP((P(x) ↔ P(y)) > x = y) (e)
und dem Prinzip der Ununterscheidbarkeit des Identischen (auch Substitutionsprinzip):
(x)(y)(x = y > AP(P(x) ↔ P(y))) (n)
unterschieden.
Identität/Vagheit/WesselVsLeibniz: bei Vagheit gilt das Leibnizsche Prinzip der Identität des Ununterscheidbaren nicht, da in der nichttraditionellen Prädikationstheorie die Formeln
P(x) ↔ P(y) und
-i P(x) ↔ -i P(y)
nicht äquivalent sind.
Zusätzliche Forderung (Wessel 1987; 1988):
es müssen auch die gleichen Prädikate abgesprochen werden!
strenge Identität:
x = y =def AP((P(x) ↔ P(y)) u (-i P(x) ↔ -i P(y))). WesselVsWessel: das ist aber nicht aufrechtzuerhalten, weil die entsprechende Bisubjunktion existentiell belastet ist!.
I 229
In der Terminitheorie werden wir die Identität mit Hilfe der Bezeichnungsrelation definieren.

We I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999
Parsons, Ter. Hilbert Vs Parsons, Ter.
 
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I 37
Nichtexistente Objekte/unverwirklichte Möglichkeiten/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: These: es gibt nichtexistente Objekte, und zwar in der wirklichen Welt (WiWe). (>Possibilia). HintikkaVsQuine: die Philosophen, die sie ablehnen, haben zu stark in syntaktischen Bahnen gedacht.
Hintikka. These: man muss die Frage eher semantisch (modelltheoretisch) beantworten.
Fiktion/Ryle: Test: gilt die Paraphrase?
Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryles test schlägt fehlt in Fällen wie Bsp „Mir. Pickwick ist eine Fiktion“.
HintikkaVsParsons: die Relevanz des Kriteriums ist überhaupt fraglich.
I 38
Ontologie/Sprache/sprachlich/HintikkaVsRyle: wie sollten linguistische Fragen wie Paraphrasierbarkeit über ontologischen Status entscheiden? Lösung/Hintikka: für die Frage ob es nichtexistente Objekte gibt: Modelltheorie.
Bsp Puccinis Tosca: her geht es darum, ob die Soldaten Kugeln in ihren Gewehrläufen haben. ((s) sic, von Puccini, nicht von Verdi).
Pointe: selbst wenn sie welche haben, wären es nur fiktive! ((s) innerhalb der Geschichte).
((s) D.h. damit die Geschichte überhaupt erzählt werden kann, muss man annehmen, dass über den entsprechenden Satz mit “wahr” oder “falsch” entschieden werden kann, abhängig davon, ob Kugeln in den Läufen sind. Sonst wäre der Satz unverständlich.)
Modelltheorie/Hintikka: liefert eine ernstzunehmende Antwort. ((s) „wahr im Modell“ heißt, in der Geschichte ist es wahr, dass Kugeln in den Läufen sind).
HintikkaVsParsons: man sollte nicht zu stark syntaktisch argumentieren, d.h. nicht bloß fragen, welche Schlußfolgerungen gezogen werden dürfen und welche nicht.
Akzeptanz/Akzeptierbarkeit/Inferenzen/Hintikka: fragen nach der Akzeptierbarkeit von Inferenzen und von Sprache und Intuitionen sind syntaktisch.
sing Term/ontologische Verpflichtung/Existenz/Parsons: Parsons spricht davon, dass der Gebrauch von sing Term uns zu einer existentiellen Generalisierung verpflichtet. Und damit auf eine Referenten. D.h. es ist eine Verpflichtung zu einer Inferenz.
HintikkaVsParsons.
I 41
Nichtexistente Objekte/mögliche Gegenstände/unverwirklichte Möglichkeiten/Hintikka: aber sind nicht einige dieser nichtexistenten Objekte in unserer eigenen aktualen Welt (WiWe)? Hintikka: These: ja, einige dieser bloß möglichen Objekte sind in der WiWe. bona fide Objekt/Hintikka: kann in einer Möwe existieren und in einer anderen fehlen.
Weltlinie/Hintikka: wenn es darum geht, welche gezogen werden können ist Existenz nicht das wichtigste Problem. Eher Wohldefiniertheit.
HintikkaVsLeibniz: wir erlauben auch, dass ein Objekt in mehreren MöWe existiert.
Frage: wenn Bewohner zweier verschiedener Möwe dann identisch sein können, wann sind sie dann identisch?
I 42
Existentielle Generalisierung/EG/HintikkaVsParsons: das zeigt, dass sein Kriterium der EG falsch ist, denn sie kann fehlschlagen aus Gründen, die nichts mit Nichtexistenz zu tun haben. Bsp
(1) Königin Victoria wußte, dass Lewis Carroll Lewis Carroll ist
daraus kann man nicht schließen, selbst obwohl Caroll existierte, und dies von der Königin gewusst wurde, dass
(2) (Ex)Königin Victoria wußte, dass Lewis Carroll x ist.
Und daher
(3) Jemand ist so, dass Königin Victoria wußte, dass er Lewis Carroll ist
(2) und (3) sagen dasselbe wie
(4) Königin Victoria wußte, wer Lewis Carroll ist.
Das ist aber nicht von (1) impliziert (entailed).
Existentielle Generalisierung/EG/Hintikka: die Äquivalenz von (2)-(3) mit (4) ist aber ganz unabhängig davon, ob die Quantoren nur über existente oder auch über nichtexistente Objekte gehen.
Der Grund für das Fehlschlagen der EG ist nicht ein Fehlschlagen der Eindeutigkeit.
Eindeutigkeit schlägt allerdings fehl, denn in verschiedenen Situationen, die mit dem Wissen der Königin kompatibel sind, kann der Name Lewis Carroll auf verschiedene Personen angewendet werden. Daher kann nicht nur ein einzelnes, bestimmtes Objekt als Wert von „x“ fungieren.
Daher findet die EG keine Anwendung und (1) und dennoch kann sie so verstanden werden, dass sie den Äußerer auf die Existenz von Lewis Carroll verpflichtet. Daher schlägt Parsons Kriterium fehl.
Peirce, Ch.S. Wessel Vs Peirce, Ch.S.
 
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I 228
Identität/PeirceVsLeibniz: "Sein Prinzip ist gänzlich Unsinn. Ohne Zweifel sind alle Dinge voneinander unterschieden, aber dafür gibt es keine logische Notwendigkeit".
Identität/Peirce:
x = y ↔ AP(P(x) u P(y) v ~P(x) u ~P(y)) WesselVsPeirce: das ist ebenfalls existentiell belastet.

We I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999
Phenomenalism Smart Vs Phenomenalism
 
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Fraassen I 209
Regularität/Fraassen: können wir dann a) als zufällig auffassen, dann können wir sie gar nicht als Regularitäten wissen! Denn dann müßten sie gar nicht geschehen.
b) als von darunterliegenden Gründen (reasons) auffassen.
Wir wissen aber von gewissen Regularitäten, daher muss es zugrundeliegende Gründe geben.
wissenschaftlicher Realismus/Peirce/Smart/Fraassen:
Peirce: ~ sage mit Zuversicht voraus, dass der Stein zu Boden fallen wird, wenn ich ihn loslasse.
Theoretische Entitäten/SmartVsPhänomenalismus: wenn er (ungläubig in Bezug auf theoretische Entitäten) recht hätte, wäre alles ein kosmischer Zufall. Dann sind Aussagen über Elektronen nur instrumentalistisch von Nutzen.
FraassenVsLeibniz: wir haben gelernt, die Frage „Warum gibt es etwas und nicht vielmehr nichts?“ als illegitim zu erkennen.
Aber wir betrachten es immer noch als legitim zu fragen:
I 210
„Warum ist die Welt so und nicht vielmehr anders?“. Aber beide Fragen dürfen nicht beantwortet werden mit „aus Zufall“ , oder „weil es so ist“. (“as a matter of fact“).

Smart I
J. J. C. Smart
Philosophy and Scientific Realism London 2013

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Substantivalism Leibniz Vs Substantivalism
 
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Field I 39
Metaphysical Possibility/Essentialism/Modality/Leibniz/Field: the modal argument of Leibniz VsSubstantivalismus: (see above: "empty space is real", not only a logical construction): e.g. question: Does it make sense to accept the possibility of a possible world (poss.w.), which is exactly like our actual one, with the exception of its history which is shifted one mile. (LeibnizVsabsolute space: No!).
Every poss.w. which is qualitatively identical with our world would simply be the actual world.
LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: He must deny this: Substantivalism needs to take two of those poss.w. as truly separate. And this seems absurd.
FieldVsLeibniz: That seems convincing at first glance. But (Horwich, 1978) is it not a strong argument against the existence of electrons as well?
e.g.
(DS) There is a poss.w. which is distinct from our actual world, but is exactly like our actual one, with the exception of its history which is shifted one mile.
(DE) There is a poss.w. which is distinct from our actual world, but is exactly like our actual one. The only difference between the two is that in the poss.w. electron A and B were reversed during all its history.
I 40
FieldVsLeibniz: There seems to be a difference. - - -
Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999
VIII 57
Symmetry/Equilibrium/Genz: a balance scale can also be stable in a slanted position! - equilibrium is indifferent ->Sombrero- Leibniz Vs: e.g. Buridan's Ass. If there is no sufficient reason for a deviation, then there will not be one - Leibniz: there is no indifferent equilibrium > LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: there can be no independent space - because then the universe could be shifted (pointless) - today: VsLeibniz – Solution: spontaneous symmetry breaking.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Thomas Aquinas Mackie Vs Thomas Aquinas
 
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Stegmüller IV 394
proof of the existence of God/Thomas Aquinas/Stegmüller: (third argument) two stages: 1. "What can not be, is not at any one time!: (>SalmonVsAquin).
VsThomas: even that is doubtful: if "ephemeral things" are meant, the premise is even analytical. But it does not follow that there would have been nothing at any time. The transience may only occur in the future.
2. VsThomas: The existence of finite objects can overlap.
IV 395
VSVS: this overlap could however be regarded as a single object! but this suggests the problematic idea of an underlying carrier substance.
3. VsThomas: implicitly in Aquinas: "What does not exist, can not begin to exist unless through something that exists."
Now, if the sequence would have been interrupted once, it could not have been continued by anything.
HumeVsThomas: we may well form the concept of uncaused cause (uncaused commencement of existence).
If what we can imagine were impossible, this would have to be proven! (> Frege: contradictory terms as possible terms: then simply nothing falls into them).
Thomas Aquinas/Stegmüller: Anyway, let's assume there is at least one necessary and unchangeable thing.
Proof of the existence of God/Infinity/Thomas Aquinas/Stegmüller: 2. second order: Aquinas admits that the eternity of one thing could be caused by another thing; it could remain in existence by the other.
But: one can not go back endlessly in the sequence of such things.
IV 396
For in this order of efficient causes, the first is the cause of the second and the second is the cause of the latest, whether many intermediate links are present, or just one! (> Infinity). But the effect is dependent on the cause. If there is no first in the sequence, then there can be no last or second. In an infinite series there is therefore no effect and no cause.
MackieVsThomas: this is not conclusive: although the second is caused by the first in a finite sequence, that does of course not apply if the order of the causes were infinite. Here, every cause is caused by a previous one.
Error: if we consider an infinite instead of a finite order, then the way in which the first member (first cause) "disappears", does nt include the "disappearance" of the following causes!
VSVS: Mackie admits that one could improve this to become a truly conclusive argument: in a sequence, it is assumed that a relation of '"holding" or "carrying" exists, as there is in a chain.
Ex. we would be very surprised if someone claimed that an infinitely long train could go without a locomotive, because the last car would be pulled from the penultimate, this one in turn from its predecessor and so on...
Ex. as if an infinitely long chain did not need hangers, because each member would be held by the neighboring member.
IV 397Aquinas: his argument is: where an order of dependency relations exists, one can not go back infinitely. Such an order can therefore be neither infinite nor circular. (This is also found in the Islamic philosopher Al-Farabi).
Mackie: improved version of the argument by Aquinas: ("necessary" means the same as "imperishable" here): Each necessary thing either depends on something in its imperishability or it is necessary in itself.
Something whose nature does not include the existence, must others depend for its existence on anything.
Mackie: thereby we actually obtain a relationship of dependency which makes it necessary to make the going back in the chain of causes come to an end. In addition, then it is certain that only a being whose essence involves existence, can conclude the going back.
MackieVsThomas: however, we have no reason to accept the implicit assumption of Aquinas.
IV 398
Why should there be an imperishable primordial matter, whose nature includes existence, but its existence isn't derived from anything? Unlike Leibniz: the primordial matter were simply a hard fact which would have no sufficient reason.
Borrowing from Leibniz would also not save Aquinas' argument.
Conclusion:
MackieVsThomas/MackieVsLeibniz: we understand that everything that has a chronologically previous cause depends on this (somehow). But it does not follow that everything besides God needs something else on which it depends in this way (as a cause).
IV 399
"Principle of Al Farabi": in a sequence of relations of dependency (that is an order) there must be an end. MackieVsAl Farabi: why should God be the only exception?
Thereby one would burden the popular argument with exactly those thoughts that led to the collapse of its philosophical correspondences. Or else one seeks refuge in a mere mystery.

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977
Tradition Simons Vs Tradition
 
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I 291
Integrity/connection/individual/tradition/Simons: Thesis: Integrity belongs to the spatio-temporally continuous objects. SimonsVsTradition: microscopically all things are distributed and no longer connected(> microstrukture, MiSt).
Quine: this applies to all things that are not only of a single elementary particle. (1960,98)
Object/thing/object/philosophy/Simons: distributed objects are also called objects: e.g. galaxies, e.g. Indonesia.
Individual/Leibniz: must be atomic. (>Monads). (Simons: virtually all authors VsLeibniz).
- - -
I 306
Relational Accident/SimonsVsTradition: may very well exis: that means such that are based in more than one substrate: e.g. collision between two bodies. It could not have happened with other bodies (modal rigidity) and both bodies must exist at the time (temporal rigidity) even if one or both are destroyed in the accident. Also: E.g. weddings, divorces, football matches. This is nothing mysterious.
- - -
I 342
Proposition/connection/copula/tradition/Simons: the cohesion of the proposition delivered according to the tradition the copula: copula/VsTradition: occurs in the proposition only as a normal word like the others, so it cannot explain the cohesion.
Solution/Frege: unsaturated parts of a sentence.
Proposition/WittgensteinVsFrege: connection simply common juxtaposition of words (names). That means that there is not one part of the sentence which establishes the connection.
Unsaturatedness/Simons: perfectly matches the ontological dependence (undated): a part of a sentence cannot exist without certain others!

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Various Authors Mackie Vs Various Authors
 
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Stegmüller IV 399
"Kalam" argument: (common among Islamic scholars): operates with paradoxes of infinity to show that there can be no actual infinity. (> Al Ghassali). Infinity/MackieVsKalam argument: the possibility of an unlimited past cannot be ruled out on purely logical grounds!
MackieVsKant: this prejudice can also be found in the thesis about the first antinomy.
IV 400
Kalam argument/Al Ghassali: nothing that comes into existence in time, arises out of itself. ("Rational necessity"). Therefore, a creator is required. MackieVsAl Ghassali: 1. do we really know that from necessity of reason?
2. There is no reason why on one hand an uncaused thing should be impossible, but on the other hand the existence of a God with the power to create out of nothing, should be acceptable!
God/Mackie/Islam: this concept of God raises difficult problems:
1. Has God simply emerged with the time?
2. Has he always existed in infinite time? Then the formerly rejected actual infinity would be reintroduced!
3. Does God have a non-temporal existence: that would be an incomprehensible mystery again.
Mackie: additionally, one also has to assume:
a) that God's existence and creative power explain themselves and
b) that the unexplained existence of a material world would be incomprehensible and therefore unacceptable.

IV 401
Existence/MackieVsLeibniz: there is no reason a priori to indicate that things do not just occur without causation! Cosmology/proof of the existence of God/existence/Mackie: problem: either the notion of "causa sui" makes sense or not.
a) it does not make sense: then the cosmological assumption that a divine cause must be assumed for the beginning of material existence collapses.
b) it makes sense: then it can even be awarded as a property to matter itself!
- - -
Stegmüller
IV 447
Def. God/Feuerbach: "God is the sense of self of human kind freed from all loathsomeness." Religion/Feuerbach: utopia of a better religion: God's freedom from all limitations of individuals that was imputed by traditional religions now recovered in humanity as a whole.
MackieVsFeuerbach: humanity as a whole is undoubtedly not free from all limitations of individuals, it is not omnipotent, not omniscient, not all good. (vide supra: entirety as a wrong subject, cannot even act.
- - -
IV 472
Theodicy/faith/Stegmüller: Argument: God has made the earth a vale of tears, so that people would develop a religious need. MackieVs: only a very human deity could want people so submissive.
Theodicy/Gruner: insinuates to skeptics the demand for a world that is liberated from all evils. He rejects this demand as inconsistent.
MackieVsGruner: shifts the burden of proof. The skeptic demands nothing at all.
- - -
IV 271
Ethics/Education/Rousseau: Parents and teachers should refrain from any prerational teaching of children. MackieVsRousseau: understandable but unrealistic.
- - -
Stegmüller IV 502
Religion/Faith/Wittgenstein: Ex. if one makes a choice, the image of retaliation always appears in their mind. Meaning/Mackie/Stegmüller: one possibility: the believer wants his pronouncements to be understood literally. S_he stands by a statement of fact. But notwithstanding, such pronouncements outwardly serve to support their sense of responsibility and to justify it. Then, according to Wittgenstein, their faith would be superstition!
When asked for proof, they do not hold his pronouncements capable of truth. But then they change their position again and literally believe what they must believe.
Other possibility: faith has a literal meaning, but comparable with the plot of a novel, fiction. One can accept that the corresponding values have a meaning for life.
IV 503
Therefore we could accept that there is a God only in our practical moral reasoning. T. Z. Phillips: if the questions about God and immortality are undestood literally, as factual questions, then the skeptical response given by Hume is correct.
Thesis: one can and must interpret religious convictions and statements in a way that the criticism of Hume is irrelevant! It is true that logical and teleological proof of the existence of God cannot be upheld.
The reality of God must not be interpreted as the reality of an object, "God" isn't the name of a single being, it refers to nothing.
IV 504
According to Phillips metaphysicians misunderstand the everyday meanings of words. MackieVs: one doesn't dissolve the real problems of skepticism by pointing to normal parlance. Just as ordinary language philosophers couldn't prevail VsHume.
Faith/Religion/Phillips: magical and religious language should be interpreted in the sense of performative actions.
Mackie pro, but: it is wrong to say that an expressive language could not at the same time be descriptive in a literal sense.
IV 504/505
Actions of faith are both: ways to address happiness and misery in the world as well as to explain them. Religion/faith/R. B. Braithwaite: thesis: the core of the Christian faith is the determination to live by the principles of morality. The "Christian stories" are accompanied by that, although the Christian is not required to believe them literally! They are religious attitudes!
PhillipsVsBraithwaite: the grammar of "believing" and "being true" in religious convictions is not the same as in empirical statements. (> Wittgenstein).
MackieVs: thereby we lose any firm ground under your feet! Braithwaite rightly used the usual notions of truth and falsehood!
IV 506
MackieVsPhillips: there is no alternative to that which is discarded by Phillips, namely to continue in superstitions or to reduce religion such as that the "basic characteristics of faith are lost". MackieVsBraithwaite: certainly, numerous religious statements can be interpreted as moral attitudes, but this does not apply to the central statements of theism.
Faith/Mackie: needs an object of reference!

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977