Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


[german]  

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Church-Turing Thesis Lorenzen
 
Books on Amazon
P. Lorenzen Ein dialogisches Konstruktivitätskriterium (1959) in Karel Berka/L. Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin, 1983

Berka I 266
Church thesis/Lorenzen: the thesis is an equation of "constructive" with "recursive". LorenzenVsChurch: too narrow view: thus it no longer permits the free use of the quantification over the natural numbers.
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I 267
Decision-making problem/ChurchVsLorenzen: (according to Lorenzen): Advantage: greater clarity: when limiting to recursive statements, there can never be a dispute as to whether one of the admitted statements is true or false. The definition of recursiveness guarantees precisely the decision-definition, that is, the existence of a decision-making process. > Decisibility, decision-making problem.

Lorn I
P. Lorenzen
Constructive Philosophy Cambridge 1987


Brk I
K. Berka/L. Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Knowledge Lorenzen
 
Books on Amazon
Wessel I 346
Modality/Lorenzen/Wessel: it is assumed a certain group of people has accepted a certain system of statements W as true. From these people, all statements which follow logical from these statements are then recognized as true. Lorenzen regards this as meaningful only for future statements.
Knowledge/Lorenzen/Wessel: for Lorenzen, it follows that everything we know is necessary with regard to this knowledge.
Tradition: For example, if we know that in a pea pod are five peas and that it contains protein. This is only the second necessary knowledge. According to Lorenzen, both statements are necessary knowledge. (WesselVsLorenzen).
Modality/WesselVsLorenzen: too broad a view. That all knowledge is supposed to be necessary is a "fatalistic consequence".

Lorn I
P. Lorenzen
Constructive Philosophy Cambridge 1987


We I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999
Modalities Lorenzen
 
Books on Amazon
Wessel I 347
Modality/Wessel: modality is not a kind of truth value, as often is falsely assumed! Carnap: identifies truth and logical necessity,
Lukasiewicz: has a third truth value "possible"
Lorenzen: uses "possible" and "possibly true" synonymously. WesselVsLorenzen.
Truth value/Wessel: a truth value is a special logical predicate to which statements are pronounced or denied.
The difference between modalities and truth values is obvious: since alethic modalities are only linked to subjects of the form sA (the fact that A) and truth values are linked only to such with those of the form tA (the statement A) to connect statements.
Truth value: is a statement.
Modality: is a fact.

Lorn I
P. Lorenzen
Constructive Philosophy Cambridge 1987


We I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Church, A. Lorenzen Vs Church, A.
 
Books on Amazon
Berka I 266
Church thesis/Lorenzen: the thesis is an equating of "constructive" with "recursive". (S) so all structures are recursively possible? Or: there is only one recursive structure. (Slightly different meaning).
LorenzenVsChurch: view to narrow: it allows no longer the free use of the quantification of the natural numbers.
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I 267
decision problem/ChurchVsLorenzen: (according to Lorenzen): Advantage: greater clarity: when limited to recursive statement forms there can never arise dispute whether one of the approved statements is true or false. The definition of recursivity guarantees precisely the decision definiteness, that means the existence of a decision process.

Lorn I
P. Lorenzen
Constructive Philosophy Cambridge 1987

Brk I
K. Berka/L. Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Kamlah, A. Schurz Vs Kamlah, A.
 
Books on Amazon:
Gerhard Schurz
I 28
Intersubjectivity/Objectivity/SchurzVsLorenzen/SchurzVsKamlah: intersubjectivity kann nicht als Definition von objectivity verwendet werden, da Kompetenz ein unsicheres und graduelles Kriterium ist. Alle kompetenten Sprecher können sich irren. Lösung/Peirce: idealisiertes Endresultat.

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Lorenzen, P. Wessel Vs Lorenzen, P.
 
Books on Amazon
I 345/346
Gesetze/Wessel: haben immer die logische Form einer formalen Implikation (obwohl nicht alle wahren formalen Implikationen Gesetze darstellen) ((x)(P(x) > Q(x). Als Folgerungen allein daraus erhalten wir niemals Formeln der Form Q(a), wo a eine Individuenkonstante ist.
Modality/Lorenzen/Wessel: angenommen wird, eine bestimmte Menschengruppe hat ein bestimmtes System von Aussagen W als wahr akzeptiert. Von diesen Menschen werden dann auch alle Aussagen als wahr anerkannt, die logisch aus diesen Aussagen folgen.
Lorenzen betrachtet das nur für Zukunftsaussagen als sinnvoll.
Wissen/Lorenzen/Wessel: für Lorenzen ergibt sich daraus, dass alles, was wir wissen, bezüglich dieses Wissens notwendig ist.
Tradition: Bsp wenn wir wissen, dass in einer Erbsenschote fünf Erbsen sind und dass sie Eiweiß enthält. So ist nur das zweite notwendiges Wissen. Nach Lorenzen sind beide Aussagen notwendiges Wissen. (WesselVs).
Modality/WesselVsCarnap: zu enge Auffassung.
Modality/WesselVsLorenzen: zu weite Auffassung. Dass alles Wissen notwendig sein soll, ist eine "fatalistische Konsequenz".
I 347
Modality/Wessel: ist keine Art von Wahrheitswert, wie oft fälschlich angenommen wird! Carnap: identifiziert Wahrheit und logische Notwendigkeit,
Lukasiewicz: hat einen dritten Wahrheitwert "möglich"
Lorenzen: benutzt "möglich" und "möglicherweise wahr" synonym. WesselVsLorenzen.

We I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999