Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 64 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Assertibility Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 308
RortyVsPutnam: this is similar to the arguments of Moore against all attempts "to define good" - "true, but not justified assertible" is as meaningful as "good, but not conducive to the greatest happiness."

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Axioms Hacking
 
Books on Amazon
I 182
Axioms/Hacking: mass ratios can be incorporated into axioms. E.g. The mass of the myon is 206,786 times the mass of the electron - HackingVsPutnam: but this cannot be reinterpreted according to Loewenheim because of a bundle of consistent calculations and many relationships to natural constants - these are experimentally confirmed, not just sentences.

Hack I
I. Hacking
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Beliefs Lewis
 
Books on Amazon
V 151
Belief/Perry: always has two objects. - 1st object: Pair of individual and property - (propositional belief: would be a zero-digit relation) - Belief/Perry: not inside the head - Heimson and Hume are the same inside the head - but different pairs of individual and property - problem: then madness would lie in the states of the world - solution/Perry: the first object of Heimson is incorrect - 2nd object: a function with the subject as an argument and the first object (individual-property pair) as a value - according to the 2nd object, beliefs are indeed inside my head - Hume and Heimson have the same 2nd object: the function Hume attributes to the pair Hume and the property to be Hume - both believe the same thing. - Lewis pro. ---
IV 152
Belief/LewisVsPutnam: is inside the head. - The self-attribution of the subject is the whole of its belief system - external ascriptions are no other belief attitudes - on the other hand: belief de re: is not inside the head - is not a real belief either - they are facts by virtue of the relation of belief in the things. ---
IV 153
Belief de re/Lewis: not de re: E.g. the attribution of "is a spy" to "smallest spy" ... - E.g. not de re: the attribution "murderer" when the murder is not yet resolved - appropriate descriptions would single out the essence - not de re: E.g. somebody gave me ... ---
IV 155
Solution: acquaintance - E.g. "the man of whom I've heard by the name of Hume ..." is already an acquaintance. - Also: E.g. the driver of the car in front of me - unknown entity is irrelevant. ---
Schw I 179
Belief/Dogma/semantics/LewisVsStalnaker: whether a player knows the best move does not depend on him if he considers the sentence "this is the best move" to be true - he does not have to speak any language - (omniscience/Stalnaker: actual ignorance in apparent ignorance of necessary truth always involves linguistic state of affairs.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Coherence Theory Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
II 126
Def idealism: truth does not match with the inner nature of an object, but coherence.
Ayer: by the "linguistic turn" he was given the possibility to present, as a logical positivist, a version of coherence theory of truth that was freed from metaphysics.
II 130
McDowell: Coherence Theory / Rorty per Davidson: beliefs: can a) be seen from the outside view of the field researcher, causal interactions with the environment - b) from the inside, from the perspective of the natives, as rules of action.
The internal perspective is normative, in the space of reasons.
RortyVsPutnam: he somehow tries to think that together.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Completeness Hacking
 
Books on Amazon
I 162
Description / StrawsonVsLeibniz: monads: "complete description" is pointless! - VsPutnam: Internal Realism: requires the idea of ​​a "full description" because of ideal acceptability.

Hack I
I. Hacking
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Concepts Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 185 ff
Neither are there views that can be dissolved to terms (like Carnap), nor internal relations between concepts that enable "grammatical discoveries" (as in the Oxford philosophy). There is probably nothing left today that would be "analytic philosophy".
I 192
RortyVsOxford: there are no grammatical discoveries alone between terms.
I 326f
RortyVsPutnam (internal realism): this means no more than that we should congratulate ourselves on the invention of the term lithium, so that something stands for lithium, for which all the time there had been nothing. The fact that based on our insights we are coping with the world very well is true, but trivial. That we adequately reflect it is "just an image".
I 339f
Platonic concepts: the trouble with them is not that they are "false", but that not much can be said about them. They cannot be naturalized or otherwise connected with our needs. Davidson: would probably say the good would not require verificationist arguments.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Correspondence Millikan
 
Books on Amazon
I 107
Correspondence/Correspondence Relation/Millikan: here we are dealing with the relationship between an indicative intentional icon and its real value. 1. Definition: real value is the normal condition for the exertion of the direct eigenfunction of the icon.
2. There are correspondences between transformations on both sides!
3. Each transformation on the page of the icon has a normal condition for the eigenfunction (proper performance) of the corresponding transformation of the real value.
N.B.: this is about a comparison of the transformations of icon and real value, not a correspondence of the elements of icon and real value. ((s)> covariance).
Transformation/Millikan: this is not about "parts" but about invariant and variable aspects ((s) of a whole).
E.g. bee dance: variable: direction - invariant: existence of nectar.
---
I 108
Transformation/Sentence/Millikan: for sentences, the most frequent transformation is substitution or negation. E.g. "Theaitetos swims" Every transformation corresponds to a possible world situation (fact, world affair).
Articulation: a fact, is determined by a group of possible transformations.
---
I 307
Consensus/Millikan: first you have to know something about the objective world, not the world, as we perceive it (sensory world). Consensus/judgment: consensus in judgment is not to respond to the same stimulus with the same reaction. Rarely two people react to the same stimulus with the same choice of words. There is also no agreement on how to divide the world into pieces. Instead, it is a sign that each speaker has contact with the world in its own way, and that it is the same, which is mapped in different ways.
---
I 329
Correspondence/Putnam: it is incoherent to assume that truth is a correspondence with the WORLD. Image/Representation/Putnam: mathematical images are omnipresent, representations are not omnipresent.
Problem: a correspondence theory based on the fact that there is a mapping relation between a complete set of true representations and the world is empty.
---
I 330
Solution: there must first be a distinction between images and representations. Solution: there must be an additional condition for reference, namely, that an intended interpretation is marked.
Causal theory/Putnam: a causal theory would not help here. For it is just as uncertain whether "cause" clearly refers, as if "cat" clearly refers.
Concept/Sign/Ockham/Putnam: Problem: a concept must not simply be a "mental particular", otherwise every sign merely refers to another sign again.
PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: it is incomprehensible how a relation between a sign and its object could be picked out, either by holding up the sign itself,
E.g.
COW
Or by holding up a different sign, e.g.
REFERS
Or maybe
CAUSES.
Meaning/Meaning rationalism/Putnam/Millikan: this is the meaning rationalism: in order to mean something, we must know what we mean and namely "know" with a very definite, meaning-rationalist shine on "know":
The relation between the head and the world must be reflected wholly in the head,
((s)> See Leibniz, "Transcending General").
PutnamVs: that would only work if there was a mysterious "direct understanding of forms" ((s) platonic). Then the relation would not have to be mirrored again.
---
I 331
Correspondence/to mean/Meaning/References/MillikanVsPutnam/Millikan: Thesis: the relations between the head and the world are indeed between the head and the world. However, the understanding of these relations does not contribute to the justification of meaning and reference. They do not have to be intended so that one can refer.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

de dicto Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
II 249
De dicto: only concerning the mental contents - de re: relationships between people and objects - SearleVsQuine, VsPutnam: all beliefs are de dicto. - ((s) so they should always be concerned with mental contents and never with objects?)
---
II 261
De dicto/belief/SearleVsAll: all beliefs are de dicto - de re beliefs are a subclass - QuineVs: irreducible belief de re: is between the believer and the objects - in addition to the de dicto beliefs - (much stronger thesis) - brains in a vat: purely de dicto - SearleVsQuine: if the world would change, the beliefs would change, even if everything stays the same in the head. ---
II 262
General desire for a sailing boat: de dicto - for a more specific: de re. ---
II 263
SearleVsQuine: Then in the general case allegedly context free but: BurgeVsQuine: contextually bound beliefs cannot be characterized completely by their intentional content (not only as a relation between concept and object) - de dicto/Burge: E.g. red hat in the fog, "there is a man who ..." -Searle: that is enough to individuate any de re- counterpart - the same man can belong to fulfillment conditions for very different perceptions. ---
II 268
Thesis, there are forms of intentionality that are not conceptual, but also not de re.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

de re Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
II 247
De dicto: concernsg only the mental contents. - De re: relationships between people and objects - SearleVsQuine, VsPutnam: all beliefs are de dicto. ---
II 271
De re/de dicto/SearleVsQuine: is a distinction between different types of report - intentional states are not intensional by themselves. That is a mix of logical properties of reports with the states themselves - there is no "de re-setting" - only indexicals (VsKaplan, VsPerry). ---
VI 182f
De re/de dicto/Searle: not two different beliefs - Ralph's beliefs are the same in both cases - difference is in how far the reporting person wants to commit himself - Ralph cannot express this difference - the truth conditions are the same.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Descriptions Hacking
 
Books on Amazon
I 162
Description/StrawsonVsLeibniz: monads: complete description pointless! - VsPutnam: Internal realism requires the idea of ​​a "complete description" because of ideal acceptability.

Hack I
I. Hacking
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Descriptions Lewis
 
Books on Amazon
I 10
Description/Lewis: it always is also about the meaning of the terms used. - Therefore, it is pointless to point out several differences. - - -
IV 240
Definite Description/Lewis: necessary: something outstanding, relative prominence - not: uniqueness. - The prominence changes constantly during the conversation. - Denotation by a definite description then depends on the score keeping. - Alignment rule: Prominence of an object is affected by the course of the conversation. - Boundaries/Lewis: it is easier to expand the boundaries than to narrow them. ---
I 26/27
Failed descriptions are not meaningless. (Putnam: the theoretical terms of a refuted theory are meaningless.) LewisVsPutnam: they are not, if they are similar failed descriptions. "The Mars moon" and "The Venus moon" name nothing here in our real world (in any normal way); but they are not meaningless, because we know very well what they denote in certain other possible worlds.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Externalism Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
Externalism/Putnam/Kripke: correct causal chains between word and object. > Causal theory.
Externalism/DavidsonVsKripke, DavidsonVsPutnam: complete sentences, interpretation.
---
I 8
Definition Externalism/Davidson: Events and objects by which a belief is evoked determine at the same time their content - DavidsonVs: (s) nothing outside the mind determines a belief - externalism: shows the correctness (not infallibility) of the majority of judgments - (Davidson Pro). ---
I 72
Externalism/Davidson: pro variant: from twin earth, not from linguistic division of labor. Therefore no threat of the 1st person authority - Radical interpretation: interpreter has to find out the factors, by means of indirect evidence, that first determine the content of the thought of the others - there is no room for error for one's own content because the same factors determine both thoughts. ---
I 74
Externalism/Burge: two forms: a): social, meaning from linguistic practice (community) - b) importance of causal history (learning history) dependent on the individual - Burge: causal relationship to the object in order to comprehend content - DavidsonVsBurge: does not protect against error. ---
II 185
Externalism/Putnam/Kripke: correct causal chains between word and object. > Causal Theory - Externalism/DavidsonVsKripke/DavidsonVsPutnam: whole sentences, interpretation - reference of single words/Davidson: theoretical construct - ((s) derived from entire sentences). ---
Frank I 626ff
Externalism/Davidson: it does not matter if mental states are individuated by something outside, just like sunburn ceases to be on the skin because it has an external cause. ---
Frank I 663
Externalism/Authority: if thoughts are externally determined, then the subject does not necessarily need to know what it thinks of - if the externalism is correct, then VsFrege: thoughts cannot be completely comprehended - VsDescartes: inner states not certain - Burge: false use of terms: possibility to not know his own thoughts - DavidsonVsBurge: beliefs depend on other beliefs, therefore less strong possibility of error - DavidsonVsBurge: intent of successful communication has no necessary connection to the correct identification of meaning. ---
I 663-667
Externalism: Putnam: Distinguishing inner and "ordinary" external beliefs - Fodor: "methodological solipsism": only observing internal states - Burge: external factors find their way into the determination of the contents via "thought experiments" - e.g. wrongly used terms: wrong beliefs about oneself possible e.g. arthritis) - DavidsonVsBurge: initially pro: the content is not determined by what is going on in the person, but: content is determined so strong holistically that individual confusion of ideas cannot be so decisive, and therefore no rigid rules for the attribution of thoughts, we are not compelled to ascribe to the words of another person the same meaning as that person. ---
I 676
Mind/Tradition/DavidsonVsDescartes: if stage with alleged representatives of the objects, how can the mind pave his way out? - but the "objects" do not interest it, but their cousins, the propositions - but the mind has not the solution "in mind": externalism: all that helps to determine the object must likewise be grasped by the mind when it should know in which state it is.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Functionalism Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
Dennett I 557
Function/Searle: (according to Dennett): only products that were produced by a real human consciousness, have a function (> objet ambigu, P. Valéry). DennettVsSearle: therefore the wings of the aircraft serve to fly, but not the wings of the eagle.
---
I 19
SearleVsFunctionalism (SearleVsPutnam) relationships between mind states are not only causal. Otherwise stones would have the same mind states like us with the right causal relations. ---
I 59 ff
VsFunctionalism: eliminates qualia - imitation of a functional organization does not result in pain sensation. ---
I 233f
Machine is defined by effects, cannot be recreated from cheese - Computer: is syntactically defined, can be rebuild by anything (cats, mice, cheese) - Syntax is always relative to the observer. Not intrinsical - but heart is an intrinsical pump - also water is describable as intelligent (lowest resistance). ---
I 266F
Intentional phenomena: rule consequences: genuine causal phenomena - Functional explanation: only bare physical facts, causality only through interest-oriented description here - rules are no cause for action. ---
I 266
Function/Searle: has no separate layer. ---
I 269
Pattern: plays a causal role in functional terms, but does not guarantee unconscious representation. (Intentionality) ---
III 24
SearleVsMillikan: function is always relative to the observer (only "flow" immanent) - Millikan: function arose evolutionary.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Identity Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
Dav II 69
E.g. identity: How clear is the idea that the ancient Greeks - some ancient Greeks - believed the earth was flat? This earth? If anyone believes nothing of what we believe about the earth, to what extent does it refer to the earth? ---
II 72
This makes it clear that beliefs must be thought of in a similarly networked way as sentences. Beliefs - like sentences - never occur individually. ---
Dav I 21
Identity/Quine: we cannot pick out "the" relationship which is constitutive for the recognition of the identity of an object - any property can be regarded as relevant - Davidson: if the mind always had to establish a clear relation to the object, thinking would be impossible. ---
Frank I 672
Identity/Davidson: "molecular identical", "tie identical": For example, the same skin redness can be a sunburn on one hand, and something quite different on the other - even twin earth twins are molecule-identical. ---
I, 674
DavidsonVsPutnam: but not psychically identical (Anomal monism).

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Indeterminacy Dennett
 
Books on Amazon
I 574
Indeterminacy / DennettVsPutnam: E.g. "cat", "Siamese": perhaps you simply note one day that one must make a distinction that was previously not necessary because the subject did not come up for discussion. This uncertainty undermines Putnam s Twin Earth argument.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Index Words Burge
 
Books on Amazon:
Tyler Burge
Frank I 684
Index Words/Indexical Specification/Mental States/Twin Earth/Burge/Bruns: a) the mental states are identified with indexical expressions: e.g. "this is water". (Individuation).
b) non-indexically identified: e.g. "water is a liquid".
Conclusion: if non-indexical, then they cannot be used to explain behavior, because they do not individuate their content.
BurgeVsPutnam: although he does not deal with any beliefs, his argument only works, because he analyzes terms expressing natural kinds like indexical terms.
Frank I, 685
Burge thesis: even in the individuation of non-indexical mental states reference must be made to external objects. "Anti-individualism" (= externalism). Narrow content is not sufficient for individuation, they must rather be defined by "broad content".
Content/Twin Earth/Burge/Bruns: if there is no aluminum on the twin earth, Hermann's conviction that aluminum is a metal has a different content. (DavidsonVs: you can also understand "moon" without ever having seen it).
Neither he nor his doppelganger know the atomic structure of aluminum or twin-earth aluminum.
Burge's argument now depends entirely on whether we are ready to attribute convictions about the corresponding light metals to the two.
Frank I 707
"Here"/Twin Earth/Burge: I know I am here (differently: on the earth!). My knowledge involves more than the mere knowledge that I know that I am where I am.
I have the normal ability to think about my environment. And I have this knowledge, because I perceive my own - and not other imaginable environments.

Burge I
T. Burge
Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Information Dennett
 
Books on Amazon
I 268
Information/Code/Dennett: the fact that a one-dimensional code can represent a three-dimensional structure is a gain of information. Actually, "value" is added! (Contribution to the functioning).
II 35
Information/Action/virus/Dennett: the virus must "make sure" of the proliferation of its information. in order to achieve its objectives, it produces an enzyme which is shown a "password", and then it leaves the other molecules "untouched".
II 94f
Information/Life/Dennett: long before there were nervous systems in organisms, they used a primitive. postal service: the circulation and metabolism for transmitting information. Information processing/DennettVsFunctionalism: one thing was always clear: as soon as there are transducers and effectors in an information system, its "media neutrality" or multiple realization disappears. (VsPutnam, VsTuring).
Embodied Information/Dennett: Evolution causes information to become physical in every part of every living creature. E.g. the baleen of the whale embodies information about the food. E.g. The bird s wings contain information about the medium air. E.g. The skin of the chameleon carries information about the environment.
This information need not go to the brain as copies!.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Loewenheim Hacking
 
Books on Amazon
I 176
Löwenheim/Hacking: Paradox: that statements about an area where they E.g. state the lack of clear assignability (E.g. subsets of natural numbers are cannot be assigned unambiguously to the natural numbers) then also apply to a countable area: then it would followed that the natural numbers cannot be unambiguously represented in the natural numbers (unintended model). - Today that is no longer considered to be a paradox.
I 178
Löwenheim/HackingVsPutnam: his criticism only applies to the correspondence theory or the representation theory.
I 180 ff
HackingVsLöwenheim/HackingVsPutnam: 1) Physics does not fit into 1st order logic - 3) everyday language always has indicators - 4) VsWittgenstein: does not prove that our use is essentially unreliable - 4) The Löwenheim proposition refers to numbers, not words - 5) I do not need a theory of reference to refer - 6) There are photographs in books about myons 7) The Löwenheim proposition is not constructive! - I.e. there is no method for producing an unintended model - 8) affixes such as sour cherry and Persian do not work like the adjective "sweet." - You do not pickle Vistula cats and do not eat heart cats as fresh fruit.

Hack I
I. Hacking
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Logic Wright
 
Books on Amazon
I 60ff
Semantic anti-realism/evidence: in contrast to Putnam might be satisfied now with a "one-way": (EC, epistemic limitation):
(EC) If P is true, then there is evidence that it is so.

Evidence/WrightVsPutnam: truth is limited by evidence. This leads to a revision of the logic.
If there is no evidence, Putnam must actually allow by contraposition of EC that it is not the case that P is true, from which follows per negation equivalence that the negation of P must be regarded as true.
---
I 61
Semantic Anti-Realism: refuses to concede the unlimited validity of the principle of bivalence (true/false). Semantic Anti-Realism/Wright: there is this scope for reconciliation: who represents EC, is obliged by the negation equivalence, to permit (A):
A If no evidence for P is present, then there is evidence for its negation. (s) VsAbsurd.
Wright: this is synonymous to an admission that there is evidence, in principle, both for the confirmation as well as for the rejection of P: But that conceals a suppressed premise:
B Either there is evidence for P or there is none.
A case of the excluded third.
---
I 62
Classic, is the conditional (A) an equivalent of the disjunction (C): C Either there is evidence for P or there is evidence for its negation. ((s) Not at undecidability).
Problem: that it is precisely the case of the excluded third, that is not to be assertible (not assertible): It would not be sufficient to simply reject the principle of the bivalence (true/false). If (B) Either there is evidence for P or there is no unlimited assertible, the embarrassment will occur: the logic must be revised for all cases where evidence is not guaranteed.
---
I 87f
Revision of Logic/Wright: may be required when the Liar or anything alike comes into play. Here one can assume a "weak" biconditional: Definition biconditional, weak: A <> B is weakly valid if it is impossible that one of the two statements may be true, if the other is not, even if A, under certain circumstances has a different valuation from B or no truth value, while B has one.
Definition biconditional, strong: A <> B is highly valid if A and B always get necessarily the same valuation.
Then it also apllies for discourse areas in which the disquotation scheme and the equivalence scheme are called into doubt that both are still weakly valid.
Revision of Logic/Negation: within an apparatus with more than two truth values there can be no objection against the introduction of an operator "Neg", which is subject to the determination that Neg A is false if A is true, but is true in all other cases.
  Then, if A <> B is weakly valid, that also aplies to Neg A <> Neg B. Then there is no obstacle against the derivation of the negation equivalence:
Neg (P) is true <> Neg ("P" is true).
---
I 89
WrightVs: however, this will not succeed. Not even as an assertion of weak validity when "assertible" is used for "true."

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

Meaning Black
 
Books on Amazon
I 58
Meaning / Grice : only by the effect on the listener - not only discover the primary speaker s intention , but the listener should also think of something specific - and intend it. - BlackVs : this is not sufficient and not necessary : it must not be true, even though the conditions are met, and may be true although they are not met
I 77
The background can not be understood if the core ( " it s snowing " ) is not understood (DF ) - Meaning / BlackVsGrice: Black thesis not detecting the speaker s intention to cause an effect on the listener, allowing the r to determine the meaning , but rather the reverse : the discovery of speaker meaning it allows the listener to infer the speaker s intention - intention / Black: surely there could be no understanding and speaker, without primitive situations in which a speaker s intention is recognized - but that is no proof of the correctness of an intentionalist analysis
II 58
Meaning / Black: must be located beyond language , for words to ever have a practical application - Example Determine whether there is a color - Differences between objects in the world recognized along the scale of our language categories
II 98
Meaning / Black: the "life of the words " is not in any "mental circumstances " , but rather in the ability to interact with symbolic actions in relationship and for it to serve as a starting point - meaning can not be fixed to any feature of mental actions - brain-o-scope/Black : would still remain the task of interpreting the images
II 211
Meaning / BlackVsPutnam : can not be the object ! e.g. "Titanic" would have no meaning - meaning need not be " in me " to be mine - (( s)> " meaning in the head" -

Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

Bla III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Meaning Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
I 64
Quine has revolutionized our understanding of communication by having shown that there is not more about meaning than what a person with the associated facilities is able to learn by observing. Causal theory of meaning VsDescartes : senses do not matter - only in learning, but then contingent ( Vsscepticism )
I 47
Def meaning (interpretation) of a sentence is given by the fact that the sentence is assigned a semantic space in the structure of records that make up a language . The meaning of a sentence consists in being the holder of this place and no other place in the macro structure of the language . This is the only content of the concept of meaning for Davidson.
II 53
DavidsonVs social nature of meaning: idiolect in principle is also to be interpreted (via causal hypotheses). Putnam / Kripke: causal theory: correct link word / object - DavdisonVsPutnam: Interpretation of whole sentences
Rorty VI 419
DavidsonVsQuine/Rorty: rejects notion of "stimulus meaning" from: Like Newton’s attempt to soar to the "Newton of the mind ". Instead: distal theory of meaning . There is no "central region " between linguistically formulated beliefs and physiology.
Dav I 95
Causal theory of meaning : meaning do not matter - only in learning, but then contingent ( Vsscepticism).
I 99
DavidsonVsPutnam : that meanings are not in the head is not due to special names for natural kinds , but on broad social character of language.
II 50
Meaning / Davidson / Glüer : the interpretation is given by the fact that the semantic space of a sentence is located in the structure of sentences that make up the language - ( multiple language = truth - theories ) possible - Def Meaning / Davidson: then, is being the holder of this unique place in the macro structure of the language.
II 51
Meaning / Tarski / Davidson: Tarski-type theories are not based on meaning as defined entities ( per Davidson : Meaning ultimately not fixed ) - consequences: 1 DavidsonVsTaski: actually spoken language ultimately irrelevant - 2 the trivial thesis that meaning is conventional, must be abandoned.
Frank I 672
sunburn-example/Davidson: as sunburn is still a reddening of my skin, even though it was caused by the sun - not just external causation leads to the fact that meanings are not in the head - otherwise, pro Putnam: meanings not in the head , but rather simple prop. att.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Meaning Fodor
 
Books on Amazon
Cresswell II 56
Meanings / Fodor / Cresswell : FodorVsPutnam : These: meanings are in the head - CresswellVsFodor : problem with the ascription:I will have to have the same representation in the head - it must have the same belief as the one he has - ( see above : meanings are not representations ) -
IV 57
meaning / Quine : not from speaker meaning , not acceptance of inferences of the speaker - the speaker meaning depends on the worldview, and thus of an intention what the words should mean - it can not distinguish between the views the speaker accepted a priori and those he accepted later -- so there are no analytic sentences- there is no epistemic criteria for “true by meaning” -
IV 117
meaning / truth / Davidson : a speaker holds a sentence to be true because of the meaning and because of his belief - so we can not conclude from utterance meaning if we do not know the beliefs of the speaker and we can not do it the other way around -
IV 121
belief ascription / attribution of meaning / Davidson theory: information about the shape of the words , which are held to be true are the decisive evidence for both attributions here - adoption of sincerity alone is not enough to detect meaning - we need information either about his belief - or about the meanings - ( (s) key Passage ) - Fodor / LeporeVsLewis : then the primacy thesis is implausible - (PT : " the conditions of intentional attribution include the conditions for belief ascription " )-

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Meaning Poundstone
 
Books on Amazon
I 339
Meaning / PoundstoneVsPutnam: in your head, that is in the consciousness of the one who knows the encryption (cryptography) - an extreme case: rules result in "iii ..." then it is divided between the text and key
W. Poundstone
I W. Poundstone Im Labyrinth des Denkens, Reinbek 1995
Meaning Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
I 66
Naturalization of content: separation consciousness - intentionality (SearleVs) SearleVsPutnam/Searle: meanings are in your head (Intentionality). ---
II 25 ff
Meanings in the head (VsPutnam) because perception is self-related - perception provides self fulfilling conditions. ---
II 255
Meaning: Searle in mind, fulfilling conditions of intentionality - Putnam: not in the head, conditions in the world have crucial indexical determination, not the concept fixes the meaning - Searle: meaning not determined by ideolect. - > elm/beech, > twin Earth. ---
V 69
Meaning goes beyond the intention. It is usually a matter of convention. ---
V 68
Chess/Searle: the figures usually have no meaning, and who makes a move usually means nothing. ---
IV 157
Meaning/Searle: depends on the context - like other non-conventional succession of forms of intentionality. ---
VI 159
Ultimately, meaning depends on our perception as a basic form of intentionlity.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Meaning Millikan
 
Books on Amazon
I 263
Natural Law/Millikan: My theory of intentionality is determined on that a thing like a normal explanation is something outside in the world and that is something that supports our thinking rather than being supported by our thinking. For it to be true, natural laws must be in nature, not merely a summation of the patterns of nature. MillikanVsVerificationism: If my theory is correct, verificationism must be false.
Truth/world/relation/Millikan: thesis: ultimately, meaning and truth lie in relations between thought and the world,...
---
I 264
...therefore they cannot be in the head, we cannot internalize them.
MillikanVsPutnam.
---
I 305
Meaning/language-dependent/language-independent/knowledge/knowing/Millikan: even if we take almost all the meanings of our words from linguistic communication, like adults, and no longer from direct perception, that does not exclude that we know "their meaning".

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Meaning Gärdenfors
 
Books on Amazon:
Peter Gärdenfors
I 18
Bedeutung/Gärdenfors: These: Semantik, aufgefasst als „Meeting of minds“ impliziert, dass die Bedeutungen von Ausdrücken nicht in der äußeren Welt und auch nicht ausschließlich in den Bildschemata der Sprecher wohnen, sondern aus den kommunikativen Interaktionen der Sprachbenutzer. Daher sind Bedeutungen im Kopf der Sprecher. Gärdenfors, 1993, Warglien & Gärdenfors 2013). GärdenforsVsPutnam: Bedeutungen sind im Kopf.
Gärdenfors: dabei gehe ich nicht davon aus, dass Sprecher dieselben Bildschemata oder dieselben Repräsentationen haben.


Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Meaning Change Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty I 291
Meaning change/DavidsonVsPutnam/Rorty: the concept itself is already incoherent. ---
Rorty IV 23
Davidson/Rorty: every sentence ever used at all refers to the world of which we now believe exists (such as the world of electrons and the like). Aristotle and Galileo must therefore be held responsible in front of the same court. Rorty: but this is not a new result, which would have been enforced by Kripke, for example, it is simply trivial. ---
Rorty V 18
DavidsonVsIncommensurability: if that means "expressions that are used in other cultures cannot be equated with our expressions", then this thesis refutes itself. - Putnam: there are no criteria such as "institutionalized norms" and a contrary thesis refutes itself just as the thesis of incommensurability.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Meaning Theory Fraassen
 
Books on Amazon
I 35
Verificationistic Meaning Theory / Verificationism / Positivism / Fraassen: the full cognitive content of a statement is a function of the empirical results that would verify or refute it. Therefore, there can be no real differences between the two hypothese with the same empirical content. - e.g. Vaihinger: ("as if"): even if there are no electrons, the observable world would be just as it is, when Rutherford s theory were true - Verificationism: then both theories run out to the same thing. - PutnamVs: no, because one says that there are electrons, the other say there aren’t. - even when the observable phenomena are as Rutherford says that there are,the unobservables aren’t. - PositivismVsPutnam: that you can never prove.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980

Mental States Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
I30
Twin earth/Davidson: Subjective states do not arise as a consequence of the state of the brain or the nervous system.
---
II 154
False theory: the objects would be the meanings of sentences (Vs), that is, the propositions. DavidsonVs: with this, it would be so arranged that, e.g. if a Frenchman attributed the same state of consciousness to Paul as I do, the same subject would be named by us both, whereas this would not be the case in the theory under consideration, for the sentence in question of the Frenchman would not be the same as mine. (Falsely).
It should not concern us that the Frenchman and I use different words, it is similar to ounces and carats. (> measuring)
My monism is ontological: it asserts that mental events and objects can also be described as physical.
---
I 99
Mind/Davidson: if we consider the subjective or mental exclusively as a consequence of the physical characteristics of a person, meanings cannot be something purely subjective or mental. (Putnam: Meanings ain't in the head). ---
Frank I 626
Mind/Davidson: not without language, both equal. ---
Frank I 657ff
Mental states/external attribution/Davidson: "narrow" state/twin earth: "inner", is solipsistic, as with Descartes. The narrow states are the same for the twin earth. - BurgeVsPutnam: they do not exist. - SearleVsPutnam: narrow states are unnecessary, ordinary propositional attitudes suffice - DavidsonVsSearle/VsBurge: ordinary mental states are narrow (internal) and at the same time "non-individualistic", i.e. externally identifiable.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Method Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 278
Method/theory/Chomsky: requirement; we must be able to describe what the person receives - the percept itself is a construction of the first order - its properties are determined experiment. Grammar: construction of the second-order - for this one must abstract from the other factors involved in the use and understanding of language and refer to internalized knowledge of the speaker - VsBehaviorismus: excludes the concept of "what is perceived" and "what is learned" from the outset. ---
I ~ 297ff
Method/theory: PutnamVsChomsky: certain ambiguities can only be discovered through routine, therefore their postulated explanation by Chomsky's grammar is not that impressive - ChomskyVsPutnam: he misunderstands it, in fact this refers to competence and not to performance - routine does not matter here, but the inherent correlation between sound and meaning. ---
I 303
Chomsky: my universal grammar is not a "theory of language acquisition", but one element of it - my thesis is an "all-at-once" proposal and does not try to capture the interplay between the tentative hypotheses constructed by the child and new data interpreted with them. ---
I 316
Method/theory/Chomsky: "association", "reinforcement", "random mutation ": hide our ignorance - (s) something dissimilar may also be associated. ---
I 321
Method/theory/ChomskyVsQuine: his concept of "reinforcement" is almost empty - if reinforcement is needed for learning, it means that learning cannot happen without data. ---
I 323
Language Learning/ChomskyVsQuine: he does not explain it: if only association and conditioning, then the result is merely a finite language. ---
I 324
VsQuine: concept of probability of a sentence is empty: the fact that I utter a particular German sentence is as unlikely as a particular Japanese sentence from me.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Natural Kinds Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
II 194
natural way / Putnam / Glüer: Putnam s scientistic essentialism determines the reference of names for natural kinds as to be the scientifically discovered essence of the kind - sub-form of externalism - DavidsonVsPutnam

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Natural Kinds Burge
 
Books on Amazon:
Tyler Burge
Fra I 686
Natural Kind/BurgeVsPutnam: Expressions referring to them should not be constructed in an indexical manner nor be analyzed like that. (Twin Earth: "This is water"). The differences in the beliefs do not go back to supposedly hidden indexicality!

Burge I
T. Burge
Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Natural Kinds Millikan
 
Books on Amazon
I 11
Properties/Kind/Millikan: propoerties exist only in the actual world (our real world).
MillikanVsNominalism.
---
I 328
Natural kinds/Putnam/Millikan: Thesis: at least in the case of natural kind-concepts, the intension does not determine the extension. Reason: it is possible that such concepts have identical intensions but different extensions.
Meaning/Putnam: whatever has different extensions, must have different meanings. Therefore, meanings cannot be in the head.
---
I 329
Putnam/Millikan: his argumentation here is that of a realist. Meaning/Millikan: if meanings are not intensions, there must be something else that can determine the reference or the extension.
Natural kind/solution/Putnam: contrary to the appearance natural kind-concepts are indexical. And tradition has always had its difficulties with this.
Extension/Putnam: Thesis: the extension of "water" and "gold" is determined by a relation between the expression token and the extension.
MillikanVsPutnam: that is the reason why he mistakenly thinks that natural kind-concepts are indexical. No problem is solved, but only one is named.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Natural Laws Millikan
 
Books on Amazon
I 263
Natural Law/Millikan: My theory of intentionality is determined on that a thing like a normal explanation is something outside in the world and that is something that supports our thinking rather than being supported by our thinking. For it to be true, natural laws must be in nature, not merely a summation of the patterns of nature. MillikanVsVerificationism: If my theory is correct, verificationism must be false.
Truth/world/relation/Millikan: thesis: ultimately, meaning and truth lie in relations between thought and the world,...
---
I 264
...therefore they cannot be in the head, we cannot internalize them.
MillikanVsPutnam.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Naturalism Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
I 66
Naturalization of content: Separation consciousness/intentionality (SearleVs) SearleVsPutnam/Searle: Meanings are in your head (Intentionality).
Intentionality is biological, teleological: SearleVs: in a case of confusion we needed words like
"Horse or cow" ((s) > disjunction.)

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Nominalism Hacking
 
Books on Amazon
I 185
Nominalism/Hacking: does not affect the existence, but classifying. It is not only due to our way of thinking that we distinguish between grass and straw. The boundaries are not given by nature, the categories are given by the mind, not by nature. Rorty: we cannot divide nature at the joints.- Does not deny the existence of material objects.
I 185
> Idealism: concerns the existence! Nominalism, Traditional/Hacking: believes that categories are a product of the human mind, but not changeable. KuhnVs: even very changeable.
I 185
Nominalism/HackingVsPutnam: concerns the classification, not the objects - Idealism: concerns the objects.

Hack I
I. Hacking
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Object Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 409
Object/thing/language/Internal Realism/world/Putnam: thesis: objects themselves are also made as they are discovered. -FieldVsPutnam: Then you would have to regard non-seperate parts as language-dependent, but they are language independent. ---
Putnam I 247
Realism/reality/objects/Spacetime Points/Putnam: Kripke, Quine, Lewis disagree: what is the relationship between the chair and the spacetime region, which it occupies? - Quine: the chair and his constituent electromagnetic and other fields are one and the same. The chair is the spacetime region. - KripkeVsQuine: both are numerically different objects, however, have the same mass (E.g. statue/clay) - the chair could take another spacetime region. - QuineVsKripke: this evidence is worthless because modal predicates are hopelessly vague. - Lewis: Quine is right, in terms of the chair, but wrong in terms of the modal predicates.- LewisVsKripke: not the chair, but a counterpart to this chair could have been somewhere else. - Putnam: it is nonsense to ask whether the chair is identical with the matter or coexists with it - no convention: if the chair is blue - Convention: whether it is a spacetime region, and if we have to decide that. - Spacetime points: are imagined by some authors as predicates - then the spacetime region is a set of properties. - Putnam: that is a matter of opinion - (> four-dimensionalism).

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Objectivity Field
 
Books on Amazon
I 272f
Definition Objectivity/Mathematics/Gyro/Putnam/Field: should consist in that we believe only the true axioms. (s) objectivity, i.e. subjective, based on propositional attitudes, simultaneously on truth) - Problem: the axioms also refer to the ontology. ---
I 274
Objectivity does not have to be explained in terms of the truth of the axioms - this is not possible in the associated modal propositions. ---
I 277
Objectivity/mathematics/quantum theory/Field: even if we accept "ε" as fixed, the platonic (!) view does not have to assume that the truths are objectively determinated - because there are other totalities over which the quantors can go in a set theory. - Putnam: further: there is no reason to keep "ε" fixed. FieldVsPutnam: confusion of the view that the reference is fixed (e.g. causally) with the view that it is defined by a description theory that contains the word "cause". ---
II 316
Objectivity/Truth/Mathematics/Field: Thesis: even if there are no mathematical objects, why should it not be the case that there is exactly one value of n for which An - modally interpreted - is objectively true? ---
II 316
Mathematical objectivity/Field: for them we do not need to accept the existence of mathematical objects if we presuppose the objectivity of logic - but objectively correct are only sentences of mathematics which can be proved from the axioms. ---
II 319
Mathematical concepts are not causally connected with their predicates - ((s) but conceptually) -E.g. For each choice of a power of the continuum, we can find properties and relations for our set theoretical concepts (here: vocabulary) that make this choice true and another choice wrong. ---
II 320
The defense of axioms is enough to make mathematics (without objects) objective, but only with the broad notion of consistency: that a system is consistent if not every sentence is a consequence of it. ---
II 340
Objectivity/quantity theory/element relation/Field: to determine the specific extension of "e" and "quantity" we also need the physical applications - also for "finity". ---
III 79
Arbitrariness/arbitrary/scalar types/scalar field/mass density/Field: mass density is a very special scalar field which is, because of its logarithmic structure, less arbitrary than the scale for the gravitational potential - ((s) > objectivity, > logarithm.) logarithmic structures are less arbitrary - Mass density: needs more basic concepts than other scalar fields - Scalar field: E.g. Height.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Perception Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
Skirbekk Wahrheitstheorien Frankurt/M 1996
I 28
Meanings in the head (SearleVsPutnam), because perception is self-referential - perception provides itself the fulfillment conditions. ---
Skirbekk I 78ff
Perception/Searle: we perceive the whole house, not just facades, but that is no inference. - perceptiopn is linked to a representation system (e.g. language) -> Goldman. ---
Searle II 296
Perception/Searle: nailed to the world: by the causal self-referentiality of intentional content. - (s) the perception delivers the satisfaction conditions that the object must have) - name/proper name/Searle: here there is no intentional causation.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


Wah
G. Skirbekk (Hg)
Wahrheitstheorien Frankfurt 1977
Properties Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
III 177
Properties/LewisVsPutnam: properties must be something simple - if one follows from another, then that would be a necessary relationship between two simple properties. - Putnam: that would be incomprehensible - wrong solution/Lewis: then properties would have to be interpreted as complexes in turn - LewisVs: properties must be simple - from what should they be composed? - PutnamVsLewis: this is not an analytical style - why should something simple not make any relations? ---
V 119
Properties/identity/Putnam: synonymy is necessary for identity of predicates, not properties - temperature is not synonymous with molecular motion. ---
I 195
Functional property/Putnam: E.g. to have a program is for a computer a functional property instead of a physical - non-functional properties: inputs and outputs - functional properties: are defined by cause and effect. ---
I 195
Reference/Lewis: is a functional property - N.B.: that should undermine the distinction physical/non-physical - Reference is then a functional property of the organism-plus-environment system.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Proximal Theory Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
I 53
Proximal/meaning theory/Davidson: same meaning with the same stimulus patterns - distal: same objects - here it must be translated several times - 1. Comparison of the linguistic response to changes in the environment - 2. own sentence that the radical interpreter himself would express. ---
I 53f
Distal/DavidsonVsQuine: same objects and causes for speakers - here several times translation - DavidsonVsQuine: the proximal theory leads to classical skepticism - e.g. Gavagai: both could mean the same, whereby the same circumstances make all sentences true for one and for the other one all false - proximal/Quine: documents primary - distal/Davidson: truth primary: meaning linked to the truth conditions - Quine/DummettVsEvans: Do not align meaning on truth conditions. - DavidsonVs: too simplified, every theory must relate meaning to truth and to documents - proofs/Davidson: are relations between sentences. - (no last data, only observing records) - VsDistal: Problem: there are probably several candidates for the position of the common cause item. E.g. every more comprehensive segment of the universe to the birth of the speaker for the utterance of "this is red". And so it would be the cause for any other disposition of the speaker - that would equal the meaning of all observation sentences. ---
I 58
Proximal: does not guarantee that our theory of the world applies at all - difference proximal/distal: as between meaning theories which a) assigns to the evidence (proximal, stimulus pattern) or b) to the truth (distal, objects) the primary status - Quine pro a) (proximal) ---
I 58
QuineVsEvans/DummettVsEvans: meaning not from truth conditions - instead: proximal theory: stimulus patterns (evidence) instead of objects - this is simplistic, since every meaning theory has to relate meaning to truth and to documents. ---
I 59
DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsDummett: VsProximal theory: skepticism, relativization on the individual - cartesian. ---
I 59
Evidence/Davidson: must be relations between propositions - the theory cannot support this from the outside. ---
I 61
Proximal meaning theory - similar to Descartes, Dummett, Frege - stimulus patterns instead of objects is decisive. ---
II 53
DavidsonVs social character of meaning: also idiolect is in principle interpretable (via causal hypotheses).

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Qualities Field
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 409
Primary qualities/Locke: E.g. length, size, shape - secondary: e.g. color. - secondary quality/Locke: do not resemble our ideas directly - Putnam thesis: Kant has that what Locke said about secondary extended to primary - Field: many say that today because the imaging theory is dead. - FieldVsPicture theory. - Locke color is a force to affect us. - Putnam: this also applies to size, charge, mass,...etc. - Putnam: even extends this to properties of sensations - but this force is not a noumenon, but the world itself (= Vs correspondence theory - (s): forces instead of objects). Problem: if electrons do not exist as noumena, they do not exist at all. ---
I 410
Qualities/Locke: secondary are founded in primary: the objects have the power to affect us by the length, size, mass, etc. of the corpuscles - otherwise bare facts. - "Things for us"/Putnam/Field: according to the limits of scientific research. ---
I 412
I.e. shape, etc. are only dispo, we will never represent the last properties, so and so to appear - we will never represent the last properties - FieldVsPutnam: that can never be proven.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Quote/Disquotation Putnam
 
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Rorty VI 87
Truth/Putnam: we cannot get around, that there is some sort of truth, any kind of accuracy, that has substance, and not merely owes the "disquotation". This means that the normative cannot be eliminated. Putnam: this accuracy cannot only apply for a time and a place. (RortyVsPutnam). ---
Putnam I 144f
Disquotation/Putnam: says that criterion W is correct, but not how one can define "true" so that the criterion will be met - disquotation does not allow also, to remove the predicate "true" from all contexts. - E.g. with what sentence, which does not contain "true", shall this be equivalent: "If the premises of a conclusion of the form p or q, not p, so q, are both true in S, then the conclusion is also true in S"? - Tarski's theory goes beyond disquotation because it provides an equivalence with variables and quantifiers that alone does not provide the disquotation.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Rationality Hacking
 
Books on Amazon
I 38
Rationality / Hacking: not so important for science - VsPutnam: reason and truth do not have to be so closely related.

Hack I
I. Hacking
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Realism Field
 
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I 249ff
Truth/Realism/Field: does not want to claim truth as a metaphorical concept about the theory but instead the theory itself. - The existence of mathematical entities follows from the theory itself, not from the truth of the theory (in the sense of correspondence theory). ---
II 120
Realism/Variant/Field: here: Thesis: "There are sentences in our language that are true, but for which we shall never have a reason to believe them." - Then you need a T-concept to generalize. (> Infinite conjunction/disjunction). - Anti-realism/variant: would be the opposite position here: to identify truth with justifiability in the long run. - (> ideal justification). ---
Horwich I 405 f
Metaphysical Realism/Field: three game styles. Metaphysical realism 1: there are mind-independent objects - metaphysical realism 2: There is only one correct description (FieldVs) - metaphysical realism 3: correspondence theory - a refutation of metaphysical realism 3 is not yet one of metaphysical realism 1. ---
I 414
PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Thesis: metaphysical realism leads to a dichotomy facts/values. -> Relativism - this refutes itself. - Dichotomy between evaluative (pseudo-facts, nonfactual) and non-evaluative facts. - FieldVsPutnam/Field per relativism: we can refer the relativism to purely evaluative statements (not facts). - Garfinkel: the relativism itself is no valuation. - Internal Realism/Putnam: our standards of rationality are objectively correct.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Realism Nagel
 
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The mere recognition of a distinction between appearance and reality provides no way to discover reality. I 119

Def Internal realism: our seemingly objective world view should be understood as if it was essentially a creative product of our language and our points of view, the truth of our beliefs is to be understood as their continuation in the context of an ideal development of the corresponding point of view.
I 130
Putnam: Def truth is nothing but "idealized rational acceptability". LL. And as long as "acceptability" means the same as "acceptability for us", the logical gap between thought and the world will disappear.

NagelVsPutnam: The internal realism fails on its own test of rational acceptability. What we actually accept is a worldview which confirms or denies our perceptions. Even our interpretation of quantum theory and the related observations would be a view of the suchness of the world, even if a physicist says it could not be interpreted realistically.
It would not eb a view that would rightly be limited by means of an "internalist" interpretation. Our point of view is a set of beliefs that concern the real suchness, while admitting that there is much we do not know.
The only method for establishing the rational acceptability is to think about whether it is true. I 130 ff

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

Realism Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
II 87
Realism/SearleVsNaive: is right that the material objects and experiences are the typical objects of perception. - But he overlooks the fact that they can only be it because perception has an intentional content. ---
II 199
Realism/Searle: no hypothesis or belief, realism belongs to the background. I am set to the background - Realism is a prerequisite for hypotheses - being determined to realism itself is not a hypothesis.
---
III 160f
External Realism/Searle: must still differ between representation-independent (e.g. stars) and mind-independent (also stars)- e.g. pain is representation-independent but not mind-independent. ---
III 165
Realism/Searle: thesis says that there is an independent reality, not about how it is designed, no theory of language, no theory of representation, but ontological. ---
III 163f
Realism/Searle: should not be confused with correspondence theory, it is no theory of truth - it is a condition for our hypotheses - it is compatible with any truth theory because it is a theory of ontology and not the meaning of "true" - no semantic theory - Putnam understands realism epistemically: the realism asserts that it would be reasonable to assume a divine standpoint -SearleVsPutnam: accepting a mistake that reality determines itself what vocabulary is appropriate. ---
III 165
Searle: realism is not a theory of language - VsTradition: N.B.: realism is not a theory about how the world "really" is. - Reason: we could be wrong about all the details, and the realism can nevertheless be true.- Definition realism/Searle: the view that there is a way of being of the things that is logically independent of all representations, it does not say how things are. ---
III 166
Realism/Searle: arguments against the existence of things are claims about the external reality like any other. They presuppose the realism just as others do. - The non-existence of things ((s) "out there") - would be a property of that representation-independent reality. ---
III 191
External Realism/Searle: is a condition for understanding other hypotheses. ---
III 169
Realism/Searle: says that there is an independent reality, but nothing about how it is designed, no theory of language, no theory of representation, but ontological.
---
III 193 ff
Realism: thesis: has no hypothesis, but conditions for any hypotheses - realism as part of the background.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Realism Boyd
 
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Horwich I 492
Scientific Realism/Richard Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd's defense of the scientific realism is much more complex than what we have seen so far: ---
Horw I 493
Does it require a substantial (explanatory) scientific concept? Boyd: more indirect way than Putnam: the (approximate) truth of our theories explains the instrumental reliability of our methods.
Method/Boyd: method is not theory neutral! On the contrary, because they are formed by our theories, it is their truth which explains the success of the methods.
Boyd/M. Williams: thus he turns a well-known argument on the head: BoydVsPositivism.
Positivism/Theory: Thesis: the language of observation must be theory neutral. Likewise the methodological principles.
IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory Neutrality. e.g. Kuhn: the scientific community establishes the "facts".
Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd cleverly makes the theory-ladenness of our methodological judgments the basis of his realism. These methods, which are so loaded as our theory, would not work if the corresponding theories were not "approximately true in a relevant manner".
N.B.: one cannot accuse him of making an unacceptable rigid separation of theory and observation.
Ad. 1. Vs: that invalidates the first objection
Ad. 2. Vs: Boyd: it would be a miracle if our theory-loaded methods worked, although the theories proved to be wrong. There is no explanation for scientific realism.
Ad. 3. Vs:
---
Horw I 494
M. Williams: this is not VsScientific realism but VsPutnam: PutnamVsBoyd: arguments such as those of Boyd establish a causal role for the scientific concept.
BoydVsPutnam: they do not do that at all: "true" is only a conventional expression, which does not add any explanatory power to scientific realism.
Truth/explanation/realism/Boyd/M. Williams: explaining the success of our methods by the truth of our theories boils down to say that the methods with which we investigate particles work because the world consists of such particles that are more or less the way we think.
Conclusion: but it makes no difference whether we explain this success (of our methods) by the truth of the theories or by the theories themselves!
M. Williams pro deflationism: so we need no substantial concept of truth.
---
Horw I 494
Truth/M.Williams: truth has no substantial role - and no explanatory role: no difference whether we explain success by truth of theory or by theory itself (pro deflationism) Scientific Realism/M. Williams: some might object that according to the scientific realism our present theories are not true in one way or another, but simply and literally true.
M. Williams: that can be, but even the deflationist truth is in a sense realistic, because it does not insist on reconstructing the scientific concept epistemically.
---
Horw I 495
Anti-Realism/Boyd: (BoydVsAnti-Realism/BoydVsDummett): two types: a) "empirical" thesis that theories must be re-interpreted instrumentalistically
b) "constructivist" thesis (Kuhn): that the world must be constructed from the theoretical tradition of the scientific community

M. Williams: if that means that objects are not simply "given", then practically everyone is constructivist today.
Deflationism/M. Williams: deflationism does not have to face any version of constructivism.
Boyd/M. Williams: his scientific realism does not ask whether a substantial explanation is necessary in terms of "correspondence." His realism is more "empirical" (in Kant's sense) than "transcendental". It is not concerned with truth but with empirical relations between truths.

Boyd I
Richard Boyd
The Philosophy of Science Cambridge 1991


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Reference Hacking
 
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I 146f
Reference/Extension/Theory/Meaning Change/Putnam: E.g. acid: today, we mean something different when we use the word. - Putnam: yet we are talking about the same thing. - HackingVsPutnam: E.g. Lavoisier held all views accepted today plus the wrong one that all acids contain oxygen. - In spite of the mistake he spoke of the same acids. - Today: Normal acids and Bronsted Lovry acids cover all acids - but they are mutually exclusive. - Only in special cases it is necessary to know which one you mean.

Hack I
I. Hacking
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Reference Lewis
 
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Horwich I 437
Elite classes/nature/natural reference/world/language/Lewis/Putnam: thesis: there are certain classes of things -out there- (elite classes) which are intrinsically different, while it is a natural condition for reference (integrated in nature) that as many of our concepts as possible should refer to these elite classes. - PutnamVs: that’s spooky. ---
Schw I 149
New theory of reference/Putnam: Reference has nothing to do with associated description - so pain might actually be joy. (Kripke ditto) - LewisVsPutnam: Solution: Role: pain cannot play the role of Joy. ---
Schw I 217
Reference/description theory of reference/Lewis: Thesis: expressions such as possible worlds, meanings, pain, objective probability are associated with roles that determine what they refer to. ---
Putnam II 195 f
Reference/Lewis: is a functional property. (See property/Put) - Important argument: to be distinguished in physical/non-physical - Reference is then a functional property of the organism-plus-environment system - then the commonality of references is just as abstract as a program, but does not require any fundamental quantities. - PutnamVsLewis: Reference is no functional property, no causality or causality is nothing physical. - (> Charles Fried)

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Reference Rorty
 
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Richard Rorty
I 96
Reference: for each distinction between referees of expressions one needs some ontological categories, anything, even coarse to tailor the things.
I 317f
RortyVsPutnam, RortyVsKripke: If the concept of "really talk about" is confused with the concept of reference, one can easily get the idea like Kripke and Putnam that we had "intuitions" about the reference. Of course, there can be no reference to fictions. This corresponds to the technical-scientific use. But then "reference" has nothing to do with "talk about", and only comes into play after you have made a choice between the interpretive strategies.
I 316ff
Real questions of existence are also not affected by the criterion of Searle and Strawson. What is then the right criterion? Rorty: there is none at all.
I 321
For Davidsons ’pure’ philosophy of language neither one nor the other is necessary. - - -
Horwich I 450
Reference/Davidson: is a byproduct of the translation - reference/Kripke: causation must have something to do with reference - Reference/Strawson: you find out what somebody is referring to by finding out for what most of his beliefs are true. - RI: reconciles the two approaches: Strawson right when he is understood holistically. - Quine: middle position between Kripke and Strawson: knowledge of causation and reference is a matter of the coherence of the beliefs of the natives and the field linguists. - Kripke: modular approach: causal paths of objects to speech acts - then all beliefs can also be wrong - That means that one does not know what one is referring to. - DavidsonVsKripke: this is precisely the gap between conceptual scheme and content. - Solution/Davidson: reversed: first maximize coherence and truth, then reference as a byproduct - then it can be as it likes! - Important argument: This ensures that in the most direct cases the intentional objects are the causes of the beliefs - the Gödel-Schmitt case must then be an exception. - I 451 otherwise the term of reference had no content. - (like analytical). RI/DavidsonVsKripke: works if we know most of the intentional objects of the native. - RI begins at home: we assume for ourselves and for the native that most beliefs are true - (I 452 that requires no causality!) - then we have to reject intermediate links "the determined meaning" or "intended interpretation", "imaginations". - Meaning/belief/Quine/Davidson: cannot be found out independently of one another.
Rorty I 323
Reference Theory/PutnamVscausal reference theory/Putnam/Rorty: a "causal" reference theory cannot help: - because the question of how the term "cause" can clearly refer to something is just as enigmatic as the question of how the term "cat" can do it.
IV 23
Reference/Reference Theory/Putnam/Rorty: early: only causal theory of reference - not intentional - can spare us from relativism. - ((s) later: non-intentional theory does not explain learning.)

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Reference Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
II 289
Reference/Searle: linguistic reference always comes from intellectual terms. ---
II 313f
Names/Meaning/Reference/Searle: E.g. Goedel/Schmidt: intentional content determines reference: "discoverer, no matter whatever his name is" - we are talking about the person who has been recognized by their contemporaries - e.g. exchanged stains: identification: "the stain which causes the experience "- variant forgetting: "the one I was previously able to identify as A". ---
II 316
Twin Earth/Reference/Searle: Reference cannot rely on descriptive content, our names still refer to our domestic objects, when the perceptual situation is unchanged - SearleVsPutnam: causal self-referentiality is sufficient.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Relativism Rorty
 
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Richard Rorty
I 304
Relativism: The assertion that truth and reference are "relative to a conceptual system" sounds as if it said more. But that is not the case as long as our system of concepts simply stands for the things which we currently believe.
II 36
RortyVsHabermas: needs an Archimedean point to criticize Foucault for his "relativism".
II 152
Cultural relativism: is not relativistic as long as relativism amounts to the assertion that every moral view is as good as any other. Rorty: our moral conception is much better than any competing view. It’s one thing to make the false assertion that there is no difference between us and the Nazis. A very different thing is to represent the correct assertion that there is no neutral common ground on which a Nazi and I can retreat to discuss.
III 87
Schumpeter: "the insight that the validity of one’s own beliefs is only relative, and yet stand up for them fearlessly, distinguishes a civilized man from a barbarian" Berlin: one must not ask for more.
IV 11
Relativism/cultural relativism/RortyVsPutnam: false solution: a transcultural point of view. - That would be just another God point of view: ideal truth as limiting concept.
V 20
Cultures have no axiomatic structures. The fact that they have institutionalized norms actually says the same thing as Foucault’s thesis: that knowledge and power can never be separated. If you do not believe in certain things at a certain place at a certain time, you probably have to atone for it.
VI 74
Relativism/Realism/PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsRelativism/Rorty: both assume that one could simultaneously be both inside and outside language.
VI 77f
Fascism/relativism/truth/Sartre/Rorty: E.g. tomorrow, after my death, people can decide to introduce fascism - then fascism will be the human truth. - RortyVsSartre: not the truth - the truth would have been forgotten. - Putnam: Truth is a third instance between the camps. - RortyVsPutnam: correctness instead of truth - namely, according to our standards. - According to what other standards, teh ones of the fascists?.
VI 79
Justification of the standards/Rorty: from our self-improvement.
VI 246
Cultural relativism/Rorty: I am of the opinion that our Western culture is more than others. But this kind of relativism is not irrationalism. One does not have to be an irrationalist if one abstains from making one’s own network of beliefs as coherent and transparent as possible.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Representation Cartwright
 
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I 56
Representation / Putnam / Cartwright: nothing represents the facts - not even the simplest sentences e.g. about the cookies in the oven - even the laws of physics do not represent.   CartwrightVsPutnam: generalizations of biology and engineering do represent, but not the fundamental laws.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

Science Hacking
 
Books on Amazon
I 149f
Science / Meaning / Hacking: types of items instead of important species - VsPutnam: Reference ultimately not decisive. - first examine the role: whatever ... - (similar Fregean sense) - Progress: if this sense is not the object, then new baptism - (> name).
I 265
Science / HackingVsPopper: not always refutation of the theory. - E.g. discovery of the background radiation was just something new.

Hack I
I. Hacking
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Transformational Grammar Chomsky
 
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Noam Chomsky
I 271
Chomsky: thesis: in any language, surface structures are produced by "grammatical transformation" from "deep structures" - Definition transformation: Representation of an indexed bracket on an indexed bracket, e.g. [S[NPJohn][VP is [AP Certain] [VP ...] - deep structure: even an indexed bracket - the large class of deep structure is specified by basic rules - deep structure: subject and predicate may be exchanged - deep structures are limited in their variance. ---
I 296
Transformation/Grammar/ChomskyVsPutnam: Transformations are not rules but operations - (for creating surface structures from deep structures). ---
Strawson VI 395
Transformational grammar Vs traditional grammar: it is supposed to be too unsystematic, no explanation with the traditional concepts "verb" , "noun", "object" is possible - transformational grammer Vs formal logic. ---
397 VI
Grammar/Strawson: must distinguish between essential and non-essential connections.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006


Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Translation Poundstone
 
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I 327
Translation / Twin Earth / PoundstoneVsPutnam Version: e.g. assume there is a text of Schiller: "The Maid of Orleans" - but a translation would be Urfaust - then we could have a slogan: "meanings are not in the book" - Vs: such a translation would not be possible because the word frequencies would give the same pattern in each translation - Solution: Algorithm completely modified the text - N.B.: there is no evidence that the Voynich manuscript is not a translation of a known text.
W. Poundstone
I W. Poundstone Im Labyrinth des Denkens, Reinbek 1995
Truth Harman
 
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Horwich I 422
Truth / HarmanVsPutnam: it is not merely idealized rational acceptability - it involves a relation between an observation or thought and the way things are in the world.
Horwich I 427
idealized acceptability / HarmanVsPutnam: truth can not be identified with idealized acceptability, but because there are trivial but unacceptable truths .

Harm I
G. Harman
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Twin Earth Davidson
 
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Twin earth: brain state identical, mental state different.
Davidson I 29
Twin Earth/Davidson: before the difference comes out, one believes to have water in front of him, the other twin earth water, but no one knows what he believes because he cannot claim to believe anything else than the other - no psychological difference - Putnam: therefore, external-subjective factors are responsible for the "object of thought" - DavidsonVsPutnam: he does not know what he believes, but he still knows what he thinks: that would only follow if the object what is used to identify my thoughts would be something for which I should be able to do a differentiation. - I do not run the risk of holding water for twin earth water because I do not know what that is. - I also do not think to see water, and I am right because it is possibly not water, but twin earth water. I know that I think that because I know that I believe that the substance has the same structure as the one I have learned the word of - even if the twins are interchanged in sleep, no one is mistaken about what he thinks himself. - Conclusion: subjective states do not arise from brain states - but from external differences (water/twin earth water). ---
I 30
Twin earth: Belief content is not known to the subject - distinction is not necessary, not possible at all. - No opposite is conscious - subjective states no consequence of brain states. Fallacy/Deception: The possibility of error is only then intelligible if a special psychological relation to the object of the "thought-content" is assumed, which should serve for identification.
---
I 31
Belief/knowledge/thinking/twin earth/Davidson: Conclusion: propositional attitudes are truly psychological states - you always know what you think. There is always an advantage in favor of the thinker himself in the question of what is going on in consciousness. ---
I 32
Belief/thinking/knowledge/propositional attitudes/content/twin earth/Davidson: Object, not of thinking, (twin earth water), but the object, which regularly indicates the state of consciousness (from learning history). ---
Frank I 658
Twin Earth/Davidson: Everyone says the truth because the words mean different things - narrow (inner) states are equal - but they believe different things: A believes that water is in front of him, B, twin earth water (but calls it water) - Putnam (among others): no one knows what he thinks - DavidsonVs: the speaker is certainly right, because he has learned the word in his environment.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Twin Earth Dennett
 
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I 572
Twin Earth/Putnam/DennettVsPutnam: he calls for a leap in reference, a leap in intentionality.
I 573f
Dennett: one could now tend to think that the inner intentionality had a certain "inertia". The brain cannot focus on one thing and mean another. (Wittgenstein). Twin Earth/Dennett/VsPutnam: you cannot tell a story under the assumption that tables are no tables, even though they look like tables and are used like tables.
Anything else would be a "living creature that looks like Fury" (but is not Fury).
But if there are "Butterhorses" on the twin earth which are in all aspects like our horses, then Butterhorses are horses - not an earthly sort of horses, but horses after all.
((s) that is why the twin earth water does have a different chemical formula in Putnam: YXZ.
Dennett: of course you can also represented a stricter opinion, according to which the non-earthly horses are a separate species. Both is possible. ((s) VsDennett: it depends on how you define determination). ((s) that only works with "hidden" properties)
Twin Earth/DennettVsPutnam: he tries to close the gap by saying that we are referring to natural types, whether we know it or not.
Dennett: But what types are natural? A breed is as natural as a species or a genus.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Twin Earth Poundstone
 
Books on Amazon
I 323
Twin Earth/PoundstoneVsPutnam: long molecular chains correspond with sticky liquids - then no confusability - the water would be undrinkable - thought experiments: physical feasibility is relevant - Twin Earth/Poundstone: only possible connection: hydrogen/oxygen (peroxide): extremely unstable. when ammonia is liquid, mercury is fixed - completely different world - (s) H2O/XYZ cannot be the only change then - (s) Poundstone argues holistically - Putnam: _ identical experiences - but more than a reality that fits to it. ---
I 327
Translation/Twin Earth/PoundstoneVsPutnam: Variant: supposing there is a text of "Schiller", "The Maid of Orleans" - but translation would result into Urfaust - then slogan: "meanings are not in the book" - Vs: such a translation would not be possible because the word frequencies would have to give the same pattern in each translation - solution: algorithm which completely modifies the text - N.B.: there is no evidence that the Voynich manuscript is not a translation of a known text.
W. Poundstone
I W. Poundstone Im Labyrinth des Denkens, Reinbek 1995
Twin Earth Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
II 89
Twin earth/fulfilment condition/Searle: what is decisive in the content that the presence of Sally and not twin earth-Sally is one of the fulfilment conditions? - (Qualitatively identical visual experiences) - how to determine that, is not the question, but what has been identified here on Earth before, may fulfill the conditions - SearleVs: this is the viewpoint of the 3rd person, but we need the 1st person. ---
apropos II 255
Twin Earth: Putnam(s) not a different type of water (tradition) but a different type of liquid. ---
II 283
Self-reference/Searle: is shown, but not seen - Twin Earth: "this man" different Fregean sense, although experiences are type-identical: perception and expression are self-referential, they would not be satisfied when exchanged - self-reference/Frege's "completing sense": intentional contents are never undefined (SearleVsQuine: no undefined sailboat can be desired). ---
II 316
Twin Earth/reference/Searle: reference cannot rely on descriptive content, our names would still relate with identical perceptual situation to our domestic objects - SearleVsPutnam: causal self-reference is not enough.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Unintended Models Field
 
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II 264
Unintended/Non-standard model/NSM/Field: Problem: we cannot simply say that the non-standard model is unintended. ---
II 265
Non-disquotational view: here it is only meaningful to speak of "unintended", if we can state by what facts about our practice these models are unintend - and precisely because these models make each of our sentences just as true, the specification of such facts appears to be impossible. ---
II 267
Applying/Explanation/Observing/Field: our observation practice explains how our physical vocabulary applies to all that and only that to which it applies to. - That explains why some non-standard models are unintended. ---
II 319
Unintended Model/Interpretation/Putnam/Field: there is nothing in our use of the set theoretical predicates that could make an interpretation "unintended". - (VsObjectivity of mathematics). - FieldVsPutnam: but this cannot be extended to the number theory. ---
II 320
Not every objective statement is formalizable. - E.g. Consequences with the quantifier "only finitely many".

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

World/Thinking Putnam
 
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McDowell I 177
PutnamVsDavidson: when the cause-effect description is complete, then the sounds we utter, cannot be more than a mere "expression of our subjectivity". RortyVsPutnam: Putnam understands by a "Declaration of X" still a synopsis, the synthesis of external and internal position.
Representatives of disquotation believe that people can only be described in behaviorist manner. But why should it be impossible to consider supplements by normative representations? (Putnam's philosophy was ultimately traditional).
---
McDowell I 177
Causality/Putnam: the desire to tell a story about the causal relationships of human pronouncements and environment, does not rule out that one invents a story, after the speakers expressing thoughts, and make assertions, and try to not make mistakes. These stories are then eventually not distinguishable.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

The author or concept searched is found in the following 59 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Adaptionism Dennett Vs Adaptionism
 
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I 359
DennettVsAdaptionism / mimicry: there is a temptation to say, when the forest floor looked different, the butterfly had a different color. But that is not justified. It does not have to be true too! (Dennett otherwise pro)   The Adaptionist would ask: why do all the doors in this village have the hinges on the left? Answer: there is no reason for it, it s just a historical accident. (Dennett pro).
Münch III 375
DennettVsAdaptionism: is in danger to construe the entire building out of nothing, like mentalism does.
I 382
Theory /Dennett: adaptionism and mentalism are not theories in the traditional sense! They are attitudes and strategies to organize data to explain relationships and nature to ask questions. - - -

III 376
Pangloss/Dennett: you can use this position to open up the completeness of a list of conditions. DobzhanskyVsAdaptionism: 1956 (in the spirit of Gould and Lewontin): The usefulness of a feature cannot be taken for granted.
CainVsDobzhansky: 1964. Also, the uselessness cannot be taken for granted.
III 379
Explanation/DennettVsPutnam: an explanation on a micro-physical level is not inconsistent with an explanation on rational grounds. Adaptionism/Dennett: the more complex the condition, the less likely appears the rational reason. But the truth of a non-adaptionist story does not require the falsehood of all adaptationist stories.
We should accept Pangloss’ assumption.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Mü I
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Boyd, R. Putnam Vs Boyd, R.
 
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Horwich I 492
Scientific Realism/Richard Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd's defense of scientific realism is much more complex than what we have considered so far:
I 493
Is a substantial (explanatory) truth concept necessary? Boyd: more indirect approach than Putnam: the (approximate) truth of our theories explains the instrumental reliability of our methods.
Method/Boyd: is not theory neutral! On the contrary, because they are formed by our theories, it is their truth that explains the success of the methods.
Boyd/M. Williams: thus it turns a well-known argument on its head: BoydVsPositivism.
Positivism/Theory: Thesis: the observing language must be theory neutral. The methodological principles likewise.
IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory Neutrality. E.g. Kuhn: the scientific community determines the "facts".
Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd turns the theory ladenness of our methodological judgments very cleverly into the base of his realism. Thesis: Methods that are as theory-laden as ours would not work if the corresponding theories were not "approximately true in a relevant way".
Point: thus he cannot be blamed of making an unacceptably rigid separation between theory and observation.
Ad. 1) Vs: this invalidates the first objection
Ad. 2) Vs: Boyd: it would be a miracle if our theory-laden methods functioned even though the theories proved to be false. For scientific realism, there is nothing to explain here.
Ad. 3) Vs:
I 494
M. Williams: this is not VsScientific Realism, but VsPutnam: PutnamVsBoyd: arguments like that of Boyd do not establish a causal explanatory role for the truth concept.
BoydVsPutnam: they don't do that: "true" is only a conventional expression which adds no explanatory power to the scientific realism.
Truth/Explanation/Realism/Boyd/M. Williams: explaining the success of our methods with the truth of our theories boils down to saying that the methods by which we examine particles work, because the world is composed of such particles that are more or less the way we think.
Conclusion: but it makes no difference whether we explain this success (of our methods) by the truth of the theories or by the theories themselves!
M. Williams pro Deflationism: so we do not need a substantial truth concept.
- - -
Putnam I 80
Convergence/Putnam: there is something to the convergence of scientific knowledge! Science/Theory/Richard Boyd: Thesis: from the usual positivist philosophy of science merely follows that later theories imply many observation sentences of earlier ones, but not that later theories must imply the approximate truth of the earlier ones! (1976).
Science/Boyd: (1) terms of a mature science typically refer
(2) The laws of a theory that belongs to a mature science are typically approximately true. (Boyd needs more premises).
I 81
Boyd/Putnam: the most important thing about these findings is that the concepts of "truth" and "reference" play a causally explanatory role in epistemology. When replacing them in Boyd with operationalist concept, for example, "is simple and leads to true predictions", the explanation is not maintained.
Truth/Theory/Putnam: I do not only want to have theories that are "approximately true", but those that have the chance to be true.
Then the later theories must contain the laws of the earlier ones as a borderline case.
PutnamVsBoyd: according to him, I only know that T2 should imply most of my observation sentences that T1 implies. It does not follow that it must imply the truth of the laws of T1!
I 82
Then there is also no reason why T2 should have the property that we can assign reference objects to the terms of T1 from the position of T2. E.g. Yet it is a fact that from the standpoint of the RT we can assign a reference object to the concept "gravity" in the Newtonian theory, but not to others: for example, phlogiston or ether.
With concepts such as "is easy" or "leads to true predictions" no analogue is given to the demand of reference.
I 85/86
Truth/Boyd: what about truth if none of the expressions or predicates refers? Then the concept "truth value" becomes uninteresting for sentences containing theoretical concepts. So truth will also collapse. PutnamVsBoyd: this is perhaps not quite what would happen, but for that we need a detour via the following considerations:
I 86
Intuitionism/Logic/Connectives/Putnam: the meaning of the classical connectives is reinterpreted in intuitionism: statements:
p p is asserted p is asserted to be provable

"~p" it is provable that a proof of p would imply the provability of 1 = 0. "~p" states the absurdity of the provability of p (and not the typical "falsity" of p).

"p u q" there is proof for p and there is proof for q

"p > q" there is a method that applied to any proof of p produces proof of q (and proof that this method does this).
I 87
Special contrast to classical logic: "p v ~p" classical: means decidability of every statement.
Intuitionistically: there is no theorem here at all.
We now want to reinterpret the classical connectives intuitionistically:
~(classical) is identical with ~(intuitionist)
u (classical) is identified with u (intuitionist)
p v q (classical) is identified with ~(~p u ~q)(intuitionist)
p > q (classical) is identified with ~(p u ~q) (intuitionist)
So this is a translation of one calculus into the other, but not in the sense that the classical meanings of the connectives were presented using the intuitionistic concepts, but in the sense that the classical theorems are generated. ((s) Not translation, but generation.)
The meanings of the connectives are still not classical, because these meanings are explained by means of provability and not of truth or falsity (according to the reinterpretation)).
E.g. Classical means p v ~p: every statement is true or false.
Intuitionistically formulated: ~(~p u ~~p) means: it is absurd that a statement and its negation are both absurd. (Nothing of true or false!).

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Burge, T. Davidson Vs Burge, T.
 
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I 74
Burge: Two types externalism: a) Social: Meaning depends on social practices (community - b) on the causal history of the person. DavidsonVsBurge: a) our intuition does not suggest that the meaning of a speaker is determined by other speakers. b) Which group should be outstanding? c) an unconscious elite in the background is problematic.
Burge: in order to have a thought about water, you just have to be in contact with water, you don’t have to prove anything.
DavidsonVsBurge: even a false thought about water is one about water. - VsBurge: Community not causally involved
Burge: radiation patterns or physically described stimuli make everything infinitely complicated. DavidsonVs: Complicated for whom? It is us humans who make all these classifications and groupings! We group according to similarities that are obvious to ourselves.
I 116
DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsBurge: The fact that he focuses so strongly on the everyday situation through the triangulation sets him apart from the externalism of Putnam and Burges.
II 53
DavidsonVsSocial character of meaning: even idiolect interpretable in principle (via causal hypotheses).
II 167
Burge and Dummett think that what speakers mean by their words depended very much on how the community used those words. DavidsonVsDummett, DavidsonVsBurge: Complete nonsense, because it has nothing to do with successful communication! If you speak differently than the community, and someone finds out, then you can communicate all day long. And that happens all the time.
- - -
Frank I 665
Contents/Thoughts/Externalism/Burge/Davidson: Content is not determined by what is happening in the person, or by what is easily accessible for them through careful reflection. (E.g. incorrectly used terms, information gaps). DavidsonVsBurge: I’m not sure how these assertions are to be understood, because I’m not sure how serious talk of a "direct acquaintance" with a content is to be taken.
But the first person authority is seriously compromised by that.
Therefore, I must reject one of the premises of Burge.
1) I agree that content is not only determined or "fixed" by what is going on inside me.
2) VsBurge: Vs representation of the way in which social and other external factors control the contents.
Fra I 665/666
DavidsonVsBurge: His characteristics are not as relevant as he makes them look: E.g. Suppose I believe that "arthritis" is only used for calcium-induced arthritis. My friend Arthur knows better. We both say honestly to Smith: "Carl has arthritis’.
Burge: Then our words mean the same thing, we mean the same and express the same belief. My mistake is irrelevant for what I thought on this occasion.
Reason: that’s what everyone (who is not tainted by philosophy) would say about Arthur and me.
DavidsonVsBurge: I doubt that he is right, but even if he were right, it would not prove his point:
Ordinary attributions of meanings and attitudes are based on far-reaching and vague assumptions about what speaker and listener have in common.
If some assumptions are not confirmed, we can change the words we used often change drastically.
We usually choose the easy way: we take a speaker by his word, even if that does not fully account for one aspect of his thought.
E.g. if Smith informs a third party about what Arthur and I both believe about arthritis, then he may mislead its listeners!
Fra I 667
If he is careful, he would add, "But Davidson thinks arthritis is calcium-induced". The fact that this addition is necessary shows that the simple attribution was not right.
BurgeVs: could reply that the report is literally correct ((s) because also the wrong-believer sincerely believes that it is arthritis).
DavidsonVsBurge: That overlooks the extent to which the contents of a belief depend on of the contents of other beliefs. Therefore, there can be no simple rigid rule for the attribution of a single thought.
Burge: social determination of contents also leads to the fact that we usually mean what others mean in the community. "certain responsibility towards the group practice".
DavidsonVsBurge: I do not deny it, but that does not show what is supposed to show:
a) It is often reasonable to make people responsible for ensuring that they know the meaning of their words. But this has nothing to do with what they want to say!
b) As a good citizens, we want to increase the opportunities for communication, but that only explains our "legalistic" attribution of meanings and beliefs.
((s) that the meanings are not so).
c) A speaker who wants to be understood, must have the intention that his words are interpreted in a certain way, and consequently the way others do. And vice versa, the listener wants to interpret the words as the speaker does. This has moral weight, but it has no necessary connection with the determination of what anyone thinks.
I 667/668
Externalism/Social community/Meaning/Meaning/DavidsonVsBurge: We are not forced to give the words of a person the meanings that they have in their language community. It is also not true that we cannot help but to interpret their propositional attitudes on the same basis.
I 710
Self-knowledge/Burge: Error excluded (immune), because reflection in the same act. DavidsonVsBurge: that only shows that you cannot make a mistake in identifying the contents.
It does not show why you cannot be wrong about the existence of the attitude.
Worse: Burge cannot show that the two kinds of knowledge (1st and 2nd order) have the same subject.
As long as the asymmetry is not explained by recourse to the social situation (relationships between the speakers), I doubt that a non-skeptical solution is possible.
I 711
Representation/Perceptual knowledge/Burge: It cannot generally be wrong that the representations represent that from which they usually originate and to which they are applied. DavidsonVsBurge: I have long been of this view, but I do not understand why Burge is of this view.
How do we decide where representations usually originate? Circular: "from what they represent."
But which of the many possible causes is the right one? Incidents in the nervous system, stimulation patterns of nerve endings, or a little further out? (proximal/distal).
Burge: We should be watch out for the relation of different observers: they have similar perceptions. Perception is "impersonal".
DavidsonVsBurge: But that is exactly what should be proved!
We need not only causal interaction between different observers and the same objects, but the right kind of causal interaction.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Carnap, R. Putnam Vs Carnap, R.
 
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Goodman II Putnam Foreword
Carnap / Putnam:according to Putnam Carnap has the constant tendency to identify terms with their syntactic representations (> Put I 48).
Carnap suggested that a predicate can also be disjunctive or non-disjunctive in itself,
PutnamVsCarnap: Ex "logical sky" Ex "is to tell us" e.g. "metaphysical pointer".

- - -
Lewis IV 85
Partial Interpretation/PutnamVsCarnap: theories with false observation consequences have no interpretation! Because they have no "model" that is "standard" with respect to the observation concepts.
IV 85/86
Putnam: such interpretations are wrong then, not pointless! Sense/Theory/LewisVsPutnam: the theoretical concept are also not meaningless here, but denotation-less (without denotation): their sense is given by their denotation in those possible worlds in which the theory is uniquely implemented and thus has no wrong consequences there.
They have a sense as well as the reference-less term "Nicholas".
- - -
Putnam V 244
Pain/Physical Object/Putnam: It is difficult to understand that the statement that a table stands in front of someone is easier to accept than the statement that someone is in pain. Popper/Carnap: would respond: the methodological difference consists in that one of them is public and the other is private.
PutnamVsPopper/VsCarnap: both exaggerate the extent to which observations of physical objects are always publicly verifiable.
- - -
V 250
Method/Science/PutnamVsCarnap: many philosophers believed (wrongly) that science proceeded by a method (e.g. Carnap). - - -
Putnam I 42
Carnap/Putnam: (Logischer Aufbau der Welt) Final Chapter: brings a sketch of the relation between object language to sensation language which is not a translation! PutnamVsCarnap/PutnamVsPhenomenology: this amounts to the old assertion that we would pick out the object theory that is the "easiest" and most useful.
There is no evidence as to why a positivist is entitled to quantify over material things (or to refer to them).
Phenomenology/Putnam: after their failure there were two reactions:
1) theories were no longer to be construed as statements systems that would need to have a perfectly understandable interpretation, they are now construed as calculi with the aim to make predictions.
I 43
2) Transition from the phenomenalistic language to "language of observable things" as the basis of the reduction. I.e. one seeks an interpretation of physical theories in the "language of things", not in the "sensation language". - - -
Putnam I 46
Simplicity/Putnam: gains nothing here: the conjunction of simple theories need not be simple. Def Truth/Theory/Carnap: the truth of a theory is the truth of its Ramsey sentence.
PutnamVsCarnap: this again is not the same property as "truth"!
(I 46 +: Hilbert's Epsilon, formalization of Carnap: two theories with the same term).
- - -
Putnam I 48
Language/Syntax/Semantics/PutnamVsCarnap: he has the constant tendency to identify concepts with their syntactic representations, e.g. mathematical truth with the property of being a theorem.
I 49
Had he been successful with his formal language, it would have been successful because it would have corresponded to a reasonable degree of probability over the set of facts; However, it is precisely that which positivism did not allow him to say!

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Causal Theory Davidson Vs Causal Theory
 
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II 185
Externalism: possible misunderstandings: Neither Davidson s externalism nor his characterization of occasional T-equivalences commit him to a causal theory of reference as it is represented by Kripke, Putnam and Devitt. For them successful reference depends on whether the subject and utterance of the word are connected by the correct causal chain. Externalism / Putnam / Kripke: correct causal chains between word and object. > Causal theory.
Externalism / DavidsonVsKripke, DavidsonVsPutnam: full sentences, interpretation.
Putnam / Kripke: causal theory: proper linking word - object - DavdisonVsPutnam: Interpretation of whole sentences.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
Causal Theory Skepticism Vs Causal Theory
 
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Brendel I 284
"alles anders"/BIV/Referenz/Wahrheit/Putnam/BrendelVsPutnam/Brendel: dass Gehirne im Tank auch nicht wahrerweise sagen könnten Bsp "Vielleicht ist ja alles ganz anders als wir glauben" ist alles andere als klar. Selbst wenn man die Kausaltheorie der Referenz zugrundelegt. SkepticismVsKausaltheory/Brendel: könnte entgegnen, dass es ihm gar nicht um Gehirne und Tanks ginge, sondern, um die Möglichkeit, dass die Welt generell anders sein könnte.

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Chomsky, N. Putnam Vs Chomsky, N.
 
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I 293
PutnamVsChomsky: Putnam assumes for phonetics in the universal grammar, that it only has a single list of sounds. This did not require a sophisticated explanatory hypothesis. Only "memory span and powers of recollection". "No upright behaviorist would deny that these are innate properties." ChomskyVsPutnam: but there have been set up very strong empirical hypotheses about the selection of the universal distinctive features, none of which seems to be explained on the basis of restrictions of memory.
I 298
PutnamVsChomsky: Thesis: instead of an innate schematism, "general multipurpose strategies" could be assumed. This innate base would have to be the same for the acquisition of any knowledge, so that there is nothing special about language acquisition.
I 299
ChomskyVsPutnam: with that he is no longer entitled to assume something is innate. Furthermore, it only shifts the problem. PutnamVsChomsky: the evaluation functions proposed in the universal grammar "the kind of facts is constituted which tries to explain the theory of learning, but not the required explanation itself".
ChomskyVsPutnam: E.g. no one would say that the genetic basis for the development of arms instead of wings was "the kind of fact that attempts to explain the theory of learning". Rather, they are the basis for an explanation of other facts of human behavior.
Whether the evaluation function is learned or is the basis of learning, is an empirical question.
PutnamVsChomsky: certain ambiguities can only be discovered by routine, therefore their postulated explanation by Chomsky's grammar is not very impressive.
ChomskyVsPutnam: he misunderstands it, in fact that refers to competence and not to performance (actual practice).
What the grammar explains is why e.g. in "criticism of students" "student" can be understood as subject or object, whereas e.g. "grain" in "the growing of the grain" can only be subject.
The question of routine does not matter here.
I 300
Innate Ideas/ChomskyVsPutnam: the innate representation of universal grammar indeed solves the problem of learning (at least partly) if it is really true that this is the basis for language acquisition, which may very well be the case! - - -
III 87
Putnam/Chomsky: Putnam proposes: correctness in linguistics is what the currently available data best explain about the behavior of the speaker under a current interest. What is true today, will be false tomorrow. PutnamVsChomsky: I never said that what is right today, will be wrong tomorrow.
Putnam: Chomsky's hidden main theses:
1) the we are free to choose our interests at will,
2) that interests themselves are not subject to normative criticism.
E.g. Hans' heart attack lies in the defiance of medical recommendations. Other explanation: high blood pressure. It may be, in fact, that on one day one fact is more in the interests of the speaker, and the next day another one.
III 88
PutnamVsChomsky: 1) we cannot just pick and choose our interests. (>Schopenhauer). 2) It sometimes happens that the relevance of a particular interest is disputed. How can it be, however, that some interests are more reasonable than others? Reasonableness is supposed to depend on different conditions in different contexts. There is no general answer.
III 88/89
The assertion that a concept is interest relative does not come out at the same as the thesis, all interests are equally reasonable.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Coherence Theory Williams, M. Vs Coherence Theory
 
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Horwich I 488
Kohärenztheorie/M Williams: hat mit dem Skeptizismus zu tun. Die c.th. sagt, dass die Analyse von Wahrheit in nicht epistemischen Begriffen diese unzugänglich macht. M. Williams: wenn das stimmte, würde der disquotationalism, aber auch die reichere Korrespondenztheorie ausgeschlossen.
I 489
Wahrheit/Rechtfertigung/Akzeptierbarkeit/Arthur Fine: wenn man sieht, dass der realistische T-concept eine Lücke schafft, die den epistemischen Zugang ((s) Rechtfertigung) immer außerhalb der Reichweite hält, könnte man versucht sein, Wahrheit in epistemischen Begriffen neu zu definieren, um ihn buchstäblich zugänglich zu machen. M. WilliamsVs: als epistemische These kann der Skeptizismus überhaupt nur unter skeptischen Prämissen abgeleitet werden!
Wahrheit/Skeptizismus/M. Williams: kein Begriff der Wahrheit macht diese von sich aus unzugänglich: man braucht immer epistemische Prämissen!
gap/M. Williams: die Lücke die Fine meint, ist wahrscheinlich: selbst die am besten gerechtfertigte Überzeugungen kann falsch sein.
M. WilliamsVs: dennoch, warum sollte das zum radikalen Skeptizismus führen? ((s) Jede kann, aber nicht alle können falsch sein).
Korrespondenztheorie/Skeptizismus/M. Williams: kombiniert mit einem cartesianische Dualismus führt sie zum Skeptizismus.
Wenn Repräsentationen aber nur mit anderen Repräsentationen verglichen werden können, führt das zur Kohärenztheorie ((s) Berkeley> Kohärenztheorie).
Korrespondenztheorie/M. Williams: moderne Form: tendiert zum Naturalismus und Physikalismus, indem sie Referenz mit einer Kausalrelation identifiziert. (Kausaltheorie der Referenz).
I 490
Korrespondenztheorie: argumentiert mit der Unmöglichkeit einer Alternative. Das tut die Kohärenztheorie ebenfalls! M. Williams: beide beantworten die Frage nicht: warum sollte man sich nicht lieber mit dem deflationism zufrieden geben?
Deflationism/M. Williams: kann viele der Kritikpunkte der Correspondence theoryVsCoherence theory teilen und umgekehrt. Weil er weder die Idee von Wahrheit als Korrespondenz ausgestaltet noch zeigt, dass Wahrheit eine epistemische Eigenschaft wäre.
I 495
Korrespondenztheorie/Putnam/M. Williams: Putnam: weil die Wahrheit unserer Überzeugungen den Erfolg erklärt, kann eine corr. th. erklären,
I 496
was der Beitrag des Sprachverhaltens zum Erfolg des Gesamtverhaltens ist. Wahrheit/Erklärung: erklärt der Erfolg so:
(i) wenn wir wahre Überzeugungen über unsere Ziele haben, werden wir sie im allgemeinen erreichen.
(ii) Wir haben wahre Überzeugungen darüber, wie wir unsere Ziele erreichen
(iii) Wir erreichen im allgemeinen unserer Ziele.
Horwich: gibt zu, dass Wahrheit hier tatsächlich eine erklärende Rolle hat. Putnam hätte recht, wenn es keine alternative Erklärung gäbe.
VsPutnam/VsKorrespondenztheorie: dennoch gibt es keine offensichtliche Verbindung zwischen seinem Argument und einer physikalistischen KT:
Wahrheit/Gesetz/M. Williams: man kann Putnams Argument retten, wenn man annimmt, dass (i) eine Verallgemeinerung involviert, die vielleicht sogar gesetzesartig ist.
BoydVsPutnam: wünscht dagegen nicht, dass Wahrheit in irgendwelchen Gesetzen vorkommt. ((s) Die Theorie erklärt den Erfolg genauso wie die Wahrheit der Theorie. Stattdessen könnten die Theorien einfach aufgelistet werden. - Vs: das ginge nur ohne Verallgemeinerung.)
M. Williams: ich glaube nicht, dass (i) ein Gesetz ist. Schon deshalb, weil es keine wirklich empirische Position ist.
Überzeugung/Inhalt/Wahrheit/Davidson: ihren Inhalt zu bestimmen, ist nicht unabhängig davon, unserem allgemeinen Verhalten einen Sinn zu geben und daher müssen die meisten wahr sein.
Ad (i): ist dann kein empirisches Gesetz sondern eine Reflexion einer Interpretationsbedingung.
I 497
Korrespondenztheorie/Putnam: es ist nicht die Erklärung unseres Erfolgs die selbst für sich die c. th. motiviert, sondern Überlegung zu Prämisse (ii): dass die meisten Überzeugungen wahr sind.
Überzeugung/PutnamVsDavidson: dass die meisten wahr sind, wird nicht durch die Methodologie der Interpretation garantiert, weil der Vorrat an Überzeugungen ständig wechselt. Daher können wir (ii) nur dann einen Sinn geben, wenn wir die Verläßlichkeit des Lernens erklären und das kann nur der Realismus.
Kausaltheorie/Korrespondenz/Putnam: der Verläßlichkeit des Lernens: würde uns als verläßliche Signalgeber darstellen. Was würde die truth theory beitragen? Sie teilt mit, dass der Satz wahr ist gdw. der Zustand besteht. Das ist die Korrespondenz, die in der Kausaltheorie involviert ist, sie ist genau die Korrespondenz die durch die T-Def aufgestellt wird.
Deflationism/Korrespondenz/M. Williams: ihm ist diese minimale Korrespondenz auch verfügbar. D.h. Putnams Argument garantiert keine physikalische Korrespondenz oder eine andere substantielle Theorie.

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Correspondence Theory Williams, M. Vs Correspondence Theory
 
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Horwich I 487
Deflationismus/M. Williams: (pro) sollten wir aber nicht Theorie sondern Sichtweise nennen. Er ist interessant, nicht weil er uns Neues sagt, sondern weil er bestreitet, dass man etwas darüber hinausgehendes braucht. (VsKorrepsondenztheorie, VsKohärenztheorie).
I 488
Frage: was könnte eine substantielle WT (die über den Deflationismus hinausgeht) sagen, das der Deflationismus nicht kann? KorrespondenztheorieVsKohärenztheorie/M.Williams: appelliert an „Intuition“, was kein hilfreicher Begriff ist. (Auch KorrespondenztheorieVsPragmatismus).
„Intuition“: soll hier sein, dass sogar ideal gerechtfertigte Überzeugungen falsch sein können. ((s) Wobei der Begriff „ideal“ starr gehalten wird.)
Korrespondenztheorie: schließt sich dann an den Realismus an, indem sie sagt, dass Wahrheit nichts mit Rechtfertigung oder Akzeptierbarkeit zu tun hat, sondern mit einer nicht epistemischen Relation zur Welt. ((s) Bsp Verursachung).
M.WilliamsVs: wenn es so wäre: selbst wenn alle Philosophen diese Intuition teilten, warum sollte es mehr sein als ein kulturelles Vorurteil zugunsten der Korrespondenztheorie?
Def epistemisch/(s): Bsp Rechtfertigung, Akzeptierbarkeit. Statt z.B. Verursachung.
M.WilliamsVsKorrespondenztheorie: die Intuition gegen epistemischen Zugang zur Wahrheit ist nicht automatisch ein Argument für die Korrespondenztheorie. Bestenfalls schließt sie eine Identifikation von Wahrheit mit einer epistemischen Eigenschaft aus. Damit wird sie akzeptierbar für den Deflationismus, der diese Identifikation auch nicht macht.
Disquotationalismus//M.Williams: das zeigt, dass sogar disquotationale Wahrheit „realistisch“ ist. D.h. Wahrheit ist keine epistemische Eigenschaft (Rechtfertigung oder Akzeptierbarkeit, M. WilliamsVsPutnam), genauso wenig wie in einer ausgewachsenen Korrespondenztheorie.
Jemand der glaubt, dass Wahrheit epistemisch sein muss, kann den Disquotationalismus als einen „minimalen Realismus“ ansehen.

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Davidson, D. Friedman Vs Davidson, D.
 
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Horwich I 498
Korrespondenztheorie/Kausaltheorie der Referenz/Michael Friedman/M.Williams: (wie Boyd mit der Verläßlichkeit unserer Methoden befaßt): wenn Wissenschaft als rationales Handeln gerechtfertigt werden muss, muss es möglich sein zu zeigen, dass es eine enge Verbindung von Bestätigung und Wahrheit gibt. ((s) Lager: Friedman: „substantieller W Begriff, VsDeflationismus),. Lösung/Friedman: ein statistisches Gesetz für die Verbindung von Bestätigung und Wahrheit. Dies leiten wir von unseren psychologischen und physikalischen Theorien und den Theorien darüber, wie der Geist durch Interaktion mit der Umgebung zu Überzeugungen kommt, ab.
Friedman/M. Williams: weil er Wahrheit innerhalb von Gesetzen verlangt, scheint das einen substantiellen W Begriff zu verlangen.
DeflationismusVsFriedman/M. Williams: aber das stimmt nicht. Und das könnte auch gar nicht sein: Das Zitattilgungsschema liefert die Mittel für semantischen Aufstieg und auch semantischen Abstieg: d.h. Wahrheit kann immer wegparaphrasiert werden. So kann man Friedman paraphrasieren. Bsp
Für jedes p, wenn p durch unsere Methoden bestätigt wird, dann wahrscheinlich p.
((s) ohne Wahrheit).
M. Williams: das involviert Quantifikation über Propositionen oder Sätze (statements). Verwandt mit „Alles was er sagte“, und dafür gibt es ähnliche konventionelle Lösungen.
Wahrheit/FriedmanVs: kann damit aber nicht ad acta gelegt werden: das Zitattilgungsschema allein zeigt nicht den Sprachgebrauch (s.o.).
Kompositionalität/W Theorie/Friedman: These WT verlangt eine kompositionale WT.
Wahrheit/Deflationismus/M. Williams: das heißt aber nicht, dass ein reicherer (substantieller) W Begriff benötigt wird! Das zeigt der Fall von Davidson (s.o.).
Selbst Validierung/Selbst Bestätigung/Überzeugung//Wissenschaft/FriedmanVsDavidson/M. Williams: Friedman These: Selbst Validierung ist möglich. Aber dazu darf nicht angenommen werden, dass unsere Erklärung, wie Referenz bestimmt ist, von vornherein garantiert, dass unsere Überzeugungen wahr sind.
Pointe: d.h. dass Friedman keinen substantiellen W Begriff aus der Tatsache herleitet, dass Wahrheit in Gesetzen vorkommt. (?).
Statt dessen argumentiert er für einen „realistischen“ Ansatz .für Referenz.
I 499
substantieller W Begriff/Friedman: ist dann ein Abfallprodukt davon! Selbst Validierung/Friedman/Zirkel/M. Williams: erscheint zirkulär, weil wir die Methoden gebrauchen, die bestätigt werden sollen.
Ähnlich;:
VsPutnam: Kausaltheorie der Referenz: setzt die Verläßlichkeit voraus, die sie erklären will.
Lösung/PutnamVsVs: es ist nur eine Art „Check der Konsistenz“.
Lösung/Friedman/M. Williams: es ist kein Zirkel, weil nicht von vornherein garantiert ist, dass es unsere besten Theorien sind, die die Verläßlichkeit garantieren.
Wissenschaft/Friedman: eine wichtige Aufgabe ist es zu zeigen, wie Wissenschaft nicht ihre eigene Belegbasis unterminieren kann. Wie Quine sagt:
Wissenschaft/Quine: verteidigt sich von innen, gegen ihre Selbstzweifel.
Friedman/M. Williams: das sieht so aus, als ob Friedman Raum für einen allgemeinen Skeptizismus schafft. Das wird klar wenn er unterscheidet:
a) Kausaltheorien der Referenz
b) Theorien die auf dem Prinzip der Nachsicht basieren, (Davidson).
Referenz/Davidson/M. Williams: nach Davidson ist die Zuschreibung von Referenten eine Sache der Methode unserer Interpretation.
Verläßlichkeit: d.h. dass wir auf Dinge referieren, über die wir verläßlich berichten können ist keine empirische Tatsache, die wir aus „unseren besten Theorien“ ableiten.
Kausaltheorie/Referenz/Friedman: dagegen: spezifiziert Referenz durch Überlegungen, die unabhängig von Wahrheit oder Falschheit der Sätze die wir zufällig akzeptieren, sind.
Überzeugung/FriedmanVsDavidson: das läßt die Möglichkeit offen, dass die meisten (oder alle) unserer Überzeugungen falsch sein könnten.
I 500
Wahrheit/Friedman: dann haben wir etwas signifikantes (substantielles?) gezeigt, wenn wir zeigen, dass unsere Methoden meist wahre Überzeugungen liefern. Aber das geht nur mit der Kausaltheorie, denn sie erlaubt diese selbst kritische Kraft, die am Ende die Selbst Rechtfertigung liefert. Skeptizismus/Friedman/M. Williams: diese Selbstkorrektur ermöglicht Friedman dadurch, dass er allgemeinen Skeptizismus zuläßt.
M. WilliamsVsFriedman: das ist pervers, so wie man eine Krankheit erwirbt aus Freude daran, sie zu kurieren. Außerdem setzt er eine Menge voraus, z.B. die Existenz „unserer induktiven Methoden“, oder die kausale Definition von Referenz.

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Disquotation Putnam Vs Disquotation
 
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Horwich I 431
Truth/Putnam: the only reason one can have to deny that truth is a property would be that one is physicalist or phenomenalist. Or maybe a culture-relativist. Truth/property/Putnam: only reductionist theories deny that truth is a property. (PutnamVsDisquotationalism.)
Truth/Putnam: is a property - PutnamVsDeflationism - Rorty: (Mirror of Nature): truth no property.
---
I 455
Divine perspective/outside/PutnamVsGods perspective/Rorty: Putnam is amused as James and Dewey about such attempts. Rorty: but he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: this one is too reductionist, to positivistic, to "behaviorist" for him ("transcendental Skinnerism").
Truth/Putnam: if a philosopher says, truth is something other than electricity because there is probably room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory,
---
I 456
and that the knowledge of the truth conditions (WB) was everything what one could know about the truth, then he denies that truth is a property. Thus, there is then no property of the correctness or accuracy ((s)> Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover. PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions assertions.
Theory/existence/reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam assumes here that the only reason to deny is that one needs a theory for an X, to say that the X is "nothing but Y" ((s) eliminative reductionism).
PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that assertions can be reduced to noise. Then the field linguist must reduce acts on motions.
Davidson/Rorty: but he does not say that assertions were nothing but noise.
Instead:
Truth/explanation/Davidson: unlike electricity truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained that a sentence which it claims, is true). ---
I XIV
VsDeflationism/Horwich: provides no explicit truth-definition, but is only based on a scheme (DS). ---
I XVI
Truth/simple/unanalysable/Russell/Moore/Cartwright/Horwich: if truth is unanalysable basic concept (VsDeflationism), then it is completely independent of awareness. That is, truth gets something metaphysical. Problem: then we cannot assume that the propositions which we believe, have this property. Then the skepticism follows.
---
I 457
Correctness/PutnamVsDavidson: although he shares his distaste for intentionalist terms, (and therefore does not consider truth as an explanation), he nevertheless wishes a representation of what kind of statement it is, to be correct. Putnam/Rorty: he wants that because he is afraid that the "inside view" of the language game where "true" is an appreciative term - is weakened, if it is not philosophically supported. Because:
If language is only production of noise - without normative element - then the noises that we utter are nothing but "an expression of our subjectivity".
Normativity/standard/language/Putnam: why should there be no normative elements in the language game? That would be the inside view of the language game.
RortyVsPutnam: thus it still depends on a synoptic God's perspective to be brought together in the inner view and outside view of the language game.
Norm/JamesVsPutnam/DeweyVsPutnam: we cannot take such a God's perspective. That is, we cannot solidify our standards in that we support them metaphysically or scientifically.
Truth/appreciation/PragmatismVsPlato/DeweyVsPlato/RortyVsPutnam: we should not repeat Plato's error, and interpret expressions of appreciation as the names of esoteric entities.
---
I 497
Belief/PutnamVsDavidson: that most are true, is not guaranteed by the methodology of interpretation, because the stock of beliefs is constantly changing. Therefore, we can only give a sense (ii) if we explain the reliability of learning and that can only do the realism. Causal theory/correspondence/Putnam: the reliability of learning: would represent us as reliable signal transmitters. What would the truth theory add? It announced that the sentence is true iff the condition exists. This is the correspondence, which is involved in the causal theory, it is precisely the correspondence that is established by the truth definition.
Deflationism/correspondence/M. Williams: the minimal correspondence is also available for him. That is, Putnam's argument does not guarantee physical correspondence or another substantive theory.
---
I 502
Truth/Putnam: must be substantial ((s) explanatory role, truth as a property, PutnamVsDeflationism). Otherwise it leads to cultural relativism. PutnamVsCultural relativism: an extreme culture-relativist may himself not even consider a thinker or speaker, as opposed to a mere noise maker. ((s) speaking not distinguishable from sound). This is mental suicide.
PutnamVsDisquotationalism: has no explanatory power, unless something is said about the concept of assertion.
M. WilliamsVsPutnam: do we need that?
Putnam: to be able to view ourselves as thinkers, speaking must be more than noise-making and then we must be able to explain to ourselves what it means to understand a sentence.
PutnamVsmetaphysical Realism/M. Williams: although Putnam finds this picture sympathetic, he prefers to explain meaning in terms of situation appropriate use.
Problem: that we do not stop that there are various inguistic practices ((s) different communities) and therefore different ways of justification.
Solution: ideal justification. And that is how Putnam understands truth.
Truth/PutnamVsDisquotationalism: if we say nothing about the truth in terms of assertibility conditions, we do not get a concept of objective truth, which allows the cultural relativism to escape. Then we identified truth implicitly with assertibility relative to the norms of a particular community.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Dummett, M. Davidson Vs Dummett, M.
 
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Brandom II 15
Concept/DavidsonVsDummett: relational view. Use of the concept is not understandable in a context that does not include the language, but language can only be made intelligible by recourse to beliefs. Brandom II 16 Brandom pro Davidson: Asserting and believing are two sides of a coin, one cannot be made understandable without the other.
Davidson I 58
Putnam and Dummett show that the concept of truth itself can be given a knowledge-related twist. Yet all three have given evidence precedence over the truth (as the primary status of the meaning determination)
Davidson I 59
DavidsonVsDummett, DavidsonVsPutnam: I think this is a mistake: This leads to the difficulties of the proximal theories: to a concept of truth relativized to individuals and to skepticism. The proximal theories are always somehow Cartesian. DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsDummett: Vsproximal theory: skepticism, relativism on individuals
Evidence: The only insightful concept of evidence is that of a relationship between sentences. Or between beliefs!
Davidson II 167
Burge and Dummett mean what speakers mean with their words, it depends very much on how the community uses those words. DavidsonVsDummett, DavidsonVsBurge: Pretty much nonsense, because it has nothing to do with successful communication! If you speak differently than the community, and someone finds out, then you can communicate all day long. And that happens all the time.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Field, H. Putnam Vs Field, H.
 
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Horwich I 405
Internal realism/metaphysical/Putnam/Field: (ad Putnam: Reason, Truth, and History): FieldVsPutnam: the contrast between internal realism and metaphysical realism is not defined clearly enough.
Metaphysical realism/Field: comprises three theses, which are not separated by Putnam.
1. metaphysical realism 1: thesis, the world is made up of a unity of mentally independent objects.
2. metaphysical realism 2: thesis, there is exactly one true and complete description (theory) of the world.
Metaphysical realism 2/Field: is not a consequence of the metaphysical realism 1 ((s) is independent) and is not a theory that any metaphysical realist would represent at all.
Description/world/FieldVsPutnam: how can there only be a single description of the world ((s) or of anything)? The terms that we use are never inevitable; Beings that are very different from us, could need predicates with other extensions, and these could be totally indefinable in our language.
---
I 406
Why should such a strange description be "the same description"? Perhaps there is a very abstract characterization that allows this, but we do not have this yet. wrong solution: one cannot say, there is a single description that uses our own terms. Our current terms might not be sufficient for a description of the "complete" physics (or "complete" psychology, etc.).
One could at most represent that there is, at best, a true and complete description that uses our terms. However, this must be treated with caution because of the vagueness of our present terms.
Theory/world/FieldVsPutnam: the metaphysical realism should not only be distinguished from his opponent, the internal realism, by the adoption of one true theory.
3. Metaphysical realism 3/Field: Thesis, truth involves a kind of correspondence theory between words and external things.
VsMetaphysical Realism 3/VsCorrespondence Theory/Field: the correspondence theory is rejected by many people, even from representatives of the metaphysical realism 1 (mentally independent objects).
---
I 429
Metaphysical realism/mR/FieldVsPutnam: a metaphysical realist is someone who accepts all of the three theses: Metaphysical realism 1: the world consists of a fixed totality of mentally independent objects.
Metaphysical realism 2: there is only one true and complete description of the world.
Metaphysical realism 3: truth involves a form of correspondence theory.
PutnamVsField: these three have no clear content, when they are separated. What does "object" or "fixed totality", "all objects", "mentally independent" mean outside certain philosophical discourses?
However, I can understand metaphysical realism 2 when I accept metaphysical realism 3.
I: is a definite set of individuals.
---
I 430
P: set of all properties and relations Ideal Language: Suppose we have an ideal language with a name for each element of I and a predicate for each element of P.
This language will not be countable (unless we take properties as extensions ((s) intensions would not be countable > Language infinite because intensions are infinite) and then only countable if the number of individuals is finite. But it is unique up to isomorphism (but not further, unique up to isomorphism).
Theory of World/Putnam: the amount of true propositions in relation to each particular type (up to any definite type) will also be unique.
Whole/totality/Putnam: conversely, if we assume that there is an ideal theory of the world, then the concept of a "fixed totality" is (of individuals and their properties and relations) of course explained by the totality of the individuals which are identified with the range of individual variables, and the totality of the properties and relations with the region of the predicate variables within the theory.
PutnamVsField: if he was right and there is no objective justification, how can there be objectivity of interpretation then?
Field/Putnam: could cover two positions:
1. He could say that there is a fact in regard to what good "rational reconstruction" of the speaker's intention is. And that treatment of "electron" as a rigid designator (of "what entity whatsoever", which is responsible for certain effects and obeys certain laws, but no objective fact of justification. Or.
2. He could say that interpretation is subjective, but that this does not mean that the reference is subjective.
Ad 1.: here he must claim that a real "rational reconstruction" of the speaker's intention of "general recognition" is separated, and also of "inductive competence", etc.
Problem: why should then the decision that something ("approximately") obeys certain laws or disobeys, (what then applies to Bohr's electrons of 1900 and 1934, but not for phlogiston) be completely different by nature (and be isolable) from decisions on rationality in general?
Ad 2.: this would mean that we have a term of reference, which is independent of procedures and practices with which we decide whether different people in different situations with different background beliefs actually refer on the same things. That seems incomprehensible.
Reference/theory change/Putnam: We assume, of course, that people who have spoken 200 years ago about plants, referred, on the whole, to the same as we do. If everything would be subjective, there would be no inter-theoretical, interlinguistic term of reference and truth.
If the reference is, however, objective, then I would ask why the terms of translation and interpretation are in a better shape than the term of justification.
---
Putnam III 208
Reference/PutnamVsField: there is nothing that would be in the nature of reference and that would make sure that the connection for two expressions would ever result in outcomes by "and". In short, we need a theory of "reference by description".
---
V 70
Reference/FieldVsPutnam: recently different view: reference is a "physicalist relationship": complex causal relationships between words or mental representations and objects. It is a task of empirical science to find out which physicalistic relationship this is about. PutnamVsField: this is not without problems. Suppose that there is a possible physicalist definition of reference and we also assume:
(1) x refers to y if and only if x stands in R to y.
Where R is a relationship that is scientifically defined, without semantic terms (such as "refers to"). Then (1) is a sentence that is true even when accepting the theory that the reference is only determined by operational or theoretical preconditions.
Sentence (1) would thus be a part of our "reflective equilibrium" theory (see above) in the world, or of our "ideal boundaries" theory of the world.
---
V 71
Reference/Reference/PutnamVsOperationalism: is the reference, however, only determined by operational and theoretical preconditions, the reference of "x is available in R y" is, in turn, undetermined. Knowing that (1) is true, is not of any use. Each permissible model of our object language will correspond to one model in our meta-language, in which (1) applies, and the interpretation of "x is in R to y" will determine the interpretation of "x refers to y". However, this will only be in a relation in each admissible model and it will not contribute anything to reduce the number of allowable models. FieldVs: this is not, of course, what Field intends. He claims (a) that there is a certain unique relationship between words and things, and (b) that this is the relationship that must also be used when assigning a truth value to (1) as the reference relation.
PutnamVsField: that cannot necessarily be expressed by simply pronouncing (1), and it is a mystery how we could learn to express what Field wans to say.
Field: a certain definite relationship between words and objects is true.
PutnamVsField: if it is so that (1) is true in this view by what is it then made true? What makes a particular correspondence R to be discarded? It appears, that the fact, that R is actually the reference, is a metaphysical inexplicable fact. (So magical theory of reference, as if referring to things is intrinsically adhered). (Not to be confused with Kripke's "metaphysically necessary" truth).
----
Putnam I 93
PutnamVsField: truth and reference are not causally explanatory terms. Anyway, in a certain sense: even if Boyd's causal explanations of the success of science are wrong, we still need them to do formal logic.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Field, H. Verschiedene Vs Field, H. Field I 51
Unendlichkeit/Physik/Essay 4: selbst ohne "Teil von" Relation brauchen wir nicht wirklich den Endlichkeits Operator für Physik. VsField: viele haben mir vorgeworfen, daß ich jede Extension der Logik 1. Stufe brauche. Aber das ist nicht der Fall.
I 52
Ich nehme eher an, daß das Nominalisierungsprogramm (nominalization) noch nicht weit genug vorangetrieben worden ist, um sagen zu können, was die beste logische Basis ist. Letztlich werden wir nur wenige natürliche Mittel wählen, die über die Logik 1. Stufe hinausgehen, Möglichst solche, die der Platonist auch brauchen würde. Aber das können wir nur durch Ausprobieren erfahren.
I 73
Unverzichtbarkeits Argument/Logik/VsField: wenn mE in der Wissenschaft verzichtbar sein mögen, so sind sie es doch nicht in der Logik! Und Logik brauchen wir in der Wissenschaft. logische Folgebeziehung/Konsequenz/Field: wird normalerweise in Begriffen der Modelltheorie definiert: (Modelle sind mE, semantisch: ein Modell ist wahr oder nicht wahr.
Auch wenn man sie beweistheoretisch formuliert ("es gibt eine Ableitung", syntaktisch, bzw. beweisbar in einem System) braucht man mE bzw. abstrakte Objekte: willkürliche Zeichen Sequenzen von Symbol Tokens und deren willkürliche Sequenzen.
I 77
VsField: manche haben eingewendet, daß nur wenn wir eine Tarski Theorie der Wahrheit akzeptieren, wir mE in der Mathematik brauchen. FieldVsVs: das führte zum Mißverständnis, daß Mathematik ohne Tarskische Wahrheit keine epistemischen Probleme hätte.
Mathematik/Field: impliziert in der Tat selbst mE, (bloß, wir brauchen nicht immer Mathematik) und zwar ohne Hilfe des Wahrheitsbegriffs, z.B. daß es Primzahlen > 1000 gibt.
I 138
Logik der Teil-von-Relation/Field: hat kein vollständiges Beweisverfahren. VsField: wie können semantische Folgebeziehungen daraus dann von Nutzen sein?
Field: sicher, die Mittel, mit denen wir wissen können, daß etwas aus etwas anderem folgt, sind in einem Beweisverfahren kodifizierbar, und das scheint zu implizieren, daß kein Appell an irgend etwas Stärkeres als einen Beweis von praktischem Nutzen sein kann.
FieldVsVs: aber man braucht gar keinen epistemischen Zugang zu mehr als einem abzählbaren Teil davon anzunehmen.
I 182
Feldtheorie/FT/Relationalismus/Substantivalismus/einige AutorenVsField: begründen die Relevanz von Feldtheorien für den Streit zwischen S/R gerade umgekehrt: für sie machen FT es leicht, eine relationalistische Sicht zu begründen: (Putnam, 1981, Malament 1982): sie postulieren als Feld ein einziges riesiges (wegen der Unbegrenztheit physikalischer Kräfte) und einen korrespondierenden Teil davon für jede Region. Variante: das Feld existiert nicht an allen Orten! Aber alle Punkte im Feld sind nicht null.
FieldVsPutnam: ich glaube nicht, daß man auf Regionen verzichten kann.
- - -
Field II 351
Unbestimmtheit/Unentscheidbarkeit/Mengenlehre/ML/Zahlentheorie/ZT/Field: These: nicht nur in der ML auch in der ZT haben viele unentscheidbare Sätze keinen bestimmten WW. Viele VsField: 1. Wahrheit und Referenz sind im Grunde disquotational.
disquotationale Sicht/Field: wird manchmal so gesehen, als schlösse sie Unbestimmtheit für unsere gegenwärtige Sprache aus.
FieldVsVs: das ist nicht so :>Kapitel 10 zeigte das.
VsField: selbst wenn es Unbestimmtheit in unserer gegenwärtigen (current) Sprache auch für den Disquotationalismus gibt, sind die Argumente für sie aus dieser Perspektive weniger überzeugend.
Bsp die Frage nach der Mächtigkeit des Kontinuums ((s) ist unentscheidbar für uns, die Antwort könnte aber (aus objektivistischer Sicht (FieldVs)) einen bestimmten WW haben.
Unbestimmtheit/ML/ZT/Field: in jüngster Zeit haben einige namhafte Philosophen Argumente für eine Unmöglichkeit jeglicher Unbestimmtheit in ML und ZT hervorgebracht, die mit dem Disquotationalismus nichts zu tun haben: Zwei Varianten:
1. Angenommen, ML und ZT sind in voller Logik 2. Stufe (d.h. Logik 2. Stufe, die modelltheoretisch verstanden wird, mit der Forderung, daß jede legitime Interpretation
Def „voll“ ist in dem Sinne, daß die Quantoren 2. Stufe über alle Teilmengen des Bereichs der Quantoren 1 Stufe gehen.
2. Angenommen, ZT und ML seien in einer Variante der vollen Logik 2. Stufe formuliert, die wir „volle schematische Logik 1. Stufe“ nennen könnten.
- - -
II 354
volle schematische Logik 1. Stufe/LavineVsField: bestreitet, daß sie eine Teiltheorie der (nichtschematischen!) Logik 2. Stufe ist. Field: wir vergessen jetzt lieber die Logik 2. Stufe zugunsten der vollen schematischen Theorien. Dabei bleiben wir ei der ZT um Komplikationen zu vermeiden. Wir nehmen an, daß die Bestimmtheit der ZT nicht in Frage steht, außer was den Gebrauch von vollen Schemata anbetrifft.





Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Fodor, J. Putnam Vs Fodor, J.
 
Books on Amazon
Pauen V 228
Meaning/VsFodor: it is not sure if Fodor has made here a sufficient condition for the emergence of meaning. Example, one could consider, according to Fodor, artificial chicken eggs as asymmetrically dependent on the production of real chicken eggs. Yet, one will not regard such eggs as a representation of chickens, although the latter represent the asymmetrical effective "causes" for the emergence of chicken eggs.
---
V 229
Meaning/PutnamVsFodor/Pauen: it is also unclear whether the asymmetric dependence of references of a mental representation is necessary. E.g. Super-Billionaire: here, the meaning does not depend on the meeting with real specimens.
E.g. Unicorn: can be no "original cause" of our thoughts.
The relation is much more complex than it is assumed in Fodor with a quasi one to one opposition. It's about the whole language practice of our ancestors.
Another problem: it has to be excluded that the original causations are from e.g. Lions children's books or television tubes.
---
Putnam III 56ff
Dependency/reference/Possible World/PutnamVsFodor: does the relationship really exist and is it asymmetrical? In the terminology of semantics of possible worlds this thought says that the "closest possible worlds" in which the cats do not trigger such remarks, are possible worlds, in which the word "cat" refers to something completely different (possible worlds not real worlds, but hypothetical situations). ---
III 57
This would show that the dependency relationship does exist, and the law according to which the expressions of images are triggered is dependent on the law that cats trigger the expressions. But it is not enough to show that they are asymmetrical. For this, the evidence would have to be provided: if not images, then also not cats as a trigger. Fodor thinks this is obvious, but is it really?
VsFodor: Would it not be reasonable to assume that the closest possible worlds, in which it is not a "law" that images are triggers, are possible worlds in which most people have no idea how cats look like at all!?
If these are the closest possible worlds in which images do not trigger any, then it would be the case when images would not trigger any remarks, cats would also not trigger any, and then the dependency relationship would be symmetrical.
FodorVsVs: possible answer: simply "intuitive" understanding. It could be about worlds in which people are blind.
---
III 58
VsFodor: but this does not seem reasonable. He could better say that the signs would sometimes be triggered. Then it could be objected that the thesis is too weak. One would probably say that the sentence could be true, but it is not "law-like". "Law-like"/Fodor: is an undefined basic concept in Fodors metaphysics. Not a property of sentences, but a relationship between universals. In this way, he fends off the objection by the use of this term, an already intentional concept is introduced. (Putnam: is probably intentional).
---
III 59
Fodor: even if the ordinary people there would have no idea, how cats look like, there would certainly be biologists and other specialists who would still know how cats look like. PutnamVs: at least for natural kinds it does not necessarily follow that it is possible for the theory to provide necessary and sufficient conditions of reference.
The theory even fails completely when it comes to extensions by an analytical definition of necessary and sufficient conditions.
---
III 60
E.g. "Super-billionaire" persons whose property is at least 100 billion Mark. It could be that there is not a single example of the triggering of such statements. Fodor could say, the characters would be triggered when the people would know about all the relevant facts. But what actually a relevant fact is, depends on the meaning of each considered word. The word is already interpreted. Omniscience is not only a non-real fact, but an impossible.
FodorVsVs: could say that his theory does not apply to words that have analytical definitions.
---
III 61
But especially Fodor's theory is anti-hermeneutic, he disputes the view that the reference of a word cannot be determined in isolation. Hermeneutics/PutnamVsFodor: according to the hermeneutic view, there can be no such thing as necessary and sufficient conditions for the reference of a word to individual x. The best we can hope for are the adequacy criteria of translation schemes. (FodorVs).
FodorVsVs: in his view, this leads to the "meaning-holism" which, in turn, results in the "meaning-nihilism" and thus the denial of the possibility of a "special science" of linguistics.
---
III 62
FodorVsVs: might reply, actually the theory should not apply to natural languages, but to his hypothetical innate thinking language "mentalese". PutnamVsFodor: definitely, Fodor's theory fails for other words: E.g. witch. Perhaps it is analytic that real witches possess magical powers and are women. But no necessary and sufficient conditions for witch. There are also good witches.
---
III 63
A witch-law (see above) would be wrong. Indeed, there are no witches that can trigger remarks.
---
III 67 ff
Cause/causality/PutnamVsFodor: uses the concept of causation very informal. ---
III 68
Putnam: the normal linguistic concept of cause is context-bound and interest-dependent. The concept of causality used by Fodor is not the relatively more context-independent concept of a contributing cause, but the context-sensitive and interest-relative concept of everyday language.
According to Fodor the presence of a cat is then a contributing cause for remarks.
---
III 69
PutnamVsFodor: now, then past behavior of past generations is (not to mention representatives of strong dialects) also a contributing factor. ---
III 70
FodorVsPutnam: that is certainly not Fodor's causality. All his examples just want to take the colloquial term as an undefined basic concept as a basis. PutnamVsFodor: the strange thing is that this is interest-relative. How do we use it, depends on what alternatives we consider for all relevants. (Intentionality).
---
III 71
Counterfactual conditionals/KoKo/Fodor: assumes, they had established truth values. PutnamVsFodor: counterfactual conditionals have no fixed truth values.
---
III 73
Possible Worlds/Putnam: we can then call "closer" worlds the ones which we believe are more relevant when it comes to determining the truth value of the conditional clause. ---
III 74
FodorVs: might reply that this physics would be given a special position compared to the specialized sciences. PutnamVsFodor: one might then reply, the laws of the special sciences are just as unproblematic as those of physics.
FodorVsVs: but that does not really work: E.g. "coffee, sugar cubes": it could mean that this piece of sugar is somehow "not normal."
---
III 78
Reductionism/PutnamVsFodor: Fodor fails in the scaling-down, because he fails to define the reference using these terms (law, counterfactual conditionals and causality). ---
III 79/80
PutnamVsFodor: from the fact that a statement does not specifically deal with something mental, it does not follow that no requirement of this statement refers to our cognitive interests. Causality/Putnam: the concept of causality has a cognitive dimension, even if it is used on inanimate objects.
---
Putnam I 269
Meaning/PutnamVsFodor: actually makes the same mistake as Saussure and Derrida: that equality of meaning is, strictly speaking, only reasonable in the impossible case in which two languages or texts are isomorphic.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Functionalism Dennett Vs Functionalism
 
Books on Amazon
II 87
Functionalism/Dennett: widely spread in everyday life. Basic idea: E.g. "noble is who does nobly", "Not what it is made of makes a mind (or a belief, a pain, a fear), but what it can do."  In common linguistic use of functionalism, such entities defined by their function allow multiple realizations. Why can an artificial mind not be made like an artificial heart with almost any material?
II 88
DennettVsFunctionalism: he deliberately abstracts from the inscrutable details of performance and focuses on the work that is actually done. But he simplifies too much.
II 95
Information Processing/DennettVsFunctionalism: one thing was always clear: as soon as there are transducers and effectors in an information system, its "media neutrality" or multiple realization disappears. (VsPutnam, VsTuring). E.g. To receive light something light-sensitive is needed. E.g. Controls for ships or factories are media-neutral, as long as they fulfill their task in the time available.
But to the nervous system applies that much less time is available. The realization of the nervous system is not a media-neutral.
And that is not because it would need to have a certain aura of a particular material or of living being, but because it originated in evolution as the central control system of living beings who’ve been abundantly equipped with very decentralized control systems.
The new systems had to be set up above them, but in very close collaboration with them. There was an astronomical number of conversion points.

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Habermas, J. Rorty Vs Habermas, J.
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
Brendel I 133
Justification/Rorty/Brendel: Thesis: truth is not its goal. That would suppose a false separation of truth and justification. There is also not the one scientific method that leads to the truth. Epistemic justification: can have many goals.
I 134
Correspondence/RortyVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty/Brendel: therefore there is no correspondence between statements and independent reality. Truth/RortyVsPutnam: is not idealized rational acceptability either.
Reality/PutnamVsRorty: there is a consciousness independent reality.
Truth/Peirce/Rorty/Brendel: Both: Thesis: there are no in principle unknowable truths.
Reality/PeirceVsRorty: there is a reality that is independent of consciousness.
Truth/Peirce/Brendel: obtained by the consensus of an ideal research community.
Convergence/Peirce/Brendel: Thesis: there is a convergence of research. The corresponding true conviction expresses actually existing SV. (Habermas ditto).
Convergence/RortyVsPeirce: does not exist and therefore no universally valid convictions of an ideal research community.
I 135
RortyVsHabermas: ditto. Communication/RortyVsHabermas/Rorty/Brendel: is not a pursuit of universally valid statements. Thesis: there is no difference in principle between a cooperative search for truth and the pursuit of group interests.
- - -
Rorty II 50
RortyVsHabermas: sounds as if he took over the metaphysical position, as if all the alternative candidates for belief and desire already exist and the only thing that must be ensured is that they can be freely discussed. Ahistorical universalist "transcendentalism".
II 29
French Philosophy/HabermasVsFrench: "the vexatious game of these duplications: a symptom of exhaustion." RortyVsHabermas: Rather signs of vitality. I read Heidegger and Nietzsche as good private philosophers,
Habermas reads them as poor public ones. He treats them as if they targeted what he calls "universal validity."
II 43
Principle/Validity/Application/RortyVsHabermas: the question of the "internal validity" of the principles is not relevant. Especially not if it these are "universally valid". The only thing that keeps a society from having considering the institutionalized humiliation of the weak as norma, of course, is a detailed description of these humiliations. Such descriptions are given by journalists, anthropologists, sociologists, novelists, playwrights, filmmakers and painters.
II 94
Habermas/Rorty distinguishes between a strategic and a genuinely communicative use of language. Scale of degrees of confidence.
II 94/95
Rorty: if we stop to interpret reason as a source of authority, the Platonic and Kantian dichotomy between reason and emotion dissolves.
II 96
RortyVsHabermas: the idea of ​​the "better argument" only makes sense if you can find a natural, transcultural relevance relationship.
III 113
Foucault/Rorty: Society denies the space for self-creation and private projects. (VsHabermas).
III 119
RortyVsHabermas: Habermas is more afraid of a "romantic revolution" like Hitler and Mao have brought about than of the stifling effect that encrusted societies may have. He is more afraid of autonomy than what Foucault calls the "biopower" of experts.
III 120
RortyVsHabermas: I am very suspicious of the idea of ​​'universal validity' (metaphysics). This claim is no longer credible if we are convinced of the "contingency of language".
III 231
Self/Literature/Appropriateness/RortyVsHabermas: for him the very traditional image of the self with its three spheres, the cognitive, the moral and the aesthetic, is of central importance. This classification means that he sees literature as a "matter for the appropriate expression of feelings" and literary criticism as a "matter of taste".
III 232
Rorty: if we give up this classification, we will no longer ask questions like "Does this book promote truth or beauty?" "Does it promote proper behavior or pleasure?" and instead we will ask: "What is the purpose the book?"
- - -
V 9
World/Language/RortyVsHabermas: Vsdemand that the world-disclosing (poetic) power of language (Heidegger, Foucault) should be subordinated to the inner-worldly practice.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Harman, G. Putnam Vs Harman, G.
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 421
Truth/HarmanVsPutnam: it is not merely idealized rational acceptability. It involves a relationship between a remark or a thought and the way how things are in the world.
Putnam/Harman: is right when he equates the decisive point with a determination to the localization of all the facts in a world.
Harman: when I suppose, thesis, there is one clear causal physical order, I ask myself the following questions: "What is the place of the mind in the physical world?", "What is the place of values in the world of facts?" I believe that it is a serious philosophical error, if we believe we can avoid these issues.
PutnamVsHarman: a position as Harman's leads to two implausible conclusions:
1. Identity thesis of body and mind. (HarmanVs! I do not think that it follows from the assumption of a single causal order, rather to functionalism, that Putnam himself represented)
2. moral relativism. (Harman pro! There is nothing problematic).
---
I 428
Truth/HarmanVsPutnam: I do not think that he would consider it as a good argument for the conclusion that truth is the same as consistency: Problem: but then his argument does not show that truth is an idealization of rational acceptability.
---
I 434
Competence/Chomsky/Putnam: (Chomsky Syntactic Structures) promised us that there would be a normal form for grammars and a mathematical simplicity function that would explain everything precisely. Here you would have to look at various descriptions of the speaker's competence, which are given in the normal form, and measure the simplicity of every description, (with the mathematical function) in order to find the easiest. This would be "the" description of the speaker's competence. Putnam: actually Chomsky owes us also a mathematical function with which one measures the "goodness", with which the competence description fits with the actual performance.
Chomsky/Putnam: the idea of ​​mathematization has since been abandoned. The idea currently rests that the speaker's competence could be given by an idealization of the actual speaker's behavior, on an intuitive notion of a "best idealization" or "best explanation".
Justification/PutnamVsChomskyPutnamVsHarman: to assume that the concept of justification could be made physicalistically through identification with what people should say in accordance with the description of their competence, is absurd.
---
I 435
Harman/Putnam: but would say that there is a difference whether one asks if the earth might have emerged only a few thousand years ago, ---
I 436
or whether one asks something moral, because there are no physical facts, which decide about it. PutnamVsHarman: if the metaphysical realism with Harman (and with Mackie) has to break, then the whole justification of the distinction facts/values is damaged.
Interpretation/explanation/Putnam: our ideas of interpretation, explanation, etc. come from human needs as deep as ethical values.
Putnam: then a critic might say of me, (even if he remains metaphysical realism): "All right, then explanation, interpretation and ethics are in the same boat" ("Companions in Guilt" argument).
Putnam: and this is where I wanted it to be. That was my main concern in "truth, reason and history." (Putnam thesis explanation, interpretation and ethics are not in the same boat" ("companions in guilt" argument: in case of partial relativism the total relativism is near. PutnamVsHarman).
Relativism/Putnam: There is no rational reason to support ethical relativism, but not at the same total relativism.
Reference/Harman/Putnam: Harman's answer is that the world has a unique causal order.
---
I 437
PutnamVsHarman: but that does not help: if my linguistic competence is caused by E1, E2 ... , then it's true that it was caused* by E*1, E*2 ... whereby* the corresponding entity designates in a non-standard model. ((s)>Löwenheim) Problem: why is reference then determined by cause and not by cause*?
Reference/Physicalism/Putnam: the only answer he could give, would be: "because it is the nature of reference". This would mean that nature itself picks out objects and places them in correspondence to our words.
David Lewis/Putnam: has suggested something similar: ... + ...

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Indispensability Field Vs Indispensability
 
Books on Amazon
I 14
Indispensability Argument/Field: here it’s all about purposes - such an argument must be based on the best explanation (BE).
I 17
FieldVsIndispensability Argument: we can show that there are good theories that do without mathematical entities - Justification/Field: is gradual. FieldVsIndispensability Argument: two points which together make it seem untenable: 1) if we can show that there are equally good theories that do not involve ME. I believe that we can show that in the case of ME, but not in the case of electrons! (Lit.Field: "Science without Numbers"). At the moment, we do not yet know exactly how to eliminate ME, and our method of ((s) complete) induction gives us some confidence in mathematical entities 2) Justification is not a question of all or nothing! (justification gradual)
I 29
Indispensability Argument/Field: Might even be explained by way of evolutionary theory: that evolutionary pressure finally led us to find the empirically indispensable mathematical assumptions plausible. FieldVsVsBenacerraf:. Problem: the scope of mathematics which is used in empirical science is relatively small! That means that only this small portion could be confirmed as reliable by empiricism. And inferences on the rest of mathematics are not sustainable, there are simply too many possible answers to questions about large cardinals or the continuum hypothesis or even about the axiom of choice. These work well enough to provide us with the simpler "application mathematics". ((s) That means that we cannot infer a specific answer to the questions of the higher levels from application mathematics.)
II 328
Utility/Truth/Mathematics/Putnam/Field: (Putnam 1971 locus classicus, unlike 1980): Thesis: we must consider mathematics as true in order to be able to explain its utility (benefit) in other fields. E.g. in science and metalogic. (i.e. the theory of logical consequence). Modality/Modal/Mathematics/Field: this is in contrast to his former view that we can use modality instead of mathematical objects to explain mathematical truth.
II 329
Modal Explanation: will not work for other disciplines such as physics, however. (FieldVsPutnam, Field 1989/91: 252-69). Putnam/Field: the general form of his argument is this: (i) we must speak in terms of mathematical entities in order to study science, metalogic, etc. (ii) If need them for such important purposes, we have reason to believe that this kind of entities exists. VsPutnam/Field: there are two possible strategies against this: 1) Vs: "foolhardy" strategy: requires us to substantially change premise (i): we want to show that we basically do not need to make any assumptions which require mathematical entities. I.e. we could study physics and metalogic "nominalistically". Problem: in a practical sense, we still need the mathematical entities for physics and metalogic. We need to explain this practical indispensability. "foolhardy" strategyVs: in order to explain them, we just have to show that mathematical entities are only intended to facilitate inferences between nominalistic premises. And if this facilitation of inference is the only role of mathematical entities, then (ii) fails. Solution: In that case, something much weaker than truth (E.g. "conservatism") suffices as an explanation for this limited kind of utility. FieldVs: Unfortunately, the project of nominalization is not trivial. (Field 1980 for physics, 1991 for metalogic). At that time I found only few followers, but I am too stubborn to admit defeat. 2) Vs ("less foolhardy strategy"): questions (ii) more profoundly: it denies that we can move from the theoretical indispensability of existence assumptions to a rational belief in their truth. That is what Putnam calls "indispensability argument". Putnam pro. FieldVsPutnam: that requires some restrictions and ManyVsPutnam: these restrictions ultimately prevent an application in mathematics. And ultimately, because mathematical entities are simply not causally involved in physical effects.
II 330
FieldVsPutnam: that’s plausible. PutnamVsVs: If mathematical entities are theoretically indispensable in causal explanations (such as (i) claims), however, there seems to be a sense in which they are very well causally involved. Conversely, it would have to be explained why they should not be causally involved. FieldVs: a closer look should reveal that the role of mathematical entities is not causal. And that it supports no indispensability argument. E.g. the role of quantities in physics was simply to allow us to assert the local compactness of physical space. Other E.g. role of quantities in physics. Allow us to accept (Cp) instead of (Cs). (Field, 1989) 1, 136-7). ... + ...

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Kripke, S. A. Lewis Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
Books on Amazon
V 251/252
Ereignis/Kennzeichnung/Beschreiben/Benennen/Lewis: wird meist durch akzidentelle Eigenschaften spezifiziert. Auch wenn es sogar klar ist, was es bedeutete ,es durch sein Wesen zu spezifizieren. Ein Ereignis trifft z.B. auf eine Kennzeichnung zu, hätte sich aber auch ereignen können, ohne auf die Beschreibung zuzutreffen.
Def Ereignis/Lewis: ist eine Klasse, die aus einer Region dieser Welt zusammen mit verschiedenen Regionen von anderen möglichen Welten (MöWe) besteht, in denen sich das Ereignis hätte ereignen können. (Weil Ereignisse immer kontingent sind).
Was der Beschreibung in einer Region entspricht, entspricht ihr nicht in einer anderen Region (einer anderen MöWe).
Man kann nie ein vollständiges Inventar der möglichen Beschreibungen (Kennzeichnungen) eines Ereignisses erreichen.
1. künstliche Beschreibung: Bsp "das Ereignis, das im Urknall besteht wenn Essendon das Endspiel gewinnt, aber die Geburt von Calvin Coolidge, wenn nicht". "p > q, sonst r".
2. teils durch Ursache oder Wirkungen
3. durch Referenz auf den Ort in einem System von Konventionen Bsp Unterschreiben des Schecks
4. Vermischung von wesentlichen und akzidentellen Elementen: Singen, während Rom brennt. Bsp Tripel Eigenschaft, Zeit, Individuum, (s.o.).
5. Spezifikation durch einen Zeitpunkt, obwohl das Ereignis auch früher oder später hätte vorkommen können
6. obwohl Individuen wesentlich involviert sein können, können akzidentell zugehörige Individuen herausgehoben werden.
7. es kann sein, dass ein reiches Wesen eines Ereignisses darin besteht, zu schlendern, aber ein weniger fragiles (beschreibungsabhängiges) Ereignis könnte lediglich akzidentell ein Schlendern sein. (s) Und es kann unklar bleiben, ob das Ereignis nun wesentlich durch Schlendern charakterisiert ist.
8. ein Ereignis, das ein Individuum wesentlich involviert, mag gleichzeitig akzidentell ein anderes Involvieren: Bsp ein bestimmter Soldat, der zufällig zu einer bestimmten Armee gehört, Das entsprechende Ereignis kann nicht in Regionen vorkommen, wo es kein Gegenstück zu diesem Soldat gibt, wohl aber, wenn es ein GS von dem Soldaten gibt, dieses aber zu einer anderen Armee gehört.
V 253
Dann wird die Armee akzidentell involviert, über die Weise ihres Soldaten. 9. Wärme: nichtstarrer Designator (nonrigid): (LewisVsKripke):
nicht starr: was immer diese Rolle hat: was immer die und die Manifestation hervorbringt.
Bsp Wärme hätte auch etwas anderes als Molekülbewegung sein können.
Lewis: in einer MöWe, wo Wärmefluss die entsprechenden Manifestationen hervorbringt, sind heiße Dinge solche, die eine Menge Wärmefluss haben.
- - -
Schwarz I 55
Wesen/Kontextabhängigkeit/LewisVsKripke/SchwarzVsKripke: in bestimmen Kontexten können wir durchaus fragen, Bsp wie es wäre, wenn wir andere Eltern gehabt hätten oder einer anderen Art angehörten. Bsp Statue/Ton: Angenommen, Statue und Ton existieren beide genau gleich lang. Sollen wir dann sagen, dass sie es trotz ihrer materiellen Natur schaffen, stets zu selben Zeit am selben Ort zu sein? Sollen wir sagen, dass beide gleich vie wiegen, aber zusammen nicht doppelt?
Problem: wenn man sagt, dass die beiden identisch sind, bekommt man Ärger mit den modalen Eigenschaften: Bsp das Stück Lehm hätte auch ganz anders geformt sein können, die Statue aber nicht – umgekehrt:
I 56
Bsp die Staute hätte aus Gold bestehen können, aber der Ton hätte nicht aus Gold bestehen können. Gegenstück Theorie/GT/Identität: Lösung: die relevante Ähnlichkeitsrelation hängt davon ab, wie wir auf das Ding Bezug nehmen, als Statue oder als Lehm.
Gegenstück Relation: Kann (anders als Identität) nicht nur vage und variabel, sondern auch asymmetrisch und intransitiv sein. (1968,28f): Das ist die Lösung für
Def Chisholms Paradox/Schwarz: (Chisholm, 1967): Bsp Angenommen, Kripke könnte unmöglich ein Rührei sein. Aber sicher könnte er ein wenig rühreiartiger sein, wenn er ein wenige kleiner und gelber wäre! Und wäre er ein bisschen mehr so, dann könnte er auch noch mehr so sein. Und es wäre seltsam, wenn er in jener MöWe nicht wenigstens ein kleines bisschen kleiner und gelber sein könnte.
GT/Lösung: weil die GR intransitiv ist, folgt aber keineswegs, dass am Ende Kripke ein Rührei ist. Ein GS eines GS von Kripke muss nicht ein GS von Kripke sein. (1986e,246)
I 57
KripkeVs Gegenstück-Theorie/KripkeVsLewis: Bsp wenn wir sagen „Humphrey hätte die Wahl gewinnen können“ reden wir nach Lewis eben nicht von Humphrey, sondern von jemand anderem. Und nichts könnte ihm gleichgültiger sein („he couldn’t care less“). (Kripke 1980,44f). Gegenstück/GT/SchwarzVsKripke/SchwarzVsPlantinga: die beiden Einwände missverstehen Lewis: Lewis behauptet nicht, dass Humphrey die Wahl nicht hätte gewinnen können, im Gegenteil: „er hätte die Wahl gewinnen können“ steht genau für die Eigenschaft, die jemand hat, wenn eins seiner Gegenstücke die Wahl gewinnt. Diese Eigenschaft hat Humphrey, kraft seines Charakters. (1983d,42).
Eigentliches Problem: wie macht Humphrey das, dass er in der und der MöWe die Wahl gewinnt?
Plantinga: Humphrey hätte gewonnen, wenn der entsprechenden MöWe (dem Sachverhalt) die Eigenschaft des Bestehens zukäme.
Lewis/Schwarz: diese Frage hat mit den Intuitionen auf die sich Kripke und Plantinga berufen, nichts zu tun.
- - -
Schwarz I 223
Namen/Kennzeichnung/Referenz/Kripke/Putnam/Schwarz: (Kripke 1980, Putnam 1975): These: für Namen und Artausdrücke gibt es keine allgemeinbekannte Beschreibung (Kennzeichnung), die festlegt, worauf der Ausdruck sich bezieht. These: Kennzeichnungen sind für die Referenz völlig irrelevant. Beschreibungstheorie/LewisVsKripke/LewisVsPutnam/Schwarz: das wiederlegt nur die naive Kennzeichnungstheorie, nach der biographische Taten aufgelistet werden, die dem Referenten notwendig zukommen sollen.
Lösung/Lewis: seine Beschreibungstheorie der Namen erlaubt, dass Bsp „Gödel“ nur eine zentrale Komponente hat: nämlich dass Gödel am Anfang der Kausalkette steht. Damit steht die Theorie nicht mehr im Widerspruch zur Kausaltheorie der Referenz. (1984b,59,1994b,313,1997c,353f,Fn22).
((s)Vs: aber nicht die Kennzeichnung „steht am Anfang der Kausalkette“, denn das unterscheidet einen Namen nicht von irgendeinem anderen. Andererseits: „am Anfang der Gödel Kausalkette“ wäre nichtssagend.)
Referenz/LewisVsmagische Theorie der Referenz: wonach Referenz eine primitive, irreduzible Beziehung ist, (vgl. Kripke 1980,88 Fn 38), so dass wir, selbst wenn wir alle nicht semantischen Tatsachen über uns und die Welt wüssten, immer noch nicht wüssten, worauf unsere Wörter sich beziehen, nach der wir dazu spezielle Referenz o Meter bräuchten, die fundamentale semantische Tatsachen ans Licht bringen.
Wenn die magische Theorie der Referenz falsch ist, dann genügt nicht semantische Information im Prinzip, um uns zu sagen, worauf wir uns mit Bsp „Gödel“ beziehen: „wenn die Dinge so und so sind, bezieht sich „Gödel“ auf den und den“. Daraus können wir dann eine Kennzeichnung konstruieren, von der wir a priori wissen, dass sie Gödel herausgreift.
Diese Kennzeichnung wird oft indexikalische oder demonstrative Elemente enthalten, Verweise auf die wirkliche Welt.
I 224
Referenz/Theorie/Namen/Kennzeichnung/Beschreibungstheorie/LewisVsPutnam/LewisVsKripke/Schwarz: Bsp unsere Bananen Theorie sagt nicht, dass Bananen zu allen Zeiten und in allen MöWe im Supermarkt verkauft werden. Bsp unsere Gödel Theorie sagt nicht, dass Gödel in alle MöWe Gödel heißt. ((s) >Deskriptivismus). (KripkeVsLewis: doch: Namen sind starre Designatoren). LewisVsKripke: bei der Auswertung von Namen im Bereich von Temporal und Modaloperatoren muss man berücksichtigen, was in der Äußerungssituation die Kennzeichnung erfüllt, nicht in der MöWe oder in der Zeit, von der gerade die Rede ist. (1970c,87,1984b,59,1997c,356f)
I 225
A posteriori Notwendigkeit/Kripke/Schwarz: könnte es nicht sein, dass Wahrheiten über Schmerzen zwar auf physikalisch biologischen Tatsachen supervenieren und damit notwendig aus diesen folgen, dass uns diese Beziehung aber nicht a priori oder durch Begriffsanalyse zugänglich ist? Die Reduktion von Wasser auf H2O ist schließlich nicht philosophisch, sondern wissenschaftlich. Schwarz: wenn das stimmt, macht sich Lewis die Arbeit unnötig schwer. Als Physikalist müsste er nur behaupten, dass phänomenale Begriffe in nicht phänomenalem Vokabular analysierbar sind. Man könnte auch die Analyse von Naturgesetzen und Kausalität sparen. Er könnte einfach behaupten, diese Phänomene folgten notwendig a posteriori aus der Verteilung lokaler physikalischer Eigenschaften.
a posteriori notwendig/LewisVsKripke: das ist inkohärent: dass ein Satz a posteriori ist, heißt, dass man Information über die aktuelle Situation braucht, um herauszufinden, ob er wahr ist. Bsp dass Blair der tatsächliche Premierminister ist (tatsächlich eine a posteriori Notwendigkeit) muss man wissen, dass er in der aktuellen Situation Premierminister ist,
Schw I 226
was wiederum eine kontingente Tatsache ist. Wenn wir genügend Information über die ganze Welt haben, könnten wir im Prinzip a priori entnehmen, dass Blair der tatsächliche Premierminister ist. A posteriori Notwendigkeiten folgen a priori aus kontingenten Wahrheiten über die aktuelle Situation. (1994b,296f,2002b, Jackson 1998a: 56 86), s.o. 8.2)

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Kripke, S. A. Putnam Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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I 35
Names/Kripke/Putnam: central point: you can use a proper name to refer to a thing or a person, without having true beliefs regarding X.
---
I 36
The use of the name includes the existence of a causal chain. PutnamVsKripke: right: knowledge of a speaker does not have to set the reference in his idiolect.
The use of names is common.
Now you might say that terms of physical quantities are also proper names, not of things but of quantities.
----
I 189
Nature/essence/Kripke: E.g. Statue: The statue and the piece of clay are two items. The fact that the piece of clay has a modal property, namely, "to be a thing that might have been spherical", is missing to the statue.
VsKripke: that sounds initially odd: E.g. when I put the statue on the scale, do I measure then two items?
E.g. Equally strange is it to say, a human being is not identical with the aggregation of its molecules.
Intrinsic properties/Putnam: E.g. Suppose there are "intrinsic connections" of my thoughts to external objects: then there is perhaps in my brain a spacetime region with set-theoretical connections with an abstract object which includes certain external objects.
Then this spacetime region will have a similar set-theoretical connections with other abstract entities that contain other external objects.
Then the materialist can certainly say that my "thoughts" include certain external objects intrinsically, by identifying these thoughts with a certain abstract entity.
Problem: but if this identification should be a train of reality itself, then there must be in the world essences in a sense that cannot be explained by the set theory .
Nature/essential properties/PutnamVsKripke: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot serve to justify him.
Modal properties are not part of the materialistic establishment of the world..
But Kripke individuates objects by their modal characteristics.
Essential properties/Possible Worlds/Putnam: I, myself,(1975) spoke of "essential properties" but not in parallel worlds, but in other possible states of our world.
Example: We can imagine another "possible world" (not parallel), in which a liquid other than water has the taste of water, but none, in which H2O is not water.
This is insofar a kind of essentialism, as we have thus discovered the nature of water.
We just say water should not be anything else.
---
I 192
And that was already our intention, when we did not know the composition of H2O. Nature/essence/Putnam: is in this sense, however, the product of our use of the word. It is not "built into the world".
Nature/Kripke/Putnam: so it is also justified by Kripke.
Putnam: both our conception of "nature" does not help the materialists.
This purely semantic interpretation presupposes the reference. It cannot support the reference as an "intrinsic correlation" between thought and thing".
---
I 246
Truth/legitimate assertibility/Kripke Wittgenstein: that would only be a matter of general agreement. PutnamVsKripke: then this would be a wrong description of the terms that we actually have. And a self-confuting attempt to take an "absolute perspective".
---
Rorty VI 129/130
Causal theory of reference: PutnamVsKripke/Rorty, self-criticism, PutnamVsPutnam: the description of the causal relationships between a something and other things is nothing more than the description of characteristics that are neither in a greater nor lesser extent in a"intrinsic" or in an "extrinsic" relationship with it. So also the feature "to be described by a human being". PutnamVsSearle: Vs distinction "intrinsic"/"relational".

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Kripke, S. A. Rorty Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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Richard Rorty
I 318
Reference/RortyVsPutnam/RortyVsKripke: if we confuse the concept of "really talk about" with the concept of reference, we can, like Kripke and Putnam, easily get the idea that we have "intuitions" about the reference. Rorty: in my opinion, the problem does not arises. The only question of fact that exists here, concerns the existence or non-existence of certain entities, which are being talked about.
I 320
Fiction/Reference/RortyVsKripke/RortyVsPutnam: of course there can be no reference to fictions. This corresponds to the technical and scientific use. But then "reference" has basically nothing to do with "talking about", and only comes into play after the choice between different strategies was made. Reference is a technical term and therefore we have no intuitions about it at all! Real existential issues are also not affected by the criterion of Searle and Strawson! What then is the right criterion? Rorty: there is none at all!
It is not only possible to talk about non-existent entities, but also to find out that we have actually talked about them! Talking about X in reality and talking about a real X is not the same.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Lewis, D. Putnam Vs Lewis, D.
 
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I Lanz 291
Functionalism/identity theory: common: recognition of causally relevant inner states. But functionalism Vsidentity theory: the substance is not what plays a causal role for the commitment. (PutnamVsLewis). ---
Horwich I 437
"Elite classes"/Nature/Natural Reference/world/language/Lewis/Putnam: thesis, there are certain classes of things "out there" (elite classes) which are intrinsically distinguished, whereby it is a "natural condition" for reference, (incorporated into nature), that as many of our concepts as possible should refer to these elite classes. This does not clearly determine the reference of our terms, because sometimes there are other desiderata, but so the language is "tied to the world".
Löwenheim/Putnam: from my ((s) Löwenheim-) argument follows that all our beliefs and experiences would be the same and none of my critics has ever contested that.
N.B.: it follows that Lewis "natural conditions" were not brought in by our interests, but that they are something that works with our interests to fix reference.
LewisVsLöwenheim/Putnam: Lewis' thesis boils down to that e.g., the class of cats longs to be designated but not the one of cats*.
Reference/PutnamVsLewis: his idea of the elite classes does not solve the problem of reference, but even confuses the materialist picture, by introducing something spooky.
PutnamVsLewis: this does not only affect reference but also justification, relations of simultaneous assertibility, (that something could remain true, while something other is no longer true). All this cannot be fixed by something psychological, by something "in the head".
PutnamVsPhysicalism: it cannot say that they are fixed, without falling back into medieval speech of a "clear causal order." Physicalism cannot say how it would be fixed, without falling back into medieval speech.
---
Black I 149
"New Theory of Reference/PutnamVsLewis/KripkeVsLewis/Schwarz: Did Kripke and Putnam not prove that, what an expression refers to, has nothing to do with associated descriptions? Then it could be that we are referring with "pain" to a state that does not play the everyday psychological role, which is not caused by injuries, etc., but may play the role that we mistakenly attribute to "joy". Then people would typically smile with pain. Typical cause of pain would be the fulfillment of wishes.
LewisVsPutnam: thinks this is nonsense. When a state plays the role of joy, it is joy.
---
Putnam III 176
Possible Worlds/Lewis: I believe in what is claimed by permissible reformulations of my beliefs. Does one take the reformulation at face value, I believe in the existence of entities that could be called "ways, how things could have turned out". These entities, I call "possible worlds". (Realistic interpretation possible worlds.) PutnamVsLewis: "way" does not necessarily need to be interpreted as a different world.
---
III 177
Possible Worlds/David Lewis: we already know what our world is all about, other worlds are things of the same kind, which do not differ in kind, but only by the processes that take place in them. We call our world, therefore the real world, because it is the world in which we live. Possible world/PutnamVsLewis: a possible "way" of world development could also be perceived as a property, not as a different world. This property could be (no matter how complicated) a feature that could correspond to the whole world.
Possible World/PutnamVsLewis: if a "way of possible world development" would be a property (a "state description" of the whole world), and the Eiffel Tower would have a different height, then the property "is a world in which the Eiffel Tower is 150 meters high" must follow from the property that the Eiffel tower in our world is not 150 meters high.
Lewis: claims, properties would have to be something simple, and the statement that a property follows from another, boils down to the assertion that there is a necessary relationship between various simple ones, and that is, as Lewis says, "incomprehensible". So the properties would have to be in turn interpreted as complexes. But Lewis is unable to see in how far properties could be complexes, because of what should they be made?
---
III 178
PutnamVsLewis: Lewis has not answered here in the "analytical" style. He did not say normal things. I have no idea what is going on with the intuitive ideas claimed by Lewis, why something works intuitively and something else works incomprehensible. The argument that something simple cannot enter a relationship, is according to my impression far from possessing practical or spiritual significance. I find these intuitive ideas not only alien; I even feel I do not understand what it means. ---
Putnam I 187
Counterfactual conditionals/unreal conditionals/Lewis: Suggestion: analyze "cause" based on unreal conditional sentences: "If A had not happened, B would not have happened". Counterfactual conditional/PutnamVsLewis: there are situations in which it is simply not true that B would not have happened if A had not happened.
---
I 201
E.g. B could have been caused by another cause. E.g. Identical twins: it is so that both always have the same hair color. But the hair of one is not the cause of the other. Lewis cannot separate this.
Counterfactual conditionals/unreal conditionals/truth conditions/Lewis/Stalnaker: Lewis follows Stalnaker and provides truth condition for unreal conditional clauses: for this he needs possible worlds and a similarity measure.
Definition truth condition/Lewis: "If X would have happened, Y would have happened" is true if and only if Y, in all closest worlds where X is the case, is really true.
PutnamVsLewis: an ontology, which requires parallel and possible worlds, is at least not a materialistic ontology. Besides it also sounds pretty much like science fiction.
---
I 188/189
The notion of an intrinsic similarity measure, i.e. a measure that is sensitive to the fact of what we deem relevant or normal, is again in such a way that the world is like a ghost or impregnated with something like reason. This then requires a metaphysical explanation and is therefore idealism.
And objective idealism can hardly be "a bit true".
"It is all physics, except that there is that similarity measure makes simply no sense.
---
Putnam I 189
Identity/nature/essence/Lewis: Proposal: the aggregation of molecules and "I" are identical for a period of time, similar to Highway 2 and Highway 16, which are identical for some time. VsLewis: but not every property of aggregation is a property of mine.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

Bla III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983
Metaphysical Realism Millikan Vs Metaphysical Realism
 
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Millikan I 329
Correspondence/Putnam: it is incoherent to suppose that truth was a correspondence with the WORLD. Projection/representation/Putnam: mathematical projections are omnipresent, representations are not omnipresent.
Problem: a correspondence theory, which is based on a projective relation between a complete collection of true representations and the world is empty.
I 330
Solution: there must first be a distinction between projections and representations. Solution: there must be an additional condition for reference, namely that an intended interpretation is identified.
Causal theory/Putnam: would not help here. Because it is equally uncertain whether the "Cause" references unambiguously or the "Cat" references unambiguously.
Concept/signs/Ockham/Putnam: Problem: a concept must not simply be a "mental individual thing", otherwise each sign merely refers to a different sign repeatedly.
PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: it is incomprehensible how a relation between a sign and its object could be singled out, either by holding up the sign itself, Ex
COW
Or by holding up another sign e.g.
REFERENCES
Or maybe
CAUSES.
To mean/meaning rationalism/Putnam/Millikan: this is the rationalism of meaning: in order to mean something, we need to know what we mean, namely "know" it with a very specific clarity informed by rationalism of meaning:
The relation between the head and the world must be reflected in full in the head,
((S)> overarching general).
PutnamVs: That could only work if there was a mysterious "direct capture of the shape" ((s) platonic). Then the relation would not have to be mirrored again.
I 331
Correspondence/to mean/meaning/reference/MillikanVsPutnam/Millikan: thesis: the relations between the head and the world are actually between the head and the world. Understanding these relationships contributes nothing to the explanation of meaning and reference. They don't have to be intended in order to make a reference.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987
Peirce, Ch.S. Brandom Vs Peirce, Ch.S.
 
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Rorty VI 193
Wahrheit/BrandomVsPutnam/BrandomVsPeirce/BrandomVsHabermas: Brandom ist nicht darauf festgelegt, "wahr" epistemisch zu definieren. Also nicht das, was "von allen Mitgliedern der Gemeinschaft oder den Sachverständigen für wahr gehalten wird (oder unter idealen Bedingungen)" . Vielmehr gibt es gar keine Vogelperspektive.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Perry, J. Lewis Vs Perry, J.
 
Books on Amazon
IV 70
Person/Identität/Spaltung/Perry/Lewis: wir beide haben dasselbe Ziel, aber verschiedene Prioritäten. Perry: gebraucht nicht die zeitliche Identität (Identität zu t). Er erlaubt nicht die Identifikation der I-Relation (IR) und der R-Relation (RR) sondern nur von gewissen zeitlichen Unterrelationen von ihnen.
LewisVsPerry: dazu muss er eine unintuitive Unterscheidung zwischen Personen, die zu verschiedenen Zeiten existieren (Zustände haben) einführen. ((s) >Castaneda: "flüchtige Iche").
Alle Personen sind bestimmbar zu einer Zeit (außer den Problemfällen).
Bsp Stadium S1 sei R relativiert zu t kurz R1r in Bezug auf S2 dann und nur dann, wenn S1 und S2 Rr simpliciter sind, und auch S2 zu t lokalisiert ist. Dann ist die R1Relation die R Relation zwischen Stadien zu t und anderen Stadien zu anderen Zeiten oder zu t.
IV 71
Und S1 ist Ir zu t kurz I1 relativ auf S2 wenn beide S1 und S2 Stadien einer dP sind, die bestimmbar zu t ist und S2 zu t lokalisiert ist. Dabei müssen wir e.p. auslassen, die nicht zu t bestimmbar sind. Enduring Person/Perry: (continuant, e.p.): ein C ist eine e.p. wenn für ein Person Stadium S, lokalisiert zu t, C das Aggregat ist, das alle und nur Stadien umfasst, die Rtr auf S sind.
Allgemein, eine dP ist ein continuant, der zu einer Zeit bestimmbar ist. Niemand ist zu dauerhafter Unidentifizierbarkeit verurteilt.
Def Lebenszeit/Perry: enduring Person, (continuant).
Def Zweig/Terminologie/Perry: maximal R korreliertes Aggregat von Person Stadien (genau das, was ich eine dP nenne).
Spaltung: hier sind einige Lebenszeiten keine Zweige. Das ganze ist eine Lebenszeit (kein Zweig) die bestimmbar ist zu t0 (vor der Spaltung). C1 und C2 sind noch gar nicht unterscheidbar, während C nicht mehr bestimmbar ist zu t1 (nach der Spaltung).
PerryVsLewis: These: die RR ist nicht dasselbe wie die IR (in diesem Fall). Denn C ist eine Lebenszeit und dann sind nach Perry S1 und S2 I r, aber wegen der Spaltung nicht R r.
Daraus folgt, dass für jede Zeit t die RtR dieselbe wie die I1R ist.
Lewis: vielleicht genügt das, dann jede Frage nach dem Überleben oder der Identität entsteht ja zu einer bestimmten Zeit! D.h. zu t sind nur die RtR und ItR relevant.
Es ist harmlos, dass S1 und S2 Ir sind weil sie weder It0 noch It1r noch überhaupt Itr zu irgendeiner Zeit t sind.
Perry These: jedes Person Stadium zu einer Zeit muss zu genau einer dP bestimmbar zu der Zeit gehören. Personen können wohlgemerkt Stadien teilen:
Bsp Spaltung: S gehört zu drei Lebenszeiten: C, C1, C2 aber nur zu zwei Zweigen: C1 und C2. S1 gehört zu zwei LZ C und C1 aber nur zu einem Zweig: C1.
Stadien/Perry: werden aber nur dann geteilt, wenn alle bis auf einen Träger nicht bestimmbar sind.
Deshalb können wir mit Identität zählen, wenn wir nur die Personen zählen, die zu einer Zeit bestimmbar sind und bekommen die richtige Anwort. Eine Person existiert vor der Spaltung, zwei nachher.
Insgesamt sind es drei, aber dann werden auch die nichtbestimmbaren gezählt! Aber bei der Spaltung verschwindet die erste und zwei neue entstehen.
LewisVsPerry: ich gebe zu, dass Zählung durch Identität zu t etwas kontraintuitiv ist, aber ist es nicht genauso kontraintuitiv, unbestimmbare Personen auszulassen?
"es gibt"/existeren: zeitlos gesehen gibt es Personen, sie existieren aber zu einer Zeit. (d.h. sie haben Zustände, Stadien).
IV 72
Und damit sind sie nicht identisch mit den Personen, die wir zählen. Ist es nicht ungerechtfertigt, sie auszuschließen? Perry kann sagen: wir haben ausgezeichnete praktische Gründe. Methusalem/Perry/Lewis: Perry geht nicht darauf ein, sein Ansatz kann aber darauf angewendet werden:
Das Ganze von Methusalem ist sowohl Lebenszeit als auch Zweig und damit eine unproblematische Peson.
Zweige/Lewis: (= continuants, dauerhafte Personen) die (willkürlich gewählten) Segmente von 137 Jahren. Für Perry wären es die doppelten 274 Jahre.
Lebenszeit: ist bei den trivialen Ausnahmefällen des Beginns und des Endes nicht identisch. D.h. die ersten und die letzten 137 Jahre sind beides: Zweig und Lebenszeit, da sie nicht auseinanderklaffen können.
Jedes Stadium gehört zu genau einer Person, die zu t bestimmbar ist und zu unendlich vielen nichtbestimmbaren Personen!
Zählung nach Identität liefert die richtige Antwort, weil sie die unbestimmbaren auslässt.
RtR und ItR sind für jede Zeit t identisch, aber sie RR und die IR differieren für je zwei Stadien, die weiter als 137 Jahre auseinander liegen. (Aber nicht mehr als 274).
Identität/Perry: er sagt nichts über Grade personaler Identität.
Lewis: er könnte sie aber übernehmen.
LewisVsPerry: pro Perry was die normalen Fälle betrifft, aber bei pathologischen Fällen (Spaltung usw.) fehlt ein genauer Punkt der Referenz:
Das führt wieder zu Überbevölkerung:
Bsp wie viele Personen waren bei einer Spaltung involviert, die sich vor langer Zeit ereignete? Ich sage: zwei Perry: drei. Oder er sagt: keine heute bestimmbaren.
- - -
IV 151
Heimson Bsp/LewisVsPerry: soweit sein Argument und ich glaube, dass es funktioniert, aber es ist zu kompliziert, ohne extra etwas zu leisten. Seine Lösung muss mindestens so gut sein wie meine, weil sie ein Teil meiner Lösung ist. Wann immer ich sage, dass jemand sich die Eigenschaft X zuschreibt, sagt Perry: das erste Objekt ist ein Paar von ihm und der Eigenschaft X. Das zweite Objekt ist dann die Funktion die irgendeinem Subjekt das Paar Y und X zuschreibt.
Der scheinbare Vorteil bei Perry ist, dass er external attribution (e.a.) genauso gut wie self attribution (s.a.) erklärt.
Glauben de re: Zuschreibung von Eigenschaften an Individuen.
Perrys Schema ist gemacht für Zuschreibung de re, aber de se fällt darunter als Spezialfall.
IV 152
De re: Heimson und der Psychiater stimmen darin überein, Heimson die Eigenschaft, Hume zu sein, zuschreiben. LewisVsPerry: meine Lösung ist einfacher: die Selbstzuschreibungen eines Subjekts sind das Ganze seines Glaubenssystems ((s) >Chisholm).
Fremdzuschreibungen: sind keine weiteren Glaubenseinstellungen neben den .
Glauben/Überzeugung/LewisVsPutnam: ist im Kopf! ((s) Putnam spricht auch nur von Bedeutungen, die nicht im Kopf sind.)
Lewis: aber ich stimme mit Perry überein, dass Glauben de re im allgemeinen nicht im Kopf sind, weil sie in Wirklichkeit gar nicht Glauben sind! Sie sind Sachverhalte, Kraft der Relationen des Glaubens des Subjekts zu den Dingen.
LewisVsPerry: sein Schema repräsentiert neben Glauben noch etwas anderes. Für Glauben ist es redundant. Wenn wir ein paar erste Objekte haben und ein paar erforderliche Tatsachen die nicht über Glauben.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Putnam, H. Block Vs Putnam, H.
 
Books on Amazon:
Ned Block
I 179
Pain/Functionalism/Putnam: Thesis: pain is a functional state. Thesis: no organism that can feel pain, allows a decomposition into parts that have separate descriptions. E.g. a swarm of bees as a whole cannot be a single pain feeler.
BlockVsPutnam: 1) that could be modified in a way that the parts may not all have one organization that are characteristic of sentient beings.
This would not exclude a system with homunculi!.
E.g. sense organs have also insentient parts!.
2) Also vice versa it should not be said that no real part may feel:
E.g. otherwise, pregnant women and organisms infested with parasites would not be considered as pain feeling beings.
Block: what is important is that the sentient beings play a crucial role in giving the thing its functional organization.
I 192
Best explanation/Abduction/Block: E.g. Psycho functionalism: you could say: "What else could mental states be, if not psycho-functional states?" (Putnam per psycho functionalism, 1967). "Better explanation than behaviorism or materialism. BlockVsPutnam: this is a dubious use of the inference to the best explanation. Because what guarantees us that an answer to the question "What are mental states?" exists at all?.
In addition, the conclusion about the best explanation is not applicable if there are no acceptable explanations. ((s) If nothing is useful, what is available?)

Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007
Putnam, H. Carnap Vs Putnam, H.
 
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VI 242
Substance/Carnap: E.g. substance gold: Class of the golden objects. Extension/Putnam: E.g. all occurrences of H2O in the universe.
CarnapVsPutnam: E.g. gold reserves of the Earth: a whole.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Putnam, H. Davidson Vs Putnam, H.
 
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I 29
Twin Earth/: The question is whether it follows that the person concerned does not know what they think? DavidsonVsPutnam: Answer: this does not follow: it would only follow if the object that is used to identify my thoughts were something which I would have to be able to distinguish in order to know what I think. However, we had abandoned this assumption. What I see in front of me I believe to be water, I do not run the risk of thinking it was twin earth water, because I do not know what twin earth water is.
I 30
Even more: I also believe that I think I see water, and I am right with that, although it is probably not to water but twin earth water.
I 59
Putnam and Dummett show that the concept of truth itself can be given a knowledge-based twist. Yet all three have given the evidence precedence over the truth (as the primary status for the determination of meaning). DavidsonVsDummett, DavidsonVsPutnam: I think this is a mistake: This leads to the difficulties of the proximal theories: to a concept of truth relativized to individuals and to skepticism. The proximal theories are always kind of Cartesian.
I 73
DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsDummett: Vsproximal theory: skepticism, relativism to individual evidence: The only insightful concept of evidence is that of a relation between sentences. Or between beliefs! Davidson: My externalism is excited not by "linguistic division of labor" but by the "Twin Earth". Therefore, I do not believe that Putnam’s externalism threatens the authority of the first person. But I do not quite agree for other reasons.
DavidsonVsPutnam: his externalism applies primarily to words for natural species such as "water" and "leopard". The idea is that I identify these objects henceforth through the microstructure. ((s) why?)
DavidsonVsPutnam: but I do not see why the equality of the microstructure necessarily should be the decisive similarity, through which the reference of a word such as water should be determined.
I 116
There is no reason to limit externalism to a single, or small number of categories. For language and thought it is generally characteristic that their link with the world emerge from the kind of causal connections I discussed. Putnam: microstructure provides similarity for determining the reference (DavidsonVs)
Davidson: causal connections generally relevant for language and reference
DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsBurge: The fact that he emphasizes the everyday situation so strongly with the triangulation sets him apart from Putnam’s and Burge’s externalism.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
Putnam, H. Dennett Vs Putnam, H.
 
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I 571/572
Meaning/Function/Evolution/Dennett: the meaning is like the function at the moment of their creation still nothing definite. Twin Earth/t.e./Putnam/DennettVsPutnam: it requires a leap in the reference, a jump in the intentionality.
Dennett: you could now tend to think that inner intentionality has a certain "inertia".
I 573
Twin Earth/Dennett/VsPutnam: you cannot tell a story assuming that tables are no tables, even though they look like tables and are used like tables. Something else would be a "living being that looks like Fury" (But is not Fury).
But if there are "twin earth horses" on the Twin Earth which are much like our horses, then twin earth horses are horses, a non-terrestrial kind of horse though, but after all horses.
((s), therefore, in Putnam the Twin Earth water has a different chemical formula: YXZ.)
Dennett: of course you can also represent a more stringent opinion according to which the non-terrestrial horses are a separate species. Both are possible.
I 575
Indeterminacy/Twin Earth/Dennett: Their idea of ​​what "horse" for really means suffers under the same indeterminacy like the frog’s idea of the fly as a "little flying edible object". Indeterminacy/DennettVsPutnam: E.g. "cat", "Siamese cat": Perhaps you simply find one day that you must make a distinction that was just not necessary previously, because the subject did not come up for discussion.
This indeterminacy undermines Putnam’s argument of the t.e.
Münch III 379
Twin Earth/DennettVsPutnam: he tries to close the gap by saying that we are referring to natural types, whether we know it or not. Dennett: But what types are natural? Races are as natural as species or classes! ((s) VsDennett: There is also the view that only the species are natural).
DennettVsEssentialism: E.g. Vending Machine has dissolved into nothingness. Equally: E.g. Frog: he would have caught food pellets in the wild just the same if they had come in his way. Disjunction: in a way "flies or pellets" are a natural type for frogs. They do not distinguish between the two naturally. On the other hand, the disjunction is not a natural type: it does not occur in nature!.
Twin Earth/DennettVsPutnam: "natural type" twin earth horse/horses/disjunction: E.g. Assuming someone had brought twin earth horse to the Earth unnoticed, we would have readily referred to them as horses. Meaning/Dennett: Vending machine and the information of the frog’s eye derive their meaning from the function. Where the function does not provide a response, there is nothing to investigate.
The meanings of the people are just as derived as those of a venidng machine. This proves the t.e. Otherwise you have to postulate essentialism.
Explanation/DennettVsPutnam: an explanation on microphysical level is not inconsistent with an explanation on rational grounds.
III 31 Putnam
DennettVsPutnam: according to Putnam’s conception the mind something chaotic. Dennett and Fodor: Both authors have an unspoken premise in mind, and this is reductionist. There is also cognition without reductionism.

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Mü I
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Putnam, H. Esfeld Vs Putnam, H.
 
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I 133
EsfeldVsPutnam: unser sozialer Holismus ist verschieden von seinem Externalismus: es geht um soziale Praktiken und nicht um Merkmale der physikalischen Umwelt.
I 155
Überzeugung/Zwillingserde: obwohl die soziale Praxis auf der Erde und der ZE ununterscheidbar ist, sind die betreffenden Überzeugungen verschieden! sozialer Holismus/Esfeld: die soziale Erklärung von Bedeutung (Inhalt) reicht nicht hin, um Referenz zu bestimmen. (Unterschied Bedeutung/Bezug).
EsfeldVsPutnam: man mag Bedenken haben gegen die Sicht von Referenz, die Putnam hier voraussetzt.
Bedeutung/Bezug/Referenz/Zwillingserde/EsfeldVsPutnam: wenn man vertritt, daß die Mikrostruktur die Bedeutung durch kausale Relation bestimmt, dann trennt man nicht nur Referenz, sondern auch Bedeutung von unserer Praktiken ab.
I 156
Das antwortet aber nicht auf Kripkes skeptische Herausforderung! Diese behauptet, daß die Annahme von natürlichen Eigenschaften, die physikalisch instantiiert werden, das Problem nicht löst. Jede endliche Reihe instantiiert mehr als nur eine natürliche Eigenschaft. ((s) DF Analogie zum Problem der hinweisenden Definition).

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Putnam, H. Field Vs Putnam, H.
 
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III 113
Pure Mathematics/Putnam: should be interpreted in a way that it asserts the possible existence of physical structures that satisfy the mathematical axioms. FieldVsPutnam: pure mathematics should not be interpreted at all.
I 211
Properties/Relations/Putnam: (1970): are predicative, according to them we have a few basic physical prop and rel from which all others are derived: 1st order: Allows no reference to a totality of physical objects when a new property is constructed.
2nd order: Allows reference to the totality of the properties of the 1st order.
3rd order: Allows reference to the totality of the properties of the 1st and 2nd order. - Every physical property appears on any level of the hierarchy -> functionalism.
Functional properties are 2nd or higher order properties - the prop that the role has may differ from person to person.
I 214
FieldVsPutnam: instead of properties provide instantiations of properties with steps.
I 268
Mathematics/Ontology/Putnam: ("Mathematics without foundations", 1976b, 1975 "What is mathematical truth?"): Field: Putnam Thesis: the mathematical realist does not have to accept the "mathematical object picture". He can formulate his views in purely modal terms. And that not as an alternative, but only as another formulation of the same view.
I 269
Indispensability Argument/Putnam: appear in the subsequent text. Field: If "Mathematics as a modal" logic was really an equivalent description of mathematics in terms of mathematical objects (MO), then it should also be possible to reformulate the Indispensability Argument so that there is a prima facie argument for one or the other kind of modalized mathematics and mathematical objects.
FieldVsPutnam: but Section 6 and 7 show that we cannot formulate the indispensability argument like that: it requires MO and modalized mathematics does not bring them forth.
VSVs: but beware: I have not studied all the possibilities.
I 269
FieldVsPutnam: his mathematical realism seems puzzling: Mathematics/Ontology/Putnam: Thesis: there is a modal translation of pure mathematics: he presents a translation procedure that turns mathematical statements into modal statements, one that transforms acceptable mathematical statements (E.g. axioms of set theory) into true modal assertions that include no quantification, unless it is modalized away. (I.e. ​​no mathematical entities (ME) in the modal statements).
I 270
FieldVsPutnam: two general questions: 1) what kind modality is involved here?
2) what benefit is the translation to have?
ad 1): Putnam thinks that the "object-image" (the starting position) and its modal translation are equivalent at a deeper level.
FieldVs: that’s really not interesting: "mathematically possible" should coincide with "logically possible" in any reasonable view (this is stated by conservatism). ((s) contrary to the above).
Important argument: if A is not mathematically possible, then "~A" is a consequence of mathematics - i.e. if A (and then also its negation) are purely non-mathematically, then "~A" is logically true.
If Putnam now says that his modal translation involves a "strong and clear mathematical sense of possibility", then a mathematical possibility operator must be applied to sentences that contain ME.
However, such a sentence A could also be a mixed sentence (see above, with purely mathematical and purely physical components).
I 271
FieldVsPutnam: for purely mathematical sentences mathematical possibility and truth coincide! But then the "modal translations" are just as ontologically committed as the mathematical assertions.
FieldVs"Mathematical Possibility"/FieldVsPutnam: we had better ignore it. Maybe it was about 2nd order logical possibility as opposed to 1st order for Putnam?
I 271
FieldVsPutnam: what benefits does his modal translation have? Does it provide a truth transfer (as opposed to the transmission of mere acceptability)? And what value has it to say that the mathematical statements are both true and acceptable? Etc. Mathematics/Realism/Putnam/Field: Putnam describes himself as
"mathematical realist": Difference to Field’s definition of realism: he does not consider ME as mind-independent and language-independent, but (1975):
Putnam: you can be a realist without being obliged to mathematical objects.
I 272
The question is the one that Kreisel formulated long ago: the question of the objectivity of mathematics and not the question the existence of mathematical objects. FieldVsPutnam: this is puzzling.
I 277
Model Theory/Intended Model/Putnam/Field: this morality can be strengthened: there is no reason to consider "∈" as fixed! Putnam says that in "Models and Reality": the only thing that could fix the "intended interpretation" would be the acceptance of sentences that contain "∈" through the person or the community. Putnam then extends this to non-mathematical predicates. ((s)> Löwenheim-Skolem).
FieldVsPutnam: this is misleading: it is based on the confusion of the view that the reference is determined, E.g. by causal reasoning with the view that it is defined by a description theory (description theory, (labeling theory?), in which descriptions (labels?) that contain the word "cause" should play a prominent role. (> Glymour, 1982, Devitt, 1983, Lewis 1984).

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Putnam, H. Fodor Vs Putnam, H.
 
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I Lanz 290
Functionalism / Fodor: (FodorVsPutnam) advocates a wider concept of functionalism. (Turing machine as a model of psychological systems is too limited).   What makes the state of a living being or of a system to be a state of mind of a particular type are the causal relations, in which this state is in relation to 1st inputs - 2nd to other mental states - 3rd in relation to the output.
  Various material substrates can bear the same role (> robot, > zombie). Therefore, they are irrelevant to the specification of the nature of mental states.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Putnam, H. Fraassen Vs Putnam, H.
 
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Hacking I 80
Theory of meaning / FraassenVsPutnam: may be interesting, but it does not contribute to the understanding of science. (Hacking ditto). Empiricism is true, but not in the language-related figure given to it by the logical positivists! Def Constructive empiricism / Frassen per: Science aims to provide theories that are empirically adequate. Acceptance here means only that a theory is adequate.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Putnam, H. Goodman Vs Putnam, H.
 
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Horwich I 397
Realism/Incompatibility/Putnam/Early: in particular, I believed that what we refer to as "incompatible" can be applied to the same real object, though not within the same theory. E.g. this "real object" may be called a "point" in one theory, an "amount convergent segments" in another. Conversely: the same term can be applied to different objects in different theories.
Putnam early: it is a property of the world (i.e. the WORLD) itself that it "allows different images":
Problem/GoodmanVsPutnam (early): the price for this is that this view preserves the WORLD, but gives up an understandable concept of how the world is. Each of the many equivalent descriptions will only express one theory relative property of the world.

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G II
N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

G III
N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Putnam, H. Hacking Vs Putnam, H.
 
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I40
Truth/Reason/Putnam: are very closely connected. HackingVsPutnam.
I 148
Meaning/Science/HackingVsPutnam: we should talk about types of objects, not about types of meaning. Meaning is not a very good concept for philosophy of science.
I 156
HackingVsPutnam: Reference is ultimately not decisive! (E.g. muon). For physicists, "Meson" was initially synonymous with "whatever corresponds to the presumption of Yukawa". That’s something like Fregean sense. When it became clear that this sense did not correspond to the object, the baptism was annulled and a new name was given.
I 163
PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Vs idea of ​​"fixed whole of mind-independent objects". HackingVsPutnam: nobody has never represented this!.
I 164
HackingVsPutnam: links his different theses, as if they were logically connected. They are not!. HackingVsPutnam: he used to represent a scientific realism. He has not changed party, he has changed war.
I 179
HackingVsPutnam: however, actually he has shown nothing but the failure of the reference by naming a number of true statements, which are brought into being in the first-order logic (>Löwenheim, >AustinVsMoore).
I 181
Löwenheim-Skolem/Premises/Hacking: 1) the sentence is only about the first-order logic sentences. So far, no one has proved that the language of the physicists could be pressed in this context. Spoken languages ​​contain indicators: "this" and "that". Montague thesis: colloquial language primarily uses second-order quantifiers. Wittgenstein’s arguments against showing, according to which it was not possible to fully specify meaning using rules, do not imply that there was something in our linguistic practice, which is essential undetermined. Löwenheim and Skolem spoke about large numbers and we can only talk about them. About cats or cherries we can do more than merely talk. Putnam asserts that it is possible to reinterpret words such as "designate" and "refer" in turn. HackingVsPutnam: I do not need theory of reference to refer. And it’s a - possibly with reference to Wittgenstein - at least defensible conception that there cannot be a general theory of reference.
I 182
scientific articles on muons are full of photographs! - E.g. muons: it has been found that the mass of the muon is 206,786 times the mass of the electron. How have we found out this figure at the time?.
I 183
From a whole bunch of complicated calculations with a bunch of variables and a number of relations between nature constants. These consist not only of sentences, but are linked to experimental findings. They also have been found by independent scientists and laboratories.
I 184
The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem is not constructive. I.e. in principle there is no method for producing a non-intended interpretation available to man. - E.g. we also speak of "Persian" and "Heart Cherry". These species names do not act like ordinary adjectives of the type "sweet", because sweet heart cherries are sweet fruits and not "heart fruit". - Solution: This is not possible or would be noticed, because the number of subspecies is not the same: the number of cherry species is different from the number of cat species. So no correspondence relation will preserve the structure of the species names. Moreover, you would not bake a cake with cats! How should cherry facts come to light in the cat world?.
I 185
Putnam perhaps commits the gravest error possible in philosophy: he takes a sentence as an example that was perhaps never uttered and would be pointless outside logic. The next step is then to assert that just as it is possible to reinterpret "cherries" it is possible to reinterpret "designating". Reference: its warranty does not depend primarily on the expression of true propositions, but on our interactions with the world. Even at the level of the language there is far more structure given than Putnam involves.
I 220
HackingVsPutnam: transcendental Nominalist (anti-realist). It is not possible to step out of the system of thought and retain a base of reference that does not belong to one’s own system of reference. HackingVsPutnam: misguided dichotomy of thought and action (like Dewey). Hacking Thesis: man is a representing being. (A tribe without images is not a human tribe for me).

Hack I
I. Hacking
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996
Putnam, H. Lewis Vs Putnam, H.
 
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I 27
Fehlgeschlagene Kennzeichnungen sind nicht sinnlos! (Putnam: die theoretischen Termini einer widerlegten Theorie sind sinnlos.). LewisVsPutnam: das sind sie nicht, falls sie fehlgeschlagenen Kennzeichnungen gleichen. »Der Marsmond« und »der Venusmond« benennen (auf irgend eine normale Weise) nichts hier in unserer wirklichen Welt; aber sie sind nicht sinnlos, weil wir sehr gut wissen, was sie in gewissen anderen möglichen Welten benennen.
In unserer Detektivgeschichte wäre dann eine andere Geschichte realisiert. Ja, sie hatte sogar eine einzige Realisierung: die Geschichte, die sich ergibt, wenn wir den kleinen Fehler beseitigen oder berichtigen. Eine einzige Beinahe-Realisierung.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Putnam, H. Nagel Vs Putnam, H.
 
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I 25
NagelVsPutnam: has always been flirting with subjectivism. - - -
I 132
Internal realism fails because of its own test of rational acceptability. What we actually accept is a worldview that confirms or refutes our perceptions. Even our interpretation of the quantum theory and the related observations would be a view on the suchness of the world, even if a physicist says it could not be interpreted realistically.   It would not be a view that would rightly be restricted by means of an "internalist" interpretation. Our point of view is a set of beliefs that affect the real suchness, while it is being admitted that we do not know many things.
 The only method of determining the rational acceptability is thinking about whether it is true. With all the evidence and arguments, and considering all the things that are cited by others as relevant.
 Nagel: we must not equate acceptability with truth, otherwise we would rob both terms of any content.
Internal Realism/Putnam: internal realism should not contain any reduction of truth to epistemic terms, truth and acceptability are interdependent.
NagelVsPutnam: that is not clear. Putnam seems to be making concessions lately, however, see his explanation for why Wittgenstein was not a relativist: a position outside the language game is something else than participating in the language game itself.
Putnam: but why should metalanguage be so sure of itself?"
I 133
Brand: the belief that the world is organized is quite confirmed in a number of areas, namely: if they predict observations that, in turn, cannot be explained by our belief in these hypotheses. The "theory ladenness" of the observation in my opinion is of little importance.

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991
Putnam, H. Nozick Vs Putnam, H.
 
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II 339
Functionalism/NozickVsPutnam: f in addition we need the biological function of the physical states as realization of functional connections. Putnam: is right in that the defined material base is not important. But it does not follow that nothing is essential about the material basis! E.g. a marble rolling up and down in the head of a Martian would have the same functional connections as joke has for us. It does not follow that the Martian is in pain during this process! VsPutnam: two additional conditions: 1) the respective states under the functional isomorphism must have isomorphic internal structures themselves. 2) (which gives content to the first): these states have to play their role in a way that depends on its (isomorphic) internal structure. Mental State/Pain/Martian/Nozick: for the mental states to be the same as for us, the physical states must not only play the same role, but also be configured the same as ours (internally). (FN 47). If the internal configurations of the Martians are different from ours, although they should explain the same roles, then they are in other mental states. Nozick: nevertheless even Martians for whom all of this applies II 340 are still not in the same mental states if they do not have the same biological function as ours: to identify or bring about the abstract rational relations.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994
Putnam, H. Quine Vs Putnam, H.
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
Schurz I 211
Realism/Philosophy of Science/Schurz: two kinds: a) metaphysical
I 212
b) hypothetical constructive realism: Thesis: the question of whether a theoretical term (TT) refers cannot be decided a priori. It depends on the success of the concept in empirical insight. Then realistic question of reasons converges with the instrumentalist question of meaning!
Miracle Argument/PutnamVsQuine/PutnamVsUnder-Determinacy: (pro realism): it would be a miracle if theories that have long been empirically successful, were not also realistically true.
Underdeterminacy/QuineVsPutnam/QuineVsRealism: Thesis: it is always possible to construct empirically equivalent theories T* to a given theory T with greatly different or even incompatible theoretical superstructure, so that it is impossible for T and T* to be true at the same time. However, such empirically equivalent theory transformations are always post hoc.
Miracle Argument: (Worrall 1997 153ff, Carrier 2003 §4): can only be valid if we mean by empirical success the ability to make qualitatively new predictions.
CarrierVsQuine/WorrallVsQuine//Schurz: no post hoc constructed theory T* was ever able to do that.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Putnam, H. Rorty Vs Putnam, H.
 
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Richard Rorty
McDowell I 175
Coherence Theory/Rorty pro Davidson: Beliefs: can a) be seen from the outside, perspective of the field researcher, causal interactions with the surroundings - b) from the inside, from the perspective of the natives, as rules of action. The inside view is normative, in the space of reasons. RortyVsPutnam: he attempts to somehow think this together.
McDowell I 178
RortyVsPutnam: By an "explanation of X" Putnam still understands a synopsis, the synthesis of external and internal position. Representatives of disquotation believe that people could only be described in a behavioral manner. But why should it be impossible to consider supplements by normative representations? (Putnam's philosophy was ultimately traditional). Causality/Putnam: the desire to tell a story about the causal relationships of human pronouncements and environment does not rule out that a story is invented according to which the speakers express thoughts and make assertions, and try not to make mistakes. But these stories may then be indistinguishable! (PutnamVsRorty) Rorty Thesis: from a causal standpoint we cannot subdue our beliefs to standards of investigation. - - -
Rorty I 304
RortyVsPutnam: he provokes a pseudo-controversy between an "idealistic" and realistic theory of meaning.
I 307
Putnam/Rorty: follows 3 thoughts: 1) against the construction of 'true' as synonymous with 'justified assertibility' (or any other "soft" concept to do with justification). This is to show that only a theory of the relationship between words and the world can give a satisfactory meaning of the concept of truth.
2) a certain type of sociological facts requires explanation: the reliability of normal methods of scientific research, the usefulness of our language as a means, and that these facts can be explained only on the basis of realism.
3) only the realist can avoid the inference from "many of the terms of the past did not refer" to "it is very likely that none of the terms used today refers".
I 308
RortyVsPutnam: that is similar to the arguments of Moore against all attempts to define "good": "true, but not assertible" with reason" makes just as much sense as "good, but not conducive to the greatest happiness".
I 312
Theoretical Terms/TT/Reference/Putnam/Rorty. We must prevent the disastrous consequence that no theoretical term refers to anything (argument 3), see above). What if we accepted a theory according to which electrons are like phlogiston? We would have to say that electrons do not exist in reality. What if this happened all the time? Of course, such a conclusion must be blocked. Granted desideratum of reference theory.
I 313
RortyVsPutnam: puzzling for two reasons: 1) unclear from which philosophical standpoint it could be shown that the revolutionary transformation of science has come to an end.
2) even if there were such a standpoint, it remains unclear how the theory of reference could ever provide it.
I 314
In a pre-theoretical sense we know very well that they have referred to such things. They all tried to cope with the same universe.
I 315
Rorty: We should perhaps rather regard the function of an expression as "picking of entities" than as "description of reality". We could just represent things from the winning perspective in a way that even the most primitive animists talked about the movement of molecules and genes. This does not appease the skeptic who thinks that perhaps there are no molecules, but on the other hand it will also be unable to make a discovery about the relations between words and the world.
Reference/Rorty: Dilemma: either we
a) need the theory of reference as a guarantor of the success of today's science, or
b) the reference theory is nothing more than a decision about how to write the history of science (rather than supplying its foundation.)
I 319
Reference/RortyVsPutnam/RortyVsKripke: if the concept of "really talking about" is confused with the concept of reference, we can, like Kripke and Putnam, easily get the idea that we have "intuitions" about the reference. Rorty: in my opinion, the problem does not arise. The only question of fact that exists here, relates to the existence or non-existence of certain entities that are being talked about.
I 320
Fiction/Reference/RortyVsKripke/RortyVsPutnam: of course there can be no reference to fictions. This corresponds to the technical and scientific use. But then "reference" has basically nothing to do with "talking about", and only comes into play after the choice between different strategies is made. Reference is a technical term, and therefore we have no intuitions about it! Real existence issues are also not affected by the criterion of Searle and Strawson! What then is the right criterion? Rorty: there is none at all!
We cannot talk about non-existent entities, but we can also find out that we have actually talked about them! Talking about X in reality and talking about a real X is not the same thing.
I 324
Realism/PutnamVsPutnam/Self-Criticism/Rorty: metaphysical realism collapses at the point where it claims to be different from Peirce's realism. I.e. the assertion that there is an ideal theory.
I 326
Internal Realism/Putnam/Rorty: position according to which we can explain the "mundane" fact that the use of language contributes to achieving our goals, to our satisfaction, etc. by the fact that "not language, but the speakers reflect the world, insofar as they produce a symbolic representation of their environment. (Putnam). By means of our conventions we simply represent the universe better than ever.
RortyVsPutnam: that means nothing more than that we congratulate ourselves to having invented the term lithium, so that lithium stands for something for which nothing has stood all the time.
I 327
The fact that based on our insights we are quite capable of dealing with the world, is true but trivial. That we reasonably reflect it is "just an image".
Rorty V 21
Analytic/Synthetic/Culture/Quine/Rorty: the same arguments can also be used to finish off the anthropological distinction between the intercultural and the intra-cultural. So we also manage without the concept of a universal transcultural rationality that Putnam cites against relativists.
V 22
Truth/Putnam: "the very fact that we speak of our different conceptions of rationality sets a conceptual limit, a conceptual limit of the ideal truth." RortyVsPutnam: but what can such a limit do? Except for introducing a God standpoint after all?
Rorty VI 75
Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation RortyVsPutnam: I cannot see what "idealized rational acceptability" can mean other than "acceptability for an ideal community". I.e. of tolerant and educated liberals. (>Peirce: "community of researchers at the ideal end of the research").
VI 76
Peirce/Terminology: "CSP" "Conceptual System Peirce" (so called by Sellars). Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation/RortyVsPutnam: since forbids himself to reproduce the step of Williams back to approaching a single correct result, he has no way to go this step a la Peirce!
VI 79
Human/Society/Good/Bad/Rorty: "we ourselves with our standards" does not mean "we, whether we are Nazis or not", but something like "language users who, by our knowledge, are improved remakes of ourselves." We have gone through a development process that we accept as rational persuasion.
VI 80
This includes the prevention of brainwashing and friendly toleration of troublemakers à la Socrates and rogues à la Feyerabend. Does that mean we should keep the possibility of persuasion by Nazis open? Yes, it does, but it is no more dangerous than the possibility to return to the Ptolemaic worldview!
PutnamVsRorty: "cope better" is not a concept according to which there are better or worse standards, ... it is an internal property of our image of justification, that a justification is independent of the majority ...
(Rorty: I cannot remember having ever said that justification depends on a majority.)
RortyVsPutnam: "better" in terms of "us at our best" less problematic than in terms of "idealized rational acceptability". Let's try a few new ways of thinking.
VI 82
Putnam: what is "bad" supposed to mean here, except in regard to a failed metaphysical image?
VI 87
Truth/Putnam: we cannot get around the fact that there is some sort of truth, some kind of accuracy, that has substance, and not merely owes to "disquotation"! This means that the normative cannot be eliminated. Putnam: this accuracy cannot apply only for a time and a place (RortyVsPutnam).
VI 90
Ratio/Putnam: the ratio cannot be naturalized. RortyVsPutnam: this is ambiguous: on the one hand trivial, on the other hand, it is wrong to say that the Darwinian view leaves a gap in the causal fabric.
Ratio/Putnam: it is both transcendent and immanent. (Rorty pro, but different sense of "transcendent": going beyond our practice today).
RortyVsPutnam: confuses the possibility that the future transcends the present, with the need for eternity to transcend time.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
Putnam, H. Searle Vs Putnam, H.
 
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John R. Searle
Searle passim
Core thesis: (VsPutnam): meanings are in the head! Because perception is self-respect and delivers the performance conditions itself.
Propositions, characters are also only objects in the world. But their power representation is not intrinsical! It is derived from the intentionality of the mind.
I 34
SearleVsFunctionalism/SearleVsPutnam: the actual mental phenomena, however, have nothing to do with attributes but are subjective first-person phenomena. - - -
II 91
Twin Earth/Putnam: the world takes command.
II 92
SearleVsPutnam: that is not enough. Tradition: two mistakes:
1. assumption, any intentional content is an isolated unit.
2. assumption, causation is always a non-intentional relation.
Intentionality/causality/Searle: there is a relevance of causality.
1. Network and background affect fulfilling conditions.
2. intentional causation is always in an internal relation to the fulfilling conditions.
3. a person stands in indexical relation with their own intentional states, network, and background. (Each with its own background).
II 93
Causality: occurs as part of the intentional content. Previously Bill must have identified Sally as Sally, so it belongs to the fulfillment of conditions, it must be caused by Sally and not by Twin-Sally. His current experience has to make reference to this earlier identification. Indexicality: the experience is not merely an experience that someone has. It is the experience of someone with the specific network and the special background.
(...) Twin Earth (TE) Example's interchange of the two Sallys in childhood. How may it be that both express the same proposition and have identical qualitative experiences and yet mean something different?
II 97
TE/Searle: Experiences are in fact "qualitatively identical" but have different content and different fulfillment conditions. Recognition: one has the ability to recognize somebody here on earth but this ability itself does not need to include representation yet to exist in them!
The difference between the two twins is that their experiences refer to their own background skills. (Indexicality).
- - -
II 250
SearleVsPutnam: all the arguments have in common that according to them the inner intentional content of the speaker is not sufficient to determine what he refers to.
II 251
SearleVsPutnam : the thesis that the meaning determines the reference can hardly be falsified by the consideration of cases where speakers do not even know the meaning! Intension and extension are not defined relative to idiolects! To mean/tradition: Intension is an abstract entity, which can be more or less detected by individual speakers. But it is not enough to show that the speaker does not like or have recorded only incompletely the intension, because such a speaker also had no relevant extension!
SearleVsPutnam: this one would have to suggest that the totality of intentional states of speakers (including experts) does not determine the correct extension.
Searle: it is for the experts to decide.
Elms/beeches/Searle: I know that beeches are no elms. How do I know that? Because I know that there are different species of tree. I have thus formulated conceptual knowledge.
II 257
SearleVsPutnam: a murderer is not defined by the microstructure.
II 257/258
SearleVsPutnam: Another point: Putnam makes certain assumptions: never anyone came up with the idea to extend the traditional thesis that intension determines the extension to these indexical words. Example "I have a headache" (Twin Earth). But the extension of "I" is another. It has in two different idiolects two different extensions. Searle: But it does not follow that the concept, I have of myself, is in any way different from the concept that my doppelganger has of himself. SearleVsPutnam: Putnam assumes that the tradition cannot be applied to indexical expressions. 2. that fulfillment conditions must also be identical with the doppelganger. Searle: both is wrong.
Searle: if we understand intentional content under "intension" it just yet determines the extension. In addition, two persons may be in type identical mental states and yet their intentional contents may be different. They can have different truth conditions.
II 259
Searle: suppose Jones christens 1750 water indexically on Earth and Twin Jones on Twin Earth. Type identical intellectual content and visual experiences Putnam: because they now give the same definition, Putnam assumes that we cannot explain with drawing on their mental content that they are two different extensions.
Searle: simple answer: they do not have type identical intentional contents. Because these contents are self-referential. The fulfillment conditions are set. Different things are meant in both cases. (> to mean).
- - -
III 173
SearleVsPutnam: confuses two logically independent theses under his label "metaphysical realism": 1. reality exists independently of our representations.
2. there is exactly one correct conceptual schema for the description of reality (privileged scheme: PS).
Searle: Putnam sees quite truely that the external realism refutes the privileged scheme. The metaphysical realism is the conjunction of these two.
SearleVsPutnam: but you do not refute both by refuting one of the conjunction members. The falsity of the privileged scheme lets the external realism untouched.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Putnam, H. Wright Vs Putnam, H.
 
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I 58
"Putnams Equivalence"/(Wright): P ist wahr dann und nur dann, wenn P unter idealen epistemischen Umständen gerechtfertigt werden könnte.
Konvergenzforderung/Putnam: keine Aussage, die unter epistemisch idealen Umständen gerechtfertigt ist, kann gleichzeitig mit ihrer Negation behauptet werden.
Wright: das ist natürlich von der Forderung nach Vollständigkeit zu unterscheiden: nicht alle Fragen sind entscheidbar.(Quantenmechanik).
Wright: es scheint hier, dass sogar ideale epistemische Umstände nicht neutral in bezug auf Negation sein können. ((s) Bsp (s) wenn der Ort des Elektrons nicht fixiert werden kann, ist das keine negative Aussage über diesen oder einen anderen Ort.)
I 59
Negation/Minimalism: verlangt die übliche Negationsäquivalenz: "Es ist nicht der Fall, dass P" ist wahr dann und nur dann, wenn es nicht der Fall ist, dass "P" wahr ist.
Das funktioniert nicht für die Quantenmechanik.
WrightVsPutnam: die Bsp aus der Quantenmechanik oder auch aus der Mathematik (Unentscheidbarkeit) sind tödlich für Putnams Ansatz.(Bsp generalisierte Kontinuumshypothese).
Es gilt sicher nicht einmal für empirische Aussagen a priori, dass jede davon unter idealen Umständen entscheidbar wäre.
I 60
(Also bestätigbar oder widerlegbar). A priori/Minimalism/Wright: die minimalen Plattitüden gelten vermutlich a priori.
WrightVsPutnam: wenn also Putnams informelle Erläuterung a priori korrekt wäre das muss sie sein um überhaupt korrekt zu sein - dann würde a priori zu gelten haben, dass auch die Negation einer Aussage, die unter idealen Umständen nicht gerechtfertigt werden kann (Elektron) gerechtfertigt sein würde.
Wright: genau das kann aber a priori nicht der Fall sein.
WrightVsPutnam: irrtümlich apriorischer Anspruch. Aber es kommt noch schlimmer: die Erweiterung der Argumentation macht jeden Versuch, Wahrheit als wesentlich evidenzunabhängig (>Evidenz, Quantenmechanik) zu bestimmen, zunichte.
Anti-Realism, semantischer/Evidenz: mag sich nun im Gegensatz zu Putnam mit einer "Einbahnstrasse" zufrieden geben: (EC, epistemische Einschränkung):
EC Wenn P wahr ist, dann gibt es Evidenz dafür, dass es so ist.
Evidenz/WrightVsPutnam: Wahrheit wird durch Evidenz engeschränkt. Das führt zu einer Revision der Logik.
I 64
WrightVsPutnam: er muss intuitionistische Revisionen vornehmen.
I 66
I 66
Def Wahrheit/Peirce: das, was an einer idealen Grenze des Erkennens gerechtfertigt ist, wenn alle empirische Information eingeholt ist. PutnamVsPeirce: man kann einfach nicht wissen, wann man alle Information hat! Wright dito
I 68/69
Def Superassertibility: eine Aussage ist superassertibel, wenn sie berechtigt ist, oder berechtigt werden kann, und wenn ihre Berechtigung sowohl die beliebig genaue Prüfung ihrer Abstammung als auch beliebig umfangreiche Ergänzungen und Verbesserungen der Information überleben würde. Wright: für unsere Zwecke reicht es aus, dass der Begriff "relativ klar" ist.

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001
Putnam, H. Verschiedene Vs Putnam, H. Davidson II 196
GlüerVsPutnam: Davidson sollte sich Putnams eigene Deutung (bedingt durch dessen szientistischen Essentialismus) nicht zu eigen machen. Die fraglichen Überzeugungen spielen in deren Überzeugungssystemen identische inferentielle Rollen, da weder der eine noch der andere per definitionem über chemische Kenntnisse verfügen. Gegenüber Putnams Idee der Essenz einer natürlichen Art, auch und gerade einer noch wissenschaftlich zu entdeckenden, sollte der Radikalinterpret skeptisch sein. Putnams Annahmen kollidieren auch mit der Autorität der ersten Person. Dennoch lebt Davidsons Argumentation von der Putnamschen Annahme, daß der mentale Ereignistyp eines Ereignisses nicht durch seinen physikalischen Typ determiniert ist. - - -
Putnam V 42
Bsp Zwillingserde:(Wasser: H20/ Zwasser: XYZ,1750): verschiedener Bezug aber kein wesentlich unterschiedener Geisteszustand. Der Bezug ist verschieden, weil der Stoff verschieden ist! VsPutnam: einige Philosophen: man sollte sagen: „es gibt zwei Arten von Wasser“, und nicht, dass sich unser Wort „Wasser“ nicht auf die Flüssigkeit der Zwillingserde bezieht. Nach Ansicht dieser Autoren haben wir dann einfach die Aussage falsifiziert, dass alles Wasser H2O sei.
PutnamVsVs: das Beispiel lässt sich ohne Schwierigkeit ändern, so dass es von diesem Argument nicht betroffen wird: Bsp’ nehmen wir an, das Wasser auf der Zwillingserde sei in Wirklichkeit ein Gemisch aus 20 % Äthylalkohol und 80 % Wasser.
- - -
Putnam V 60
Löwenheim-Skolem/Putnam/VsPutnam (Bsp): man könnte einwenden, die oben angeführten Definitionen beziehen sich auf Dinge, die von den betreffenden Gegenständen (z. B. Kirschen auf Bäumen und Katzen auf Matten) verschieden sind, extrinsische Eigenschaften. In der tatsächlichen Welt ist jede Kirsche eine Katze*, doch wenn es keine Kirsche auf einem Baum gäbe, wäre sie keine Katze*, selbst wenn ihre intrinsischen Eigenschaften genau dieselben wären! Ob etwas eine Katze ist oder nicht, hängt im Gegensatz dazu nur von seinen intrinsischen Eigenschaften ab.
PutnamVsVs: die Schwierigkeit dieses Vorschlags ist eine gewisse Symmetrie in der Beziehung von „Katze“ und „Matte“ zu „Katze*“ und „Matte*“. Bsp’ wie oben, nur sollen Bäume* jetzt Photonen im Fall (c) sein.
Seltsamerweise sind diese Fälle genau unsere alten Fälle (a),(b),(c) unter einer neuen Beschreibung.(+ V 60,61) in allen drei Fällen stellen sich Katzen als Katzen heraus!
V 61
Analog variiertes Bsp mit Quark* als Matte (in c)), dann stellen sich Matten in allen drei Fällen als Matten heraus.





D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Putnam, H. Poundstone Vs Putnam, H.
 
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I 95
Quark/Poundstone: are quarks counterfactual? It is impossible to observe an isolated quark. They are what would make a proton split if it could be split, but it cannot be split.
I 96
Reason: the color intensity grows with increasing distance instead of diminishing. Endless energy demand. Even if it was possible to provide this energy, new particles would be produced instead of a quark.
PoundstoneVsPutnam: the answer to whether these assumptions are merely complications lies not in the skies, but in our minds.
- - -
I 319
Universe/Turtle/Poundstone: E.g. "The universe rests on the back of a turtle": is to say that the known universe rests on the back of an unknown turtle. We automatically determine the semantic content of "universe" such that it fits into the context of the sentence. Brains in the Vat/PoundstoneVsPutnam: we would do the same with a statement, "We are brains in a vat"! They could say: "I am that which "retort brain" means in the laboratory language". Within the retort language "laboratory language" would be a metaphysical expression without physical equivalent.
- - -
I 323
Thought Experiment/PoundstoneVsPutnam: possible or impossible physical realization is of importance in thought experiments! E.g. Twin Earth: a long chemical formula would correspond to a thick, sticky mass! Therefore no confusability with our water, other mental state!
The only other combination of hydrogen and oxygen (H2O2 hydrogen peroxide) is extremely unstable.
Planets with ammonia atmosphere would have to be much colder. When ammonia is liquid, mercury is solid. That would be a very different world.
((s) PoundstoneVsPutnam/(s): brings a holistic argument then).
I 324
PoundstoneVsPutnam: our brain is largely composed of water, i.e. we also have the meaning of water in our heads. The inhabitants of the Twin Earth would then have XYZ in their heads!
I 326
Twin Earth/Putnam: every experience is ambiguous. The counterparts have made identical experiences, their neuron currents or brain states may be identical, but there is more than one reality to match. - - -
I 336
Model Theory/PoundstoneVsPutnam: a key which provides some kind of meaningful text at all will be the right one! Reason: the infinite number of theoretically possible keys.
I 339
Meaning/Translation/Coding/Cryptography/Poundstone: where is it? In the message, in the key? In the consciousness of those who understand the message? PoundstoneVsPutnam: only few would argue that the meaning is in the consciousness, after all, i.e. in the mind.
Extreme case: if the system puts out "iiii...", then the entire meaning lies in the key. Mostly, the meaning is divided between the text and the key.
W. Poundstone
I W. Poundstone Im Labyrinth des Denkens, Reinbek 1995
Putnam, H. Peacocke Vs Putnam, H.
 
Books on Amazon
I 179
Other Minds/PeacockeVsPutnam: it is possible to know that someone is in pain. VsSuper spartan. Individuation: therefore it is possible that there are also complex and general dependencies in the reverse direction for individuation.

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983
Putnam, H. Cresswell Vs Putnam, H.
 
Books on Amazon
II 70
Meaning/In the head/Putnam/Kripke/CresswellVsKripke/CresswellVsPutnam: both only pretend to have shown that meanings are "not in your head". I myself do not know what does it actually meant by that. Therefore, I also do not know if my approach is incompatible with the two or not. ---
II 71
Twin Earth/TE/Putnam: his example fits exactly into my semantics, i.e. it can be solved.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Putnam, H. Stalnaker Vs Putnam, H.
 
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II 23
Belief ascription/belief attribution/externalism/anti-individualism/wide content/Burge/Stalnaker: thesis: the ascription of wide content is generally only an indirect and vague way to describe underlying facts described more directly by the narrow content. Narrow content/StalnakerVsNarrow content/StalnakerVsPutnam/Stalnaker: n.c. is obscure and confused. E.g. twin earth: it are the properties of the convictions that are "wide" not the content itself.
II 24
Def "organismic contribution"/Dennett: (Dennett 1982): contribution to the belief content: an intrinsic component e.g. of water. Analogy e.g. mass as it contributes to weight. Thesis: one might view intentional properties as intrinsic components of convictions.
StalnakerVs: yet it is not clear whether one should establish the distinction narrow / wide in the content.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Putnam, H. Brendel Vs Putnam, H.
 
Books on Amazon
I 70
T-Def/WT/PutnamVsTarski/Putnam/Brendel: Tarski’s Theorie sei von vornherein kontraintuitiv: das gilt auch für die modelltheoretischen Varianten. Sie werden unserem intuitiven Begriff von "wahr" nicht gerecht.
I 71
Sein T-Begriff sei noch nicht einmal "semantisch". BrendelVsPutnam: sein Begriff von "intuitiver Wahrheit" ist selbst ganz unklar.
I 105
Disquotationstheorie/Zitattilgungstheorie/Disquotationalismus/Putnam/Brendel: Thesis: ist nur eine Variante der Redundanztheorie. BrendelVsPutnam/Brendel: das ist ein Irrtum: denn die Redundanztheorie nimmt einen Operator an und ein disquotationstheoretischer Wahrheitsbegriff kann kein aussagenlogischer Operator sein und damit nicht redundanztheoretisch.
I 278
Brains in a vat/BIV/PutnamVsSkepticism/Putnam: Thesis: die Aussage, wir seien BIV kann sich gar nicht als wahr herausstellen, weil Repräsentationen keine intrinsische Verbindung zu ihren Repräsentanten haben ("magische Referenz") - unabhängig von Verursachung.
I 279
SkeptizismusVsPutnam/Brendel: den Skeptizismus muss das nicht beeindrucken. Er kann Putnam’s Argument als transzendentales Argument einstufen: es bezieht sich auf die Voraussetzungen der Möglichkeit, den Satz "Wir sind BIV" zu formulieren. StroudVsPutnam/Brendel: solche transzendentalen Argumente setzen schon bestimmte verifikationistische Annahmen voraus.
I 280
Problem: daraus kann man noch nicht schließen, dass es die Welt tatsächlich gibt. Dazu müsste man noch annehmen, dass erkenntniskonstituierende Prinzipien die Welt notwendigerweise so beschreiben, wie sie tatsächlich ist. StroudVsTranszendental Argument/Brendel: petitio principii.
I 281
BrendelVsStroud: Lösung: semantische Wahrheit/Brendel: die skeptische Hypothese ist keine sinnvolle wahrheitsfähige Aussage im Sinn der semantischen Wahrheit.
BIV/Putnam/Brendel: Putnam selbst räumt ein, dass BIV physikalisch möglich sind. Aber was bedeutet das, außer, dass es eine mögliche solche Beschreibung gibt?
I 282
BrendelVsPutnam: es wird gar keine physikalische Möglichkeit gezeigt, nur eine black box. (David WardVsPutnam Ward, 1995, 191f). er müsste die Denkmöglichkeit oder Denkunmöglichkeit zeigen. ((s) Weil er selbst letztlich von einem Argument der Denkunmöglichkeit (Unmöglichkeit der Referenz) ausgeht.)
Gedankenexperiment/th.e.Brendel: dass etwas physikalisch möglich ist, ist auch noch kein Argument für die Legitimität von th.e.
I 283
Begriffsanalyse/Brendel: lässt sich nur durch begriffliche Möglichkeiten bestätigen oder widerlegen.
I 284
BrendelVsPutnam: die Welt der BIV ist uns gar nicht so verschlossen, wir haben eine Vorstellung, wie es wäre.
I 285
Verstehen/Skeptizismus/BrendelVsPutnam/Brendel: daher ist die skeptische Hypothese uns gar nicht unverständlich. Und dann auch wahrheitsfähig. "alles anders"/Brendel: hier kommen dann allerdings Grenzen unseres Vorstellungsvermögens herein.

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Putnam, H. Cartwright Vs Putnam, H.
 
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I 56
Representation/Putnam/Cartwright: nothing represents the facts - not even the simplest sentences E.g. about the cookies in the oven - the laws of physics do not represent either - CartwrightVsPutnam: generalizations of biology and engineering do represent, but not the fundamental laws.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983
Putnam, H. Millikan Vs Putnam, H.
 
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I 328
natural kind/Putnam/Millikan: (Meaning of Meaning): thesis: at least in the case of concepts of natural kinds the intension does not determine the extension. Reason: it is possible that such concepts have identical intensions but different extensions.
Meaning/Putnam: whatever has different extensions must have different meanings. Therefore, meanings can not be in the head.
I 329
Putnam/Millikan: his argument here is that of a realist. Meaning/Millikan: if meanings are not intensions, there must be something else that may determine the reference or the extension.
natural kind/solution/Putnam: contrary to appearances concepts of natural kinds are indexical. And tradition has always had its difficulties with that.
Extension/Putnam: thesis: the extension of "water" and "Gold" is determined by a relation between the token of expression and the extension.
MillikanVsPutnam: that is the reason why he thinks erroneously that concepts of natural kinds would be indexical. Thereby no problem is solved, but only named.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987
Putnam, H. Newen Vs Putnam, H.
 
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NS I 136
BIV/Brains in a Vat/Putnam: the phrase "I am a brain in a vat" is always wrong! a) if we are not brains in a vat
b) Suppose we are brains in a vat (have always been there): then our word refers to electrical impulses that generate the false perception of tanks.
((s) Point/(s) even though we know that the sentence formulated by us is false, it doesn't mean we know that we are indeed not brains in the vat! Only our sentence could not refer to these vats and to our real brains. And then precisely, because we are brains in a vat! (see below, point 3) Vs.)
NS I 137
VsPutnam/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: 1) this works only for brains that have always been in the vat. Other brains that were possibly kidnapped would have learned the real-world references in her time in the world.
NS I 138
Vs: 2) the example assumes that the vats and the whole apparatus emerged ex nihilo. Vs: 3) an even stronger skepticism can arise: not only am I left in doubt whether I am a brain in a vat, I cannot even my articulate doubt.
Newen/Schrenk: could we not formulate a different sentence? E.g. "I am pickled"?
NS I 139
Some authors believe that.

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005
Putnam, H. Vollmer Vs Putnam, H.
 
Books on Amazon
I 285
Kausalität/Putnam: kann charakterisiert werden 1. Regelmäßige Abfolgen (rein physikalisch, unbefriedigend) oder 2. Über den Begriff der Erklärung, (nicht rein physikalisch) oder
3. Über kontrafaktische Bedingungen (das erfordert "Normalbedingungen" oder "möglichst ähnliche Welten").
Def Referenz/Lewis/Vollmer: funktionale Eigenschaft (nicht einfach eines Lebewesens, sondern) eines Lebewesens mit seiner Umwelt.
I 285
Def Referenz/Lewis/Vollmer: funktionale Eigenschaft (nicht einfach eines Lebewesens, sondern) eines Lebewesens mit seiner Umwelt.
Kausalität/VollmerVsPutnam: übersieht die vierte Möglichkeit der Charakterisierung der Kausalität: Energieübertragung.
PutnamVsVollmer: wenn Energieübertrag eine so große Rolle spielen soll, dann kann das Betätigen eines Lichtschalters keine Ursache sein!
VollmerVsPutnam: das übersieht, dass nicht die gesamte Energie übertragen werden muss, sondern nur ein beliebig kleines Minimum.
I 286
PutnamVsVollmer: wenn man das zugibt, ist dennoch die Frage, wie man das ohne kontrafaktische Formulierung charakterisieren solle. VollmerVsPutnam: das ist überhaupt nicht nötig, weil ja eine physikalische Charakterisierung vorliegt.
Referenz/VsEvolutionstheorie: (z.B. Putnam): es ist nicht klar, welche Referenz physikalische Begriffe überhaupt haben!
VollmerVsVs: hat man erst einmal eine physikalische Charakterisierung kausaler Beziehungen (Energieübertrag) so lässt sich auch "Referenz" physikalisch explizieren.

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

Vo II
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd II Stuttgart 1988
Quine, W.V.O. Field Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
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I 129
Nominalism/Philosophy of Science/FieldVsQuine-Putnam Argument: An argument to show that nominalistic resources are adequate for good science would be: (E) For each Platonic scientific theory there is a nominalist theory to which the Platonic one is a conservative extension. But this is trivial if there are no restrictions regarding which sets of sentences that have been completed under a logical entailment count as theories. Of course, any Platonic theory T is a conservative extension of the "theory" which consists of nominalistic inferences from T. We have to reinforce (E) so that uninteresting nominalistic theories are excluded. Science Without Numbers: here I did not argue with (E). (E) or any amplifying extension is an existence assertion of a sufficiently wide variation of nominalist theories, and that goes beyond the assertion of the conservatism of mathematical theory.
I 241
Conservatism/Mathematics/Field: Truth does not require conservatism! True empirical theories are obviously not conservative! But conservatism is certainly also recognized by most realists for mathematics. For they say that good mathematics is not only true, but necessarily true! Conservatism/Field: (see above) conservative mathematics has the properties of necessary truth, without having to be true itself! Quine: is a realist in terms of mathematics. He wants to nip talk of mathematical necessity in the bud. But for that he needs conservatism. FieldVsQuine: for that he would have to make a major renovation to his thesis that mathematics continuously flows into the rest of the other sciences. Logic/Empiricism/Quine: Thesis: logic could be empirically refuted. Conservatism/Field: The fact that mathematics is empirically refuted is consistent with that, while the logic remains intact.
Horwich I 407
Internal Realism/IR/Existence/Ontology/Property/Putnam: what kind of objects exist can only be decided within a theory, according to the IR. FieldVsPutnam: I’m not sure I understand what he means. I suppose he thinks there are several correct theories that answer the question of ontology differently. But this is too trivial. sharper: (Put p 72 74.) two equally correct theories may have different ontologies. PutnamVsRedundancy Theory: does not offer an explanation of our understanding. FieldVsPutnam: this implied neither mind-independence nor theory-dependence, however! And it does not refute the correspondence theory. E.g. you can explain the behavior of electrically charged bodies with or without the assumption of fields. Ontology/Existence/Field: most of us would say that there is more than we are forced to assert. FieldVsQuine: E.g. is rarely critical to assert the existence of unseparated rabbit parts in addition to the existence of rabbits. FieldVsPutnam: if this is clear, then you can hardly draw anti-realistic conclusions from the fact that two equally good theories may differ in ontology.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Rorty, R. Putnam Vs Rorty, R.
 
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McDowell I 178
Rorty: from the causal point of view we can not submit our beliefs to the standards of investigation. PutnamVsRorty: then it remains a mystery how there may be something as beliefs at all. A second point then does not help further if we do not allow into take account the causal interactions between people with beliefs and the object of their beliefs. Because then it remains a mystery how this second standpoint is to supply the standards.
- - -
Putnam I 21
Theory/Meaning/Putnam: there will always be different theorie but that does not matter as long as they use different terms. If they are empirically equivalent they make no difference to us. Representation/illustration/Rorty: the whole problem is misguided, a sham debate.
PutnamVsRorty: this is precisely the attempt to take the position of God.
- - -
Putnam I 204/205
PutnamVsRorty: if there is such a thing as "a notion being worth it", then inevitably there is the question about the nature of this "correctness". Putnam: what makes speech more than a mere expression of our present subjectivity, is that it can be evaluated for the presence or absence of these features, whether one wants to call them "truth" or "correctness" or "being worth it" or whatever.
Even if it is a property that is culturally relative. But that does not indemnify us of the responsibility to say which property is!
- - -
Putnam I 239
Metaphysics/Philosophy/Rorty/Putnam: for Rorty and the French whom he admired two notions seem to be thrilling: 1. The failure of our philosophical "foundations" is a failure of our whole culture, therefore we have to be philosophical revisionists.
I 2402.
Typical Rorty: he rejects the "realism/anti-realism debate" and the "emotion/cognition debate" by ridiculing the debate. PutnamVsRorty: when a controversy is "futile", it does not mean that the competing images are unimportant.
I 242
justified assertibility/PutnamVsRorty: is independent of the opinion of the majority, but that is not a fact of transcendent reality, but it's a feature of the concept of legitimacy. The majority can agree or disagree with legitimacy.
By their practice relativists themselves have demonstrated that this is the case!
RelativismusVs: could argue that was just a "bad feature of the ordinary concept of "legitimcy"".
PutnamVsVs: what can be called "bad", if not in relation to a metaphysical notion behind?
I 242/243
A philosopher who refers to that (those exist), could claim that his own convictions are true, but not justified - such a philosopher would not refute her*himself. However, it is a pragmatic inconsistency of her*his position: PutnamVsRelativismus/PutnamVsRealismus: both claim they can be simultaneously inside and outside of language!
Realism does not immediately refute itself since it adopts a "perspective of God" anyway. But relativism refutes itself.
- - -
Norms/values/Rorty: (1985) the improvements are not better with respect to a previously known state, but only better in the sense that now they clearly appear better than their predecessors.
Norms/values/PutnamVsRorty: this is not a clarification of the concept of "improvement".
I 243/244
As Rorty normally speaks of Western cultural community, it could be that those gain the upper hand, who think that we "cope best" with Holcaust. ((s) "Coping better" does not seem to have been used by Rorty himself.)
PutnamVsRorty: "coping better" is a question of how something appears to us and is not at all the notion of better and worse norms and standards. But standards and their image are logically independent!
Therefore, it makes sense to say that what most consider to be an improvement, is in fact not.
Discourse/Rorty: (Mirror of Nature) distinguishes between "normal" and "hermeneutic" discourse.
normal: in compliance with the relevant standards and norms of a culture.
hermeneutic: will attempt to bridge a gap of paradigms in case of unsolvable disagreements.
I 244/245
PutnamVsRorty: uses "true" and "reasonable" in an emotional way. This is rhetoric. Why? As is known, Mussolini was pro pragmatism: supports thoughtless activism. R.B. Perry, 1936).
If tolerance and an open society are our goal, would it not be better to argue directly for them, than to hope they were byproducts of a change of the metaphysical image?
PutnamVsRorty: probably he thinks that metaphysical realism is wrong. But he can not say it!
Behind this disguise there is the attempt to say from the perspective of God that there is no perspective of God.
- - -
Rorty VI 79
Human/society/good/bad/Rorty: "we ourselves with our standards" does not mean "we, whether we are Nazis or not", but something like "language users, who by our knowledge became improved remakes of ourselves." We have gone through a development process that we accept as rational persuasion.
VI 80
This includes the prevention of brainwashing and friendly toleration of troublemakers à la Socrates and rogues à la Feyerabend. Does that mean we should keep open the possibility of persuasion by Nazis? Yes, it is, but is no more dangerous than the possibility of returning to the Ptolemaic worldview!
PutnamVsRorty: "coping better" is not a concept, according to which there are better or worse norms, ... it is an internal property of our notion of justification, that justification be independent of the majority ...
(Rorty: I can not remember having ever said justification is dependent on a majority.)
RortyVsPutnam: "better" in relation to "us at its best" less problematic than in relation to "idealized rational acceptability". Let's try a few new ways of thinking.
VI 82
Putnam: what is "bad" supposed to mean here. Except in regard to a mistaken metaphysical image?

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Skepticism Field Vs Skepticism
 
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Horwich I 418
Epistemic Relativism/Field: here, equally good proof systems may differ in their evaluation of convictions. Perhaps there is no best proof system. There are three main tasks:
1) a spectrum of variation must be demonstrated by proof systems,
2) a variation range of intuitively desirable goals
3) (most importantly): ER must evaluate how different proof systems can fulfill different goals.
This cannot be done from a neutral point of view.
Important argument: the assertion that one proof system is better than another is a factual assertion, and in that, of course, we use the proof system that we normally use. This has led some people to a skepticism that no assertion is ever really justified.
Relativism: for him, the question of a "real" justification does not make sense anyway.
I 419
Relativism/FieldVsSkepticism: precisely relativism provides a refutation of skepticism! PutnamVsEpistemic Relativism/Field: three arguments:
1) (p 136): (premise): there are no facts that are independent of values. And that is only of interest if we are VsMetaphysical Realism before.
2) (p 119f): it seems inconsistent to simultaneously represent one point and another that seems to be equally good.
FieldVsPutnam: a relativist who is not simultaneously a Protagorean (>Protagoras) should not assume that all points of view are equally good! Some are true, some are false, some are reliable, others are not, etc.
3) (Putnam p 121f): (refers to the inability to distinguish relativism of justification from that of the truth: If statements of the form "X is true (justified) relative to person P" themselves are absolutely true or justified, then this is ultimately an absolute concept of truth (justification).
FieldVsPutnam: but precisely that does not apply to justification: the above only shows that statements about justification relative to a system are absolutely true or false, and since truth is factual, not evaluative, for the metaphys.r., this is unproblematic for the MR.
FieldVsPutnam: his attempt to refute epistemic relativism fails.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Tarski, A. Putnam Vs Tarski, A.
 
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Brendel I 70
Truth Def/theory of truth/PutnamVsTarski/Putnam/Brendel: Tarski's theory is counterintuitive from the outset: this also applies to the model theoretical variants. They do not do our intuitive concept of "true" justice.
I 71
His concept of truth is not even "semantic". BrendelVsPutnam: his concept of "intuitive truth" itself is quite unclear.
I 72
"True-in-L"/PutnamVsTarski: doesn't consider the speaker nor their use of expressions. It depends only on syntactic features. Problem: Then "snow is white" is also true in such possible worlds in which the words have an entirely different meaning! Then they correspond to another issue. Then what is semantic about it? And what does it mean that in a counterfactual situation a sentence is true-in-L, but not "true"? It must then be said, in what language the phrase is "not true".
I 73
It should also be explained why such a "counterfactual situation" shows that "truth" was not analyzed conceptually. Ex
I1: "Snow is white" here means that snow is white (L1).
I2: here that water is liquid.
I2: in a trivial sense "snow is white" is also L1-true! This is the case even if in a world "snow" and "white" are interpreted in a way that they express a false sentence in this possible world.
Ex ""The earth is at rest" is true in a geocentric worldview" is true also in the heliocentric worldview.
Counterfactual situation/Putnam/Brendel: here, the expressions are supposed to have a different meaning, and the issue to continue to hold that snow is white.
I 73
Counterfactual situation/Putnam/Brendel: expressions have a different meaning, but the SBV are equal. - - -
Putnam I 16
PutnamVsTarski: it must be added a certain substantial understanding of reference and truth, in which both are not made conditional on the possibility of human knowledge. (That would be the case of instrumentalism which thinks a sentence must be true if certain criteria are met, such as "sensations xyz are present."). Truth has to go beyond basic recognizability according to realism.
I 66
PutnamVsTarski: many think that he has completely and precisely defined reference, I do not. Truth/reference/Field: (1972) has shown that the "definitions of truth" and "definitions of reference" of logic did not do their job at all.
PutnamVsTarski: his "Convention T" does not clarify the concepts of truth and reference, because it uses the terms of the designation of a sentence and "following from something". These concepts are closely related to truth and reference, but need to be clarified.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Taylor, Ch. Rorty Vs Taylor, Ch.
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
VI 126
World/Knowledge/Reality/Existence/Taylor/Rorty: Taylor: Thesis: nobody is seriously prepared to deny that there are no chairs in this room, and that this is true or false because of the nature of reality. RortyVsTaylor: I do deny this, however! There are two ways to interpret the phrase "due to the sochness of things":
1) as an abbreviation: "due to the uses of our current descriptions and causal interactions.
2) "Because of the suchness of things, regardless of how we describe these things." (Rorty: this is simply pointless).
VI 127
Correspondence/Rorty: with the absence of the thing in itself, the notion of correspondence has also disappeared from the scene. RortyVsTaylor: tries to retain one concept while he renounces the other. That's doomed.
VI130
Truth/Taylor: Thesis: "Internal frame": a concept of truth, which is given by our non-representational handling of what is at hand. ((s) >practice, practical use). Rorty/RortyVsTaylor: (with Sellars): according to psychological nominalism (everything is linguistic) "non-representational handling" of anything is suspicious.
RortyVsSellars: also, language represents nothing! (Sellars pro representation (!!)).
RortyVsTaylor: our handling of things at most gives us a sense of the causal independence of things, but not a concept of truth of conformity.
VI 131
Taylor: distinguishes "internal frame" truth (correspondence) and "understanding yourself". Because we ourselves are to a great extent constituted by our acts of self-understanding, we can interpret them as if they were in the same manner as our object descriptions about an independent object.
VI 133
Reality/Knowledge/World/RortyVsTaylor: it is not good to say. "The solar system was there, waiting for Kepler". Re-Description/Rorty: difference between a new description of the solar system and of myself: the solar system is not changed by that, and I can make true statements about it at the time before that. For myself, in some cases, I even do not use them to make true statements about my past self.
But there are no scientific re-descriptions the solar system à la Sartre!
(Sartre/Rorty: e.g. "He recognized himself as a coward and thereby lost his cowardice").
TaylorVsRorty/TaylorVsPutnam/TaylorVsGoodman: those authors who say there is no description independent suchness of the world are still tempted to use form/material metaphors. They are tempted to say there were no objects before language had formed the raw material.
Wrong causal relationship: as if the word "dinosaur" caused their emergence.
Taylor: We should stop saying something general about the relationship between language and reality or the "essence of reference" at all. (Only statements about the specific linguistic behavior of certain persons are permitted, which also allows for predictions).
World/Language/Davidson/Rorty: there is certainly a very specific relationship between the word "Kilimanjaro" and a particular speaker, but we are unable to say even the slightest about it if we are not very well informed on the role of this word in sentences!
Referencing/Reference/Davidson/Rorty: no hope of explaingin the reference directly in non-language-related terminology (regardless of sentence)!
Language/Davidson/Rorty: "something like a language does not exist." (Nice Derangement of Epitaphs): there is no set of conventions that you would have to learn when you learn to speak. No abstract entity that would have to be internalized.
VI 134
Taylor/Rorty: distinguishes between things "that can be decided by means of reason" and things where that is not possible. RortyVsTaylor: at most pragmatic distinction between useful for us and not useful for us.
VI 137
Taylor: once you escaped epistemology, you come to an "uncompromising realism". RortyVsTaylor: only at a trivial and uninteresting realism.
VI 139
Representation/Knowledge/Taylor Rorty: the epistemological interpretation of knowledge as mental images is inappropriate. We can draw a line between my image and the object, but not between my handling of the object and the object itself. The notion that our understanding is based in our handling of the world rejects representations in general.
VI 140
Taylor: Heidegger ( "handiness") and Merleau-Ponty (thesis: action and corporeality) show a way out. RortyVsTaylor: precisely these two authors are holding on to images and representations, and no matter how mediated.
Representation/Taylor/Rorty: Thesis: handling the world more original than representation.
VI 141
Rorty: no break between the non-verbal and the verbal interactions between organisms (and machines) and the world. Object/Representation:/RortyVsTaylor: we cannot - in contrast to Taylor - draw any line between the object and our image of the object, because the "image" is also merely a form of handling.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Woodfield, A. Davidson Vs Woodfield, A.
 
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Frank I 672
DavidsonVsPutnam: I doubt his assumption (1) that ordinary propositional attitudes are not in the head. And that the authority could not be applied apply to it because of that. This does not follow from the external individuation. E.g. Sunburn/Davidson: It is just as absurd to say that external cause leads to the fact that meanings are not in the head as to believe that, because sunburn is caused by the sun it is not a condition of my skin. E.g. Suppose it could be that someone else suffered an indistinguishable burning of the skin by some other cause (> "tie identical"/> Sellars). Nevertheless, only one of us has real sunburn, the other doesn’t. This is enough to show that a recognition of externalism does not discredit an identity theory of the mental with the physical. Andrew WoodfieldVs: "No de re state about an object outside the brain can possibly be identical to a state of this brain, since no brain state presupposes the existence of an external object." ((s) You can hallucinate everything). Concept/DavidsonVsWoodfield: individual states and events as such do not require anything conceptually! Some of their descriptions, however, do so very much!" E.g. my grandfather did not presuppose me, but if someone is described as my grandfather, Fra.
I 673
Then there must be other people apart from my grandfather, including myself.
I 674
DavidsonVsPutnam/DavidsonVsWoodfield: Both are wrong to assert that it is "absurd" to think that two physically identical people might differ in their ordinary psychological states. They can. (Twin earth) Twin earth/Putnam: (somewhere): psychological states identical DavidsonVsPutnam: not the identical (anomalous monism). This weakens the threat to first person authority, which then no longer simply arises from the fact that the contents are individuated externally.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Meanings n. i.th. Head Versus Cresswell II 56
FodorVsPutnam: meanings are in the head!

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Meanings n. i.th. Head Neutral Cresswell II 70/71
Bedeutung nicht im Kopf/Putnam -" CresswellVsPutnam: nicht klar, was damit gemeint ist, weder pro noch Vs -"

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988
Externalism Versus DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsBurge: Daß er mit der Triangulation die Alltagssituation so stark in den Vordergrund rückt, unterscheidet ihn von dem Externalismus Putnams und Burges. Davidson I 116
Externalismus/DavidsonVsKripke,DavidsonVsPutnam: ganze Sätze, Interpretation. Davidson II 185
Davidson I 72f
Externalismus: pro: Putnam, Burge, Davidson (modifiziert: Triangulation setzt Alltagssituation stärker in den Mittelpunkt) ï·" Vs: Searle ï·" ï·" Quine: nicht eindeutig Vertreter des Externalismus -"
II 185
Externalismus/Putnam/Kripke: richtige Kausalketten zwischen Wort und Gegenstand. >Kausaltheorie ï·" Externalismus/DavidsonVsKripke, DavidsonVsPutnam: ganze Sätze, Interpretation -" Frank I 661~ aber Davidson pro Volkspychologie, VsStich

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
Realism Pro Field I 241
Mathematik: Quine: ist Realist in Bezug auf Mathematik ï·" QuineVsmathematische Notwendigkeit -" dafür braucht er dann aber die Konservativität -"
I 271
Lager: Realismus/Mathematik: Putnam: bezeichnet sich selbst als -œmathematischen Realisten- -" Field: anderer Sinn von Realismus -" Putnam: mE sind nicht geistunabhängig und nicht sprachunabhängig sondern man kann Realist sein, ohne auf mathematische Objekte verpflichtet zu sein -" Kreisel: mathematischer Realismus verlangt mehr als Glauben in mE -" Wright dito -" KreiselVsPutnam/WrightVsPutnam: mE geistunabhängig und sprachunabhängig -"

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Logicism/Math. Pro Field II 331
KreiselVsPutnam / KreiselVsField: These mathematical objectivity is transcended logical objectivity - FieldVsKreisel: logical objectivity is all we have.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Externalism Versus Hacking I 161
HackingVsPutnam. per externalism - our theories probably true - adequacy could also originate from the devil - Putnam: reality not mind-independent.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Meaning Fodor, J.
 
Books on Amazon
Cresswell II 56
Meanings / Fodor / Cresswell: FodorVsPutnam: Thesis: meanings are in the head - CresswellVsFodor: Problem: for an attribution of a thought I have to have the same representation in my head - it must be the same belief as the one he has - (see. above: meanings are not representations ).

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Display Hacking, I.
 
Books on Amazon
I 220
HackingVsPutnam: These verfehlte Dichotomie von Denken und Handeln (Wie Dewey). Hacking These der Mensch ist ein darstellendes Wesen. (Ein Volksstamm ohne Bilder ist für mich kein Menschenstamm).
Morality Harman, G.
 
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Horwich I 421
Moral / Putnam: we can and must assume that there is a non-relative moral truth.   HarmanVsPutnam: of which I am fascinated but not persuaded. I still feel attracted by metaphysical realism.

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Names Lewis, D.
 
Books on Amazon
Schw I 223
Namen/Kennzeichnung/Referenz/Kripke/Putnam/Schwarz: (Kripke 1980, Putnam 1975): für Namen und Artausdrücke gibt es keine allgemeinbekannte Beschreibung (Kennzeichnung), die festlegt, worauf der Ausdruck sich bezieht. Kennzeichnungen sind für die Referenz völlig irrelevant. Beschreibungstheorie/LewisVsKripke/LewisVsPutnam/Schwarz: das wiederlegt nur die naive Kennzeichnungstheorie, nach der biographische Taten aufgelistet werden, die dem Referenten notwendig zukommen sollen.
Schw I 228
Namen/Prädikat/Eigenschaft/Lewis: These Namen können alles benennen: statt Prädikat "F" nehmen wir "F-heit" - Prädikate sind keine Namen und benennen nichts - Prädikat/(s): kein sing Term - SchwarzVsLewis/ RussellVsFrege: wenn man annimmt, daß jedem Prädikat ein Name für eine entsprechende Eigenschaft zugeordnet werden kann, folgt Russells Paradoxie.
Experience Nagel, Th.
 
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III 26
Erlebnis/Nagel: These alle Wesen haben spezifische Erlebnisse, die nicht mit den Mitteln jener psychologischen Begriffe darzustellen sind, die wir in der ersten Person, subjektiv, verstehen könnten. Das bedeutet aber nicht, daß wir nicht über Erlebnisse auf eine ganz allgemeine Weise nachzudenken vermögen, die jedoch kein subjektives Verständnis einschließt!
Wir müssen sie aber auch weiterhin als subjektive Erlebnisse betrachten ï·" nicht bloß als Verhaltensdisposition oder funktionale Zustände. (NagelVsPutnam, NagelVsRyle)!
Modalisation Putnam, H.
 
Books on Amazon
Field I 268
Field: Putnam These der mathematische Realist muß nicht das "mathematische Gegenstandsï·"Bild" ("mathematical object picture") akzeptieren. Er können seine Sicht in rein modalen Begriffen formulieren. Und zwar nicht als Alternative, sondern nur als andere Formulierung derselben Sicht.
I 296
Mathematik/Ontologie/Putnam: These es gibt eine modale Übersetzung reiner Mathematik: er stellt eine Übersetzungsprozedur in vor, die mathematische Aussagen in modale Aussagen verwandelt, eine die akzeptable mathematische Aussagen (z.B. Axiome der Mengenlehre) in wahre modale Behauptungen verwandelt, die keine Quantifikation enthält, außer wenn diese wegmodalisiert ist. (Also keine mE in den modalen Aussagen).
I 270
FieldVsPutnam: zwei allgemeine Fragen: 1. welche Art Modalität ist hier involviert?
2. welchen Nutzen soll die Übersetzung haben? ...+...
I 275
modale Übersetzung/Field: These mÜ von einzelnen mathematischen Anwendungen ohne Annahme von mE ist einfacher als eine der ganzen Mathematik, denn bei den Anwendungen braucht man keine reine Mathematik.
II 321
Mathematik/modal/Modalität/Putnam/Field: (Putnam 1967, Hellman 1989): These Mathematik sollte modal verstanden werden. ((s) -žEs gibt eine MöWe, in der die Mächtigkeit des Kontinuums so und so groß ist, und eine andere, wo sie größer/kleiner ist-œ?). Field. könnte es auch dann nicht auch, wenn es gar keine mathematischen Entitäten gibt, der Fall sein, daß für einen Wert von a für den Ca (-žDie Mächtigkeit des Kontinuums ist Aleph a-œ) modal interpretiert objektiv wahr ist.
FieldVs: . +
Horwich I 398
Menge/Putnam: (anderswo) These Rede über Mengen kann immer in Rede über Möglichkeiten übersetzt werden.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Representation Putnam, H.
 
Books on Amazon
Cartwright I 56
Putnam: (interner Realismus): die Gesetze der Physik repräsentieren nicht die Tatsachen, und zwar, weil überhaupt nichts die Tatsachen repräsentiert! Repräsentation/Tatsachen/Putnam: These nichts repräsentiert ((s) -ž vollständige-œ) Tatsachen. Nicht einmal Bsp allgemeinste Sätze über die Plätzchen im Ofen.
Putnam/Cartwright: würde vermutlich die Gleichungen der modernen Physik noch am ehesten als Repräsentationen der Realität ansehen.
Repräsentation/CartwrightVsPutnam: ich denke, es gibt alle möglichen Repräsentationen der Realität, inklusive die Verallgemeinerungen der Biologie und Ingenieurswissenschaften.
Was nicht repräsentiert, sind die fundamentalen Gesetze!

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983
Mathematics Putnam, H.
 
Books on Amazon
Field II 319
Putnam: These es gibt viele Eigenschaften und Relationen in denen diese mathematischen Entitäten zueinander stehen können. Und es gibt nicht viel darüber festzulegen, wofür solche Eigenschaften und Relationen für die wir unsere mathematischen Prädikate gebrauchen, stehen sollten, abgesehen davon, daß sie die von uns akzeptierten mathematischen Sätze wahr machen.
II 321
Wahrheit/Mathematik/Putnam: These Wahrheit ist zu leicht zu erreichen ((s) durch Uminterpretation) um unsere Wahl der Axiome zu beschränken. (Allerdings nur, so lange es (unendlich viele) mathematische Objekte gibt).
II 328
Nützlichkeit/Wahrheit/Mathematik/Putnam/Field: (Putnam 1971 locus classicus, anders als 1980): These wir müssen Mathematik als wahr ansehen, um ihre Nützlichkeit (Nutzen) auf anderen Gebieten erklären zu können. Z.B. in Wissenschaft und Metalogik. (d.h. der Theorie der logischen Folge). Modalität/modal/Mathematik/Field: das steht im Gegensatz zu seiner früheren Auffassung, daß wir Modalität statt mathematischer Objekte gebrauchen können, um mathematische Wahrheit zu erklären.
II 329
Modale Erklärung: wird aber nicht für andere Disziplinen wie Physik funktionieren. (FieldVsPutnam, Field 1989/91: 252-69). Putnam/Field: die allgemeine Form seines Arguments geht so:
(i) wir müssen in Begriffen mathematischer Entitäten sprechen, um Wissenschaft, Metalogik usw. zu betreiben.
(ii) wenn wir sie für so wichtige Zwecke brauchen, haben wir Grund anzunehmen, daß diese Art Entitäten existiert.
VsPutnam/Field: ... +

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980