Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


[german]  

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 120 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Abstraction Geach
 
Books on Amazon
I 223
Abstraction / FregeVs: mere abstraction of differences does not create (identical) properties - Geach: E.g. Def "surmen" are identical if their surnames are identical - so that is actually a subset of people, but the same man when abstracted from differences - GeachVs: that would not explain the word "surman" - Solution / Quine: "Tangibility": properties had little sense when you used "red" etc. only as names of properties - GeachVsQuine: then we get all the problems with classes: E.g. "The property, to be a prop that does not apply to itself" - would be parallel to Russell’s antinomy.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Actions Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
II 108
Action depends on description (Example Mary) - Events are independent of description! Evening Star/Morning Star - Burglar/Father Action: not definable in the language of the propositional attitudes (burglar example) - instead: primary cause and proper causation.
II 109 f
Davidson can argue precisely on the basis of the anomalism thesis in favor of a monism 1: monism results from the combination of two other premises of the theory of action: (CI) principle of causal interaction. At least some mental events interact causally with physical events. (Undeniable) (NC) principle of the nomological character of causality: events that are in cause-effect relation fall under strict laws. - - -
Brandom I 724
Action/Davidson: is an act if there is a description under which it is intentional - Brandom: two kinds of intentional explanation: a) what was intended - b) what was achieved - I 726 Success/Problem: Nicole successfully killed the animal in front of her (cow instead of stag) - description dependent - I 727 she believed of a cow (de re) that it was a stag - incorrect de dicto: she believed "the cow was a stag" (that the cow) - I 728 Reference: she had (without realizing it) the intention, in relation to the cow, to shoot it - it is about the content of the commitment, not about the type of commitment. - As in beliefs.
I 957
Accordion Effect/Success/Davidson: Example: even though the powder was wet, she succeeded in bending her finger - so there is success in every action - Example Mountain Climber: I 958 Solution/Brandom: Reference to VURD: there needs to be nothing that I intend and in which I succeeded - I 729 Example: I reach for the bread and spill the wine - I 957 Intention: is not wanting that a sentence becomes true (de dicto) - intentions do not correspond to the specifications agreed on, but to the ones recognized - Davidson: muscle contraction does not need to be part of the intention - Brandom: but intentionally I can only contract my muscles in this way by reaching for the bread - the content of the intention can thus be specified as de re - thus success or failure can be established. - - -
II 92
Quine: ontology only physical objects and classes - action not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action event and reference object
II 96
Action/Event/Adverbial Analysis/Davidson/Glüer: Problem 2 types of adverbs resist: 1) Example "almost" hit: syncategorematic, not removable - 2) Example "good", "large", "small" can possibly be omitted - MontagueVsDavidson: Events superfluous, "modifier theory" - KimVsDavidson: not identify events with individuated individuals, but with properties - ((s) i.e. inversely)
II 110
Action: not definable in the language of the propositional attitudes (burglar example) - instead: primary cause and proper causation - (s) because example differing causal chain superimposes an intention and makes it ineffective - Example Mountain Climbers - (s) something does not yet become action, because it is intentional, proper causation must be added.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Analyticity/Syntheticity Fodor
 
Books on Amazon
IV 57
Meaning/Quine: not from speaker meaning, not from acceptance of inferences of the speaker - the speaker meaning depends on the worldview from, and thus on an intention regarding what the words should mean - in this it is not possible to distinguish what views the speaker accepts a priori - So there are no analytic sentences - Vs a/s "true through meaning": there is no epistemic criterion for this.
IV 177ff
Analyticity/block/Dummett/Devitt/Bilgrami: VsQuine: perhaps "gradual A"? - Fodor/LeporeVs: would presuppose equal meaning instead of equal identity: Problem: in the end everything is "just about": sentences just about express propositions, because "John" refers just about to John - not analytical: e.g. "brown cows are dangerous" - no inference from -cows are dangerous and -brown things are dangerous- "therefore then no compositionality.
IV 186
Analyticity/analytical/Fodor/Lepore: if meanings are stereotypes, yet none of the individual features is defining - "E.g. the stereotypical brown cow can be dangerous, even though the stereotype dangerous does not match the stereotype brown or the stereotype cow " - hence the distinction analytic/synthetic fails - Important Argument: even if your reject the a/s distinction, it is clear that meanings are never stereotypes!.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Analyticity/Syntheticity Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
V 18
Analyticity/Quine: E.g. I do not know whether the statement ’Everything green is extended’ is analytic - Searle: sophisticated: one can deny that the sense data are extended - SearleVsQuine: conversely, to show that the criteria for A are missing, we must already understand A. ---
V 19
Analyticity/SearleVsQuine. we understand analyticity, otherwise we could not find such good examples.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Analyticity/Syntheticity Strawson
 
Books on Amazon
Wright I 198
Strawson/Grice: E.g. our daily talk of analyticity is a sociological fact and therefore has enough discipline to be considered minimally capable of truth. StrawsonVsQuine/GriceVsQuine: it is hopeless to deny that a distinction exists, if it is not used within linguistic practice in a pre-arranged way that is capable of mutual agreement.
QuineVsStrawson/QuineVsGrice: this is fully consistent with a cognitive psychology of the practical use of the distinction, which does not assume that we respond to exemplifications of the distinctions. (see Wright)


Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981


Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001
Attributive/referential Millikan
 
Books on Amazon
I 215
Beschreibend/referentiell/Kennzeichnung/Klassifikation/Millikan: man kann erzwingen, dass eine beschreibende Kennzeichnung referentiell funktioniert, Bsp „Er sagte, dass der Gewinner der Verlierer war“. Bsp (Russell): „Ich dachte, deine Yacht wäre größer als sie ist“.
I 216
Lösung: „der Gewinner“, und „größer als deine Yacht“ müssen als nach dem angepassten (adaptierten) Sinn klassifiziert angesehen werden. Dagegen:
„Der Verlierer“: hat wahrscheinlich nur beschreibenden Sinn-
„Deine Yacht“: wird durch beides klassifiziert: durch angepassten und durch relationalen Sinn, nur „dein“ ist rein referentiell.
Quine: (klassisches Beispiel) Bsp „Phillip glaubt, dass die Hauptstadt von Honduras in Nicaragua liegt“.
MillikanVsQuine: das ist nicht, wie Quine glaubt, offensichtlich falsch. Es kann als wahr gelesen werden, wenn „Hauptstadt von Honduras“ relationalen Sinn in diesem Kontext hat.
Referentiell/beschreibend/Glaubenszuschreibung/intentional/Millikan: es gibt Ausnahmen, wo die Ausdrücke nicht beschreibend, aber auch nicht rein referentiell funktionieren, sondern auch durch relationalen Sinn oder Intension.
Bsp „der Mann der uns nach Hause fuhr“ sei jemand, der Sprecher und Hörer sehr gut bekannt ist. Dann muss der Hörer annehmen, dass hier jemand anderes gemeint ist, weil der Name nicht gebraucht wird.
Regel: hier wird die zweite Hälfte der Regel für intentionale Kontexte verletzt, „setzte welchen Ausdruck auch immer ein, der die Referenz erhält“. Das ist oft ein Zeichen dafür, dass die erste Hälfte verletzt ist: „ein Zeichen hat nicht nur Referenz, sondern auch Sinn oder Intension, die erhalten werden müssen. Warum sollte man sonst eine so umständliche Kennzeichnung („der Mann der uns nach Hause fuhr“) gebrauchen, statt des Namens?


Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Beliefs Millikan
 
Books on Amazon
I 5
Glauben/Wünsche/Intention/Millikan: können ohne Referenz auf Sprache erklärt werden.
I 13
Überzeugungen: insoweit unsere Bedeutungen und unsere Fähigkeiten, Dinge wieder zu erkennen richtig und gültig sind,
I 14
sind die meisten unserer Überzeugungen und Urteile wahr. ((s) >Davidson).
I 62
Überzeugung/Millikan: 1. entsteht zum Teil aus der inneren Beschaffenheit des Subjekts (Nerven, Verschaltung usw.) Aber nicht zwei Leute mit denselben Verschaltungen müssen dieselben Überzeugungen haben.
I 63
2. Nicht die ganze innere Hardware ist im Einsatz, wenn man etwas glaubt. Überzeugung/Haben/Gebrauch/Millikan: ich kann eine Überzeugung haben, während ich sie gar nicht gebrauche, Bsp dass Kolumbus Amerika entdeckt hat, brauche ich fast nie, vor allem nicht, wenn ich mir die Zähne putze.
Entdeckung/Überzeugung/Millikan: Bsp ein Mathematiker, der wach liegt und nach einem Beweis sucht und ihn endlich findet: man kann nicht von ihm sagen, dass er ihn vorher schon geglaubt hat!
Imperativ/Millikan: nun ist es sicher so, dass ein Hörer, wenn er gefragt wird, ob der Sprecher intendiert habe, dass er dem Befehl gehorcht, sicher sofort „ja“ antworten wird.
I 64
Aber das heißt nicht, dass er diese Überzeugung beim Gehorchen gebraucht hat.
I 67
Glauben/Millikan: These: wenn man etwas glaubt, glaubt man normalerweise durch Beobachtungsurteile. Problem: Hintergrundinformation, die einen von dem Urteil abhalten könnte, ist nicht notwendig eine Information, deren Leugnung man im Normalfall gebrauchen würde, würde, um die Überzeugung zu stützen!
I 68
Dieses Prinzip werde ich gebrauchen MillikanVsQuine. Theorie/Beobachtung/Quine: These: beide sind unlöslich miteinander verwunden.
MillikanVsHolismus.
Gricesche Intentionen/Millikan: sollte man nicht als Mechanismus auffassen. Allerdings:
Bsp Einen Motor: kann man auch als Hierarchie auffassen, wobei höhere Levels niedrigere stoppen können. Dabei muss ich als Benutzer auch wenig über die Funktionsweise der niedrigeren Stufen wissen.
I 127
Glauben/Überzeugung/Intention/Millikan: Überzeugungen sind innere intentionale Icons, vielleicht auch Sätze in einer inneren Sprache.
I 300
Überzeugung/Gauben/Wahrheit/Welt/Erkennen/Millikan: die grundlegenden Dinge, die wir lernen müssen zu unterscheiden, wenn wir wahre Überzeugungen über die Welt erwerben wollen, sind Eigenschaften und Substanzen. Eigenschaften/Eigenschaft/Millikan: dazu gehören auch Handlungen (Akte) wie Bsp Sitzen.


Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Causal Theory of Knowledge Brandom
 
Books on Amazon
I 310ff
Causal theory of knowledge/GoldmanVs/Barn facades: classic causal theory: Knowledge for the wrong reasons no knowledge - Goldman: Resident of real-barn province expresses genuine knowledge - the knowledge of the resident of the fassade province no real knowledge - Problem: mere chance whether real barn - the difference of circumstances has influence, even if they are causally irrelevant - Quantity: few (unrecognizable) sparrow dummies do not turn a reliable onlooker into an unreliable one; they will, however, when there are many dummies - reliability is the correct term for the barn E.g. - ((s) the method does not change when many dummies are used.). ---
I 312
Goldman: underlines the possibility of gerrymandering: it depends on whether you are in the center or at the edge of the province when it comes to allocating values. ---
II 149
Knowledge/Causal Theory of Knowledge/Goldman/Brandom: objective probability can only specified relative to a reference class - but the world itself does not distinguish such classes - so the choice of the reference class in turn is not determined objectively by naturalistically specifiable facts. ---
II 149 f
Barn facades/Goldman/Brandom: VsCausal Theory - Pioneer of reliability theories - Causal chain must be ideal - E.g. facades of provinces, each with changed practices: fake/real ... etc. - then it depends entirely on the choice of the reference class, whether the sight of a real barn is knowledge - maximum reliable: the narrowest reference class. Internalism/twin earth: it could be argued that the internal states are similar - Goldman/Brandom: all in all, the presence of fakes (barn facades) in the surroundings is causally irrelevant.
---
II 152
Brandom: the circumstances are external! ((s) so it is true?) - BrandomVsQuine: Goldman does not support the naturalistic epistemology, because knowledge is independent of the choice of the reference class - so one argument place remains empty. - It depends on how we describe the convinced person: as a citizen of the country, the state, etc. And that would be just the naturalistically formulated ones. - Definition naturalistic blind spot of the reliability theories/Brandom: whether an observer is reliable or not depends on the choice of reference classes (barn province), and thus on external circumstances that have nothing to do with the object under observation. ---
II 155
Reliability theories: good reason for not separating belief from good inference - difference: knowledge/authorization for knowledge.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Concepts Geach
 
Books on Amazon
I 26ff
Concept/Frege/Geach: the meaning of "people" is not "many people", but the concept.
I 220
Concept/GeachVsFrege: Frege: "The concept horse is not a concept" - i.e. it must be an object: this is a fallacy! - Not objects are realized, but concepts. - (The former is not falsehood, but nonsense). - Correct: E.g. "The concept human being is realized" is divided into "human being" and "the concept ... is realized" - the latter = "something is a...". - What cannot be divided like this, is meaningless: E.g. "the concept human bein is timeless".
I 226
Concept/Frege: purely extensional view - therefore not "sense of the name", but reference of the predicate. - ((s) reference/(s): set of designated objects = extension.) - But: Extension/Frege: Object - Concept/Frege: not an object - reason: the concept is unsaturated, the object is saturated. - "Red" does not stand for a concept, otherwise the concept would be a name.
I 228f
Concept/Geach: "The concept horse" is not a concept, because otherwise concepts would have names - (...+...) - Nor is a concept a logical unit. - No more than e.g. "Napoleon was a great general and the conqueror of Napoleon was a great general". - E.g. "A man is wise" is not an instance of "___ is wise " ("a man" is not a name), but of a derived predicate "a ... is wise" - sentences from which "the concept of human being" cannot be eliminated are pointless! - E.g. "The concept human being is an abstract entity" - sentences about concepts need a quantifier.
I 230
Concept/Geach: cannot have a proper name. - Instead, we refer the concept with the predicate. - VsFrege: he uses pseudo-proper names for concepts: "The extension of the concept x cut the throat of x'." Pseudo-name: "the concept x cut x" - Geach: correct: the name of the extension is "the range of x for x cut the throat of x'."
I 234
Concept/Object/Quine: the distinction is unnecessary! - GeachVsQuine: it is necessary! - Quine's disguised distinction between class and element corresponds to it.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Concepts Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Rorty I 216
(According to Rorty): term, meaning: Quine: only a type of intention. And all intentions are to be overturned. "Means", "believes" and "wishes" have no behavioral equivalent; "opinion" and "desire" are just as dispensable as the terms "concept" and "intuition". RortyVsQuine: concepts and meaning are harmless as long as they are postulated to explain our behavior. They only become harmful when they are supposed to be the source of a certain kind of truth.
---
Rorty VI 170
Language/world/Quine/Rorty: Vs separation between the conceptual and the empirical. ---
Stroud I 216
Conceptual sovereignty/Quine/Stroud: meagre input: light/dark, temperature variations, etc. rich output: theories about the world - sovereignty: we discover something about the meagreness and thus discover the extent to which science is our "free creation".

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Conceptual Schemes Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
I 41/42
Third Dogma/Conceptual Scheme/DavidsonVsQuine: Scheme: language along with ontology and world theory - Contents: build exemplary firing of the neurons - (in Quine instead of sense data) - QuineVsDavidson: Separation not intended, only to appears in Davidson's presentation like this - The concept of the uninterpretable content is necessary, however, to make conceptual relativism clear - conceptual relativism: the conceptual scheme is a human creation, arbitrary. - "Conceptual sovereignty".
I 44
DavidsonVsQuine: there are no last data, therefore no subtraction.
I 87 ~
Conceptual Scheme/Separation Scheme/Content >relativism - "stream of experience" - "uninterpreted givenness" - conceptual relativism.
I 96
Scheme/Contents: have come into play as a pair, (Cl. Lewis) now we can let them drop out as pair - then no objects remain, in terms of which the question of representation could be raised - beliefs are true or false, but they represent nothing!
I 98
Third Dogma/Scheme/Content/Error/Delusion/Davidson: Deception no longer a problem after the abolition of the separation scheme/content, no matter whether we are capable of knowing the world and other minds - all the more: how - but these are no epistemological questions anymore now, but questions of the nature of rationality.
II 133
Incommensuralibilty presumes the separation scheme/content (3rd Dogma).

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Conceptual Schemes Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
Horwich I 454
Conceptual scheme/DavidsonVscorrespondence/Rorty: we get rid of all these intermediate elements together with the correspondence - e.g. CS, "perspective", language, culture, "point of view", - "tertia" - this intentionalist terms are the sources of skepticism.
Horwich I 454
Scheme/content/conceptual scheme/DavidsonVsScepticism/Rorty: the dualism scheme/content: possible forms: "conceptual frame", "intended interpretation": these are not causally linked to the things they organize - they vary independently of the rest of the universe - without them we look at our own beliefs as in the RI -
Horwich I 454
RI/conceptual scheme/Davidson/Rorty: examining ourselves with the RI makes a correspondence relation, "intended beliefs" etc. superfluous -
Rorty I 300
Conceptual scheme/3rd dogma/ Rorty: as soon as conceptual schemes became something transitory, the distinction between scheme and content itself was in at risk - then science does not become possible through an a priori contribution of our knowledge.
I 330
Conceptual scheme/Davidson/Rorty: talk of the scheme or conceptual system attempts to separate the concept of truth from the concept of meaning and therefore has to fail - then there would have to be an "alternative CS" that would be true, but untranslatable - that is incomprehensible - I 338 Rorty: there is no neutral basis from which various schemes can be compared -" nor do we have the right to assume a common scheme - solution: without 3rd Dogma (scheme/content) we restore the direct reference to the objects.
VI 64
Conceptual schemes/point of view/Putnam/Rorty we must always use a specific system of concepts (we cannot do otherwise) - but we must not claim that this is actually not the way in which things behave.
VI 127
Conceptual scheme/DavidsonVs3rd Dogma/Rorty: we must stop sorting statements by whether they are "made" true by "the world" or by "us" - DavidsonVsVs conceptual scheme/DavidsonVsQuine
VI 129
Conceptual scheme/content/Rorty: the distinction is not to be confused with the distinction "is"/"seems to be" - VI 135 we can not specify which "moves" of nature belong to the scheme and which belong to content.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Correctness Millikan
 
Books on Amazon
I 308
Wahrheit/Richtigkeit/Kriterium/Quine/Millikan. für Quine scheint ein Kriterium für richtiges Denken zu sein, dass die Relation auf einen Reiz vorhergesagt werden kann. MillikanVsQuine: aber wie soll das lernen, unisono zu sprechen, die Vorhersage erleichtern?
Übereinstimmung/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: beide berücksichtigen nicht, was Übereinstimmung in Urteilen eigentlich ist: es ist nicht unisono zu reden., Wenn man nicht dasselbe sagt, heißt das nicht, dass man nicht übereinstimmt.
Lösung/Millikan: Übereinstimmung heißt, dasselbe über dasselbe zu sagen.
Nichtübereinstimmung: kann nur entstehen, wenn Sätze Subjekt-Prädikat-Struktur haben und Negation zugelassen ist.
Ein-Wort-Satz/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine geht sogar soweit, „Autsch!“ als Satz zuzulassen. Er meint, der Unterschied zwischen Wort und Satz betrifft am Ende nur den Drucker.
Negation/Millikan: die Negation eines Satzes wird nicht durch die Abwesenheit von Belegen bewiesen, sondern durch positive Tatsachen (s.o.).
Widerspruch/Millikan: dass wir nicht einem Satz und seiner Negation gleichzeitig zustimmen, liegt in der Natur (Naturnotwendigkeit).
I 309
These: Mangel an Widerspruch basiert wesentlich auf der ontologischen Struktur der Welt. Übereinstimmung/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: beide sehen nicht die Wichtigkeit der Subjekt-Prädikat-Struktur mit Negation. Daher verkennen sie die Wichtigkeit der Übereinstimmung im Urteil.
Übereinstimmung: dabei geht es nicht darum, dass zwei Leute zusammenkommen, sondern dass sie mit der Welt zusammenkommen.
Übereinstimmung/Nichtübereinstimmung/Millikan: sind nicht zwei gleichwahrscheinliche Möglichkeiten ((s) >Nozick. Inegalitäre Theorie). Es gibt viel mehr Möglichkeiten für einen Satz falsch zu sein, als für denselben Satz, wahr zu sein.
Wenn nun ein ganzes Muster (System) übereinstimmender Urteile auftaucht, die denselben Bereich abbilden (z.B. Farbe) ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass jeder Teilnehmer einen Bereich draußen in der Welt abbildet, überwältigend.
Bsp nur weil meine Urteile über den Zeitablauf fast immer mit denen anderer übereinstimmen, habe ich Grund zu glauben, dass ich die Fähigkeit habe, meine Erinnerungen richtig in den Zeitablauf einzuordnen.
Objektivität/Zeit/Perspektive/Medium/Kommunikation/Millikan: These: das Medium, das andere Personen mit ihren Äußerungen bilden, ist für mich die am besten zugängliche Perspektive, die ich im Hinblick auf die Zeit haben kann.


Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Correspondence Theory Field
 
Books on Amazon
I 229
Correspondence Theory/Truth/Field: needs an additional concept of the truth theoretical content of psychological states. - And it is used in a way that it cannot occur in the disquotation scheme.
I 250
Correspondence Theory/FieldVsCorrespondence Theory: even for an inconsistent theory it is consistent when the the correspondence theory is assumed that it is true, because the logical words in it could have been used differently. - Therefore, the truth of the correspondence theory should not be applied to disquotational truth, because it is a logical concept itself and the instances of disquotation scheme must be regarded as logical truths.
II 199
Correspondence Theory/Ontological Commitment/O.C./Quine/Field: the ontological commitment seems to exclude the correspondence theory. - FieldVsQuine: despite the uncertainty we should allow correspondence. - >partial denotation.
Horwich I 416
VsCorrespondence: which one is the right one? - Field: which one is relevant may depend on epistemic values, but not on which values ​​are "correct." - Field pro "epistemic relativism".
I 419
RelativismVsSkepticism: the question of the "real" justification does not make sense.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Cross World Identity Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
II 158f
Identification between possible worlds: depends on the predicates - for bodies also of space displacement, composition etc. - therefore not "cross world" - "the same object" is meaningless -> singular terms instead of predicates.
---
II 149
Possible world/Quine: a vivid way, to assert an essentialist philosophy - In order to identify the subject in a world, essential properties are needed.
- - -
- - -
Hintikka I 137
QuineVsModallogik: Problem der Querwelteinidentifikation. Querwelteinidentifikation/cross-identification/Quine/(s): Problem der Identitätsbedingungen. Wenn keine Identitätsbedingungen gegeben sind, ist die Frage sinnlos, ob ein Individuum „dasselbe wie“ eins in einer anderen möglichen Welt ist.
HintikkaVsQuine: mein modifizierter Ansatz geht über die Reichweite von Quines Kritik hinaus.
Weltlinien/Hintikka: werden von uns fixiert, nicht von Gott. Dennoch sind sie nicht willkürlich. Ihre Begrenzungen sind durch Kontinuität von Raum und Zeit, Erinnerung, Lokalisierung usw. gegeben.
I 138
Es kann sogar sein, dass unsere Präsuppositionen sich als falsch herausstellen. Daher kann es keine Menge von Weltlinien geben, die alle möglichen Welten umfassen, die wir in der alethischen Modallogik brauchen. Modallogik/Quantifikation/Quine/Hintikka: eine realistische Interpretation der quantifizierten alethischen Modallogik ist unmöglich. Aber aus Gründen, die tiefer gehen als Quine angenommen hat.
Querwelteinidentifikation/HintikkaVsQuine: ist nicht intrinsisch unmöglich.
Quine/Hintikka: hat das in letzter Zeit sogar mit Einschränkungen anerkannt.
Lösung/Hintikka: Querwelteinidentifikation als Re-Identifikation.


Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
de dicto Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
II 249
De dicto: only concerning the mental contents - de re: relationships between people and objects - SearleVsQuine, VsPutnam: all beliefs are de dicto. - ((s) so they should always be concerned with mental contents and never with objects?)
---
II 261
De dicto/belief/SearleVsAll: all beliefs are de dicto - de re beliefs are a subclass - QuineVs: irreducible belief de re: is between the believer and the objects - in addition to the de dicto beliefs - (much stronger thesis) - brains in a vat: purely de dicto - SearleVsQuine: if the world would change, the beliefs would change, even if everything stays the same in the head. ---
II 262
General desire for a sailing boat: de dicto - for a more specific: de re. ---
II 263
SearleVsQuine: Then in the general case allegedly context free but: BurgeVsQuine: contextually bound beliefs cannot be characterized completely by their intentional content (not only as a relation between concept and object) - de dicto/Burge: E.g. red hat in the fog, "there is a man who ..." -Searle: that is enough to individuate any de re- counterpart - the same man can belong to fulfillment conditions for very different perceptions. ---
II 268
Thesis, there are forms of intentionality that are not conceptual, but also not de re.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

de re Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
II 247
De dicto: concernsg only the mental contents. - De re: relationships between people and objects - SearleVsQuine, VsPutnam: all beliefs are de dicto. ---
II 271
De re/de dicto/SearleVsQuine: is a distinction between different types of report - intentional states are not intensional by themselves. That is a mix of logical properties of reports with the states themselves - there is no "de re-setting" - only indexicals (VsKaplan, VsPerry). ---
VI 182f
De re/de dicto/Searle: not two different beliefs - Ralph's beliefs are the same in both cases - difference is in how far the reporting person wants to commit himself - Ralph cannot express this difference - the truth conditions are the same.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Definitions Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Rorty I 302
Definition: Quine’s attack on the first dogma had made her doubtful. Operational definition: along with Sellar’s doctrine that a "sensory fact" is a function of socialization she became twice as questionable with Quine’s holistic attacks.
---
Quine I 327
Definition: instructions for transformation, reinstate singular term - flexible, without truth value gaps. ---
II 109
Carnap quasi-analysis - full reduction through definition - QuineVs: assignment of sense qualities to spacetime points must be kept revisable - therefore not attributable to definitions. ---
VII 24
Definition/Quine: can serve opposite purposes: abbreviation - or more economic vocabulary (then longer chains) - Part and whole are bound by translation rules - Definition key neither for synonymy nor analyticity. ---
A propos X 70
Definition/object language/meta language/Quine/(s): the term which is defined, cannot stand in the object language, even if the rest of the definition is (not always) in the object language. ---
X 84
Definition/VsQuine: from appropriate method of proof is of no interest, because the -"property of being provable by a particular method is uninteresting -" is only interesting in connection with completeness theorem - QuineVsVs: logical truth is not mentioned there. ---
X 101
Context Definition: introduces merely a facon de parler-" that creates eliminability at all times without ontological commitment.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Essentialism Lewis
 
Books on Amazon
IV 32
Definition essentialism/Aristotle: essential properties are not description dependent - QuineVs: that is just as congenial as the whole modal logic - LewisVsQuine: that is really congenial - and irrespective of analyticity.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Essentialism Stalnaker
 
Books on Amazon
I 71
Essentialism/Today/VsQuine: most modal logicians today accept essentialism - QuineVsEssentialism: incorrect: to say that one description is better than the other, because it better characterizes essential properties of an object.
I 72
Essence/Essentialism/Essential property/LeibnizVsQuine/Stalnaker: Thesis: every property of every individual constitutes its essence and only the existence of the thing as a whole is contingent -
I 74
Anti-essentialism/quantified modal logic/Stalnaker/conclusion: in order to connect the two, we need real semantic conditions for atomic predicates - reason: (Ex)N(Fx) > (x)N(Fx). Is a theorem, but not its substitution instance (Ex)N(Rxy) > (x)N(Rxy). - (if something necessarily is father of x, then everything is necessarily father of x - Of course, only intrinsic predicates are in question, but this is assumed and not explained.
I 85
Essentialism/Stalnaker: questions about it are questions about how far it is appropriate and possible to abstract.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Existence Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
V 165f
Existence/ontology/criterion/AlstonVsQuine: his translations (e.g. a) "length-in-miles-from" or b) "(Ex)(E is a ...)" - 1. Alston: E-assumptions depend on statements, not on sentences - QuineVsVs: the translation shows that the prerequisite is made only seemingly 2. AlstonVsQuine: the translation would allow to say everything possible, when you only reform it accordingly. ---
V 168
Searle (like Alston): no criterion of mere notation - (s) general direction: Searle: facts, not language is decisive - SearleVsQuine: E.g. then you can claim all the knowledge (W) and yet only presuppose this spring here: one defines a predicate P(x) = this spring and W - then one takes (W) as an axiom and this spring = this spring as an axiom, then "this spring = this spring and axiom (W) "then "P (this spring)" then "(Ex)(Px)" - problem: the knowledge can be represented in paraphrases, which then would have to have the same ontological prerequisite as the original - (s) QuineVsVs: the conditions are only made seemingly - AlstonVsQuine: ~ what someone says is important not how he puts it. ---
V 172
Ontological/epistemic/Searle: E.g. "are there terrible snow men?" is an epistemic, not an ontological question. ---
V 173
Existence/ontology/Searle: there are no classes of irreducible existence conditions.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Extensionality Simons
 
Books on Amazon
Chisholm II 185
Extensionality/Quine: space time points instead of "durable goods" - SimonsVsQuine: language without continuants (permanent object) not learnable - Chisholm: probably time and modality, but not temporal or modal components: either a) accept phenomena, refuse extensionality or b) reject phenomena, demand extensionality for real lasting objects (> entia sukzessiva) - SimonsVsChisholm: better accept Aristotle things with unnecessary parts: trees simply consist of matter - more evidence than Wittgenstein's atoms. ---
Simons I 3
Extensionality/Simons: if it is rejected, more than one object can have exactly the same parts and therefore more than one object can be at the same time in the same place - then we are dealing with continuants. continuant/Simons: everything which is not an event - (see below) everything that can have mass.
---
I 11
Extensional mereology/CEM/extensionality/Simons: characteristic property: relationship "part-of-or-identical-with" corresponds with "less-than-or-equal" relationship - Overlapping: can be used as the only fundamental concept - limiting case: separateness and identity. ---
I 105f
Part/VsExtensional mereology/Simons: 1. whole sometimes not one of its own parts - 2. sometimes not transitive - 3. existence of "sum-individuals" not always guaranteed - that means, since the axioms, for individuals who obey any predicate, are wrong - 4. Identity criteria for individuals who have all parts in common, are wrong. ---
I 106
5. provides a materialist ontology of four-dimensional objects - Part/Simons: thesis: there is no uniform meaning of "part". ---
I 117
Extensionality/Simons: is left with the rejection of the proper parts principle - Proper parts principle. ---
I 28
Proper Parts Principle/strong/strong supporting principle: if x is not part of y, then there is a z which is part of x and which is separated from y - solution for distinguishing sum (Tib + Tail) and whole (process) Tibbles (cat) - ((s)intentionality, intentional mereology?) - Simons: coincidence of individuals: temporarily indistinguishable (perceptually) -> superposition: at the same time in the same place.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987


Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Formal Language Hintikka
 
Books on Amazon
I 141
Formal language/logic/canonical notation/HintikkaVsQuine: we should consider the logical language as our mother tongue, and do not place too much emphasis on the translation into the everyday language. It is all about semantic clarity anyway.


Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Gavagai Brandom
 
Books on Amazon
I 576
BrandomVsQuine: Sentences about rabbit parts predict pruned properties, namely by reference to the merged objects to which they belong. ---
I 578ff
Gavagai/BrandomVsQuine: if you want to use singular terms for (rabbit) parts, there must be predications of them, which do not only address them through the wholenesses in which they appear - if "Gavagai" is to be a real sortal, then language must be able to individuate objects that it sorts - there must be a term for "the same Gavagai" (in the derived scheme) - no natural language can be as non-autonomous that it needs a richer meta-language (of the theorist) - only artificial languages can do without it. ---
580 I
Solution/Brandom: it is about accuracy of inferences, not superficial stimuli. VsQuine: since no natural language can be non-autonomous in this sense - only artificial languages whose use is specified in a richer metalanguage can be that - a straightforward translation is to be preferred.
BrandomVsQuine: this is about correctness of inferences, not about Quine’s thin base of surface stimuli.
Gavagai: how do you distinguish whether the rabbit fly or the flash of bright stumpy tail triggers the expression? You cannot know, it does not depend on the RDRDs(reliable differential responsive dispositions) and the corresponding causal chains, but on their inferential role.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Gavagai Field
 
Books on Amazon
II 201
Indeterminacy/Gavagai/Theory/Reference/FieldVsQuine: the indeterminacy does not only refer to the absolute sense. - either a) to the absolute - b) to the relative reference. - Absolute reference/Field: here there is no fact which decides what Gavagai has as an extension. ---
II 202
Correspondence theory/indeterminacy/Gavagai/Field: new correspondence theory: partial signification: Gavagai has the relation of partial signification - a) to the quantity of rabbits - b) to the quantity of rabbit parts. - This is only interesting, if one can explain truth with it. - Then "is" is either identity relation or partial identity. - indeterminacy: is then the thesis that there is no fact that decides about it. - This does not mean that there is no disquotation scheme. - Modification: "signifies partially a and partially b". - Partial signification/everyday language: E.g. "tall man": 180-185cm? ---
II 204
Problem: relativized signification and denotation leads again to the myth of the museum. - For each predicate T, set y (or {x I Fx} and translation manual M: T signifies {x I Fx} relative to M iff M T displays to a term which signifies y (or {x I Fx}). Gavagai/FieldVsQuine: Quine needs a connection between "rabbits" ((s) not "Gavagai") in our language and actual rabbits. But his indeterminacy thesis denies the existence of such a one which does not consist at the same time equally well out of rabbit parts.
---
II 216
Gavagi/metalanguage/m.l./Field: we need defined expressions for the description of the partial extension: - E.g. "Rabbit" partly signifies the set of rabbits and partly the set of the unseparated parts of rabbits. - Question: how can this be understood by someone for whom the last two tokens of "rabbit" are indeterminate? - N.B.: the sentence is just as understandable and has the same truth conditions when the meta language is indeterminate. ---
II 220
Gavagai/indeterminacy/Field: the addition of "is an unseparated part of" to language reduces the indeterminacy. - (This comes from an inflationary view).

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Gavagai Peacocke
 
Books on Amazon
I 84
Gavagai / EvansVsQuine: his proposal, to interpret rabbits as unseparated rabbit parts has the consequence that what is always true of a unseparated rabbit part, also is true of another unseparated part of that rabbit - then there are no limits to vagueness - the price of denying that is to make the identification of predicates empirically unlimited - this also applies to the attribution of actions.

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Generality Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
I 10
Distinction singular/general term: is independent from stimulus meaning. - Name or general term for space-time segments: the same stimulus meaning ("rabbitness"). ---
I 238
Plural: abstract singular terms: "lions are dying out" - Disposition "eats mice" (31). ---
I 412
QuineVsProperties: fallacy of subtraction: deriving existence from "about" and "is about" - "round" and "dog" are terms for physical objects - but not properties! "Round" and "dog" are general terms for objects not singular terms for properties or classes. The same argument would apply to classes instead of properties: general term symbolizes its extension as well as its intension.
---
I 415
Properties: not every general term necessarily speaks of properties or classes - properties and classes acceptable as values ​​of variables. ---
IX 194~
Universality/Quine: ambiguous: a) different indices applicable - b) undivided quantification throughout an exhaustive universal class. ---
Tugendhat I 380
General statements/universality/Quine: These basic statements are general statements, and there are no singular statements at all - StrawsonVsQuine: it is the general statements themselves that refer to singular statements when specifying their truth conditions - one cannot explain the use of a general sentence without the precondition of the use of singular sentences.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Generality Russell
 
Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
Tugendhat I 377
Existence/Russell/Tugendhat: R interprets the singular predicative statement as existential statement and this as a general (overall) statement - already anticipated by Kant and Frege - then E.g. Present King of France etc. always wrong.
Tugendhat I 380
General statements/Quine: Thesis: basic statements are always general statements, and there are no singular statements at all - StrawsonVsQuine: it is the general statements themselves that refer to singular statements when specifying their truth conditions - you cannot explain the use of a general sentence without the explanation of the use of singular sentences.

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996


Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Generality Strawson
 
Books on Amazon
IV 68
generality / Strawson: the question of general categories of things or concepts is not logical answerable - it needs Epistemology.
Tugendhat II 25 ~
generality / StrawsonVsQuine: general statements can only be understood as singular statements. Existence of individual things (particulars) has already been assumed.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981


Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Holism Brandom
 
Books on Amazon
I 666
Meaning/Holism/HarmanVsQuine: Example: If the sun passes behind a cloud, does that change the meaning of my words? At least, the conditional "If a cloud hides the sun, then p" obtains a different potential to transform my definitions - Brandom: difference: whether change in significance or in content. ---
I 666
Social Holism/Brandom: Demands that understanding of the semantic content whose approval has such significance depends on the capabilities of the account holders to use relations between the different perspectives.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Holism Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
McDowell I 188
DavidsonVsQuine: Even if the "empirical meaning" cannot be divided sentence by sentence into the individual sentences, this does by no means show that rational responsibility cannot be divided into sentences, sentence by sentence. Therefore the experience must really be interpreted as a tribunal.
---
Dav I 113
Holism/Davidson: the ones of the purely linguistic meaning and the elements of his utterances, which are purely attributable to the beliefs of the speaker, cannot be neatly separated. ---
II 75
Meaning/Davidson/Glüer: a number of logical relations are also always constitutive in terms of the meaning - otherwise we could never talk about the same object. ---
II 78
But reasoning relations between beliefs are not comprehensible in a purely formal-logical way - the fewest beliefs emerge as logical truths from other beliefs. ---
Horwich I 463
Truth/Holism/DavidsonVsDummett: Truth always goes beyond the evidence for the Holism - then understanding never shows up in the manifestations which Dummett means.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Identity Geach
 
Books on Amazon
I 218
Identity/GeachVsFrege: is not a relation - "Is an A" does not mean "has identity with A" - (whereby "A" is a name). - VsFrege: (in Frege, basic principles of artihmetics) instead of "There are just as many Fs as Gs": "Either any given object F iff it is a G, or there is a relation that is a one-to-one correspondence between the Fs and Gs". But this must not be an identity. ---
I 226
Identity/Geach: only objects can be strictly identical. - In terms, there is only analogous identity: if they are coextensive. ---
I 238
Identity/GeachVsQuine: Thesis: Identity is relative. - If someone says "x is identical to y", this is an incomplete expression. - It is an abbreviation for "x is the same as y". - (Weird, that Frege did not represent this). Identity/tradition/Geach: can be expressed by a single schema.
(1)l- Fa (x)(Fx u x = a) - everyday-language: whatever is true of something which is identical with an object y is true of a and vice versa. - From this we derive the law of self-identity:
"l-a = a".
Because we take "Fx" for "x unequal a", then schema (1) gives us:
(2)l- (a unequal a) Vx(y unequal a u x = a) - this,of course, gives "l-a = a"
---
I 240
Identity/Geach: if we demand strict identity, regardless of the theory in which we move, we get into the semantic paradoxes such as Grelling's or Richard's solution: relative identity on theory or language, indissibility/"indiscernibility"/Quine -> Partial identity. ---
Tugendhat I 37
Identity/Dummett/Geach: "=" can only be used with reference to objects.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972


Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Identity Goodman
 
Books on Amazon
I 21f
Definition Identificatio/Goodman: based on the division into entities and kinds. - The answer to the question: "The same or not the same?" always has to be: "The same what?". ---
I 142
(16) In the relevant correct system each point correlates with a combination of a vertical and a horizontal line. (17) In the (one other) corresponding correct system no point correlates with a combination of any other elements.
Moreover, since the isomorphism neither guarantees identity nor excludes it (although it is guaranteed by it), means (16) no positive or negative determination on something other than straight lines, and combinations of straight lines, while (17) does not determine itself on anything except to points.
---
I 140
(14) Each point is generated by a vertical and a horizontal straight line. (15) No dot is formed by straight lines or something else.
---
I 142f
Are (14) and (15) about the same points? Is the screen on which a spot moves the same as the one on which no spot moves? Is the seen table the same as the pile of molecules? ---
I 145
Goodman: The answer to such frequently asked questions in philosophy is a strong Yes and a strong No. The realist will oppose the conclusion that there is no world. The idealist will oppose the conclusion that conflicting versions describe different worlds. Goodman: both views are appealing. Finally, the difference between them is purely conventional! ---
Goodman IV 21
Individuation/Quine:> individuation is defined by a bundle mutually interrelated grammatical particles and constructions. Plurals, pronouns, numerals, the "is" (the identity) and the from them derived "same" and "another". ---
IV 21
GoodmanVsQuine: he failed to explain that the interpretation of these particles cannot be made without consideration of the thing places they individuate. The interpretation changes when they are used in different systems. ---
IV 77
There is no way to individuate a world, except with the help of a version.

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G II
N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

G III
N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Identity Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
I 208ff
Identity/Davidson/Quine: we are unable to pick out the relationship that is constitutive for the knowledge of the identity of an object. The reason is that every property can be considered as relevant. If the mind can only think if it establishes a clear relationship to the object, then thought is impossible. (QuineVsRussell). Identity: does not work without conceptual scheme.
Identity: QuineVsHume, QuineVsLeibniz: Confusion of word and object: there is no relation between different objects but relationship between singular terms - a = b different names.
---
I 211
Copula forms indefinite singular term: no longer Fa but a = b = E.g. Agnes = a lamb - but: Agnes bleats: Fa. ---
I 211
Synonymy and analyticity is graded, identity is absolute. ---
I 365
Identity conditions strong/weak/(s):> E.g. Paul and Elmar. ---
II 23
Identity/absolutely distinguishable: open sentence only fulfilled by an object. - Relatively distinguishable: only fulfilled in the given order. - Identity: Objects that are not relatively distinguishable, not all objects that are not absolutely distinguishable. ---
I 397
Theseus ship: it is not about the term "the same" but the term "ship" - each general term has its own individuation principle. ---
II 156ff
Individuation: in our world moment-to-moment individuation by predicates - for objects at random (everything can be the object), for predicates crucial truth value. - Identification between possible worlds: is dependent on predicates - for body also from space displacement, composition, etc., therefore not cross-worlds- "The same object" is meaningless -> single Term, instead predicate. ---
Geach I 238
Identity/GeachVsQuine: Thesis: identity is relative - if someone says x is identical to y, this is an incomplete expression - it is an abbreviation for "x is the same A as y" - (weird that Frege has not supported this) - Identity/tradition/Geach: can be expressed by a single scheme: (1) l- Fa (x) (Fx ux = a) - in everyday language: whatever is always true of something that is identical to an object y, is true of a and vice versa - from which we derive the law of self-identity from: l- a = a if we take Fx for x unequal to a then scheme (1) provides us with: (2) l- (a unequal a) Vx (x unequal a u x = a) - the results in l a = a. ---
Geach I 240
But Geach pro relative identity. ---
Quine V 86
I/Quine: initially only means for extending the time pointing - then itself relative mass term: E.g. "the same dog as" - used for individuation of absolute general term E.g. "dog" - Geach: this is a reduction to a relative term - Quine. : that does not work when objects overlap. ---
V 89
Identity/Geach: only with respect to general terms, the same thing. ---
V 161
Identity: restricted: in terms of general term: "the same apple" - unrestricted: Learning: 1. anyone who agrees with the sentences [a = b] and [a is a g] also agrees to [b a g] ((s) transitivity) - 2. disposition, to agree on [a = b] , if it is recognized that one can agree [b is a g] due to [a is a g] for any g. - Relative identity: also these I. is relative, because the identity scale depends on words - [a = b] can get wrong when adding new terms. ---
I 162
Definition identity/Set Theory/Quine: x = y as the statement y is element of every class, from which x is element - characterization of the identity by using all relative clauses. ---
V 162
Definition identity/Set Theory/Quine: with quantification over classes is x = y defined as the statement y is a member of each class, from which x is element. - Language learning: here initially still substitutional quantification - then no class, but exhaustion of relative clauses. ---
VII 65 ~
Identity/Quine: important: the demand for processes or temporally extended objects - by assuming identity rather than flow kinship, one speaks of the flow instead of stages. ---
IX 24
Definition identity/Quine: we can now simplify: for y = z - y = z stands for x (x e y x e z) - because we have identified the individuals with their classes. ---
X 90
Definiton identity/Quine: then we define "x = y" as an abbreviation for:. Ax ↔ Ay (z) (bzx ↔ bzy. Bxz ↔ Byz .Czx ↔ Czy .Cxz ↔ Cyz (z') (Dzz'x ↔.... .. Dzz'y .Dzxz'↔ Dzyz' Dxzz '↔ Dyzz')) - i.e. that the objects u x. y are not distinguishable by the four predicates, not even in terms of the relation to other objects z and z'. ---
X 99
Identity/Quine: only defined (in our appearance theory of set theory) between variables, not defined between abstraction expressions or their schema letters. ---
XII 71
Relative identity/Quine: results from ontological relativity, because no entity without identity - only explicable in the frame theory. - E.g. distinguishability of income classes.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Identity Conditions Hintikka
 
Books on Amazon
I 143
Uniqueness condition/W-questions/answer/Hintikka: the condition that something is a complete and unambiguous answer to a who-question (ambiguous) is, first, that (8) must imply (7) (6) Who is the man over there?
(7) I know who the man over there is.
E.g. it is Sir Norman Brook.
(8) I know the man there is Sir Norman Brook.
Problem: the step from (8) to (7) is that of an existential generalization (EG).
---
I 144
Problem: for that we need an additional premise. E.g. (13) (Ex) Ki (Sir Norman Brook = x).
(Non-mirrored quantifier, perceptually)
"I know who Norman Brook is."
---
I 145
HintikkaVsQuine: Quine does not recognize the role that my uniqueness conditions play: Quine: Quine says that these conditions can also be transferred to belief, knowledge, etc.
Quine: Hintikka wants the subject to know who or what the person or thing is. Whom or what the term designates.
HintikkaVsQuine: he thinks I would only use one kind of uniqueness condition.
Solution: the semantic situation shows the difference: the relation between the conditions for different propositional attitudes (belief, seeing, knowledge) is one of analogy, not of identity.
Solution: the sets of compatible worlds are respectively different ones in the case of knowledge, seeing, memory, belief!
---
I 146
Identification/belief/Quine/QuineVsHintikka: every world of belief will contain innumerable bodies and objects that are not recognizable at all, simply because the believer believes that his world contains a countless number of such objects. Identity: Questions about the identity of these objects are meaningless.
Problem: if you quantify in belief contexts, how should one exclude them?
Solution: one would have to limit the range of the variables to such objects, over which the subject has a sufficiently clear idea.
Problem: How should one determine how clear these ideas must be?
HintikkaVsQuine: the solution is quite simple when we quantify over individuals in doxastic worlds:
E.g. Operator: "in a world w1, compatible with everything, Jack believes":
Solution/Hintikka: we can quantify over inhabitants of such worlds by simply using a quantifier within the operator.
((s) i.e. that Jack, but not we differentiate?).
Problem: it could be that we want to consider the inhabitants as our neighbors from the actual world w0. ("Qua neighbors").
Hintikka: but that is a problem for itself and has nothing to do with uniqueness conditions.
Problem: it rather lies in the notation of the conventional modal logic, which runs from the outside to the inside and which does not allow the evaluation process, to ever turn around so that it runs from the inside outwards.
Solution/Saarinen: the solution is "retrospective" operators.
Solution/Hintikka: it may be that we can trace back an individual from w1 to w0, even if it does not fulfill the uniqueness conditions. (These require that an individual is identifiable in all worlds.)
HintikkaVsQuine: the latter is mistaken that the question of identity is meaningless if the uniqueness conditions are not all fulfilled.
On the contrary: it has to be meaningful so that we are able to see that the conditions are not fulfilled!
Uniqueness condition/Hintikka: if the uniqueness condition is not fulfilled, it means only that we cannot find an individual in every world.
---
I 150
Truth conditions/Uniqueness conditions/Hintikka: the truth conditions of the uniqueness conditions are very different from the truth conditions for other types of the most simple sentences. World lines/Hintikka: world lines can therefore be drawn in different ways, without tipping over the remaining semantic situation.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Idiolect Dummett
 
Books on Amazon
I 144
Kripke/Dummett: (Pierre - Example, Londres Example, Pierre believes London to be ugly but Londres to be beautiful) a translation is no hypothesis, but a constitutive principle (public language instead of idiolect). - (> VsQuine: idiolect not a priority).
III 145
Idiolect/DummettVs: Language is not a family of similar idiolects, but the speaker declares himself responsible of the common usages - without fully dominating them.
III 150
The concept of Idiolect is important to explain variations, but idiolect can be explained by language, not vice versa.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Idiolect Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Dummett I 139
Idiolect/Quine: has priority over the concept of community language - never sure that the meanings are the same. ---
Dum I 139
Quine: Meaning and accepted theory are not distinguished > idiolect (Two Dogmas)> Davidson: radical interpretation, idiolect is from specific time and situation.
---
Dum I 141
DummettVsQuine, DummettVsDavidson: not the idiolect, but common language has priority.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
Indeterminacy Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 325
Indeterminacy of translation/Quine/Chomsky: According to this theory all the suggestions for the translation should be able to be "compatible with the totality of speech disposition, but incompatible with each other." (Q + O, 27) - Chomsky: that is not possible because of the problems associated with the probability. The thesis when all probabilities are indistinguishable, both inside and outside of a language - Quine: circumvents the problem by starting not from the "totality of dispositions" but from the "stimulus meaning". ---
I 325
Translation ambiguity, vagueness: ChomskyVsQuine: Disposition either in terms of stimulus, or in relation to the total corpus of the language: then all sentences are equally likely - (reference classes).

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Indeterminacy Field
 
Books on Amazon
II IX
Indeterminacy/Correspondence/Lewis/Kit Fine/Field: Indeterminacy is not a big problem for the correspondence theory. - Solution: Supervaluation for vague languages. - On the other hand: indeterminacy is a problem for deflationism (within one's own language) (Quine). - Some authors VsQuine: the assertion of an indeterminacy within one's own language is incoherent. - indeterminacy/mathematics/Field: exists in quantity theory, but not in number theory. ---
II 180
Indeterminacy/reference/conceptual change/theory change/Field: Thesis: "Mass" was undefined and still is today. Two textbooks of the Special Relativity Theory can differ by understanding mass as "eigen mass" or "relativistic mass". Then this is either the same or different in all reference systems. ---
II 192
Indeterminacy/theory/Quine: scientific terms are meaningless outside their theory. > Immanence of truth. - Truth always only in relation to a conceptual scheme. - An objective (non-relative) concept of truth could only be attempted in terms of denotation and signification, but this cannot be done if these concepts are relative to a reference system. - FieldVsQuine: Denotation is a perfectly objective relation that exists between expressions and extra-linguistic objects. - Referential indeterminacy/Field: only shows that denotation is not well-defined in certain situations. ---
II, 271 ff
Incorrect translation/Brandom/Field: E.g. Root - 1 not "i" and "-i". (+) ---
II 355
Undefined/Language/McGee/Field: = Having non-standard models. - Solution: Extension by predicate: e.g. "standard natural number". - FieldVs: that is cheating. - New axioms with new vocabulary are not better than new axioms in the old vocabulary. - Cheating: If it was to be assumed that the new predicates have certain extensions. - (Still FieldVsIndeterminism) ---
II 359
Indeterminacy/translation/system/Field: For example, assuming two speakers have different assumptions about natural numbers. Then the one must ultimately assume that the other has a wider concept than he himself. Problem: Asymmetry: A foreign concept, which is assumed to be a further, cannot be translated back into its own language. - ((s) There might be an unintended interpretation.) - Field: we also have indeterminacy of the reference on each side.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Indeterminacy McDowell
 
Books on Amazon
I 184
Indeterminacy of the translation/Quine: the results of "conceptual sovereignty" are far from being determinable by means of scientific facts about the "empirical meaning". ---
I 184
McDowellVsQuine: if we reject the Third Dogma, it has fatal consequences for Quine: for his reasoning, he needs the maintenance of the dualism endogenous/exogenous, which DavidsonVsQuine also rejects. ---
I 189
Theories language/observation language/McDowellVsQuine: now it can be that both are actually distinguishable. Then the observation meaning of a single theoretical theorem would be indeterminate.    But we could not derive a general meaning indeterminacy from this. If we try to do that, we are confronted with the Third Dogma.
  Then we stand in front of a borderline of the separation of languages: we push the whole meaning into the theory and let the experience speak no language at all. Then, of course, the rational relation is lacking.
We need this rational relationship, however, for Duhem's argument. This can only be of a local nature now.
  As we pave our way through the Third Dogma, we tailor Duhem's thoughts to the right size. (> Theory).
---
EMD II 64
Indeterminacy/underdeterminedness/Conceptual Design/McDowell: the choice of a schema is always underdetermined by the data - requires terms that the subjects have not acquired. - This is not possible according to the strong verificationism, this equates verification with susceptibility for evidence. Conceptual design/McDowell: we need that in realistic science.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001


EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Indeterminacy Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Rorty I 227
McDowellVsQuine: If truth is underdetermined by the entirety of the observable, then it must be independent of it. This is absurd for verificationists, therefore one must not understand it realistically. This strategy would imply, however, that one includes biology, but excludes translation.
ChomskyVsQuine: there is only one indeterminacy: the familiar underdeterminacy of each theory through all observations.
((s) You never know whether all the observations are taken into account, or are already done.
---
Quine I 257
Indeterminate singular terms do not designate objects. - An indefinite singular term must therefore stand in purely significant position: E.g. "The tax inspector is looking for someone" (position significant - "someone" is not significant). ---
I 283
Indefinite singular term: disappears in quantification "something is an x such that", "everything is an x .." ---
I 285
Beliefs and quotes can be understood as infinite different things (Indeterminacy). ---
II 33
Inscrutability of reference: no difference: "x is a dog" or "x is the spatiotemporal strand, which is filled by a dog" - only one statement about the used terminology and its translation, not about physical objects (representative function). - Inscrutability: occurs in translation or permutation. ---
VI 69
Indeterminacy of translation/syntax/Quine: the ambiguity does not extend to the syntax - but on the referential apparatus: plural endings, equal signs, quantifiers - but these are not part of syntax. ---
XII 60
Indeterminacy of translation/Quine: E.g. numbers of Neumann, Frege, Zermelo: each definition is correct, but they are all incompatible with one another. - Solution: we invent set-theoretic models which must comply with the laws that fulfill the numbers in non-explicit meaning - Problem: you do not know if you talk about the terms or about the Goedel numbers - (> shifted ostension). ---
XII 62
Indeterminacy of translation/Native language/Quine: the indeterminacy of translation is also valid in a language: E.g. we may translate the "hopefully" of a particular speaker better differently - principle of indulgence: justifies deviations from the homophonic translation, reproduction by the same phoneme order - compensation: can be made by corrections to the predicates - problem: we cannot ask: "are you really referring to Goedel numbers?" - Because the answer: "to numbers" lost its right to homophonic translation - ((s) because of the principle of indulgence). ---
XII 97
Indeterminacy/translation/Gavagai/linguistics/Quine: the linguist always comes to an accurate translation, but only because he unconsciously makes arbitrary decisions - decisive: the holism: statements cannot be isolated. - ((S) any differences can be compensated in other partial-translations.)

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Innateness Churchland
 
Books on Amazon:
Patricia Churchland
Fodor IV 76/77
Innate/Churchland: relatedness to a particular language is unlikely. ---
IV 78
ChurchlandVsQuine: we have no reason to believe that there is an "anglophone hyperspace" with an anglophone hyper-area for English sentences. Fodor/Lepore: it is very unlikely that the grammar of English would be innate.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014


F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Inscrutability of reference Newen, A./Schrenk, M.
 
Books on Amazon
NS I 76
Inscrutability/Gavagai/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: 1. inscrutability of reference: E.g. non-severed rabbit parts fulfil the same observation situations. - 2. inscrutability of translation: E.g. non-severed rabbit parts: can a) "be the same" b) "be part of the same thing". In each case in the foreign language. That is proceeding the inscrutability of reference - 3. underdetermination (if a theory) by the data: (corresponds to the translation inscrutability): there may be rival theories that fit to the same set of observations - VsQuine:. it never comes to radical translations because many aspects of the language are evolutionarily formalized in the brain and cannot vary greatly -. (ChomskyVsQuine) - Then there is only the 3. inscrutability.

Introduction Strawson
 
Books on Amazon
I 187
Term/expression/thing/introducing/Strawson: everything what is introduced by an expression in an uterance is a thing (Term: StrawsonVsQuine: here also non-linguistical, thing). ---
I 188
VsGeach: does not distinguish between the various types of introduction to the speech - one can say, a statement says something about every thing that is inserted into it, not only about the things that have been introduced in a referring manner - (also on smoking) - "is wise" is purportedly introduced, Socrates not. ---
I 192
But still no difference between assertive and facts-introductory mode, because the latter is also predicating. ---
I 193
Assertive mode primary. ---
I 194
Introduction: indicative verbal form: introduces thing in a statement - substantive: has no such implication can also introduce lists of things - VsFrege: is determined that terms cannot only be introduced non-substantively - hence the paradox that "is wise" is an object, not a term - (not introduced in the assertive mode). ---
I 196
StrawsonVsFrege: that the parts of the sentence only stick together by unsaturated is merely metaphorical - RamseyVsFrege: no reason to consider any part as unsaturated. ---
I 232ff
Particular/Introduction: by identifying description - so that speakers and hearers mean the same particular. ---
I 234
Introductory description must not specify texture: E.g. the city in which I lived - but true empirical statement. ---
I 235
For universals nothing corresponding. ---
I 236
But no facts about the world but about the language - (s) no truth maker. ---
I 238
When U introduced into language, no empirical certainty of truth of sentences needed. ---
I 239
Special case: if universal is not introduced through expression but through description, then confirmation trough empirical sentence necessary. - E.g. instead of "flu": "John's Disease". ---
I 239f
U/particular/introduction: Class (1): (universal): expressions of which one (without empirical facts) cannot know what they introduce - class (2) (paricular) also without empirical fact possible to know what they introduce - both are incomplete - (1) presuppose implicit expressions, have factual weight - (2) have no factual weight. ---
I 241
Subject/predicate/thing/particular/U: 3. criterion: expressions introducing particulars can never be predicate expressions - Definition subject-expression: presents a fact by itself (complete) - predicate A: incomplete "is married to John" is not a fact by itself. ---
I 242
E.g. "generosity is a more amiable virtue than intelligence" - "generosity" and "intelligence" do not present a covert joint fact. ---
I 242
General/individual: the affinity between the grammatical and the categorical criterion for subject/predicate distinction explains also the traditional concatenation of the two distinctions. ---
I 254ff
Introduction/particular: so far only quasi as quantification according to an empirical condition - new: other sense of introducing: introduction of practice, to introduce particular in the 1st sense - then also E1: introduces particular, E2: classes of particulars - then prerequisite2 V2: class of things (or universal) which can be introduced - where is then the asymmetry between particular and universal? ---
I 258
Connection of the two theories: an EF1 of a particular of the relevant class, we can think in such a way that it is a fact of the v2 class v1. ---
I 263
Both theories independ, but connectable. ---
I 259
Particular/Introduction: sentences in which certain types of particulars are introduced, cannot be traced back to those in which they do not occur - E.g. statements about Nations cannot be traced back in statements via people - but they have statements about people as a prerequisite2 - Problem: What is at the end of the chain? -> Feature-universals.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Justification McDowell
 
Books on Amazon
I 18
Logical space of the reasons/Logical space of nature/McDowell: Thesis: beside the space of reasons (concepts) there is a logical space of nature: of the natural laws, non-normative relations.   A) logical space of reasons: justification, knowledge, belief, functional concepts.
  B) logical space of nature: objects, sense impressions.
  This is not a splitting of "natural" and "normative".
---
I 31
Justification/Judgment/McDowell: the relations through which judgments are justified can only be understood as relations in the space of concepts (reasons).       It is one thing to be free from guilt, and another to have a justification. Free from guilt: the raw influence of causality (the effect of the world on our senses) withdraws itself from the control of spontaneity.
      It is an excuse for someone if he was driven by a tornado to a place where he did not have anything to look for.
But what we want is: that the exercise of spontaneity is subject to a control exercised by the world itself, but so that the applicability of spontaneity is not undermined (by no longer being the cause of excuse).
Justification/McDowell: every concept which is now constituted by the fact that it consists in a justification relation to a merely present must be a purely private concept.
---
I 161
Justification/Quine: cannot be done through experience. Only by events which are subject to natural laws. McDowellVsQuine: Contradiction: If experience is not within the order of justification, it cannot be exceeded by world views. This, however, requires "conceptual sovereignty."

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Knowledge Dummett
 
Books on Amazon
II 456
DummettVsQuine: knowledge manifests itself in practice: two speakers, same view - Quine / Davidson:> indeterminacy of translation / > radical interpretation

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Language Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 279 (where?)
Language/Chomsky: apart from its mental representation, it has no objective existence. Therefore, we do not need to distinguish here between "systems of beliefs" and "knowledge". ---
I 319
Language/ChomskyVsQuine: must separate language and theory - otherwise, two speakers of the same language could have no disagreement. ---
I 330
Language/Chomsky/Quine: no frame of a tentative theory as in physics - several analytical hypotheses not only possible but necessary - ChomskyVsQuine: Vs "property space": not sure whether the concepts of the language can be explained with physical dimensions - Aristotle: rather associated with actions - VsQuine: not evident that similarities can be localized in a room - principles, not "learned sentences". ---
I 333
VsQuine: cannot be dependent on "disposition for reaction", otherwise moods, eye injuries, nutritional status, etc. would be essential. ---
I 343
Perhaps language does not have to be taught. ---
Graeser I 121f
Language/ChomskyVsGrice: Question: should the main aspect really be communication? - Searle: rather representation, but not as opposite - Meaning/VsGrice: most of the sentences of a language have never been uttered, so anyone can hardly ever have meant something by them - Meaning/VsGrice: We can only ever find out speaker meanings, because we know what the sentence means. - Students of Grice: Strawson and Searle. ---
Münch III 320
Language/Chomsky/Holenstein: no natural kind.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006


Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002

Mü I
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Language Dummett
 
Books on Amazon
I 11 ff
Evans: Thesis: Language can be explained by modes of thinking - DummettVsEvans: vice versa! (Frege ditto)
II 448
DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: not idiolect, but common language prevails. (> Dogmas) 1) Frege, Wittgenstein earlier: language as a means of representation or reproduction of reality, "the meaning of a sentence is its truth condition".
2) later Wittgenstein, Austin, Strawson, Searle: everyday language and speech act theory: the constitutive rules of the language are not primarily a representation of reality, but allow actions of various kinds. "the sense of an expression is its use".
- - -
McDowell I 152
Language/Dummett: 1) an instrument of communication 2) carrier of meaning. None should be primary.
Language/McDowellVsDummett: both are secondary. Primarily, language is a source of tradition. (McDowell per Gadamer). To acquire language means to acquire spirit.
- - -
Dum III 81
Language/infinite/Dummett: each quantity of knowledge is finite, but must allow an understanding of infinitely many sentences.
III 145
Idiolect/DummettVs: Language is not a family of similar idiolects, but the speaker declares responsibility of the common usages - without fully dominating them.
III 150
The concept of idiolect is important to explain variations, but idiolect can be explained by language, not vice versa. - - -
Horwich I 461
Language/DavidsonVsDummett: is not a "veil" - it is a network of inferential relations. - Nothing beyond "human abilities" - Like a stone against which we hit ourselves - and that is stone by stone, bit by bit. ((s)> fulfillment,not making true.) - This applies to "this is good" and "this is red". - DavidsonVsMoore/DavidsonVsDummett.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982


MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Language Acquisition Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 281
Learning/Chomsky: a child learns as well Japanese as English - pointless to ask "which hypotheses it reduces" - there must be more than the ability to associate - structural grammar does not yield the structures that we have to postulate as generative grammar. ---
I 283
Internal organization plays an important role for the perception, it determines an extremely restrictive initial scheme. ---
I VsGoodman 285
Learning a second language is not that different. ---
I 299
Learning/Chomsky: whether the evaluation function is learned or it is the basis for learning, is an empirical question. ---
I 324
Language learning: behaviorist/Quine: Conditioning, association - ChomskyVsQuine: additionally principles , only by them infinitely many sentenes are explainable.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Manifestation Dummett
 
Books on Amazon
EM II 82/83
Manifestation/Dummett: knowing the truth conditions is not something you do, it does not show.
EMD II 96
Manifestation/undecidable/Dummett: e.g. if a skill is never exercised, there can be no truth condition for a corresponding subjunctivic conditional.
EMD II 97
Manifestation/Knowledge/Truth Conditions/Dummett: it is unreasonable to deny that someone who is able to recognize a straight stick by seeing it also knows what it is for a never seen stick to be straight.
Dum II 456
Manifestation/Translation/Uncertainty/DummettVsQuine: if knowledge is manifested in practice, two speakers have the same opinion.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982


EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Meaning Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
I 64
Quine has revolutionized our understanding of communication by having shown that there is not more about meaning than what a person with the associated facilities is able to learn by observing. Causal theory of meaning VsDescartes : senses do not matter - only in learning, but then contingent ( Vsscepticism )
I 47
Def meaning (interpretation) of a sentence is given by the fact that the sentence is assigned a semantic space in the structure of records that make up a language . The meaning of a sentence consists in being the holder of this place and no other place in the macro structure of the language . This is the only content of the concept of meaning for Davidson.
II 53
DavidsonVs social nature of meaning: idiolect in principle is also to be interpreted (via causal hypotheses). Putnam / Kripke: causal theory: correct link word / object - DavdisonVsPutnam: Interpretation of whole sentences
Rorty VI 419
DavidsonVsQuine/Rorty: rejects notion of "stimulus meaning" from: Like Newton’s attempt to soar to the "Newton of the mind ". Instead: distal theory of meaning . There is no "central region " between linguistically formulated beliefs and physiology.
Dav I 95
Causal theory of meaning : meaning do not matter - only in learning, but then contingent ( Vsscepticism).
I 99
DavidsonVsPutnam : that meanings are not in the head is not due to special names for natural kinds , but on broad social character of language.
II 50
Meaning / Davidson / Glüer : the interpretation is given by the fact that the semantic space of a sentence is located in the structure of sentences that make up the language - ( multiple language = truth - theories ) possible - Def Meaning / Davidson: then, is being the holder of this unique place in the macro structure of the language.
II 51
Meaning / Tarski / Davidson: Tarski-type theories are not based on meaning as defined entities ( per Davidson : Meaning ultimately not fixed ) - consequences: 1 DavidsonVsTaski: actually spoken language ultimately irrelevant - 2 the trivial thesis that meaning is conventional, must be abandoned.
Frank I 672
sunburn-example/Davidson: as sunburn is still a reddening of my skin, even though it was caused by the sun - not just external causation leads to the fact that meanings are not in the head - otherwise, pro Putnam: meanings not in the head , but rather simple prop. att.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Meaning McDowell
 
Books on Amazon
I, 160ff
Meaning/Quine: New: "empiricist meaning": is intellectually prestigious, because it can be explained completely by the lawful operations of the receptivity. On the other hand, the old concept of meaning stands on the wrong side of this duality. (> McDowell, see also content). Meaning/Quine: the joke in Quine is that meaning in the intuitive sense cannot be determined by exogenous factors.
---
L 184/5
McDowell: if we drop the Third Dogma (schema/content), it is not surprising that the meaning is now underdetermined by the "empiricist meaning". ---
I 185
McDowell: the "empiricist meaning" cannot be a real meaning anyway, since, as a counterpart to "conceptual sovereignty," it can have nothing to do with reasons and justification. McDowellVsQuine: but that does not show that meaning is at all underdetermined. We would have to show that we have an indelible leeway if we are looking for a kind of understanding that brings us out of the field of "empiricist meaning". An understanding that shows how life phenomena are structured in the order of justification, the space of reason. This cannot be learned from Quine.
---
I 119
Meaning/McDowell: we must not construct it "socially-pragmatic" or "communitarian". (Wittgenstein did not do that either).   Otherwise it is no longer autonomous. Uninhibited Platonism would be a tendency to the occult.
  Wittgenstein: has not asserted that meaning is nothing but approval or rejection by the community. (> Kripke).
---
I 119
Kripke's Wittgenstein/McDowellVsKripke: comes to the conclusion that there is nothing that constitutes the receptiveness for the claim that makes the meaning to us; instead, we must understand the role of thought in our lives through our participation in the community. ---
I 121
Thesis: Meaning/McDowellVsDualism: Solution: second nature. The idea of education assures that the autonomy of meaning is not inhumane. This leaves no real questions about norms. ---
EMD II XIV
Meaning/McDowell: truth theory is not sufficient for a meaning theory because of the equivalence of "snow is white" and "grass is green". - This is true, but not meaningful. - McDowell: Thesis: we need additional psychological concepts. ---
II XV
Problem: then the propositional settings must be as fixed as the meanings. -> Radical Interpretation/RI.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Meaning Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
Horwich I 449
Meaning / DavidsonVsDummett / DavidsonVsQuine / Rorty: they agree with the basic principle that importance must be reduced to experience - or to the given or stimuli (ie intermediary between conviction and objects) - Problem: scepticism: meaning is then epistemical - Truth and Meaning be separated -
I Horwich 464
meaning / Wittgenstein / Davidson / Rorty as entities: should play a dual role as cause and at the same time justification - example sensory data, example stimuli -

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Mentioning Wessel
 
Books on Amazon
I 220
Use/mention/Wessel: the statement "a and b are identical" is not about the terms "a" and "b", but about the objects they designate - that is, the terms "a" and "b" are used and not mentioned - (s) if the terms were mentioned, one would talk about the terms and not about the objects. ---
I 286
Use/mention: logical follow-up relationship: A I- B: talks about statements (i.e. not content) - Conditional: A -> B: talking about the content which is talked about in the statements (e.g. current, magnetic field) - Question/(s): mention is = if it is not talked about statements content-related? - Use: = if e.g. the truth is found? - But: "A is true" - does not mean "the current flows". ---
I 313
Use/mention/Wessel/(s): E.g. "The Inselsberg is referred to by the term Inselsberg": 1. incident used as a term, and designates the object, 2. the word is not used here as a term, but mentioned as a physical object - Berg: mention, name: used - mention: = quote (quotes) - instead of quotation marks: t: t A: name of statement A - "the statement A". ---
I 352
Incident/mention/use/Wessel: 1. Term or statement A occurs as a term or statement in: E.g. ~ A or A and B - 2. merely as a physical thing (darkness, sound) in E.g. "the statement A" (tA), or "the facts that A" (sA) - E.g. from "Ließchen says a" (only graphically A) and A ↔ B does not follow "Ließchen says B" - therefore it always needs to be defined what must be regarded as incident of a term - (s) density cannot be true or false. ---
A propos I 352
Mention/use/density/Wessel/(s): different density of the pages: just plays no role in 2 + 2 = 4. ---
I 35
"Odd"/Frege: occurrence as merely graphical part - Extensionality rule: statements can be replaced by identical ones in meaning, but not any graphical parts - Wessel: here not applicable - Because intensional rules allow very similar to extensional, but sometimes replacing of graphical parts by genuine statements. ---
I 353
Planets/Wessel: Quine does not differentiate between graphic and genuine occurrence only identity sentences evening star = morning star, number of planets = 9 and then substitutability for identities. - WesselVsQuine: See them as compound expressions: then evening star unequal morning star, as simple equal (for Venus).

We I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999

Metaphysics Strawson
 
Books on Amazon
Newen/Schrenk I 149
Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: pro descriptive metaphysics, VsRevisionists metaphysics - Definition descriptive metaphysics/Strawson: detects which ontology suggests our every day action and speaking. Definition revisionists metaphysics/StrawsonVsQuine: a physicalist ontology. This contradicts the everyday thinking. StrawsonVsQuine: for Strawson it is only about the everyday language, not about the ontology of any language.
---
I 151
Person/Strawson: further fundamental element of our everyday ontology. They have physical and psychological characteristics and are neither reducible to the one nor to the other. ---
Strawson III 436f
Strawson: descriptive metaphysics: examines our conceptual scheme and terms such as space, time, identification, recognition, etc. - fundamental contrast: individual/general (Strawson pro individual) - particular basic position - Priority: particulars which are associated with sortals: sortal: universal with counting principle or distinction principle. --
III 441
Conceptual scheme: concepts like space and time must be given, so that a coressponding experience is possible for us.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Method Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 278
Method/theory/Chomsky: requirement; we must be able to describe what the person receives - the percept itself is a construction of the first order - its properties are determined experiment. Grammar: construction of the second-order - for this one must abstract from the other factors involved in the use and understanding of language and refer to internalized knowledge of the speaker - VsBehaviorismus: excludes the concept of "what is perceived" and "what is learned" from the outset. ---
I ~ 297ff
Method/theory: PutnamVsChomsky: certain ambiguities can only be discovered through routine, therefore their postulated explanation by Chomsky's grammar is not that impressive - ChomskyVsPutnam: he misunderstands it, in fact this refers to competence and not to performance - routine does not matter here, but the inherent correlation between sound and meaning. ---
I 303
Chomsky: my universal grammar is not a "theory of language acquisition", but one element of it - my thesis is an "all-at-once" proposal and does not try to capture the interplay between the tentative hypotheses constructed by the child and new data interpreted with them. ---
I 316
Method/theory/Chomsky: "association", "reinforcement", "random mutation ": hide our ignorance - (s) something dissimilar may also be associated. ---
I 321
Method/theory/ChomskyVsQuine: his concept of "reinforcement" is almost empty - if reinforcement is needed for learning, it means that learning cannot happen without data. ---
I 323
Language Learning/ChomskyVsQuine: he does not explain it: if only association and conditioning, then the result is merely a finite language. ---
I 324
VsQuine: concept of probability of a sentence is empty: the fact that I utter a particular German sentence is as unlikely as a particular Japanese sentence from me.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Natural Deduction Geach
 
Books on Amazon
I 143
Calculus of natural deduction / Gentzen / Geach: here there are "possible names" (> existence introduction) - but no quantification over them - GeachVsQuine: he can not treat names any more as"covert descriptions".

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Naturalized Epistemology Stroud
 
Books on Amazon
I 209
Skepticism/naturalized epistemology/Stroud: Skepticism gets more inevitable, the more we take the external (distanced) position and look at evidence - there is no independent information about the world - E.g. room with monitors. - brains in a vat - Kant: such a distinction between sensory experience and other knowledge would cut us off from the world. ---
I 211
QuineVs: only applies to the traditional epistemology theory - solution: we must only avoid a "distanced" position. - QuineVsKant: so works the examination of general human knowledge. ---
I 211
Naturalized epistemology/QuineVsCarnap/Stroud: denies the need for an external position - thus avoided interior/exterior problem. ---
I 214
QuineVsKant: no a priori knowledge. ---
I 250
Naturalized epistemology/knowledge/underdetermination/skepticism/StroudVsQuine: naturalized epistemology: must explain: how distant events cause closer events? - How is our exuberant belief caused? - But that would not explain them - (how the "gap" between data and knowledge is bridged.) - Stroud: because it makes no sense to say that here there is a gap in a causal chain - then you cannot speak of underdetermination - that an event "underdetermines" another - ((s), there is no reason that would not be sufficient.) - underdetermination/Quine: E.g. truths about molecules are underdetermined by truths about everyday things - Gap/Stroud: Quine has to do with a gap, because he talkes about information ((s) content), not about mere events. ---
I 251
Input/Stroud: the individual input is not small - ((s) only as a mass term) - not small when it is conceived as an event - so we cannot speak of indeterminacy at events - StroudVsQuine: Problem: if the input is too small, the transition to the over flowing output requires consciousness - the proof has to be one, too. ---
I 253
Naturalized Epistemology/KantVsQuine/StroudVsQuine: we cannot see all our beliefs as "projections". And we must not accept epistemic priority ((s) that sensations are closer to us than the external objects).

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

Nominalism Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 124
Def nominalism/Rorty: the thesis that all creatures are of nominal nature and all necessities de dicto. No object description applies to a greater measure to the true nature of an object than any other description.
NominalismVsPlato: nature cannot be dissected at its joints.
Materialistic MetaphysicsVsNominalism: these are representatives of a "language-bound idealism". The materialists believe that Dalton and Mendeleev actually cut nature at its joints. (Kripke also). Wittgenstein merely mesmerized by words.
II 125
Nominalism: protest against any kind of metaphysics. Hobbes mistakenly linked nominalism with materialism. Quine still links it to that. RortyVs: it is a contradiction to believe that words for the smallest particles of matter will dissect nature in a way in which is not possible with other words! A contradiction-free nominalism must emphasize that the prediction success of such a vocabulary is irrelevant for the "ontological rank". NominalismVsHeidegger: Words like "physique" or "essence" are not "more essential" than words such as "Brussels sprouts" or "football"
I 126
Nominalism: (like Gadamer): as far as we understand anything at all, we understand it with the help of a description, and privileged descriptions do not exist! Nominalism: what the approach to something fixed, hidden is to the metaphysicists, is the invention of a discourse to the nominalists.
Nominalism/RortyVsQuine: does not split the nature in a more secure way and does not create certainty about which is the true ontology - (Vs linking nominalism with materialism).

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Nominalism Bigelow
 
Books on Amazon
I 97
Mengen/BigelowVsNominalismus/Bigelow/Pargetter: wenn er Mengen eliminierte, würde sie durch die Regeln der Zusammensetzung durch die Hintertür wieder hereinkommen.
I 98
Bsp statt referiert auf die Menge der Kaninchen
könnte er sagen
trifft auf alle und nur Kaninchen zu.
„alle und nur“/Bigelow/Pargetter/(s): ist eine nominalistische Vermeidung von Mengen.
BigelowVsNominalismus: man könnte sagen, das ist nur eine Abkürzung für „die Menge aller und nur der Kaninchen“.
zutreffen/BigelowVsNominalismus/Bigelow/Pargetter. „trifft zu“ muss noch zusätzlich diskutiert werden, bevor diese Paraphrase irgendetwas ontologisches Beweisen könnte. ((s) BigelowVsQuine, >semantischer Aufstieg).
Mengen/Bigelow/Pargetter: ob man an sie glaubt, ist so eine Sache. Die Semantik entscheidet jedenfalls nicht darüber.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Non-Existence Hintikka
 
Books on Amazon
I 37
Non-existent objects/Unrealized Possibilities/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: Thesis: there are non-existent objects in the actual world. (> Possibilia). HintikkaVsQuine: the philosophers who reject them have thought too strongly in syntactic paths.
Hintikka. Thesis: one has to answer the question rather semantically (model-theoretically).
Fiction/Ryle: test: is the paraphrase valid?
Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryle's test fails in cases like e.g. "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction ".
HintikkaVsParsons: the relevance of the criterion is questionable at all.
---
I 38
Ontology/Language/Linguistically/HintikkaVsRyle: how should linguistic questions such as paraphrasability decide on ontological status? Solution/Hintikka: for the question whether there are non-existent objects: model theory.
E.g. Puccini's Tosca: it's about whether the soldiers have bullets in their rifle barrels.
N.B.: even if they have some, they would be just fictional!
Model theory/Hintikka: the model theory provides a serious answer. ((s) "true in the model", means it is true in the story that the bullets are there).
HintikkaVsParsons: one should not argue too strongly syntactically, i.e. not merely ask what conclusions can be drawn and which cannot.
Acceptance/Acceptability/Inferences/Hintikka: ask for the acceptability of inferences and of language and intuitions are syntactic.
Singular terms/ontological obligation/existence/Parsons: Parsons argues that the use of singular terms obliges us to an existential generalization. And so on a referent. That is, it is a commitment to an inference.
HintikkaVsParsons.
---
I 39
Non-existent objects/substance/world/Tractatus/Hintikka: the reason why Wittgenstein postulated his "objects" as the substance of the world, ((s) which cannot be increased or diminished), is that their existence cannot be expressed. ---
I 103
Non-existence/not well-defined/HintikkaVsMontague: the Montague semantics does not allow the question of existence or non-existence to be meaningless because an individual is not well-defined in a world. ((s) Because in Montague the domain of individuals is assumed to be constant). Individual domain/solution/Hintikka: we have to allow that the individual domain is not constant. But Problem:
Quantification/belief context/existence/truth/Hintikka: in the following example we must presuppose existence so that the proposition can be true:
(11) John is looking for a unicorn and Mary is looking for it too. ((a) the same unicorn).
((s) numbering sic, then continue with (8)
Range/Quantifier/Hintikka: in the only natural reading of (11) one has to assume that the range of the implicit quantifier is such that "a unicorn" has a wider range than "searches/looks for".
((s) that is, that both are looking for the same unicorn.) Problem: how can one know whether both subjects believe in the same individual?)

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Non-Existence Parsons
 
Books on Amazon
Hintikka I 37
Non-Existential Objects/Unrealized Possibilities/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: Thesis: there are non-existent objects, namely in the actual world. (> Possibilia). HintikkaVsQuine: the philosophers who reject them have thought too strongly in syntactic paths.
Hintikka: Thesis: one has to answer the question rather semantically (model-theoretically).
Fiction/Ryle: test: Does the paraphrase apply?
Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryle's test fails in cases like e.g. "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction".
HintikkaVsParsons: the relevance of the criterion is questionable at all.
---
I 38
Ontology/Language/Linguistic/HintikkaVsRyle: how should linguistic questions such as paraphrasability make decisions about ontological status? Solution/Hintikka: for the question whether there are non-existent objects: model theory.
E.g. Puccini's Tosca: here, it is about whether the soldiers have bullets in their rifle barrels.
N.B.: even if they had some, these would be just fictional ones!
Model theory/Hintikka: model theory provides a serious answer. ((s) is "true in the model", means, it is true in the story that the bullets are there).
HintikkaVsParsons: one should not argue too strongly syntactically, i.e. not merely ask what conclusions can be drawn and which cannot.
Acceptance/Acceptability/Inferences/Hintikka: asking for the acceptability of inferences and of language and intuitions is syntactic.
Singular terms/ontological obligation/existence/Parsons: Parsons argues that the use of singular terms obliges us to an existential generalization. And so on a speaker. That is, it is a commitment to an inference.
HintikkaVsParsons.

ParCh I
Ch. Parsons
Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014

ParTa I
T. Parsons
The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967

ParTe I
Ter. Parsons
Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000


Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Object Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 409
Object/thing/language/Internal Realism/world/Putnam: thesis: objects themselves are also made as they are discovered. -FieldVsPutnam: Then you would have to regard non-seperate parts as language-dependent, but they are language independent. ---
Putnam I 247
Realism/reality/objects/Spacetime Points/Putnam: Kripke, Quine, Lewis disagree: what is the relationship between the chair and the spacetime region, which it occupies? - Quine: the chair and his constituent electromagnetic and other fields are one and the same. The chair is the spacetime region. - KripkeVsQuine: both are numerically different objects, however, have the same mass (E.g. statue/clay) - the chair could take another spacetime region. - QuineVsKripke: this evidence is worthless because modal predicates are hopelessly vague. - Lewis: Quine is right, in terms of the chair, but wrong in terms of the modal predicates.- LewisVsKripke: not the chair, but a counterpart to this chair could have been somewhere else. - Putnam: it is nonsense to ask whether the chair is identical with the matter or coexists with it - no convention: if the chair is blue - Convention: whether it is a spacetime region, and if we have to decide that. - Spacetime points: are imagined by some authors as predicates - then the spacetime region is a set of properties. - Putnam: that is a matter of opinion - (> four-dimensionalism).

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Observability Peacocke
 
Books on Amazon
I 90
Observability / Peacocke: Thesis: o. is a property of certain terms and not of other terms - the phenomena that are crucial to the concept of observability, are the ones corresponding to the individuation of Fregean thoughts and their constituents: the phenomena of cognitive significance and the epistemic possibility - that has nothing to do with the correct use of the word "observe".
I 103
Observability / PeacockeVsQuine: does not depend on the sophistication and training of the observer nor with the level of science - ((s) because of Peacockes stronger emphasis on the perceptual component.)

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Ontological Commitment Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 463
DavidsonVsOntological Commitment / DavidsonVsMetaphysics / DavidsonVsQuine / DavidsonVsFacts: the "ontological commitment" is like Dummett’s "facts": relics of metaphysics - they belong to the dualism of scheme / content.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Ontology Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
II, 94ff
Quine: Ontology only physical objects and classes - action is not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action event and reference object VsEvent ontology: various authors: Events are actually superfluous, because adverbial modifications can also be realized with more economical ontology. Montague, Clark, Parsons: "modifier-theory": no events, not restricted to "restrictive" adverbs, but more complex logical apparatus.
Jaegwon Kim: Identify events not as individualized individuals, but with the help of characteristics.
---
II 121 et seq
Davidson bases his entire philosophy on the ontology of particular events. Distinguishing between event token and description. Quine: "No entity without identity"
The radical interpretation does not necessarily lead to uniform ontologies for all speakers.
Ontological categories: for Davidson persons, material objects, events.
Ontology/Davidson: as a superordinate principle, is necessary whenever we recognize a grammatical category to which we must assign an infinite number of expressions - so we need events and objects: objects allow us to get adjectives under control - events: the same for some adverbs.
---
II 134
Ontology/Davidson/Glüer: Thesis: People, material objects, events. Question: could these ontological categories vary? - No, probably not so that different sorting makes sense. ---
II 137
Ontology/mental/physical/Davidson: is description-independent. - intentionalist as well as physical discourse are based on the same event ontology.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Opacity Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
I 263
Opacity: not "belief" is opaque, but the "that"! (Kronecker-Example) - ((s) CresswellVs?). ---
I 268
Opaque context: no significant function - Frege: "Name of a thought", "name a property", "name of individual concepts" - Russell: "propositional attitude". ---
I 270
Opaque verb: "hunts lions" is nothing in relation, not appointed a Lion - Relative Term: the police chases a man. ---
XI 175
Quantification in opaque contexts/FollesdalVsQuine: we would then have to make opaque contexts referentially transparent (what is true, is true of the object regardless of the givenness) - and at the same time make extensionally opaque (some properties are necessary, other accidental) - this is the essentialism. ---
Perler / Wild I 103
Referentially opaque/Quine/Armstrong: basic: shows actual content of beliefs, not coreferentially replaceable expressions - transparent: substitutability by coreferential expressions: suitable for the attribution of attitudes to animals.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Pain Lewis
 
Books on Amazon
Frank I 129
Martians’ pain/LewisVsQuine/Vsnaturalised epistemology - physicalist vocabulary needs not to be true. ---
Lewis I 39f
Pain/Lewis: a theory of mind should not exclude the possibility of shifted pain (same conditions, contrasting effect) and Martian pain: other states, same impact) - but there should be a simple sense of pain, where we can have all the pain - Shifted pain/Martians’ pain: show that causal role, pain and physical realization are only linked contingently. ---
I 41
Problem: how can we characterize pain a priori by causal role, despite the acknowledgment of this fact? - Identity theory solves the problem for Shifted Pain, but fails on Martians’ Pain. - Behaviorism: here the situation is reversed. ---
I 42
Pain/Lewis: if a particular neural state preferably causes pain, then this state is pain - but the concept of pain is not the concept of this neural state. - The concept of ...- is an intentional functor. - The two concepts could have applied to something different if the causal role was different - Pain would have been something else. - It could have been that the owner of the role does not own it and some non-owner owns it. - Lewis/Armstrong: pain is non-rigid - yet no coincidence of two states (pain plus neuronal state) but one single state. ---
I 33 ff
Pains are so defined by what the majority usually ... ---
I 40
Shifted pain: same states - different impacts. From this we learn that pain is merely linked contingently with its causal role. ---
I 42
Martians’ pain: other states (than ours) - Same effect. From this we learn that pain is linked merely contingently with its physical realization. But the concept of pain is not the concept of this neural state! (> concept,> identity).
---
I 42
The concept of .. is an intentional functor. The two concepts could have applied to something different if the causal role was different. Lewis/Armstrong: The concept of pain is a non-rigid designator!
---
I 52
Identity pain/neural state: contingent! LL. But I do not say that we have two states. If the person feels pain, it is pain, no matter what kind of causal role or physical condition the state has. Otherwise it is not pain.
---
Schw I I 146
Pain/Lewis/Schwarz: state with such and such causal role- ((s) then biochemical state (type) with the same causal role: Therefore, identification through precisely this role - (s) Vs (s): then circular:> theory of reference.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Perception Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Münch III 296
Definition perception/Quine/Schnelle: getting aware of an irritation. ---
III 298
Quine, "the animal responds to the semi-circle on the screen" - SchnelleVsQuine: how does he know that? - Maybe it just avoids pain. ---
Quine VI 2
Perception/Quine: Input: not objects, but activation of our sensory receptors. - We must justify ourselves with stimulus influences. - Stimulus influences instead of observation and instead of documents. ---
VI 100
Perception/Quine: are neurophysiologically recordable in principle - beliefs are not.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Mü I
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Phenomenology Nagel
 
Books on Amazon
I 49
NagelVsRorty, NagelVsSubjectivism: seeks a phenomenological reduction of thoughts, to get out of them - can not succeed - conceptual schemes fail for the same reason: I can not say "p, but I do not know if it s true" - > conceptual scheme / NagelVsQuine -

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

Pierre (Londres-Example) Dummett
 
Books on Amazon
I 144
Kripke/Dummett: (Pierre-Example, Londres-Example) translation is not a hypothesis, but a constitutive principle (public language instead idiolect) - (> VsQuine: idiolect has no priority).
((s) Explanation/(s): Piere believes that Londres is beautiful but he heard that London is ugly.)

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Possibilia Husserl
 
Books on Amazon
Hintikka I 73
Possibilia/Hintikka: These: die Rede über menschliche Erfahrung macht die Annahme von Possibilia notwendig. (Unverwirklichte Möglichkeiten). HintikkaVsQuine. Intentionalität/Husserl/Hintikka: nach Husserl ist das Wesentliche des menschlichen Denkens in einer Beziehung zu unverwirklichten Möglichkeiten.
Possibilia/Hintikka: wir brauchen sie, um mit logisch inkompatiblen Entitäten gleichen logischen Typs umzugehen.
Semantik möglicher Welten/Hintikka: ist die entsprechende Modelltheorie.

E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 (Junius)
II "Husserl" aus Hauptwerke der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Possibilia Hintikka
 
Books on Amazon
I 40/41
Non-existence/non-existent objects/localization/possible worlds/Hintikka: thesis: any non-existent object is in its own world. Possible worlds/Leibniz/Duns Scotus/Hintikka: such considerations led Leibniz and Duns Scotus before him to distribute the unordered set of non-existent individuals to divided worlds.
The totality of all non-existent objects is a non-well-formed whole.
Non-existent objects/possible objects/unrealized possibilities/Hintikka: but are not some of these non-existent objects in our own actual world? Hintikka: thesis: yes, some of these barely possible objects are in the actual world.
Bona fide object/Hintikka: a bona fide object can exist in a possible world and be missing in another.
World line/Hintikka: when it comes to which world line can be drawn, existence is not the most important problem. Rather being well-defined.
HintikkaVsLeibniz: we also allow that an object can exist in several worlds.
Question: if inhabitants of two different worlds can be identical when are they identical then?
---
I 73
Possibilia/Hintikka: Thesis: the speech about human experience makes the assumption of Possibilia necessary. (Unrealized Possibilities). HintikkaVsQuine. Intentionality/Husserl/Hintikka: according to Husserl, the essence of human thought is in a relationship to unrealized possibilities.
Possibilia/Hintikka: we need possibilia to deal with logically incompatible entities of the same logical type.
Semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: the semantics of possible worlds is the corresponding model theory.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Predicates Geach
 
Books on Amazon
I 110
Predicate/Geach: "predicables": spurious: E.g. "--- smoked a pipe" -"5 is dividable by 5 and by one", as well as for "3..." - predicate: real: "Russell smoked a pipe" - the identity of predicates with reflexive pronouns is not assured. ---
I 216
Predicate/Geach: must never be confused with names - the term does not denote the object. ---
I 224
Predicates/Geach: more common property of sentences - but not actual expression in the sentence. ---
I 224
"Stand for"/Geach: there is no difference whether I say a predicate "stands for" a property or it is its name. ---
I 224
Predicate/Geach: does not appear as an actual expression in the sentence. - Geach: there is no identity criterion for predicates. - One cannot know whether two predicates stand for the same property. - Equality of use is necessary condition for same reference. - ((s) That is, the extension but not the intension is equal!) - GeachVsQuine: therefore one should not identify properties with classes. ---
I 239
Predicate/Terminology/Geach: I call predicates only like this if they are used as the principal functor in a proposition, otherwise "predicables". - I-predicables/I-predicate/Geach: (s): those predicates in which regard the two objects are indistinguishable in a given theory - if distinctions can be made in an extended theory, then the l-predicate does not change its meaning - E.g. "uniform" for (different but not at all differentiated) tokens of words, later the tokens are distinguished, but are still "uniform".
---
I 301
GeachVs two-name theory: error: that if two names denote the same thing, that they then allow the same predicates. ---
I 301
Predicate/Geach: Predicates such as "become" can only be assigned to concrete terms.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Prediction Millikan
 
Books on Amazon
I 314
Vorhersage/Voraussage/voraussagen/Prognose/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: wir bilden die Welt ab, um sie zu bewohnen, nicht um sie vorherzusagen. Wenn Voraussagen nützlich sind, so doch nicht von Erlebnissen an unseren Nervendenden. Bestätigung/Voraussage/Millikan: ein Wahrnehmungsurteil impliziert vor allem sich selbst. Bsp wenn ich verifizieren möchte, dass dieser Behälter einen Liter fasst, muss ich nicht voraussagen können, dass die einzelnen Kanten eine bestimmte Längehaben.
D.h. ich muss keine bestimmten Sinnesdaten vorhersagen können.


Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Probability Function Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 230
Truth-function / extension / intension / DavidsonVsQuine / Rorty: truth-functional vocabularies are not particularly suited to display the final structure of reality. - The distinction extension / intension is not more interesting than between nations and people.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Process / Flux Simons
 
Books on Amazon
I 124f
Flux/Heraclitus/ChisholmVsQuine: Quine needs spatial and temporal extension on the same level - Chi: not every sum of flux stages is a flux process - we have to say what conditions a sum must satisfy to be a flow process. - Problem: that in turn presupposes continuants: shore, observers - or: absolute space - or introduction of "is co-fluvial with" - this could only be explained circularly by "is the same river as" - thus the four-dimensionalism has not eliminated all singular or general terms that denote continuants. SimonsVsQuine: one does not bath in a flux stage but in the whole flux. - Error: trying to change the subject to leave the predicate unchanged.
---
I125
Time stage/flux stages/SimonsVsFour-Dimensionalism: stages misleading: e.g. a Philip stage is not drunk, but the whole man - one does not bath in a flux stadium - consequent description in four-dimensionalism only by higher beings - for us not decidable - Terminology. Process ontology here = four-dimensionalism. - Simons: not impossible, only language different. ---
I 127
SimonsVsFour-Dimensionalism: convenient representation of the Minkowski space, but representation is not an ontological argument. ---
I 126
Process/Geach/Simons has all its properties timeless, that means, what has different properties, are the temporal parts - not the whole process - hence no change - E.g. like the poker which is hot on one end and cold at the other.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987

Proper Names Geach
 
Books on Amazon
I 46f
Name/Aristotle/Geach: direct reference, no parts (Aristotle: syntactically simple) (Geach ditto) - description: indirect reference, mediation of other characters. ---
I 143
Calculus of Natural Deduction/Gentzen/Geach: here there are "possible names" (> "introduction of existence"). - But not quantification over it. - GeachVsQuine: so he can no longer regard names as "hidden descriptions". ---
I 155
Names/Geach: not knowing the causal chain is important, but its existence. - The right to use a name can exist, even if one does not know that. - Russell: a proper name must name something (Geach dito). - GeachVsRussell: but then he makes a wrong conclusion: "only a name that has to name something is a name". - Just as wrong: fallacy of "what one knows, must be" to "only what must be like this, can be known". ---
I 162
Quasi-names/Geach: in encyclopedias, for foreign gods - (Geach pro) - Quasi-names appear only in object position after intentional verbs. - No "second order existence". - There is no identy criterion to decide whether different peoples worship the same God. ---
I 208
Names/Geach: whether something is a proper name does not depend on who it is given to. - Quasi quotation: is not a name.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Proper Names Strawson
 
Books on Amazon
VII 16
Names/Strawson: proper names have no meaning. Ignorance of the name is not linguistic ignorance. ---
I 222
Names/adjective/Strawson: also names can be adjectival: E.g. Napoleonic, Russian, even with auxiliary verb is a Hitler. ---
I 224
But: Napoleonic gesture is not connecting gesture with Napoleon but between gesture and similarity principle of the summary which is made possible by Napoleon - but: Ramsey we probably say wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates, but not: wisdom sokratizes (wrong) - particular cannot be predicted - Solution: Language has a pseudo-universal: be feature of. ---
I 226
Only pseudo-universal. otherwise regress: characterized through being characterized by... ---
VI 386 ~
Names/general term/Strawson: cannot be derived syntactically. ---
VII 113
Names/Strawson: Meaning not object - (confusion of utterance and use) - Reference: Expressions plus context - referencing does not mean to say that you refer - (steps). ---
VII 122
StrawsonVsRussell/VsQuine: Summit of circularity: names to treat as camouflaged descriptions - names are chosen arbitrarily or conventionally - otherwise names would be descriptive. ---
VII 122
Quasi names/Strawson: Glorious Revolution, Blue Grotto, Patriotic War.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Properties Strawson
 
Books on Amazon
IV 67/68
properties / Strawson: one could concede that attributes and properties are ontologically of secondary importance - reference to characteristics presupposes the reference to objects but not vice versa - IV 69 VsQuine: quantification over properties: e.g. "there is a property that no thing has: perfection"- IV 67 reference / Strawson: particulars are possible without reference to properties.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Propositions Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
I 332
Sentence = Universal! - Value of the variable: Proposition (object) - remains in place even after singular term! - Proposition resists change the truth value - Proposition remains nameless in x0p. Words denote - sentences do not! (No singular term)! - Nevertheless, a sentence has meaning: the singular terms formed by bracketing of the sentence (no proposition!).
---
I 343
Modal logic: Church/Frege: modal sentence = proposition. ---
I 347
Proposition here: completion of correct sentence to a timeless sentence - timeless sentence "The door is open": which door? this denotes nothing. ---
I 355
Vs Propositions: translations must also mean propositions. - Actually right proposition cannot be explored by behavior (Gavagai) - Proposition eliminated: synonymy indefinable - scientific truth indefinable (only within the theory) (>§16). ---
I 358
Proposition: no common meaning of translated sentences: indeterminacy of translation - propositions could all be quite different. ---
I 358
Proposition as bearers of truth: no reason why one should refer to timeless sentences and not to the sentences themselves. Sentence: The door is open bracketing: needed to find out what the sentence expresses in a situation. - what could the speaker have said? (Propositions do not help there).
---
VII 109
Propositions/Quine: if anything, they should be regarded as names of statements. ---
VII 157
Proposition/Quine: in relation to sentences as attributes, in relation to open sentences - Proposition number of planets > 7 unequal Proposition 9 > 7. ---
X 32
Proposition/Object/Quine: If a sentence is supposed to be the name of a proposition (some writers pro, QuineVs), then the proposition is an object - then correct: p or not p for all propositions p - then p is here not even variable over object, and once scheme letter of sentences, but only variable - (no semantic ascent necessary). ---
XII 39
Sentence/Proposition/Propositional attitude/Translation/ChurchVsQuine: if sentence bears the meaning instead of the proposition, then problem: E.g. Edwin believes the German sentence S translate into English: a) leave sentence, b) reproduce in indirect speech in English: then both are not equivalent - QuineVsVs: admitted, but unclear concept of everyday language equivalence - Quine: still do not accept linguistic forms as objects of propositional attitudes: to artificial.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Proximal Theory Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
I 53
Proximal/meaning theory/Davidson: same meaning with the same stimulus patterns - distal: same objects - here it must be translated several times - 1. Comparison of the linguistic response to changes in the environment - 2. own sentence that the radical interpreter himself would express. ---
I 53f
Distal/DavidsonVsQuine: same objects and causes for speakers - here several times translation - DavidsonVsQuine: the proximal theory leads to classical skepticism - e.g. Gavagai: both could mean the same, whereby the same circumstances make all sentences true for one and for the other one all false - proximal/Quine: documents primary - distal/Davidson: truth primary: meaning linked to the truth conditions - Quine/DummettVsEvans: Do not align meaning on truth conditions. - DavidsonVs: too simplified, every theory must relate meaning to truth and to documents - proofs/Davidson: are relations between sentences. - (no last data, only observing records) - VsDistal: Problem: there are probably several candidates for the position of the common cause item. E.g. every more comprehensive segment of the universe to the birth of the speaker for the utterance of "this is red". And so it would be the cause for any other disposition of the speaker - that would equal the meaning of all observation sentences. ---
I 58
Proximal: does not guarantee that our theory of the world applies at all - difference proximal/distal: as between meaning theories which a) assigns to the evidence (proximal, stimulus pattern) or b) to the truth (distal, objects) the primary status - Quine pro a) (proximal) ---
I 58
QuineVsEvans/DummettVsEvans: meaning not from truth conditions - instead: proximal theory: stimulus patterns (evidence) instead of objects - this is simplistic, since every meaning theory has to relate meaning to truth and to documents. ---
I 59
DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsDummett: VsProximal theory: skepticism, relativization on the individual - cartesian. ---
I 59
Evidence/Davidson: must be relations between propositions - the theory cannot support this from the outside. ---
I 61
Proximal meaning theory - similar to Descartes, Dummett, Frege - stimulus patterns instead of objects is decisive. ---
II 53
DavidsonVs social character of meaning: also idiolect is in principle interpretable (via causal hypotheses).

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Proximal Theory Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
VI 421 f
Stimulus / distal / DavidsonVsQuine / Rorty rejects the notion of a "stimulus meaning" - instead: distal theory of meaning - there is no "central region" between linguistically formulated beliefs and physiology.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Proximal Theory Proust
 
Books on Amazon
Joelle Proust Das intentionale Tier in D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg) Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt/M. 2005

Perler, I, 227
Proximal/Proust: primitive creatures such as the lumpfish (sea snails) react to a proximal state of the receptors. ---
I 227
Proximal/Proust: e.g. Snail: a snail can only process information when there is contact with its receptors. Distal: Birds and mammals need no contact with their receptors. Therefore, they can develop completely different spatial terms! (VsQuine).
---
I 228
Space/Animal/Thinking/Proust: intuitive, space is a kind of empty framework for possible perceptual content. The relation which is of interest to us is the occurrence at the same place, i.e. the equivalence class for all perception experience that affect the same localization in the environment.
Proust: this relation is interesting because it does not presuppose either the concept of space or the concept of a concept. It is purely logical.
Proust: the occurrence in the same place is also essential as a basis for the recognition of objects.
---
I 229
Definition Calibration/Proust: Calibration is adaptation of an auditory pattern to a visual. ((s) Coordination of sensory impressions.) Proust: this mechanism is essential to correct the sensory inputs.

Radical Interpretation Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
I 70f
Radical Interpretation/RI/Davidson: first, to find out the topic independently, then ask whether true - because the situation, which usually gives rise to belief, also determines the truth conditions. ---
I 112
Radical Interpretation/Davidson: it is not about a creation of a relationship formulated in meta-language between utterances of two languages, but about a structurally revealing theory of the interpretation of an object language - the reference to the known language is omitted. ---
II 40
Translation/Interpretation/Radical Interpretation/Davidson/Glüer: Translation knowledge is not interpretive knowledge - E.g. Nabokov "My sister, do you remember the mountain and the tall oak, and the Ladore?" - translation of the Russian sentence "..." - from the fact that this is correct, it does not follow that I only understand one of the two sentences. ---
II 40
Radical Interpretation/RI/Davidson/Glüer: Problem: mutual dependence on belief and meaning - not one without the other can be opened up - starting point: minimal belief: that a sentence is true at a certain time (occasion) - a) opportunity sentences: allows construction of hypothetical truth-equivalences. ---
II 66
Radical Interpretation/DavidsonVsQuine: general truth subordination -> Externalism: the belief contents are not independent from the world. ---
Frank I 626ff
Radical Interpretation/Davidson: the content of mental states is not to be determined independently from the linguistic behavior - the truth of the believed sentences is presupposed - otherwise no evidence can be derived from the environment and behavior would be meaningless. - The knowledge of the truth conditions is presupposed by the speaker, otherwise behavior cannot be interpreted. ---
Frank I 634
...+...

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Reality Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
I 90
Reality/world/Quine: proximal theory (nerve endings): closed from the world, which is perhaps quite different - ultimate source of evidence: irritation - DavidsonVsQuine. Cartesian separation; gap - also separation of scheme and content - DavidsonvsDescartes / DavidsonVsQuine: once one is decided to close that gap, one can not specify what the evidence actually was evidence for. - - -
Rorty VI 63 ff
World/Putnam/Goodman (VsWilliams)/Rorty: there is no real suchness of the world. Davidson: the contribution that the world is contributing is inseparable from the part we contribute ourselves.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Recognition Hintikka
 
Books on Amazon
I 209
Re-identification/Hintikka: with this problem situation semantics and semantics of possible worlds are in the same boat again. Situation semantics: situation semantics rather veils the problem. For overlapping situations it assumes, e.g. that the overlapping part remains the same.
Re-identification/Quine/Hintikka: Quine and Hintikka consider re-identification as hopeless because you cannot explain how it works.
Re-identification/Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke ditto, but that's why we should simply postulate it, at least for physical objects.
HintikkaVsQuine/HintikkaVsKripke: this is either too pessimistic or too optimistic.
But ignoring the problem would mean to neglect one of the greatest philosophical problems.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Recognition Millikan
 
Books on Amazon
I 13
MillikanVsHolismus: es geht darum, ohne Holismus und ohne Mythos des Gegebenen zu verstehen, wie wir unsere anscheinenden Fähigkeiten, Dinge wiederzuerkennen und unsere anscheinenden Bedeutungen testen.
I 299
Nichtwiderspruch/Millikan: der Test auf sie ist gleichzeitig ein Test auf unsere Fähigkeit, etwas zu identifizieren, wie auch darauf, dass unsere Begriffe das abbilden, was sie abbilden sollen. MillikanVsQuine: dabei geht es aber nicht „Bedingungen für Identität“ aufzustellen. Und auch nicht um „geteilten Bezug“ („derselbe Apfel wieder“). Das gehört zum Problem der Einheitlichkeit, nicht der Identität. Das ist nicht das Problem zu entscheiden, wie eine Ausschließlichkeitsklasse aufgeteilt wird.
I 300
Bsp zu entscheiden, wann rot aufhört und orange anfängt. Stattdessen geht es darum zu lernen, Bsp rot unter anderen Umständen wiederzuerkennen.


Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Reference Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Rorty I 219f
Quine: inscrutability of reference: not talking of what the objects of a theory are in an absolute sense is useful, but the question of how a theory of objects can be interpreted or re-interpreted in another one. E.g. How can you find out if someone sees everything upside down, or in complementary colors? It makes sense to talk about subordinate theories, but only relative to the theoretical framework with its own preliminarily appropriated and ultimately inscrutable ontology. Hartry FieldVsQuine: has shown that Quine’s talk of "relativization to a background language," and of "taking the reference literally" is not consistent with his general reasoning.
RortyVsQuine: a real holism would consider the question "are we referring in reality to rabbit or rabbit parts? To formulas or to Goedel numbers" neither meaningless nor meaningful only relative to a background language, but in reality to be a question such as " Are we are really talking about nations or groups of individual persons?" "Are we talking about witches or hallucinations?" These questions make sense if we give them meaning. That means that something else depends on their answer.
---
Quine I 273
Shared reference: Terms, not objects! - Nevertheless, it is water, which is spread - mass terms: cumulative reference, (grammatically like singular term) - singular term: shared reference. ---
I 166
Opaque verb: "hunts lions" puts nothing in relation, does not refer to a lion - relative term police chasing a man. ---
I 273
Theories and things: Prerequisite of an object not the same as reference, but same motivation - Fido-Fido principle: individual chairs mostly nameless, "chair" refers to virtually any chair.
Reference: comes out through the predication: it is the same in dogs and milk: Milk is white, Fifi is a dog - But: milk and dog cannot be. compare II 13f.
---
II 33
Inscrutability of reference: there is no difference: "x is a dog" or "x is the St-strand, which is filled by a dog" - only statement about the terminology used and its translation, not physical object (proxy function). - inscrutability: in translation or permutation. - - -
Putnam II 194
Reference/Quine: there are definitely true and false sentences, but no specific reference relation - reason: the true sentences have an infinite number of models, and there is not the one designated model (Loewenheim) - in various true models, there are then various reference relations. ---
Quine I 129
Translation: translatable: observation sentences, truth functions (conjunction, negation, alternation) - identifiable: stimulus analytic sentences, stimulus-synonymous occasion sentences of the natives - untranslatable: stimulus-synonymous occasion sentences. ---
VII 130f
Reference/Theory of reference/th.o.r./Quine: name, truth, denotation (designating ("true-by")), extension, values of variables, ontological commitments - theory of reference includes the semantic paradoxes. ---
XI 175
Reference/Extension/Singular term/General Term/Follesdal/Lauener: singular term: have a reference - general term and sentences have an extension.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Relative Clauses Geach
 
Books on Amazon
I 106
Complex terms/Relative Clause/Geach: the relation of pronoun-antecedent analog to the variable-operator is ambiguous - solution: resolution by an additional pronoun: "if", "and" etc. - ((s) It is not about unity but about dissolving the unity.) - Symbolic language/Geach: (e.g. quantum theory): can dissolve unity by definition: E.g. y belongs to the class of Ps: different depending on whether with equality sign or epsilon: for a class x, y belongs to x and if something belongs to x, it is P. - E.g. wrong: "Only a woman who has lost any sense of shame is drunk". - right: "A woman will only become... if she .." otherwise it follows: Men never get drunk. ---
I 120
Relative Clause/Geach: Difference: E.g.: "man who killed his brother"/"man, so that..." - "So that"/Principia Mathematica/Russell/PM: "so that" is an undefined basic concept in Principia Mathematica, GeachVsQuine: equally unclear - Geach: "so that" cannot be distinguished from "and" in quantifier notation. - E.g.: "The woman whom every Englishman appreciates is, above all, his mother": The relative clause here is not a general term: otherwise all appreciate the same mother! But in "... his queen ..." solution/Geach: this has nothing to do with the relative-clause, but with the range of application expressions. > Latin sentence theory/terminology.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Scheme/Content McDowell
 
Books on Amazon
I 186
Schema/McDowellVsQuine: the idea of ​​a structure that must be found in every comprehensible conceptual scheme must not have the effect that one imagines the scheme as one side of the dualism of scheme and world.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Self- Reference Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
II 283
Self-reference/Searle: is shown, but not seen - Twin Earth: "this man" different Fregean sense, although experiences are type-identical: perception and expression are self-referential, they would not be satisfied when exchanged - self-reference/Frege: "completing sense": intentional contents are never undetermined (SearleVsQuine: no undetermined sailboat can be desired). ---
II 275F
Indexicality/completing Fregean sense/Heimson/SearleVsKaplan: I, you, this, here, etc. always have a form of self-reference: they always express an intentional content because the speaker refers to a particular entity - this is Frege's "sense of proper names". ---
II 278
Self-reference/Searle: E.g. there is a hand, and because there is a hand it is causing this visual experience - the self-reference is shown, but not seen - the one of the indexical statements is also shown but not claimed. ---
II 284f
SearleVsKaplan: Hume's and Heimson's statements are self-referential - they express different levels of intentional content - the use of indexical expression defines the conditions under which it applies. ---
III 62
Circles: only problem in definition, not in use: as long as the object plays the role, we do not need to define the word. - Linguistic explanations are no circles: language is intended to explain itself, it needs no language, because it is already language.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Sensory Impressions Sellars
 
Books on Amazon
Sensory Impressions/Sellars: distinguished from pieces of the given. No direct relationship with the knowledge.
Active receptivity. But the receptivity cannot cooperate itself in a rational manner with the spontaneity. (VsQuine). (Where?)
---
I IX
Sellars: no renunciation of sensations in toto. (Unlike Quine). ---
I XXIII
Sensory Impressions/Quine: manifolds, which are to be structured through various theory drafts. (SellarsVs). ---
I XXIII
Sellars: Physical and mental are not in a causal relationship, but belong to different world views. Only conveyed by structure of world views. (Vs above). The frames are related by their structure and not by content. It is simply a wrongly asked question how impressions and electromagnetic fields can tolerate each other. ---
I XXIX
Theory of sensory impressions does not speak of inner objects. ---
I XXXVII
Sellars: sensory impressions only have causal consequences of external physical objects. A red sensation can also occur if the external object only seems to be red. Both concepts explain why the speaker always speaks of something red. Only, the sensation is according to Sellars no object of knowledge, and even the category of the object is questioned by Sellars. ---
I XL
First, however, these states are states of a person. Not of a brain. In any case, they are imperceptible. Sensory Impressions: neither they have a color, nor do they have a shape. (> Perception).
Impressions: that these are theoretical entities, is shown to us by how to characterize them in an intrinsic way: not only as descriptions: "entity as such, that looking at a red and triangular object under such and such circumstances has the standard cause." But rather as predicates.
  These are no abbreviations for descriptions of properties. Example if one says that molecules have a mass, then the word "mass" is not an abbreviation of a description of the form "the property that ...".
---
I 101
"Impression of a red triangle" does not only mean "impression like he ... through red and triangular objects ...." although it is a truth, namely a logical truth about impressions of red triangles. ---
I 103
Impressions need to be inter-subjective, not completely dissolvable impressions in behavioral symptoms: states (but not physiological) - impressions are not objects. ---
I 106
Sellars: Rylean Language: actual explanation, is more than just a code: conceptual framework public objects in space and time - Language of impressions: embodies the discovery that there are such things, but it is not specifically tailored to them (individual things no antecedent objects of thinking). VsHume: because he does not clearly distinguish between thoughts and impressions, he can assume that a natural derivative corresponds not only to a logical but also a temporal sequence. His theory must be extended so that it also includes cases such as the above or backwards: Thunder now, before a moment of lightning.
---
II 328
Hume does not see that the perception of a configuration is also the configuration of perceptions.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sentences Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
I 252f
"Purely indicative" unambiguous (substitutability of identity) not: "Tullius was a Roman" is trochaic - E.g. tax auditor/director -> propositional attitude - expression in quotation marks is not purely indicative - ambiguous reference - every truth function is sign transparent. ---
I 332
Sentence = Universal! - Value of the variables: Proposition (object) - remains intact even after singular term - Proposition resists change the truth value - Proposition remains nameless in "x0p". ---
I 337
Sentence: is not class of its expressions, otherwise non-expressed = zero class (all same meaning) - sentence not property of expressions either - solution: sentence as a consequence: class of pairs - partial sign: class of expression incidents. ---
I 336
Words describe - sentences do not (No singular term)! - Nevertheless, a sentence has meaning: the singular term is formed by bracketing the sentence. (not a proposition!) - Proposition here: completion of the correct sentence to a timeless sentence - timeless sentence "The door is open": which door? denotes nothing. ---
Prior I 35
Sentence/Quine: is not an object - Then also no quantification, no bound variables for it - PriorVsQuine: unproblematic: E.g. "J. believes p": J. does not believe anything, this ultimately stands for a sentence. ---
Quine VII 109 ~
Sentence/QuineVsFrege: sentences must not be regarded as names and "p", "q" not as variables, accept the entities as entities named through expressions as values. ---
X 31
Sentence/Quine: we speak only of sentences if we want to generalize -" (and we cannot do that through objects). ---
X 35
Semantic ascent/Quine: this mention of sentences is only a technical necessity that arises when we want to generalize in one dimension, which cannot be grasped by a variable. ---
XII 39
Sentence/Proposition/Propositional attitude/Translation/ChurchVsQuine: if sentence bears the meaning instead Proposition, then problem: E.g. Edwin believes the German sentence S - English Translation: a) leave sentence, b) reproduce in indirect speech in English: then both are not equivalent - "QuineVsVs: admitted, but unclear concept of everyday language equivalence - "Quine: still not accepts linguistic forms as objects of propositional attitude: too artificial.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Sets Bigelow
 
Books on Amazon
I 47
Mengen/Quine/Goodman/Bigelow/Pargetter: es könnte sein, dass wir, wenn wir Mengen zulassen, gar keine sonstigen Universalien mehr brauchen. Weil man mit Mengen fast alles machen kann, was die Mathematik brauch. Armstrong: glaubt dagegen an Universalien, aber nicht an Mengen!
BigelowVsQuine/BigelowVsGoodman: für die Wissenschaft brauchen wir noch weitere Universalien als Mengen, Bsp Wahrscheinlichkeit und Notwendigkeit.
I 95
Universalien/Mengen/Prädikate/Bigelow/Pargetter: wenn ein Prädikat keinem Universale entspricht, Bsp bei Hunden, nehmen wir an, daß sie wenigstens einer Menge entsprechen. Prädikat/Bigelow/Pargetter. wir können aber auch dann noch nicht einmal annehmen, daß jedes Prädikat einer Menge entspricht!
Menge/Bigelow/Pargetter: Bsp es gibt keine Menge X die alle und nur die Paare enthält für die x ein Element von y ist. (Paradoxie).
Allmenge/Allklasse/Bigelow/Pargetter: kann es auch nicht geben.
Prädikat: „ist eine Menge“ entspricht nicht einer Menge die alle und nur die Dinge enthält, auf die es zutrifft! (Paradoxie, wegen der unmöglichen Menge aller Mengen).
Mengenlehre/Bigelow/Pargetter: wir sind dennoch froh, wenn wir den meisten Prädikaten etwas zuordnen können, und deshalb ist die Mengenlehre (die aus der Mathematik stammt und nicht aus der Semantik) ein Glücksfall für die Semantik.
Referenz/Semantik/Bigelow/Pargetter: die Mengenlehre hilft, der Referenz mehr erklärende Kraft aufzubürden, um eine Wahrheitstheorie (WT) zu formulieren. Dabei bleibt noch offen, welche Rolle Referenz genau spielen soll.
- - -
I 371
Existenz/Mengen/Mengenlehre/Axiom/Bigelow/Pargetter: keins der folgenden Axiome sichert die Existenz von Mengen: Paarmengenaxiom, Extensionalitätsaxiom, Vereinigungsmengenaxiom, Potenzmengenaxiom, Separationsaxiom: sie alle sagen uns nur, was passiert, wenn es schon Mengen gibt. Axiome/ZF/Bigelow/Pargetter. ihre Axiome sind rekursiv: d.h. sie schaffen neues aus altem.
Basis: bilden zwei Axiome:
I 372
Unendlichkeitsaxiom/ZF/Bigelow/Pargetter: (wird normalerweise so formalisiert, dass es das Leermengenaxiom enthält). Behauptet die Existenz einer Menge die alle natürlichen Zahlen nach von Neumann enthält. Omega/Bigelow/Pargetter: nach unserem mathematischen Realismus sind die Mengen in der Folge ω nicht identisch mit natürlichen Zahlen. Sie instanziieren sie. Deshalb ist das Unendlichkeitsaxiom so wichtig.
Unendlichkeitsaxiom/Ontologie/Bigelow/Pargetter: das Unendlichkeitsaxiom hat wirkliche ontologische Bedeutung. Es sichert die Existenz von genügend Mengen, um die reichen Strukturen der Mathematik zu instanziieren. Und die der Physik.
Frage: ist das Axiom wahr? Bsp Angenommen, eine Eigenschaft „diese Dinge zu sein“. Und angenommen, es gibt ein Extra-Ding, das nicht inbegriffen ist. Dann ist es sehr plausibel dass es die Eigenschaften geben wird, „jene Dinge zu sein“ die auf alle bisherigen Dinge plus Extra-Ding anwendbar ist. Dazu muss es zuerst diese Eigenschaften geben. Außerdem, wenn wir Realisten über solche Eigenschaften sind, kann eine solche Eigenschaft selbst als „ein Extra-Ding“ zählen!
I 373
Das stellt sicher, dass wenn es ein Anfangssegment von  gibt, das nächste Element der Folge auch existiert. Unendlichkeit: erfordert aber mehr als das. Wir müssen noch sicherstellen, dass die Gesamtheit ω existiert! D.h. es muss die Eigenschaft geben „eins dieser Dinge zu sein“ wobei dies eine Eigenschaft ist, die von allen und nur von Neumann-Zahlen instanziiert ist. das ist in unserer Konstruktion plausibel, weil wir Mengen als plurale Essenzen (s.o.) auffassen.
Problem: wir müssen nur noch ein Anfangssegment für die Neumann-Zahlen garantieren. Das sollte die leere Menge sein.
Leere Menge/Bigelow/Pargetter: wie plausibel ist ihre Existenz in unserer Metaphysik?

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Singular Terms Strawson
 
Books on Amazon
Substitutions/Strawson / (s):
of singular terms: reversible
of predicates: not reversible.
---
I 198
Singular Term/QuineVsGeach/QuineVsFrege/QuineVsRamsey: (Singular Term) can occur at the places of quantifiable variables, general expressions not - singular term: quantifiable, Generic Term: not quantifiable - StrawsonVsQuine: not so important. ---
I 198
Singular Term/Quine: abstract singular terms: E.g. "piety", "wisdom": names of abstract objects - no general terms - Names of concrete objects: e.g. "Earth" - on the other hand general term: E.g "philosopher" - StrawsonVsQuine: no good explanation: we would not like to say that this would be true of many things - solution/Quine: in reality distinction between singular term and predicates - general term/Quine: the location which is taken by them, has no own status - decisive: predicates cannot be quantified. ---
I 203
"a philosopher"/Quine: no singular term. ---
IV 63
QuineVs singular Term: eliminable StrawsonVsQuine.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Skepticism Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
II 37
Skepticism: confusion between truth and evidence - as such not incoherent (glau, time t) - doubt also still immanent. ---
Davidsson I 54
"Everything different"/skepticism/Stroud: It could be that everything is to be different than we imagine - Quine: that would be a distinction without a difference: since the observation sentences are holophrastically conditioned to stimuli, the relations to the evidence remain unchanged - preserve the structure and you will preserve everything - (s) then everything was different yesterday already. ---
Stroud I 223
Skepticism/Knowledge//Quine: if all knowledge is put to the test at the same time, you cannot invoke any part of it - "that makes sensual experience necessary -". ---
Stroud I 225
Skepticism/Quine: the tradition has not even recognized its strength. The doubt about knowledge stems from knowledge itself - "the solution as well -" illusion: is only relative to the previously accepted assumption of real bodies". ---
I 227
Quine/Stroud: does not make the mistake of Austin: (distortion of meaning, see above) -" it’s not about the meaning of a given term -" Quine goes to the roots (language learning). ---
I 228
Skeptical doubts are scientific doubts. ---
Stroud I 228
Skepticism/Quine: if science is true, it can never say whether the world is the way we perceive it due to the meagre inputs -" then just as little knowledge would be possible as if science was wrong. ---
Stroud I 231
Skepticism/QuineVsSkepticism: is an overreaction to the uncertainty of individual options -" Solution: reflection takes place within science, not beyond it. ---
Stroud I 248
Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: if all beliefs were only projections from meager data (underdetermination) -" Knowledge: is then a combination of many subjective and few objective factors - then all hypotheses are real competitors -" no objective superiority - important argument: this is exactly the view of traditional epistemology. ---
Stroud I 248
QuineVsSkepticism: if we deprive philosophy of its external view, it is sufficient in order to exclude the total skepticism -" (naturalized epistemology) -" StroudVsQuine: This does not work as long as we consider our own knowledge as projection beyond the data)

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Statements Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Quine: "any statement may be revised".
Fodor IV 44ff
Statement/semantic holism/Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: Quine consistently avoids to say what a statement is. - A formula or a proposition or something that relates to the semantic value. - a) if they are formulas (morpho-syntactical), one and the same statement have different meanings. - Formulas come true in a different way in confirmations than sentences. - It is pointless to ask whether one form confirms the other. - Confirmation depends on the meanings - Identifying statements with forms (formulas) contradicts the Quine-Duhem-Thesis - it would not be substantial.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Superposition Simons
 
Books on Amazon
I 128
Superposition/Simons: different individuals with identical parts at the same time in the same place. - SimonsVsQuine: instead of "content of one portion RZ" - Such occupiers must be continuants anyway. - Events: among them the extensionality principle is fulfilled - masses: need different meanings of "part". ---
I 211f
Superposition instead of coincidence: E.g. Ring/Gold. - E.g. person/body. - Not two individuals, but relation one-much. - They are not identical, but take the same space - E.g. Ring/Gold: different stories. ---
I 223
Superposition/SimonsVsWiggins: that various objects can superimpose follows from the fact that a single piece of material can be in such a state that it simultaneously fulfills different existence conditions. - ((S) So intensional). - Existence conditions: are determined by the sortal term. - (lo linguistically) different existence conditions: things can last for different times. - And still be at the same red. - E.g. (s) an astronaut in the orbit can become uncle. ---
I 237
Superposition/Doepke/Simons: whenever a and b are superimposed, they must have a common part, they must be composed entirely of a third party, c.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987

Synonymy Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 335
Synonymy/ChomskyVsQuine: false idealization: not "equality in the terms" causes synonymous expressions - not assertibility conditions (circumstances) but it is about distinguishing between langue and parole, between competence and performance.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Syntax Geach
 
Books on Amazon
I 116
Syntax: Replace salva congruitate: Word chain remains correct when it is replaced. - QuineVs: Replacing changes Syntax: e.g. Copernicus was a complete idiot, iff and only if the earth is a disk. - different ranges: a) Copernicus with predicate + sentence - b) complex predicate - then there is no ambiguous word chain, but different analyzes are possible. - ambiguity: "An astronomer ... iff the earth is flat" can be seen as an operator (like negation). - (Different brackets are possible). ---
I 116
Syntax/Quine/Geach: Quine's 1. Insight: spurious names: problem of range - for real names the problem does not exist. - GeachVsQuine: he, himself blurs the distinction by regarding names as abbreviations of certain descriptions. ---
I 120
3. syntactic insight Quines: E.g. "lx (2x² + 3x³)" - This function of a number: twice its square plus three times its third power - such complex descriptions can be eliminated by usage definition. (Russell):> relative-clause. ---
I 126
4. syntactic insight Quines: Introducing a predicate by a schema letter F. - Problem: E.g.: "Every sentence or its opposite is true" must not become "(Every sentence is true) or ...". - Solution: "F() is then -__ or __s opposite is true". - Geach: sub-clauses (relative-clauses) and pronouns are not mere substitutes. - This is even a mistake in modern logic books.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Terms Strawson
 
Books on Amazon
I 197
Term / StrawsonVsQuine: not linguistically: a thing.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Theories Field
 
Books on Amazon
I 249ff
Theory/Object level/Field: we assume a theory here instead of the truth of the theory. Problem: the theory requires mathematical entities. ---
I 262
Physics/Theory/Language/Ontology/Field: Thesis: in the typical physical language, sentences are essential for the description of observations that contain mathematical entities. Then a theory without mathematical entities does not allow any inference about distances and masses. - Solution: new (comparative) predicates: For example, the distance between x and y is r-times the distance between z and w, etc. - For example, the velocity of y relative to y multiplied by the time difference between z and w is r-times spatial distance between u and v (Definition acceleration without numbers). - r: is a rational number. - This distinguishes the predicates in the family - NominalismVs: these are too many predicates. ---
II 46
Theory/Truth/Field: it is the assertion that the axioms of the theory are true of their objects at certain points of time (or at all times) - not the theory itself. - Variables: We leave it out here very often, but they must be understood as implicitly existing. - Instead of "pain has that and that causal role" we must say: "For every t and every c (organism) of type S to t, pain has that and that causal role in c to t". ---
II 187
Ideal Theory/Quine/Field: (Quine 1960, 23-4): Suppose there is an ideal theory (in the future) that could be considered as completely true: - Problem: this ideal theory could not correct the truth values of our actual (present) individual sentences. - reason: there is no general sense in which one can equate a single sentence of a theory with a single sentence of another theory. - Quine/(s): there is no inter-theoretical translatability. - Thus there is no Truth-predicate for single sentences of a theory - Falsehood is distributed to the whole theory. - There is no fact that distributes falsehood to single sentences. - FieldVsQuine: therefore the sentences are not "intertheoretically meaningless". - Solution/Field: "partial denotation": Newton's mass partially denoted. - FieldVsKuhn/FieldVsIncommensurability: denotational refinement: (later only partial quantity) means no incommensurability.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Theories McDowell
 
Books on Amazon
I 188
Theory/Quine/Duhem: the contestability through experience (E.g. here is a black swan) cannot be distributed among the sentences of the theory. ---
I 189
This is actually an argument for the indeterminacy of meaning. McDowellVsQuine: but the argument is only tenable if our observation language is distinct form our theoretical language, so that the relevant experience is not already expressed in the theoretical language. ((s) see indeterminacy.)

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Theories Sellars
 
Books on Amazon
I XXII/XXIII
Theory/SellarsVsQuine: the database itself is part of the theory. Sensory impressions or sense stimulations are we Sellars quasi-theoretical entities of an everyday theory of perception. ---
I XLIII
Theory/language: the language of the scientific world view must preserve the basic structures of the everyday world view. For example, colors are homogeneous properties. (But not according to the scientific image). So Sellars later creates the concept of Sensa, which only occurs in sentient organisms. Where the ordinary human perceives something blue, on the side of science occurs the sensum. Sensa themselves are not colored, just as the states of feeling are. Colored alone are the objects of the everyday world. Also not the physical objects. Otherwise one would have to isolate a colored surface and ask for its thickness, which leads to contradictions.
---
I 74
Reification of the methodological distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical discourse, incorrect substantive distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical existence. ---
I 85f
Theory/tradition: thesis a theory explains laws by deriving theoretical correlations of these laws from a small amount of postulates about hidden entities. - SellarsVsTradition: the assumptions of a theory are not formed by an uninterpreted calculus, but by a model. - ((S) uninterpreted: because supported by unobservable.) - Definition Model/Sellars: the description of a range of known objects that behave in the usual way. - A model gets a comment. - This restricts analogies. - Sellars: continuous transition to the everyday world. ---
I 87
SellarsVs logistical picture of forming theories: most explanations did not arise from the head of the theorists as a finished product. Between science and everyday life, there is a continuous transition. The distinction between theory language and observation language belongs to the logic of the terms of inner episodes. ---
I 100
The entities imported from the theory are states of the perceiving subject, not a class of individual objects.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Thinking Dummett
 
Books on Amazon
I 93 ff
DummettVsFrege: his theory of perception contradicts his thesis that every human can only grasp those thoughts which he understands as the sense of sentences. There are two interpretations.
I 105
Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: not necessarily linguistic: Proto-thoughts (also animals) (associated with activity) - Proto-thoughts instead of Husserl s noema.
I 137 f
Strongest interpretation: we can only think in language - weakest interpretation: none of us can have a thought that we cannot express.
I 141
DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: not idiolect, but common language prevails.
III 209
Language/thinking/Wittgenstein/Dummett: the role of language as a vehicle of thought is subordinate to its role as a tool of communication.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Time Geach
 
Books on Amazon
I 303
Time/GeachVsQuine: Vs time cuts, Vs "hours-thick sclices" (> four dimensionalism). - Space/time are not equal axes - otherwise temperature curves would be the same as "world lines" in the "temperature-time continuum". - It is not true that quantifiers can only be applied to four-dimensional space-time points. ---
I 314
Space/time/Geach: are radically different: that the expression "between" is used in both, is misleading - spatial order: affects individual objects. - Temporal order: what is ordered here is represented by complex sentences. - Geach: in the temporal, ever more complex structures can be built, not in the spatial. - e.g. "x is between (y is over w) and z" makes no sense. ---
I 316
Time/Modal logic/Geach: I am convinced that the basic time determinations "before", "after", etc. belong to the formal logic. - I think they have to do with "possible" and "necessary". - One has claimed that a world in which the modus ponens no longer applies can be described as a world in which the time is two-dimensional or the past can be changed. - If the basic truths about time are logical, then a differently temporal world would be a chimera.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Translation Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Rorty I 217
Quine: indeterminacy of translation: we look at the totality of truths about nature, also unknown and unobservable as well as future truths. My thesis is that the indeterminacy of translation even resists all of these truths, the whole truth about nature. There is not really a question of making the right choice. Also within the allotted choices under determination any theory about nature has no objective fact. VsQuine: Many critics believe this is a remnant of traditional empiricism (Chomsky). PutnamVsQuine: why should we not just say: translation in accordance with those manuals that have this property? This is a variant of essentialism: according to which we know from the outset that something that cannot be packed into the vocabulary of the physics of the day is so insignificant that it merely exists "in the eyes of the affected person". (subjective convenience).
---
Quine I 90
Stimulus meaning/SM: objective reality that the linguist needs - translation, not identity but approaching stimulus meaning. ---
I 81
Translation: is independent of stimulus meaning "soltero" = "Bachelor" not because of a particular face - but words are learned first through stimulus meaning, later through abstraction. ---
I 117
Truth of categorical sentences depends on the object - Our special denoting apparatus - but stimulus meaning is similar for natives - Goodman’s individuals calculus is translatable as syllogistic. ---
I 129ff
Translation: translatable: observation sentences, truth functions (conjunctions, negatives, alterations) - Identifiable: stimulus analytical sentences, stimulus synonymous occasion sentences of natives - untranslatable: stimulus synonymous occasion sentences. ---
I 368
Animal: fear equivalent to German sentence - Church: has many different translations. ---
I 431
Paraphrase (no synonymy): Newton could be reformulated relativistically - like Church: "true in a higher sense" - sometimes acceptable. ---
II 34
Permutation: possible if sentence-by-sentence structure is maintained. ---
II 37
Actual: radical translation: no fact decides which of the two manuals is right - Actual ontologically, naturalistically - neither transcendental nor epistemological - physical conditions, not empirical skills - reinterpretation only for others, not for ourselves. - Factuality like gravity, inherent to our nature. ---
II 61 ff
Cognitive synonymy: various points in time, individual > Community > substitutability of words - same verdicts - not in translation. ---
VII 60f
Translation/Quine: (early): a) link a sound sequence to the circumstances - b) a synonymy of this sound sequence with English sound sequence that is associated with similar circumstances, assume - problem: the relevant properties of the circumstances are hidden in the person of the speaker (>Gavagai) - Cassirer/Whorf/Quine: language inseparable from the rest of the world - differences correspond with circumstances of the form of life - Morning Star can still be a good translation of the Evening Star. - We confuse meaning and reference, because we are used to pointing to things - problem: during work alienation from direct reports, thus the clarity of potential conflicts decreases.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Truth Predicate Grover, D. L.
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 356
T-predicate / Generalization / Semantic Ascent / Quine (1970): the T-predicate is nto needed, to generalize e.g. "Dick is mortal," "Tom s ...", ((s) that goes with "x ") but for the generalization of "Tom is mortal or not mortal." ((s) If "a or b" is true, then a is true or b is true or both., where "a" stands for a whole sentence and not "x" for an individual). - Camp/Grover/Belnap/CVGBVsQuine: without quantification over sentences, where a characteristic (truth) is attributed. (BelnapVsQuine, GroverVsQuine, CampVsQuine)
Grover, D. L.

Gro I D. Grover A Prosentential Theory of Thruth Princeton New Jersey 1992

Kamp/Grover/Belnap
D.L.Grover, J.L.Kamp, N.D. Belnap
Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975)

See external reference in the individual contributions.

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Twin Earth Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
II 89
Twin earth/fulfilment condition/Searle: what is decisive in the content that the presence of Sally and not twin earth-Sally is one of the fulfilment conditions? - (Qualitatively identical visual experiences) - how to determine that, is not the question, but what has been identified here on Earth before, may fulfill the conditions - SearleVs: this is the viewpoint of the 3rd person, but we need the 1st person. ---
apropos II 255
Twin Earth: Putnam(s) not a different type of water (tradition) but a different type of liquid. ---
II 283
Self-reference/Searle: is shown, but not seen - Twin Earth: "this man" different Fregean sense, although experiences are type-identical: perception and expression are self-referential, they would not be satisfied when exchanged - self-reference/Frege's "completing sense": intentional contents are never undefined (SearleVsQuine: no undefined sailboat can be desired). ---
II 316
Twin Earth/reference/Searle: reference cannot rely on descriptive content, our names would still relate with identical perceptual situation to our domestic objects - SearleVsPutnam: causal self-reference is not enough.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Two Dogmas Fodor
 
Books on Amazon
IV ~ 45
Meaning / Two Dogmas: if confirmation is reversible and meaning depends on confirmation (Peirce), then their statements may have their significance not essentially - PeirceVsQuine: confirmation constitutes meaning and therefore can not be contingent - then see QDT and Peirce s theory of incompatible - but TD seems to becommitted to both

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Two Dogmas Millikan
 
Books on Amazon
I 321
Wissen/Zusammenhang/Holismus/Quine/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: hängt nicht alles Wissen von „kollateraler Information“ ab, wie Quine sie nennt? Wenn alle Wahrnehmung mit allgemeinen Theorien verwoben ist, wie können wir dann einzelne Begriffe unabhängig vom Rest testen?
Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. These: Unsere Feststellungen über die äußere Welt stehen nicht einzeln vor dem Tribunal der Erfahrung, sondern nur als Korpus.
Daraus folgt: keine einzelne Überzeugung ist immun gegen Korrektur.

Test/Überprüfung/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: die meisten unserer Überzeugungen stehen niemals vor dem Tribunal der Erfahrung.
I 322
Daher ist es unwahrscheinlich, dass eine solche Überzeugung jemals durch andere Überzeugungen gestützt oder widerlegt wird. Bestätigung: einzige Bestätigung: durch meine Fähigkeit, die Gegenstände wiederzuerkennen, die in meinen Einstellungen vorkommen.
Daraus, dass Überzeugungen zusammenhängen folgt nicht, dass die Begriffe ebenso zusammenhängen müssen.
Identität/Identifikation/Millikan. die Erkenntnistheorie der Identität ist vorrangig vor der der Urteile.


Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Underdetermination Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 337
Underdetermination/Indeterminacy/Theory/ChomskyVsQuine: each hypothesis goes beyond the data, otherwise it would be uninteresting.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Underdetermination Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 227
Underdetermination / data / McDowellVsQuine: if truth is underdetermined by the totality of the observable, then it must be independent of them. - But then one would have to include biology, while we exclude translation.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Unit Set Russell
 
Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
I 54
singular class / individual set/Frege / Peano / RussellVsQuine: non-individual: "i x" the class whose only element is x "ie: i x = y ^ (y = x):" the class of objects that are identical with x "-

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Universals Strawson
 
Books on Amazon
I 88
Universals/Strawson: E.g. repeated tone - same chord in various concert halls. ---
I 176
Universals/Strawson: Tradition: only universals and particular-universals (E.g. be-married to John) can be predicted - particulars can never be predicted. ---
I 215
a) Type-universals: provides classification principle, does require none - E.g. generic names - b) characterizing universals: E.g. verbs, adjectives: deliver classification-principle - only for previously classified particulars - but also particulars themselves provide "principle of summary": E.g. Socrates as well as wisdom -> "attributive binding": (non-relational relation between particulars of different types). ---
I 216
Example of characterizing binding between Socrates and the universal death corresponds to the attributive binding between Socrates and his death - see copula. ---
I 251
Universals/Quine/Strawson: should only appear as predicates - pro "nominalism" - StrawsonVsQuine: the language terms of this analysis, already presuppose the existence of subject-expressions. ---
I 250
Essential feature-universals/essential feature-localizing findings/Strawson: E.g. it rains now - snow falls - here is water - no subject-predicate sentences - here no characterizing-universals, but types of material - also no type-universals - the least to make any empirical statements - introduction with demonstrative - N.B.: does not require particular - E.g. Cat essential feature: a) for the same cat, b) for another cat. ---
I 277
Essential-feature-universal/essential feature-localizing/Strawson: the corresponding essential feature-findings actually introduce things - but are not subject terms or subject phrases - "here"/"now" set no limits - (even if they are quantifiable, "there is no point in time "). ---
I 279
Things are not introduced by space and time adverbs.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Variables Prior
 
Books on Amazon
I 30
Number variables/Prior: no names. E.g. if exactly 3 things j and exactly 4 things y, then more things are j than y. Then "3" no name but inseparable part of verb operator"Exactly 3 things __". ---
I 33
Variables/Quine: (bound) can only stand for names. So for things, not for sentences. QuineVsFrege: names are not for sentences, only for things - E.g. "For a j, jx" is the only way to read this, that there is at least one thing, so that x "does" this thing - Quine himself does not do that but he has "E" for "is element of".
---
I 35
Bound variable/name/Prior: E.g. open sentence "x is red-haired": what is x? - depends on how we stand for" understanding: a) x is for a name, such as "Peter" (Substitute) - b) or object Peter - PriorVsQuine: bound variables can also stand for sentences: "J. believes that p" (anything), then stands for a sentence. ---
A propos I 93 (external):
Sentece Variable/Wittgenstein: Tractatus: The term presupposes forms of all sentences in which it can occur - 3.312 It is therefore represented by the general form of the sentences which it characterizes - Witt.: namely in this form the expression will be constant and everything else can be variable - sentence variable: Aristotle innovation "a" for a whole sentence.
---
Prior I 148
Bound variables/Prior: represent logical proper names - "For an x: 1. x ft, 2. nothing else than x ft and 3. it is not the case that x yt". ---
I 164f
Bound variable/PriorVsAmerican logicians: not any stands for a name.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Verification Millikan
 
Books on Amazon
I 297
Verifikation/Überprüfung/Erkenntnis/Erkenntnistheorie/Realismus/Naturalismus/Millikan: unser Problem der Erkenntnis von Identitäten ist ein anderes als das gewöhnliche Erkenntnisproblem der Realisten. Bei uns geht es nicht darum, dass es einen inneren Test für die korrekte Abbildung der Welt gibt. Wir müssen nur zeigen, dass es Tests geben kann, die
I 298
festlegen, ob Begriffe, wenn sie unter Normalen Bedingungen angewendet werden, abbildende Sätze hervorbringen. Korrespondenz/Kohärenz/Tradition/Millikan: für die Tradition muss es Kohärenz sein, wenn Korrespondenz nicht das richtige ist.
Test/Millikan: Bsp das Herz kann nur zusammen mit Nieren getestet werden.
Sprache/Bedeutung/Referenz/Welt/Realität/Abbildung/Millikan: wir versuchen nur zu verstehen, wie es einen Test geben kann, der in dieser unserer Welt historisch auf menschliche Begriffe angewendet wurde, und dessen Resultate mit der Welt korreliert sind aus Gründen, die wir angeben können.
Problem: wir sind hier stärker gehandicapt als der Realismus.
I 299
Es geht um die Möglichkeit von Bedeutungshaftigkeit und Intentionalität überhaupt.
Holismus/MillikanVsHolismus: der epistemische Holismus ist falsch.
Stattdessen wäre ein Test auf Nichtwiderspruch, wenn er nur auf eine kleine Gruppe von Begriffen angewendet wird, ein relativ effektiver Test für die Adäquatheit von Begriffen.

I 312
Begriff/Gesetz/Theorie/Test/Überprüfung/Millikan: wenn ein Begriff in einem Gesetz vorkommt ist es notwendig,
I 313
ihn zusammen mit anderen Begriffen zu testen. Verknüpft sind diese Begriffe nach gewissen Schlussregeln. Begriff/Millikan: dass Begriffe aus Intensionen bestehen, sind es die Intensionen, die getestet werden müssen.
Test: heißt aber nicht, dass das Vorkommen von Sinnesdaten vorausgesagt würde. (MillikanVsQuine).
I 317
Theorie/Überprüfung/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: ist es wirklich wahr, dass alle Begriffe zusammen getestet werden müssen? Tradition: sagt, dass nicht nur einige, sondern die meisten unserer Begriffe nicht von Dingen sind, die wir direkt beobachten sondern von anderen Dingen.
Test/logische Form/Millikan: wenn es ein Ding A gibt, ds identifiziert wird, indem Effekte auf B und C beobachtet werden, wird dann nicht die Gültigkeit der Begriffe von B und C zusammen mit der Theorie, die die beobachteten Effekte auf den Einfluss von A zurückführt, zusammen mit dem Begriff von A getestet?
Millikan. Nein!
Aus der Tatsache, dass meine Intension von A auf Intensionen von B und C zurückgeht folgt nicht, dass die Gültigkeit der Begriffe, die B und C regieren, getestet wird, wenn der Begriff, der A regiert, getestet wird und umgekehrt auch nicht.
Und zwar folgt es nicht, wenn A eine bestimmte Kennzeichnung ist Bsp „der erste Präsident der USA“ und es folgt auch nicht, wenn die explizite Intension von A etwas kausal Abhängiges repräsentiert Bsp „das Quecksilber in dem Thermometer hier stieg auf die Marke 70“ als Intension für „die Temperatur betrug 70 Grad“.
I 318
Begriff/Millikan; Begriffe sind Fähigkeiten – und zwar die Fähigkeit etwas als selbstidentisch zu erkennen. Test/Überprüfung: die Überprüfungen der Gültigkeit meiner Begriffe sind ganz unabhängig voneinander: Bsp meine Fähigkeit, einen guten Kuchen zu machen ist ganz unabhängig von meiner Fähigkeit Eier zu zerschlagen, auch wenn ich Eier zerschlagen muss, um den Kuchen zu machen.
I 320
Test/Überprüfung/Theorie/Millikan: dass ein Test funktioniert kann oft gewusst werden unabhängig davon zu wissen, wie er funktioniert.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Verificationism Esfeld
 
Books on Amazon
I 62 ~
Holism / FodorVsQuine: Verificationism refers to Verbal - confirmation holism in cotrast contrast on cross-language: propositions - EsfeldVsFodor: beliefs combine both.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002

World Line Hintikka
 
Books on Amazon
I XVI
World line/cross-world identity/Hintikka: 1. We must allow some objects not only to exist in certain worlds, but also that their existence is unthinkable there. That is, world lines can cease to exist - even worse: it may be that they are not defined in certain worlds. Problem: This is not permitted in the usual knowledge logic (belief logic).
2. World lines can be drawn in two ways:
A) object-centered
B) agent-centered.
Analogy: this can be related to Russell's distinction between knowledge through acquaintance and by description.
---
I 20
World line/Hintikka: world lines should connect the counterparts of an individual in different worlds. If we have a network of world lines (in relation to a subject of knowledge), then we have truth conditions for quantified sentences in an epistemic logic of the 1st level. ---
I 22
World line/epistemic logic/knowledge logic/acquaintance/description/knowledge/Hintikka: there must be two types of world lines: A) public: knowledge through description (psychological: semantic memory).
B) private: knowledge through acquaintance. E.g. visual perception (including memory). Only related to a subject. (Psychological: episodic memory).
These world lines are then bound to a scenario.
Quantification: Problem: we need two pairs of quantifiers then.
Spelling: (∀x)/(∃x) for the public, descriptive - (Ax)/(Ex) for the private world lines established by acquaintance. Then
(2.5) (Ex) {b} K (d = x)
I.e. in a visual perception situation, b can find a niche for d under his visual objects.
More generally: b is known with d, b knows d.
---
I 59
World line/Hintikka: we use world line instead of Frege's "way of being given". ---
I 105
World lines/possible worlds/Semantics/Hintikka: a typical case would be if there are two sets of world lines for a set of worlds, which also connect each individual to an individual in another world, but the two sets differ in which individual is connected to which one. Perception/observation language/observation concepts/Hintikka: for perception verbs we need such a possibility ((s) Because it can be that one mistakes an object for another.)
---
I 148
World lines/identification/cross-world identity/Hintikka: Thesis: the world lines must be drawn before the conditions are applied at all. The drawing of the world lines is never a part of the application of the uniqueness conditions. ((s) otherwise it would be circular). Truth-conditions/atomic/atomic set/Hintikka: for my theory the interplay of truth values of atomic and non-atomic sentences is essential: it shows, e.g. how the truth values of sentences of the form
"knows + a-W-word" sentences depend on the truth values of sentences of the form (18) - (19).
(18) (∃x) K (b = x)
(19) (Ex) K (b = x)
HintikkaVsQuine: his criticism is that these conditions are always indexed (indexical), i.e. that they are context-dependent. That is, that it is only in a certain situation whether an individual is the same. Or whether it is analog to one that would criticize traditional truth tables because some of the sentences that they serve to put them together are, for their part, blurred.
Epistemic logic/Hintikka: the epistemic logic, however, is not affected by this criticism. All it claims is that once the world lines are drawn, the rest of the semantics remains as it was.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996


The author or concept searched is found in the following 103 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Analyticity Fraassen Vs Analyticity
 
Books on Amazon
EMD II 133
How-Question/Frege/Dummett: belongs to epistemology and not to theory of meaning. Sense/DummettVsFrege: this seems obvious at first glance. But if the meaning is not related to the method of verification, why does Frege not allow two analytically equivalent sentences to have the same sense?
EMD II 134
Analyticity/FregeVsQuine/Dummett: He had a well-developed theory of analyticity. Whereas, if two analytically equivalent sentences may differ in sense, there is no criterion for identity.
FregeVs/Dummett: Of course, if the concession were granted (which one?), it could not be maintained that the senses of sentences (the thoughts) are objects of beliefs. I.e. the sense is the reference of the propositional attitudes.
DummettVsFrege: but this thesis itself requires the assumption that sense is connected to the way of knowing how or to the belief reasons.
Question: Can we say that the sense only determines the object, i.e. the "what", or also the "how" or "why" it is believed?
Problem: At first glance, the two are too closely interlinked to be seen individually. Why should two things A and B not have the same sense? The only possibility seems to be that X can believe (or know) one thing without believing (or knowing) the other (opaque context).
What makes this at all possible is that the reasons of the expressions may be different.
It follows that a difference in the reasons of expression includes a difference in the belief objects.
II 135
DummettVsFrege: his fault is to have failed to insist that the theory of meaning must explain what manifests the recognition of the speaker.
II 136
Theory of Meaning/MT/Verification/DummettVsFrege: a verificationist theory of meaning explains meanings in terms of the actual ability to recognize the truth of propositions.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Benacerraf, P. Reductionism Vs Benacerraf, P.
 
Books on Amazon
Field II 214
Reduktion/Denotation/BenacerrafVsReduktion/Field: (Benacerraf, 1965): Problem: hier kann es mehrere Korrelationen geben, so daß man unmöglich von dem „wirklichen Referenten“ von Zahl-Wörtern sprechen kann. mögliche Lösung/Field: jemand könnte sagen daß es nicht wichtig ist, daß die Zahl-Wörter gerade auf diese Objekte referiert, es ist hinreichend (könnte er sagen), daß wir die Rede über Zahlen durch die Rede über Objekte ersetzen können. (Quine 1960. § § 53,54).
FieldVsQuine: das würde die Lehrsätze von Euler und Gauß zu Sätzen erklären, die mit ihren Zahl-Wörtern auf nichts referieren und letztlich falsch wären.
Benacerraf/Field: scheint damit jede Reduktion auszuschließen.
ReduktionismusVsBenacerraf/Field: Autoren, die glauben, daß es abstrakte Gegenstände gibt, die keine Mengen sind, (d.h. Zahlen) könnten sagen: alles was Benacerraf damit zeigt, daß es eine eineindeutige Relation gibt. Zur Reduktion braucht man aber nur eine Erklärung zahlentheoretischer Wahrheit in Begriffen einer Korrespondenz zwischen Zahlwörtern auf der einen Seite und physischen Objekten und/oder Mengen auf der anderen Seite. (Mit einer Verallgemeinerung gilt das auch für Gavagai).
II 214/215
Bsp „prim“: relativ zu jeder  -Sequenz s die mit den Zahlen korreliert ist, signifiziert „prim“ ((s) nicht partiell!) die Prim-Positionen von s. Pointe: dann ist ein Satz wie Bsp „Die Zahl zwei ist Cäsar“ weder wahr noch falsch (OWW).
FieldVsBenacerraf: seine Beobachtung ist also umgehbar. Wir können mathematische Wahrheit bewahren. (>Wahrheitserhalt).

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Brandom, R. McDowell Vs Brandom, R.
 
Books on Amazon
Esfeld I 185
McDowell: (1996, S 31 32): we are held captive by an oscillation between two positions: 1. a coherentism, that only permits rational relations between convictions.
2. the myth of the given, which confuses a causal relationship with a rational one. That is, it gives us an excuse rather than a justification.
I 186
McDowellVstheory of coherence: lets revolve our convictions in the void, because no rational constraint on the part of the world is allowed. Solution:
Term/world/McDowell: thesis: the conceptual realm is to be perceived of as having no boundaries: it does not end there, where people and their interactions end, rather it includes the entire physical realm.
Content/McDowell: the facts themselves, which make up the world.
To draw a boundary between the conceptual and the non-conceptual would prevent that we could utilize wordly, rational constraints on our convictions.
Esfeld: that could be understood as meaning that this limit is only shifted so that the conceptual includes the experience, but then the relationship between world and experience would still be merely causal.
World/McDowell: is in itself conceptual!
McDowellVsBrandom: Vs inferential semantics.
McDowellVsQuine: Vs confirmation of holism.
I 187
McDowell/Esfeld: opens up the prospect of a comprehensive holism based on a holism philosophy of mind. The holism of persuasion refers to the whole conceptual realm. McDowell's unlimited conceptual realm thus expands the holism of persuasion.
The physical world itself is not outside the realm of intelligibility.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Carnap, R. Quine Vs Carnap, R.
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Carnap VII 151
Intensionalist Thesis of Pragmatics/CarnapVsQuine: determining the intention is an empirical hypothesis that can be checked by observing the linguistic habits. Extensionalist Thesis/QuineVsCarnap: determining the intention is ultimately a matter of taste, the linguist is free, because it can not be verified. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise. Quine: the completed lexicon is ex pede Herculem i.e. we risk an error if we start at the bottom. But we can gain an advantage from it! (?)
However, if in the case of the lexicon (?) we delay a definition of synonymy no problem arises as nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false.
VII 154
Intention/Carnap: essential task: to find out which variations of a given specimen in different ways (for example, size, shape, color) are allowed in the area of ​​the predicate. Intention: can be defined as the range of the predicate.
QuineVsCarnap: might answer that the man on the street would be unwilling to say anything about non-existent objects.
VII 155
CarnapVsQuine: the tests concerning the intentions are independent of existential questions. The man on the street is very well able to understand questions related to assumed counterfactual situations.
Lanz I 271
QuineVsCarnap: criticism of the distinction analytic/synthetic. This distinction was important for logical empiricism, because it allows an understanding of philosophy that assigns philosophy an independent task which is clearly distinct from that of empirical sciences! Quine undermines this assumption: the lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories!
I 272
There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and sciences are on one and the same continuum. ---
Newen I 123
Quine/Newen: is like Carnap in the spirit of empiricism, but has modified it radically.
I 124
Thought/Frege: irreducible. Thought/QuineVsFrege: seeks a reductive explanation of sentence content (like Carnap).
Base/QuineVsCarnap: not individual sense data, but objectively describable stimuli.
Sentence Meaning/Quine/Newen: is determined by two quantities:
1) the amount of stimuli leading to approval
2) the amount of the stimuli leading to rejection.
This only applies for occasion sentences.
I125
Def Cognitively Equivalent/Quine/Newen: = same meaning: two sentences if they trigger the same behavior of consent or reflection. For the entire language: if it applies to all speakers.
QuineVsCarnap: sentences take precedence over words.
- - -
Quine I 73
QuineVsCarnap: difference to Carnap's empirical semantics: Carnap proposes to explore meaning by asking the subject whether they would apply it under different, previously described circumstances. Advantage: opposites of terms such as "Goblin" and "Unicorn" are preserved, even if the world falls short of examples that could be so sharply distinct from each other in such a way.
I 74
Quine: the stimulus meaning has the same advantage, because there are stimulus patterns that would cause consent to the question "unicorn?", but not for "Goblin?" QuineVsCarnap: Carnap's approach presumes decisions about which descriptions of imaginary states are permissible. So, e.g. "Unicorn", would be undesired in descriptions to explore the meaning of "Unicorn". Difference:
Quine restricts the use of unfulfilled conditionals to the researchers, Carnap makes his researcher himself submit such judgments to the informant for evaluation. Stimulus meaning can be determined already in the first stages of radical translation, where Carnap's questionnaire is not even available yet.
Quine: theory has primarily to do with records,
Carnap: to do with terms.
- - -
I 466
For a long time, Carnap advocated the view that the real problems of philosophy are linguistic ones. Pragmatic questions about our language behavior, not about objects. Why should this not apply to theoretical questions in general?
I 467
This goes hand in hand with the analyticity concept. (§ 14) In the end, the theoretical sentences generally can only be justified pragmatically. QuineVsCarnap: How can Carnap draw a line there and claim that this does not apply for certain areas?
However, we note that there is a transition from statements about objects to statements about words, for example, when we skip classes when moving from questions about the existence of unicorns to questions about the existence of points and kilometers.

Through the much-used method of "semantic ascent": the transition from statements about kilometers to statements about "kilometers". From content-related to formal speech. It is the transition from speech in certain terms to talk about these concepts.
It is precisely the transition of which Carnap said that it undressed philosophical questions of their deceptive appearance and made them step forward in their true form.
QuineVsCarnap: this part, however, I do not accept. The semantic ascent of which I speak can be used anywhere. (Carnap: "content-related" can also be called "material".)
Ex If it came down to it, the sentence "In Tasmania there are Wombats" could be paraphrased like this: ""Wombat" applies to some creatures in Tasmania."
- - -
IV 404
Carnap/(Logical Particles): ("The logical structure of the world"): Thesis: it is possible in principle to reduce all concepts to the immediately given. QuineVsCarnap: that is too reductionist: Disposition concepts such as "soluble" cannot be defined like this. (Even later recognized by Carnap himself).
IV 416
QuineVsCarnap: Why all these inventive reconstructions? Ultimately sense stimuli are the only thing we have. We have to determine how the image of the world is constructed from them. Why not be content with psychology? - - -
V 28
Disposition/Quine: Problem: the dependence on certain ceteris paribus clauses. Potential disturbances must be eliminated. Solution: some authors: (like Chomsky) retreat to probabilities.
V 29
Carnap: instead of probability: reduction sentences seen as idealizations to which corrections are made. Carnap conceives these corrections as re-definitions, i.e. they lead to analytic sentences that are true from the meaning.
QuineVsCarnap: I make no distinction between analytical and other sentences.
V 30
Reflexes/Holt/Quine: those that are conditioned later are not fundamentally different from innate ones. They consist of nerve paths with reduced resistance. Quine: therefore, one can conceive disposition as this path itself! ((s) I.e. pratically physical. Precisely as physical state.)
Disposition/GoodmanVsQuine: a disposition expression is a change to an eventually mechanical description and therefore circular. The mechanistic terms will ultimately be implicit disposition terms.
QuineVsGoodman/QuineVsCarnap: I, unlike the two, am satisfied with a theoretical vocabulary, of which some fundamental physical predicates were initially learned with the help of dipositioned speech. (Heuristic role).
- - -
VII 40
But his work is still only a fragment of the whole program. His space-time-point quadruples presume a world with few movements ("laziest world"). Principle of least movement is to be the guide for the construction of a world from experience.
QuineVsCarnap: he seemed not to notice that his treatment of physical objects lacked in reduction! The quadruples maximize and minimize certain overall features and with increasing experience the truth values ​​are revised in the same sense.
- - -
X 127
Logical Truth/Carnap: Thesis: only the language and not the structure of the world makes them true. Truth/Logical Truth/QuineVsCarnap: is not a purely linguistic matter.
Logic/QuineVsCarnap: the two breakdowns that we have just seen are similar in form and effect:
1) The logic is true because of the language only insofar as it is trivially true because of everything.
2) The logic is inseparable from the translation only insofar as all evident is inseparable from the translation.
Logic/Language/Quine: the semantic ascent seems to speak for linguistic theory.
QuineVs: the predicate "true" (T predicate) already exists and helps precisely to separate logic from language by pointing to the world.
Logic: While talks a lot about language, it is geared towards the world and not towards language. This is accomplished by the T predicate.
X 133
We learn logic by learning language. VsCarnap: but that does not differentiate logic from other areas of everyday knowledge!
- - -
XI 99
QuineVsProtocol Sentence/QuineVsCarnap/Lauener: describes private, non-public autopsychological experiences.
XI 129
Intention/Carnap/Lauener: (Meaning and Necessity): attempts to introduce intentions without thereby entangling himself in metaphysics. QuineVsCarnap: you cannot take advantage of a theory without paying the ontological bill. Therefore, the assumed objects must be values ​​of the variable.
Another way would be to say that certain predicates must be true for the theory to be true. But that means that it is the objects that must be the values ​​of variables.
To every value applies a predicate or its negation. ((s) >continuous determination).
XI 130
Conversely, everything to which a predicate applies is a value of a variable. Because a predicate is an open sentence.
XI 138
Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: Ex "x is a thing": at a higher level of universality existence assumptions no longer refer to the world, but only to the choice of a suitable linguistic framework. QuineVsCarnap: this is merely a gradual difference.
XI 142
Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: (temporarily represented): Thesis: philosophical questions are always questions about the use of language. Semantic Ascent/QuineVsCarnap: it must not be misused for evasive ontological maneuvers.
XI 150
Thing/Object/Carnap/Lauener: to accept things only means choosing a certain language. It does not mean believing in these things.
XI 151
CarnapVsQuine: his existence criterion (being the value of a bound variable) has no deeper meaning in as far as it only expresses a linguistic choice. QuineVsCarnap: language and theory cannot be separated like that. Science is the continuation of our daily practice.
- - -
XII 69
QuineVsCarnap/QuineVsUniversal Words: it is not said what exactly is the feature for the scope. Ontological Relativity/QuineVsCarnap: cannot be enlightened by internal/external questions, universal words or universal predicates. It has nothing to do with universal predicates. The question about an absolute ontology is pointless. The fact that they make sense in terms of a framework is not because the background theory has a wider scope.
Absolute Ontology/Quine: what makes it pointless, is not its universality but its circularity.
Ex "What is an F?" can only be answered by recourse to another term: "An F is a G."
- - -
XII 89
Epistemology/Scope/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements + statements about the future are uncertain if understood as about sense data or sensations) is still unsolved. Carnap/Quine: his structures would have allowed translating all sentences about the world in sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory.
XII 90
QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observational terms does not mean that it could be proved by means of logic and set theory from observation statements. ((s) means of expression are not evidence. (inside/outside, plain, circles).)
Epistemology/Quine: Important argument: wanting to equip the truths about nature with the full authority of direct experience is just as much sentenced to failure as the reduction of truths in mathematics to the potential intelligibility of elementary logic.
XII 91
Carnap/QuineVsCarnap: If Carnap had successfully carried out its construction, how could he have known if it is the right one? The question would have been empty! Any one would have appeared satisfactory if only it had represented the physical contents properly. This is the rational reconstruction.
Def Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: construction of physicalistic statements from observation terms, logical and set-theoretical concepts.
QuineVsCarnap: Problem: if that had been successful, there would have been many such constructions and each would have appeared equally satisfactory,if only it had represented the physicalistic statements properly. But each would have been a great achievement.
XII 92
QuineVsCarnap: unfortunately, the "structure" provides no reduction qua translation that would make the physicalist concepts redundant. It would not even do that if his sketch was elaborated. Problem: the point where Carnap explains how points in physical space and time are attributed sensory qualities.
But that does not provide a key for the translation of scientific sentences into such that are formed of logic, set-theoretical and observation concepts.
CarnapVsCarnap: later: ("Testability and Meaning", 1936): reduction propositions instead of definitions.
XII 94
Empiricism/QuineVsCarnap: empiricism has 1) abandoned the attempt to deduce the truth about nature from sensory experience. With that he has made a substantial concession.
2) He has abandoned rational reconstruction, i.e. attempt to translate these truths in observation terms and logical mathematical tools.
QuineVsPeirce: Suppose we meant that the meaning of a statement consists in the difference that its truth makes for the experience. Could we then not formulate in a page-long sentence in observation language any differences that might account for the truth, and could we then not see this as a translation?
Problem: this description could be infinitely long, but it could also be trapped in an infinitely long axiomatization.
Important argument: thus the empiricist abandons the hope that the empirical meaning of typical statements about reality could be expressed.
Quine: the problem is not too high a complexity for a finite axiomatization, but holism:
XII 95
Meaning/QuineVsPeirce: what normally has experience implications ("difference in the experience") only refers to theories as a whole, not to individual experience sentences. QuineVsCarnap: also the "structure" would have to be one in which the texts, into which the logical mathematical observation terms are to be translated, are entire theories and not just terms or short sentences.
Rational Reconstruction/QuineVsCarnap: would be a strange "translation": it would translate the whole (whole theories), but not the parts!
Instead of "translation" we should just speak of observation bases of theories.
pro Peirce: we can very well call this the meaning of empirical theories. ((s) Assigning whole theories to observations).

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Chomsky, N. Searle Vs Chomsky, N.
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
SearleVsChomsky: he went a step too far: he should deny that the speech organ has any structure that can be described as an automaton. So he became a victim of the analytical technique.
Dennett I 555
Language/SearleVsChomsky: One can explain language acquisition this way: there is actually an innate language acquisition device. Bat that will ad nothing to the hardware explanation assuming deep unconscious universal grammatical rules. This does not increase the predictive value.   There are naked, blind neurophysiological processes and there is consciousness. There is nothing else. ((s) otherwise regress through intermediaries).
- - -
Searle I 273
SearleVsChomsky: for universal grammar there is a much simpler hypothesis: there is indeed a language acquisition device. Brings limitations, what types of languages can be learned by human being. And there is a functional level of explanation which language types a toddler can learn when applying this mechanism.
By unconscious rules the explanatory value is not increased.
- - -
IV 9
SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsRyle: there are neither alternative deep structures nor does is require specific conversations potulate.
IV 204
Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: it is often said folllowing Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms).
VI 205
This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Their unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we go from sounds to files.
- - -
VIII 411
Grammar/language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's students (by Searle called "Young Turks") pursue Chomsky's approach more radically than Chomsky. (see below). Aspects of syntactic theory/Chomsky: (mature work, 1965) more ambitious targets than previously: Statement of all linguistic relations between the sound system and the system of meaning.
VIII 412
For this, the grammar must consist of three parts: 1. syntactic component that describes the internal structure of the infinite number of propositions (the heart of the grammar)
2. phonological component: sound structure. (Purely interpretative)
3. semantic component. (Purely interpretive),.
Also structuralism has phrase structure rules.
VIII 414
It is not suggested that a speaker actually passes consciously or unconsciously for such a process of application of rules (for example, "Replace x by y"). This would be assumed a mix of competence and performance. SearleVsChomsky: main problem: it is not yet clear how the theory of construction of propositions supplied by grammarians accurately represents the ability of the speaker and in exactly what sense of "know" the speaker should know the rules.
VIII 420
Language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's conception of language is eccentric! Contrary to common sense believes it will not serve to communicate! Instead, only a general function to express the thoughts of man.
VIII 421
If language does have a function, there is still no significant correlation with its structure! Thesis: the syntactic structures are innate and have no significant relationship with communication, even though they are of course used for communication.
The essence of language is its structure.
E.g. the "language of the bees" is no language, because it does not have the correct structure.
Point: if one day man would result in a communication with all other syntactic forms, he possessed no language but anything else!
Generative semantics/Young TurksVsChomsky: one of the decisive factors in the formation of syntactic structures is the semantics. Even terms such as "grammatically correct" or "well-formed sentence" require the introduction of semantic terms! E.g. "He called him a Republican and insulted him".
ChomskyVsYoung Turks: Mock dispute, the critics have theorized only reformulated in a new terminology.
VIII 422
Young Turks: Ross, Postal, Lakoff, McCawley, Fillmore. Thesis: grammar begins with a description of the meaning of a proposition.
Searle: when the generative semantics is right and there is no syntactic deep structures, linguistics becomes all the more interesting, we then can systematically investigate how form and function are connected. (Chomsky: there is no connection!).
VIII 426
Innate ideas/Descartes/SearleVsChomsky: Descartes has indeed considered the idea of a triangle or of perfection as innate, but of syntax of natural language he claimed nothing. He seems to have taken quite the contrary, that language is arbitrary: he assumed that we arbitrarily ascribe our ideas words!
Concepts are innate for Descartes, language is not.
Unconscious: is not allowed with Descartes!
VIII 429
Meaning theory/m.th./SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsQuine: most meaning theories make the same fallacy: Dilemma:
a) either the analysis of the meaning itself contains some key elements of the analyzed term, circular. ((s) > McDowell/PeacockeVs: Confusion mention/use).
b) the analysis leads the subject back to smaller items, that do not have key features, then it is useless because it is inadequate!
SearleVsChomsky: Chomsky's generative grammar commits the same fallacy: as one would expect from the syntactic component of the grammar that describes the syntactic competence of the speaker.
The semantic component consists of a set of rules that determine the meanings of propositions, and certainly assumes that the meaning of a propositions depends on the meaning of its elements as well as on their syntactic combination.
VIII 432
The same dilemma: a) In the various interpretations of ambiguous sentences it is merely paraphrases, then the analysis is circular.
E.g. A theory that seeks to explain the competence, must not mention two paraphrases of "I went to the bank" because the ability to understand the paraphrases, just requires the expertise that will explain it! I cannot explain the general competence to speak German by translating a German proposition into another German proposition!
b) The readings consist only of lists of items, then the analysis is inadequate: they cannot declare that the proposition expresses an assertion.
VIII 433
ad a) VsVs: It is alleged that the paraphrases only have an illustrative purpose and are not really readings. SearleVs: but what may be the real readings?
Example Suppose we could interpret the readings as heap of stones: none for a nonsense phrase, for an analytic proposition the arrangement of the predicate heap will be included in the subject heap, etc.
Nothing in the formal properties of the semantic component could stop us, but rather a statement of the relationship between sound and meaning theory delivered an unexplained relationship between sounds and stones.
VsVs: we could find the real readings expressed in a future universal semantic alphabet. The elements then stand for units of meaning in all languages.
SearleVs: the same dilemma:
a) Either the alphabet is a new kind of artificial language and the readings in turn paraphrases, only this time in Esperanto or
b) The readings in the semantic alphabet are merely a list of characteristics of the language. The analysis is inadequate, because it replaces a speech through a list of elements.
VIII 434
SearleVsChomsky: the semantic part of its grammar cannot explain, what the speaker actually recognizes when it detects one of the semantic properties. Dilemma: either sterile formalism or uninterpreted list.
Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: Solution: Speech acts have two properties whose combination we dismiss out of the dilemma: they are regularly fed and intentional.
Anyone who means a proposition literally, expresses it in accordance with certain semantic rules and with the intention of utterance are just to make it through the appeal to these rules for the execution of a particular speech act.
VIII 436
Meaning/language/SearleVsChomsky: there is no way to explain the meaning of a proposition without considering its communicative role.
VIII 437
Competence/performance/SearleVsChomsky: his distinction is missed: he apparently assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more a theory of performance than one of competence. He does not see that competence is ultimately performance skills. ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: Chomsky seems to suspect behaviorism behind the speech act.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Coherence Theory McDowell Vs Coherence Theory
 
Books on Amazon
Esfeld I 185
McDowell: (1996, S 31 32): we are held captive by an oscillation between two positions: 1. a coherentism, that only permits rational relations between convictions.
2. the myth of the given, which confuses a causal relationship with a rational one. That is, it gives us an excuse rather than a justification.
I 186
McDowellVstheory of coherence: lets revolve our convictions in the void, because no rational constraint on the part of the world is allowed. Solution:
Term/world/McDowell: thesis: the conceptual realm is to be perceived of as having no boundaries: it does not end there, where people and their interactions end, rather it includes the entire physical realm.
Content/McDowell: the facts themselves, which make up the world.
To draw a boundary between the conceptual and the non-conceptual would prevent that we could utilize wordly, rational constraints on our convictions.
Esfeld: that could be understood as meaning that this limit is only shifted so that the conceptual includes the experience, but then the relationship between world and experience would still be merely causal.
World/McDowell: is in itself conceptual!
McDowellVsBrandom: Vs inferential semantics.
McDowellVsQuine: Vs confirmation of holism.
I 187
McDowell/Esfeld: opens up the prospect of a comprehensive holism based on a holism philosophy of mind. The holism of persuasion refers to the whole conceptual realm. McDowell's unlimited conceptual realm thus expands the holism of persuasion.
The physical world itself is not outside the realm of intelligibility.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Compositionality Schiffer Vs Compositionality
 
Books on Amazon:
Stephen Schiffer
I 220
SchifferVsCompositionality: my rejection is based all the time on the rejection of the theory of relations for belief. Here it is difficult to speculate about what kind of conditional sentences for "believes" would require a meaning theory that would not be a truth-theoretic semantics. How could such m.th. look like at all?.
E.g. Conceptual Role Semantics: (Schiffer Vs: see section 4.3).
Bsp Game Theoretical Semantics/game theory/Hintikka/Schiffer: (Hintikka 1982): this is not an alternative to the conventional theory.
PeacockeVsHintikka: (1978) has shown that game theoretical rules provide corresponding truth-theoretical or model theoretical axioms.
- - -
I XV
SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: natural languages do not have any compositional meaning theories (m.th.).
I 137
Paul and Elmar/SchifferVsQuine: Quine: there are no countable belief objects. E.g. if John believes that snow is white, and Mary believes that snow is white, there must be something that both believe. Schiffer: this conditional is false:
I 138
Either that or the alleged quantification through belief objects is not what it appears to be the Quine eye.
I 144
SchifferVsQuine: harmless apparent quantification. SchifferVsCompositionality: we can now conclude that no natural language has a compositional truth-theoretic semantics (comp.tr.th.Sem.). Otherwise the theory of relations would be correct.
In addition, it also has no compositional m.th. because then it has to be a compositional semantics.
Understanding/SchifferVsFrege: So compositional semantics are not required to explain speech understanding!
I 182
SchifferVsCompositional Semantics: it is false, even regardless of the falsity of the theory of relations of belief. ((s) Compositional Semantics/(s): does not consider the truth conditions but speaks only of the contributions of the meaning of words for the meaning of the proposition.)
Schiffer. 1. t is not plausible that languages have a compositional truth-theoretic semantics unless it follows from the stronger assertion that they have compositional truth theories, which themselves are truth-theoretic. (> stronger/weaker).
I 192
SchifferVsCompositionality/public language/Mentalese/Schiffer: if I'm right, that no public language has a compositional semantics, I have to find a mistake in (U). It is not my goal to show that speech comprehension does not imply that the natural languages have compositional semantics, the explanation of our understanding would be an empirical task. I rather want to give a counter-E.g. VsCompositionality.
E.g. (1) Harvey understands an indefinite number of new propositions of a language E1, which itself contains infinitely many propositions.
(2) an explanation of his capabilities does not require compositional semantics.
E1: is not a fully-developed natural language.
I 193
Harvey: is in this considered possible world an information-processing machine that thinks in machine language: "M": Belief/conviction: Harvey has it if it is in a certain computational relation to an embodied (tokened) proposition of M. ((s) Mentalese: so there is still an internal relation to one's own thought language).
B: is a box in Harveys head in which a proposition of M (tokened) exists exactly then when a token from the proposition occurs in B. (Assuming, Harvey has only a finite number of convictions).
Belief: for each there is exactly one proposition in Mentalese whose occurrence in B realizes it.
µ: is a formula in M so that Harvey believes that snow is white.
Realisation/"meaning"/Schiffer: as propositions of M (machine language, Mentalese) realize belief, they also have ipso facto semantic or representational properties. Then it is fair to say that μ "means" that snow is white. And also, that a component of μ references as inner counterpart of the word to snow in the public language.
- - -
I 195
Speech comprehension/Understanding/Schiffer: without compositionality: E.g. (Continuation: E1: spoken language (without ambiguity and indices)
M: Mentalese for Harvey
conceptual role: to explain the transition from (1) to (2). (and any others that correspond to it).
Propositions in internal code: (or representations thereof:
(3) Nemrac derettu "sum"-"sno"-"iz"-"pör-pol"
((s) English backward, [phonetic language], metalanguage (ML) and object language (OL) mixed)
(4) Nemrac dias taht emons wons si elprup
((s) English backward, but explicit language, ML)
and
(5) Nemrac ecnarettu si eurt ffi emos wons si elprup
((s) ML and OL! "true" and "iff" in machine language, but without everyday linguistic meaning or "eurt" does not have to mean "true"! Conceptual role instead of meaning).
I 196
Conceptual Role/c.r./SchifferVsCompositionality: we hereby show that "dias taht" and "eurt" can have conceptual roles that a) do not require any compositional semantics,
b) explain the transition from one occurrence of (3) in Harveys B-Box to an occurence of (4) and (5)
We do not need to specify the full meaning role! I simply assume that (4) and (5) have a role ("whichever"), which by virtue of their formula in Harvey triggers this belief. And none of this makes a compositional semantics necessary:
Justification: E.g. you could just have a mapping relation for propositions between two different languages, with which a person who does not understand the other language, knows when a proposition of the other language is true. (…+…) I 200, 202f, 208.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Correspondence Theory Quine Vs Correspondence Theory
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
VI 112
Proposition/Fact/Correspondence/Quine: a better cultivated theory postulates facts to which true sentences then should correspond as a whole.
VI 113
But: QuineVsCorrespondence Theory: Although a host of objects is needed for an explanation of the world, namely abstract and concrete ones, but apart from the pseudo-foundation of such a correspondence theory facts do not in the least contribute. We can simply cross out "It is a fact that" from our sentences.
- - -
X 18
Sentence Meaning/Quine: apparently the same as fact: e.g. that snow is white. Both have the same name: that snow is white. That rings of correspondence theory, but as such it is but empty talk.
QuineVsCorrespondence Theory: here: empty talk. The correspondence exists only between the two non-tangible elements to which we referred as intermediate members standing between the German sentence and the white snow: meaning and fact.
VsQuine: it could be argued that this is taking the intermediate members (meaning and fact) too literally.
X 19
When speaking of meaning as a factor of truth of the proposition, we can say that the English sentence "Snow is white" would have been wrong if, for example, the word "white" would be applied in English to green things. And the reference to a fact is just an expression. Quine: very good. As long as we do not have to assume propositions for that.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Davidson, D. Dummett Vs Davidson, D.
 
Books on Amazon
Dummett I ~28
DavidsonVsTarski: ... one must have a previous understanding of the concept of truth. - But not of the conditions! Because this knowledge will be determined by the theory of truth!. Dummett: What has to be introduced, however, is the realization of the conceptual link between meaning and truth.
DummettVsDavidson: In Davidson much remains implicit, E.g. this same context, which is required of every speaker. Without the exact nature of this relation the description of the T-Theory is still not a sufficient explanation of the concept of meaning. Correspondence Th./Coherence Th.: meaning before truth - Davidson: truth before meaning (truth conditions defined later by theory) - Dummett both together!.
I 142
Since the vocabulary changes and can be used differently, Davidson no longer assumes the language of a particular individual to be the starting unit, but the disposition for language usage. DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: not idiolect, but common language prevailing.
I 146
Davidson def idiolect (refined): Language, date, speaker, certain listener. If there was a language that was only spoken by one personn, we could still all learn it. DummettVsDavidson: but in this case remains unresolved: the relation between truth and meaning, more precisely, between truth conditions and use.
Dummett: every participant in the conversation has his own theory of what the words mean. And these theories coincide, or nearly so.
I 187
DummettVsDavidson, DummettVsQuine: It is not permissible to assume that meaning and understanding depend on the private and non-communicable knowledge of a theory. It is not natural to understand precisely the idiolect primarily as a tool of communication. It is then more likely trying to see an internal state of the person concerned as that which gives the expressions of idiolect their respective meanings.
I 149
E.g. What a chess move means is not derived from the knowledge of the rules by the players, but from the rules themselves. DummettVsDavidson: If the philosophy of language is described as actually a philosophy of action, not much is gained, there is nothing language-specific in the actions.
- - -
Avramides I 8
DummettVsDavidson: not truth conditions, but verification conditions. The theory of meaning must explain what someone knows who understands one language. (This is a practical ability).
I 9
This ability must be able to manifest itself, namely through the use of expressions of that language. DummettVsDavidson/Avramides: a realistically interpreted theory of truth cannot have a concept of meaning.
I 87
Dummett: talks about translating a class of sentences that contain a questionable word. DavidsonVsDummett: This class automatically expands to an entire language! (Holism). (s) So to speak this "class of relevant sentences" does not exist.
DavidsonVsDummett/Avramides: Davidson still believes that you need a body of connected sentences, he only differs with Dummett on how to identify it. There may be sentences that do not contain the word in question, but still shed light on it. It may also be important to know in what situations the word is uttered.
Solution: "Translation without end".
EMD II 108
Truth Theory/M.Th./Dummett: There is certainly a wide field in non-classical logic for which is possible to construct a m.th that supplies trivial W sets. DummettVsDavidson: whenever this can be done, the situation is exactly reversed as required for Davidson’s m.th. A trivial axiom for any expression does not itself show the understanding, but pushes the whole task of explaining to the theory of meaning, which explains what it means to grasp the proposition expressed by the axiom.
- - -
Putnam I 148
Truth/Dummett: Neither Tarski’s theory of truth nor Davidson’s theory of meaning (assuming a spirit-independent world) have any relevance for the truth or falsity of these metaphysical views:. DummettVsDavidson: one has to wonder what this "knowing the theory of truth" as such consists in.
Some (naturalistic) PhilosophersVsDummett: the mind thinks up the statements consciously or unconsciously.
VsVs: but how does he think them, in words? Or in thought signs? Or is the mind to grasp directly without representations what it means that snow is white?.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Davidson, D. Fodor Vs Davidson, D.
 
Books on Amazon
IV 68
Problem: the logical apparatus which the meta-language needs to produce correct T-sentences automatically also produces an indefinite number of incorrect W sentences. Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: Currently, there are no suggestions as to what a theory-neutral concept of canonical derivation should look like!
IV 69
Therefore, no one knows what to consider a canonical derivation if the syntax varies from truth theory to truth theory. "Canonical Axiom"/Fodor/Lepore: such a thing would certainly not make sense: Also the issue of the attached logical truth would immediately identify this axiom as well.
Q: does not depend on the logical truth being attached behind, i.e. to the right side.
QuineVsDavidson: shows that it can also be smuggled in earlier: E.g. (x)(x satisfies "is white" iff. (x is white and LT).
could be taken as an axiom, then the derivative of Q would be a "canonical proof".
This shows once again that compositionality is not a sufficient condition to exclude the extensionality problem.
E.g. Assuming the difficulties had been solved so far, then we would have an argument that a WT, which includes W and WT, which includes T can be distinguished then (and perhaps only then) if the language L includes sentences with "snow", "white", "grass", and "green" in structures with demonstratives.
That seems to be a holistic consequence.
Vs: but that’s premature.
Language/Radical Interpretation/RI/Davidson/Quine: Thesis: nothing can ever be a language if it is not accessible to radical interpretation!
I.e. it must be possible to find out a correct WT by that evidence which observation allows.
Fodor/Lepore VsQuine/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: it is not reasonable to establish this principle: on the contrary, if radical interpretation is understood like this, it is conceivable that a perfectly kosher language like English is not a language at all!
Then there are two possible ways to justify equating the evidence for the selection of a WT with proof about the speaker behavior:
1) that the child and the field linguist are successful with it. A fortiori it must be possible.
IV 74
Vs: but this is deceptive. There is no reason to assume that the choice of is determined only by the available behavioral observation, along with something like a canon. Linguistics/Fodor/Lepore: the real linguistics always tries to exploit something like the intuitions of its informants, is therefore not in the epistemic situation of radical interpretation.
It has a background of very powerful theoretical assumptions.
From the perspective of radical interpretation, this background is circular: the evidence of the acceptance of these assumptions (background) is the current success of the linguist. (> hermeneutic circle).
These include assumptions about cognitive psychology, universals, etc.
IV 84
Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: his idea that W sentences themselves could be laws is not plausible. Even if they were, there would be no guaranteed inference from the lawlikeness of the W sentences to the content holism. W sentences are not laws. How could they be, given the conventionality of language!
IV 98
"Sam believes that snow is white" is true iff. Sam believes that snow is F. Principle of Charity/Fodor/LeporeVsPoC/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: the principle of charity does not help here at all! If we interpret Sam as believing that snow is white, and believing that snow is F, both makes Sams belief true!.
IV 100
PoC/Radical Interpretation//RI/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: we have only seen one case where the principle of charity could be applied to the radical interpretation: if there are expressions that. 1) do not occur in token reflexive expressions
2) are syntactically atomistic.
The interpretation of such expressions can not be fixed by their behavior in token reflexive expressions, it cannot be recovered by the compositionality of the interpretations of its parts.
IV 101
we do not know whether such forms exist. E.g. Maybe "proton". In such cases, the principle of charity would be un-eliminable.
> Behavior/wish IV 120ff.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Davidson, D. Quine Vs Davidson, D.
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Davidson I 42
QuineVsDavidson: answered in "Der Kerngedanke des dritten Dogmas" (Th. and things): Davidson's account of his dualism of scheme and content involved a separation of conceptual schemes and language, but he did not think of separation but the concept of uninterpreted content is necessary to make conceptual relativism comprehensible.
Davidson II 92
Quine: privileged access - Davidson Action/QuineVsDavidson: "well-swept ontology": not more than physical objects and classes. ((s) I.e. act not an object, but event) (>ontology).
II 97
An identity statement "a = b" for events is true iff. a and b have identical causes and consequences.
II 98
Idea: that the causal nexus of all events opens up a kind of system of coordinates similar to that of material things in space and time in which each event is unique.
QuineVsDavidson: the criterion presupposes already that we know what it is yet to tell us. Causes and consequences are in turn events, and each event has exactly one place in the network. Infinite recourse. Thereupon Davidson rejects his idea. He takes over Quine's identity criterion for material objects: An identity statement "a = b" for material objects is only true if a and b have the same space-time coordinates.
- - -
Quine II 56
Empiricism/Quine: stimuli do not make true, but lead to securitized beliefs. Quine: Davidson is right in that there is nothing to be added to Tarski when it comes to the concept of truth.
QuineVsDavidson: However what I feel to be a fusion of truth and belief is that Davidson, when he speaks of "the totality of experience" and "surface irritation", makes no difference between these and the "facts" and the "world".
Quine: Experience and surface irritation should not be the basis of truth, but the foundation of the securitized conviction.
Empiricism: If empiricism is interpreted as a theory of truth, it is right that Davidson claims the third dogma to him and rejects it, fortunately this causes empiricism to go overboard as a truth theory.
Empiricism: Empiricism remains a theory of evidence. However, minus the two old dogmas.
Quine: the Third Dogma remains untouched: now, however, with respect to securitized beliefs! It has both a descriptive and a normative aspect. And in none of these aspects it seems to me like a dogma. This is what partially makes scientific theory empirical, not merely a quest for inner coherence.
- - -
VI 57
Proximal/Distal/DavidsonVsQuine: the stimulus should rather be localized in the common world than at the private external surfaces of the object. The world should be the common cause. Rather a common situation than a rabbit or any object. We should make an ontology of situations our own.
VI 58
Proximal/Distal/QuineVsDavidson: I prefer to stick to determining our stimuli by neural input. I#m particularly interested in the issue of transport of perception evidence from the nerve endings to the proclamation of the sciences. My naturalism would allow me (if not the interpreted individual) to relate freely to nerve endings, rabbits or any other physical objects.
VI 59
"Common situations" are too vague for me.
VI 62
Private Stimulus Meaning/QuineVsDavidson: I locate them still on the outer surfaces of the individual (proximal): hence its stimulus meanings also remain private. I would be completely indifferent if they turned out to be as idiosyncratic as the internal nervous structures of the individuals themselves!
VI 63
      In any case, outside in the open air we are dealing with our generally accessible language which each of us internalizes neurally in our own way. - - -
VI 136
Theory/Empirical Equivalence/Empirically Equivalent/Quine: we now restrict our consideration to global world systems to avoid the question of the integration of both theories in a general context. Ex So we imagine an alternative global system that is empirically equivalent to ours, but is based on exotic terms.
VI 137
If this theory is as simple as ours, we eliminate all the exotic terms like "phlogiston" or "entelechy", since they have no predictive power. Here, then, in fact coherence considerations materialize! (>Coherence Theory).
In fact, there are cases where we have recourse to elements foreign to the theory: Ex computers to solve the four-color problem, e.g. additional truths of the numbers, theory by digressions into analysis.
Assuming the alternative theory is just as simple. But the exotic terms do not cover any newly added observable facts.
VI 138
Quine: recommends the "secessionist" position: we should reject all the contexts in which exotic terms are used. With this unequal treatment we do not justify that our own theory is the more elegant one, but we can claim that we have no access to the truth beyond our own theory. The reverse position would be ecumenical: both theories would thus be simultaneously true.
VI 139
Davidson: Variant: let both theories apply and understand the truth predicate so that it operates in an encompassing and theory-neutral language in which both theories are formulated quote-redeemingly. QuineVsDavidson: which raises questions with regard to the comprehensive language. The variables would have to extend further, but how much further? How about the truth? We must stop this at some point. We did not want a third theory.
The secessionist position may as well recognize the same right of the competing global theories. It can still award the label of entitlement, if not the truth, impartially.
VI 140
It can also switch between the two theories, and declare the terms of the other theory pointless for the time being while declaring their own to be true. - - -
XI 156
Event/Identity/QuineVsDavidson/Lauener: the identity of events is a pseudo-problem.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
Descartes, R. Quine Vs Descartes, R.
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
I 56
The truth attributions are in the same boat as the true propositions themselves. QuineVsDescartes: Even if we are in the midst of in philosophizing, we retain and use - unlike Descartes - our present beliefs until we improve them here and there because of the scientific method.
- - -
Stroud I 227
Deception/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: the concept of illusion itself is based on science, because the quality of deception is simply in the departure from external scientific reality. (Quine, Roots of reference, 3) Illusions only exist relative to a previously held assumption of real objects.
Given Facts/QuineVsSellars/Stroud: This may be the reason to assume a non-binding given fact. (SellarsVsQuine).
QuineVsDescartes/Stroud: Important Argument: then it might seem impossible to refer to the possibility of deception, because a certain knowledge of external reality is necessary to understand the concept of illusion!
Stroud: We have treated arguments of this form earlier (see above >distortion of meaning). Violation of the conditions necessary for the application of certain concepts.
Quine/Stroud: he could now be answered in line with StroudVsAustin, MooreVsAustin, but Quine will not make these mistakes.
Language/Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: his approach to the language (QuineVsAnalyticity, QuineVsSynonymy) leaves him no way to refer to what the meaning of a particular term is.
StroudVsQuine: but if he thinks that the scientific origins do not lead to skepticism, why does he think that because the "skeptical doubts are scientific doubts"
I 228
the epistemologists are "clearly" entitled to use empirical science? The question becomes even more complicated by Quine's explicit denial that:
Skepticism/Quine: I'm not saying that he leaves the question unanswered, he is right in using science to reject science. I merely say that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts.
TraditionVsQuine/Stroud: this is important for the defense of the traditional epistemologist: if it is not a logical error to eventually disprove doubts from the science itself so that at the end there is certainty, what then is the decisive logical point he has missed?
StroudVsQuine: if his "only point" is that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts, then epistemology becomes part of science.
SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: but the skeptic might respond with a "reductio ad absurdum" and then epistemology would no longer be part of science:
"Reductio ad absurdum"/SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: either
a) science is true and gives us knowledge or
b) It is not true and gives us no knowledge. Nothing we believe about the external world is knowledge.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Duhem, P. McDowell Vs Duhem, P.
 
Books on Amazon
I 188
Theory/Quine/Duhem: the contestability through experience (Ex here is a black swan) can not be distributed among the sets of the theory. McDowell: This is actually an argument for the indeterminacy of meaning!
McDowellVsQuine: but the argument is only tenable if our language of experience is distinguishable from the language of theory, so that the relevant experience does not already speak the language of theory.
I 189
Language of theory/language of observation/McDowellVsQuine: now it may be that both are in fact distinguishable. Then, the observational significance of a single theoretical sentence would be indeterminate. But from that we could derive a general indeterminacy of meaning! If we try that, we face the third party dogma.
Then we are facing a borderline case of the separation of languages: we push the whole meaning into theory and don't allow experience to speak any language at all. Then, of course, a rational relationship is missing.
However, we need this rational relationship for Duhem's argument. It can only be of a local character.
By paving our way through the third dogma, we lop Duhem's thoughts to the right size.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
Empiricism Davidson Vs Empiricism
 
Books on Amazon
I 48
Evidence/Davidson: what exactly is the role of evidence (in Quine: triggers that are perceptible to the senses)? In Quine not clear; we need to find out how sensual stimuli determine the meaning - the content - of observation sentences.
I 60
Evidence/DavidsonVsQuine: We cannot say that the sensual stimuli are the evidence, because the actor can neither observe them nor know about them! (> Anderson: People do not see the stimuli!) Nor can it be said that the sensual stimuli supplied the evidence, because the beliefs they cause are no general evidence, but are themselves based on such evidence.
Evidence/Davidson: There is apparently nothing that could be described as such evidence, but that’s not very important. According to Quine, the theory of evidence does not need to worry about evidence, it can be satisfied with examining the relationship between the sensual stimuli and their affirmation and negation. (> internal/external.)
Quine: Two main theses of empiricism:
1) "all the real evidence of the sciences are sensually given evidence."
2) "any memorizing word meanings must ultimately be based on sensually given evidence."
DavidsonVsQuine: that amounts to nothing more than to a colorless empiricism, with the triviality that the sense organs are crucial.
II 130
Davidson: Empiricism lives of the distinction between conceptual scheme and content, conceptual schemes are the ways to structure experience, category systems intended to impart form to the sense-data, viewpoints from which individuals or cultures overlook the "passing show". "Uninterpreted given".

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
Extensionality Prior Vs Extensionality
 
Books on Amazon
I 48
Extensionalism/Fallacy of/Extensionality/Extension/Extensional/Prior: Ontology/PriorVsQuine: existence as "being a value of a bound variable" is only a unproven dogma.
Quantifiers: There is another unproven dogma: that mixed constructions like "__ is green and __" or "believes that __" cannot fall into the same category as the simple ones.
In particular, it is said that "X believes that __" should not fall into the same category as "It is not the case, that __".
I.e. supposedly they not both single-digit links.
Resistance comes from the formal logicians who want to simplify their systems by saying that if the sentences S1 and S2 have the same truth value, then every composite sentence, which only differs in that it has S1 as a sub-sentence where the other one has S2 has as a sub-sentence, has the same truth value.
This is the "law of extensionality".
PriorVsExtensionality: if the law was true, the following two sentences would have to mean the same thing:
a) "X thinks the grass is pink"
b) "X thinks the grass is purple"
But everyone knows that you can think one thing without thinking the other.
Point: "X thinks the grass is pink" is not a true composite sentence with "grass is pink" as a component.
Technically speaking:
It is no real function with "grass is pink" as an argument.
Extensionality/Prior: but, apart from a certain narrow-mindedness, I cannot derive from this that the law of extensionality is wrong.
One must admit that there is a long and interesting history of logic in which it is true, just like classical mechanics in physics.
I 49
On the other hand, if its defenders speak of intuitive and immediate knowledge of its truth, then I can only say that I have contrary intuitions. Extensionality/Extension/Lesniewski/Lukasiewicz/Prior: both schools tell us that if you drop extensionality, you must admit that some propositions are then neither true nor false.
This is justified in classic logic by the fact that there are only four cases
a) "true p" is always true, no matter if "p" is true or false,
b) "false p": reversed
c) not p: reverses the truth value
d) "asserts p": true if p is true, otherwise false.
Furthermore: if "p" and "q" have the same truth value, then function of "p" has the same truth value as the function of "q".
Now, if a function does not obey the law of extensionality, it cannot be one of these four, and if there are other besides these, there must be more than two truth values. (PriorVs).
Vs: the first step of this argument already presupposes what it is to prove: namely, that the only property of "p", on which its truth value depends, is its truth value.
E.g. "If X thinks that p" was a function of "p".
But there are no functions that are false with true arguments.
I 50
But why should the truth value of a function "p" not depend on of other properties of "p" than its truth value? To say that this was impossible is to say that for each function fx of a number x, the question whether x > 0 depends on whether x is > 0, which is simply false.
E.g. fx = x 1: because in some cases, where x > 0, e.g. x = 2, is x 1 > 0, while in other cases, e.g.: x = 1, x is 1 not > 0.
So whether this function of x itself is > 0 does not depend on whether x itself is > 0, but whether x > 1.
Likewise, whether X believes that p does not depend on whether it is the case or not that p.
Prior: why ever not? ((s) Both are true, but the analogy does not need to be true.)
- - -
I 101
Protothetics/Protothetic/Lesniewski/Prior: our system is a fragment of Lesniewski's "Protothetics". (20s). 1) normal propositional calculus, ((s) p,q..u,v,>,...)
2) quantifier logic
3) normal identity laws.
Full protothetics also includes the law of extensionality. (Tarski seems to support it, because it has proved his independence.)
PriorVsExtensionality.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Field, H. Quine Vs Field, H.
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Field I 128
Quine Putnam Argument/VsField: (see introduction above): we must assume the truth of mathematical statements in order to be able to do academic work. FieldVs: the only way around this: show that the nominalistic resources for good science are adequate. This is not a consequence of conservatism.

Field II 202
Partial Signification/Field: is not so unusual: we often apply it implicitly in the case of vague expressions. Ex what is the extension of the term e.g. "big man" in German? There is no fact which decides whether 185 or 180 cm. Solution: "big man" partially signifies a set and partially other sets. Namely, the sets of shape
{xI x is a person taller than h}.
FieldVsQuine: that is quite unlike in Quine.
QuineVsField: it is not necessary to abandon the normal semantic concepts of denotation and signification. Instead, we can make them relative.
(1) for a foreign language: here we do not have to refrain from talking about the signification of a foreign word. But we must say that relative to the obvious translation manual ...
FieldVsQuine: but apparently that makes no sense. (1) seems to suggest that we could explain relative signification as:
(2) saying that a term T used in one language signifies the amount of rabbits, relative to a ÜH M, actually means that M translates T as "rabbit".
FieldVs: that is not sufficient.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Four-Dimensionalism Wiggins Vs Four-Dimensionalism
 
Books on Amazon
Simons I 115
WigginsVsFour Dimensionalism: der Unterschied zwischen einem vierdimensionalen Katzen-Prozess und einer Summe von Katzen-Teil-Prozessen ist,
I 116
dass die späteren Phasen der Summe unverbunden sein können, die des Katzen-Prozesses können aber nicht unverbunden sein. Summe: kann sich teilen – Prozess: nicht
Prozess; kann sich nicht teilen, Summe: kann es.
Summe: kann sich aufspalten, selbst wenn das nicht passiert.
Prozess: kann sich nicht aufspalten. (Logisch unmöglich).
Modality/de re/Summe/Prozess: Summe und Prozess unterscheiden sich also in der modality de re, obwohl sie als vierdimensionale Objekte zusammenfallen.
WigginsVsQuine: die modality ist in diesem Fall sogar referentiell transparent.
I 120
Tibbles-Bsp/Simons: i): die Ablehnung von i) (bzw. h)) erlaubt, Schritt (2) zurückzuweisen. Tib und Tibbles koinzidieren mereologisch zu t’, aber es reicht auch, die Superposition der beiden als Tatsache anzunehmen. Der positive Grund dafür, Tib und Tibbles niemals zu identifizieren, ist Leibniz’ Gesetz: sie unterscheiden sich, weil sie in den Eigenschaften differieren, die sie zu t haben. (Tib = Katze ohne Schwanz).
I 121
g),e): ihre Ablehnung blockiert den Schritt zu (5). Dass Tibbles zu t’ = Tib zu t’ beinhaltet dann nicht mehr, dass sie zu t identisch sind. f): seine Ablehnung bedeutet, Identität mit sortalen Prädikaten zu reformulieren: Bsp Tib ist dieselbe Katze wie Tibbles zu t’ und derselbe Katzen-Teil wie Tib zu t’. Aber wir können nicht schließen, dass Tib dieselbe Katze wie Tibbles zu t ist oder derselbe Katzen-Teil wie Tibbles zu t.
Damit ist die Transitivität blockiert.
d): es zu leugnen heißt zu leugnen, dass Tib (und Tail) zu t existieren, so dass die Frage nicht aufkommt, mit was sie identisch wären, was zu der Zeit existiert.
Problem: wenn Tib beim Unfall in die Existenz tritt, wie kann sie dann mit der vorher existierenden Tibbles identisch sein?
van Inwagen: akzeptiert a) und b) und h) sowie klassische Identität. Daher muss er entweder leugnen, dass etwas (Tib) anfängt zu existieren oder wie Chisholm: c) ablehnen.
Chisholm: Vs c).
Lösung/van Inwagen: Tibbles wird kleiner wenn der Schwanz weg ist, aber das einzige, was anfängt zu existieren, ist Tail (als Ganzes). SimonsVsInwagen, van: ist gegen den common sense und unnötig radikal. Es ist viel einfacher, h) oder i) abzulehnen.
Chisholm/Simons: ist weniger radikal in Bezug auf Identitätslogik oder auf continuants, aber radikaler als bloß h) oder i) zu leugnen. Denn c) zu leugnen blockiert das Argument schon in Schritt (2). Tibbles und Tib sind nicht identisch zu t’, obwohl sie sehr eng verbunden sind, weil sie beide zu der Zeit aus derselben mereologically constant ens per se konstituiert sind.

Wigg I
D. Wiggins
Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Four-Dimensionalism Chisholm Vs Four-Dimensionalism
 
Books on Amazon
Simons I 120
Objekt/Ding/Gegenstand/Chisholm: Thesis: "mereological constance Objekte im ursprünglichen Sinn: entia per se: können sich nicht verändern. Objekte im abgeleiteten Sinn:
entia per alio: unterliegen dem Flux, aber nur in dem Sinn, dass sie sukzessive durch verschiedene entia per se konstituiert sind, die sich in ihren Teilen unterscheiden.
Continuants/Chisholm: er leugnet sie nicht! Vielmehr ChisholmVsFour-dimensionalism (wegen seiner Ontologie von zeitlichen Objekten).
Simons I 124
Ereignis/occurrents/Ontologie/Chisholm/Simons: Chisholm widerlegt drei Argumente für die Ontologie von Ereignissen (Vorkommnissen): (Chisholm 1976, Anhang A) 1. Argument der räumlichen Analogie: es gibt eine große Disanalogie zwischen Raum und Zeit: ein Ding kann nicht an zwei verschiedenen Orten zur selben Zeit sein, aber ein Ding kann zu zwei verschiedenen Zeiten am selben Ort sein.
ChisholmVs: das ist nicht schlüssig, ein Verteidiger von zeitlichen Teilen kann dagegen argumentieren. Aber dann kann er dieses Argument gebrauchen um für seine These ohne Zirkularität zu argumentieren.
2. Argument der Veränderung (Wechsel): Bsp wie kann Philip einmal betrunken und einmal nüchtern sein? Für ihn ist beides zusammen widersprüchlich.
ChisholmVsFour Dimensionalism/Lösung: statt zu sagen ein Zeitstadium von Philip ist (zeitlos) betrunken) sagen wir einfach alltagssprachlich: er war letzte Nacht betrunken und ist jetzt nüchtern.
Entweder gebrauchen wir grammatische Zeiten wie in der Alltagssprache oder wir relativieren unsere Prädikate auf die Zeit ((s) "haben-zu-t", "sein-zu-t")
3. Argument vom Flux (nicht "Flux-Argument"): Bsp
Fluss/QuineVsHeraclitus: Quine gebraucht die zeitliche Ausdehnung des Flusses auf gleicher Stufe wie die räumliche Ausdehnung.
ChisholmVsQuine: nicht jede Summe von Flussstadien ist ein Fluss-Prozess.
I 125
Lösung/Chisholm: wir müssen sagen, welche Bedingungen eine Summe erfüllen muss, um ein Fluss-Prozess zu sein. ChisholmVsQuine: Problem: das setzt wiederum continuants voraus: (Flussufer, menschliche Beobachter) oder eine Theorie des absoluten Raums oder die Einführung eines technischen Terms ((s) Prädikat) "ist kofluvial mit").
Problem: das kann nur verstanden werden in Begriffen von "ist derselbe Fluss wie". Also zirkulär.
VsFour dimensionalism/VsProzess-Ontologie: hat es damit nicht geschafft, alle sing oder allg Term zu eliminieren, die continuants denotieren.
Prozess-Ontologie/Vierdimensionalismus/SimonsVsProzess-Ontologie: alle Vertreter außer Whitehead sprechen mit "gespaltener Zunge", wenn es um konkrete Beispiele geht.
Continuants/Quine: meint, er können sie "vierdimensional rekonstruieren". "Neu beschreiben".
Rekonstruktion/ Neubeschreibung/SimonsVsQuine: wenn etwas neu beschrieben wird, erhält es eine neue Beschreibung. Rekonstruktion ist strenggenommen ein Verwerfen. Also müssen continuants dann aus unserer Ontologie verschwinden und etwas anderes an ihre Stelle treten.
Problem: damit ist es irreführend, von Flussstadien oder Katzenstadien zu sprechen. Bsp Nicht ein Philip-Stadium ist betrunken, sondern der ganze Mensch. Bsp man badet nicht in einem Flussstadium, sondern im ganzen Fluss.
Fehler: es kann nicht richtig sein, dass Subjekt zu verändern und das Prädikat unverändert zu lassen, und denken, man hätte immer noch einen wahren Satz! Ähnlich:
Four dimensionalism/Cartwright: (1975,S. 167) "four dimensional Objekte haben verschiedene Karrieren".
SimonsVsCartwright: nur continuants wie Generäle oder Opernsänger haben Karrieren. Vierdimensionale Objekte haben keine Karriere, sie sind bestenfalls eine Karriere.
Problem: wenn nun continuants aus der Ontologie verschwinden sollen, dann gibt es nichts, wovon etwas eine Karriere sein kann. Das ist das Reden mit "gespaltener Zunge": man kann nicht die Vorteile der alten Entitäten genießen, wenn man sie abschafft. Der Vierdimensionalismus braucht eine ganz neue (unvertraute, der Alltagssprache widersprechende) Redeweise.
Whitehead/Simons: ist der einzige der das durchhält und er ist sprichwörtlich obskur.
I 126
Process-Ontology/Simons: all das zeigt nicht ihre Unmöglichkeit, nur ihre fremde Natur. Wir müssen nämlich nicht nur continuants verabschieden, sondern auch Ereignisse, die sie involvieren, insbesondere Veränderungen von continuants. SimonsVsProcess-Ontology/SimonsVsFour dimensionalism: dass die RT die Aufgabe von continuants verlangt, ist gar nicht so sicher und hängt eher von den Umständen ab. Sicher, Minkowski-Diagramme repräsentieren Zeit einfach als eine andere (gleichberechtigte) Dimension.
I 127
Argument/Simons: es ist kein schlüssiges Argument, von einer bequemen Darstellungsart (Repräsentation) eine Ontologie abzuleiten.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Frege, G. Quine Vs Frege, G.
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Quine I 425
VsFrege: tendency to object orientation. Tendency to align sentences to names and then take the objects to name them. - - -
I 209
Identity/Aristotle/Quine. Aristotle, on the contrary, had things right: "Whatever is predicated by one should always be predicated by the other" QuineVsFrege: Frege also wrong in "Über Sinn und Bedeutung".
QuineVsKorzybski: repeated doubling: Korzybski "1 = 1" must be wrong, because the left and right side of the equation spatially different! (Confusion of character and object)
"a = b": To say a = b is not the same, because the first letter of the alphabet cannot be the second: confusion between the sign and the object.
Equation/Quine: most mathematicians would like to consider equations as if they correlated numbers that are somehow the same, but different. Whitehead once defended this view: 2 + 3 and 3 + 2 are not identical, the different sequence leads to different thought processes (QuineVs).
I 264
according to Russell "Propositional Attitudes": believes, says, strives to, that, argues, is surprised, feares, wishes, etc. ...
I 265
Propositional attitudes create opaque contexts into which quantification is not allowed. (>) It is not permissible to replace a singular term by an equally descriptive term, without stretching the truth value here. Nor a general term by an equally comprehensive one. Also cross-references out of opaque contexts are prohibited.
I 266
Frege: in a structure with a propositional attitude a sentence or term may not denote truth values, a class nor an individual, but it works as "name of a thought" or name of a property or as an "individual term". QuineVsFrege: I will not take any of these steps. I do not forbid the disruption of substitutability, but only see it as an indication of a non-designating function.
- - -
II 201
Frege emphasized the "unsaturated" nature of the predicates and functions: they must be supplemented with arguments. (Objections to premature objectification of classes or properties). QuineVsFrege: Frege did not realize that general terms can schematized without reifying classes or properties. At that time, the distinction between schematic letters and quantifiable variables was still unclear.
II 202
"So that" is ontologically harmless. Despite the sad story of the confusion of the general terms and class names, I propose to take the notation of the harmless relative clause from set theory and to write:
"{x:Fx} and "ε" for the harmless copula "is a" (containment).
(i.e.​​the inversion of "so that").
Then we simply deny that we are using it to refer to classes!
We slim down properties, they become classes due to the well-known advantages of extensionality.
The quantification over classes began with a confusion of the general with the singular.
II 203
It was later realized that not every general term could be allocated its own class, because of the paradoxes. The relative clauses (written as term abstracts "{x: Fx}") or so-that sentences could continue to act in the property of general terms without restrictions, but some of them could not be allowed to exercise a dual function as a class name, while others could. What is crucial is which set theory is to be used. When specifying a quantified expression a variable may not be replaced by an abstraction such as: "x} Fx". Such a move would require a premise of the form (1), and that would be a higher form of logic, namely set theory:
(1) (Ey)(y = {x:Fx})
This premise tells us that there is such a class. And at this point, mathematics goes beyond logic! - - -
III 98
Term/Terminology/Quine: "Terms", here as a general absolute terms, in part III single-digit predicates.
III 99
Terms are never sentences. Term: is new in part II, because only here we are beginning to disassemble sentences.

Applying: Terms apply.
Centaur/Unicorn/Quine: "Centaur" applies to any centaur and to nothing else, i.e. it applies to nothing, since there are no centaurs.
III 100
Applying/Quine: Problem: "evil" does not apply to the quality of malice, nor to the class of evil people, but only to each individual evil person.
Term/Extension/Quine: Terms have extensions, but a term is not the denotation of its extension.
QuineVsFrege: one sentence is not the denotation of its truth value. ((s) Frege: "means" - not "denotes").
Quine: advantage. then we do not need to assume any abstract classes.
- - -
VII 108
Variables/Quine: "F", etc.: not bindable! They are only pseudo-predicates, vacancies in the sentence diagram. "p", "q", etc.: represent whole statements, they are sometimes regarded as if they needed entities whose names these statements are.
Proposition: these entities are sometimes called propositions. These are rather hypothetical abstract entities.
VII 109
Frege: alternatively: his statements always denote one or the other of exactly two entities: "the true one" or "the false one". The truth values. (Frege: statements: name of truth values) Quine pro Frege: better suited to distinguish the indistinguishable. (see above: maxim, truth values indistinguishable in the propositional calculus (see above VII 71).
Propositions/Quine: if they are necessary, they should rather be viewed as names for statements.
Everyday Language/Quine: it is best if we return to everyday language:
Names are one kind of expression and statements are another!
QuineVsFrege: sentences (statements) must not be regarded as names and
"p", "q" is not as variables that assume entities as values that are entities denoted by statements.
Reason: "p", "q", etc. are not bound variables! Ex "[(p>q). ~p]> ~p" is not a sentence, but a scheme.
"p", "q", etc.: no variables in the sense that they could be replaced by values! (VII 111)
- - -
VII 115
Name/QuineVsFrege: there is no reason to treat statements as names of truth values, or even as names.
IX 216
Induction/Fregean Numbers: these are, other than those of Zermelo and of von Neumann, immune against the trouble with the induction (at least in the TT), and we have to work with them anyway in NF. New Foundations/NF: But NF is essentially abolishing the TT!
Problem: the abolition of TT invites some unstratified formulas. Thus, the trouble with induction can occur again.
NFVsFrege: is, on the other hand, freed from the trouble with the finite nature which the Fregean arithmetic touched in the TT. There, a UA was needed to ensure the uniqueness of the subtraction. (special character)
Subtraction/NF: here there is no problem of ambiguity, because NF has infinite classes - especially θ - without ad-hoc demands.
- - -
Ad 173 Note 18:
Sentences/QuineVsFrege/Lauener: do not denote! Therefore, they can form no names (by quotation marks).
XI 55
QuineVsFrege/Existence Generalisation/Modal/Necessary/Lauener: Solution/FregeVsQuine: this is a fallacy, because in odd contexts a displacement between meaning and sense takes place. Here names do not refer to their object, but to their normal sense. The substitution principle remains valid, if we use a synonymous phrase for ")".
QuineVsFrege: 1) We do not know when names are synonymous. (Synonymy).
2) in formulas like e.g. "(9>7) and N(9>7)" "9" is both within and outside the modal operaotor. So that by existential generalization
(Ex)((9>7) and N(9>7))
comes out and that's incomprehensible. Because the variable x cannot stand for the same thing in the matrix both times.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Frege, G. Millikan Vs Frege, G.
 
Books on Amazon
I 102
Relation of projection/language/Millikan: We begin by saying that at least a few words are coordinated with objects. Accordingly, true propositions correspond with facts in the world.
Problem: Incorrect sentences do not correspond to any facts. How can individual words that correspond very well to objects, be composed in a way that in the end the whole sentence does not correspond?
Ex "Theaetetus flies": "Theaetetus" corresponds to Theaitetus, "flies" corresponds to flying.
wrong solution: to say that it was up to the relation between the Theaetetus and the flying. Because the relation corresponds somewhat, this may be instantiated (Ex between Theaitetos and walking) or uninstantiiert. Everything corresponds to something - just not the whole sentence "Theaetetus flies".
Solution/Frege: he joined the singular term with "values" that were the objects in the world.
I 103
Sentence/Frege/Millikan: he interpreted thus similarly to names, as complex characters that marked truth or falsity in the end. (Millikan pro Frege: "elegant") Solution/Wittgenstein/WittgensteinVsFrege/Millikan (Millikan: better than Frege): complex aRb, whereas in the case of false sentences the correspondence with the world lacks.
Correspondence/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but that is another meaning of "corresponding"! Words should correspond with different things than sentences with the world. ((S) double difference: 1. aRb unlike 2. SLW!. It would have already made a difference, if aRb and SRW were opposed.).
((S) Sense/Wittgenstein/(S): corresponds to the possibility of derogations.)
- - -
I 190
real value/indexical adaptor/denotation/Millikan: Ex "the ___ N of ....". indexical adaptor: has to be a real value of "N" to be in the embedded clause "N ..." and a real value of "the" in the embedded sentence "the ...".
focused eigenfunction/eigenfunction: to be translated into an internal name, which identifies the individual N. This has the entire denotation if it is properly adapted.
intentional Icon: Ex "the ___m of..." thus includes two intentional icons or projections on facts. But these are different from the purpose of the sentence as a whole or a subset.
embedded sentence: does not only want to introduce the listener to a fact, but o show to which complex category belongs what corresponds to the subject in the independent sentence containing the embedded sentence.
Reference: that's how the reference of a designation is determined.
Sense / Millikan: now it is clear why I have called sense the rules. Because the various markings differ in terms of the rules, even if they have the same references.
Sense according to Frege/Millikan: this difference of rules is the difference in meaning.
Meaning/reference/MillikanVsFrege: but a reference has to take on only a meaning of a certain kind. Thus, there is something that has been previously discriminated before the meaning of the remainder of the sentence has been identified.
I 191
Reference/meaning/Millikan: but the having of meaning or of references are very similar types of "having". - - -
I 274
Property/object/predicate/substance/individual/ontology/Millikan: Strawson'S distinction between "monogamous" and "non-monogamous" entities is not absolute but relative: Object/thing: Ex if my ring is made of gold, it can not be made of silver at the same time.
polygamous: Gold is relative to my ring. ((S) it could have been made of silver - the gold could have belonged to another subject.). Then gold is a property (as opposed to another) and my ring a substance.
But in relation to other substances the identity of gold seems to be like the identity of an individual.
Ontology/MillikanVsFrege/MillikanVsRussell: we must drop the rigid distinction between concept and object or individual thing and property.
I 275
Description: not only predicates are variations in world states, but also substances or individuals (they can be exchanged). Substance: if we consider gold as a property that does not prevent interpreting it also as a substance. As Aristotle said:
Individuals/Aristotle/Millikan: are merely primary substances, not the only substances that exist, that is, substances which are not properties of something else.
Substance/Millikan: is actually an epistemic category.
Substance/Millikan: Ex Gold, Ex Domestic Cat, Ex '69 Plymouth Valiant 100th.
Substance/category/Millikan: substances fall into categories defined by exclusive classes, in regard to which they are determined.
Ex gold and silver fall into the same category because they belong to the same exclusive classes: have a melting point, atomic weight, etc.
I 308
Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: For Quine a criterion for correct thinking seems to be that the relation to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction?
Correspondence/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what conformity in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If one does not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree.
Solution/Millikan: correspondence is to say the same about the same.
Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted.
One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow the sentence "Ouch!" He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer.
Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by a lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra).
Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree on a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in the nature (natural necessity).
I 309
Thesis: lack of contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987
Frege, G. Wessel Vs Frege, G.
 
Books on Amazon
I 27
Syntaktik/Syntax/Wessel: manche behaupten, in der Syntaktik würden "sinnfreie" Zeichen untersucht. (Klaus/Buhr, 1969) WesselVs: das ist eine verzerrte Vorstellung von Sprache: man kann Syntax, Semantik und Pragmatik gar nicht trennen: es gibt keine "sinnfreien Zeichen", weil ein physischer Gegenstand, der nichts bedeutet, eben kein Zeichen ist.
Semantik: die Bedeutung des Terminus "Tisch" kann nicht als besonderer Gegenstand angesprochen werden, den es gilt, irgendwo zu suchen.
WesselVsFrege: man kann ja nicht sagen: "Die Bedeutung des Terminus "Müller" geht spazieren"
- - -
I 157
Wahrheitswertlücken/Wessel: liegen vor, wenn der Gegenstand, dem Eigenschaften zu oder abgesprochen werden sollen, überhaupt nicht existiert. WesselVsFrege: ein Satz mit leerem Subjektterminus ist nicht bedeutungslos, er kann auch nicht wahr sein, aber er muss deswegen nicht ohne Wahrheitswert sein.
- - -
I 352
Intension/WesselVsFrege/WesselVsQuine: Vs Unterscheidung Intension/Extension: hilft bei den Problemen nicht weiter. Allein der Hinweis, dass es sich um intensionale Kontexte handelt, reicht nicht.

We I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999
Geach, P. Quine Vs Geach, P.
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
V 18
Perception/Quine: has more to do with consciousness than with the reception of stimuli. But it is also accessible to behavior criteria. It shows in the conditioning of reactions.
V 18/19
Dispositions/Quine: habits resulting from conditioning.
V 89
Identity/Geach: (Reference and generality, p 39f.): Only makes sense with reference to a general term like e.g. "the same dog". QuineVsGeach: this is certainly true for the beginning of language learning.
Identity/Pointing/Quine: Problem: there is no point in pointing twice and saying, "This is the same as that." Then you could still ask "The same what?".
E.g. you could have been pointing once to the dog and merely to the ear the next time.
Solution: you can easily say that a is identical with b. Whether a is the same dog or the same ear depends on whether a is a dog or an ear.
QuineVsGeach: this makes his relativism untenable once you get accustomed to the identity way of speech.
Identity/Quine: in a deeper sense still relative. (see below § 30)
- - -
V 129
Pronouns/Pronouns/Quine: are the archetype of variables in logic and mathematics. Everyday Language: here pronouns are an important part of relative clauses.
Relative Clause/Language Learning/Quine: E.g. "I bought Fido from a man who had found him."
Function: the relative clause makes it possible to separate the object of what the sentence says about it.
Relative Clause: becomes a general term if the pronoun for the name of the object is out in front: E.g. "which I bought from a man who had found him" is a general term!
This general term says the same thing of Fido as the original sentence.
Relative Clause/GeachVsQuine: (Reference and generality, p.115 122, also "Quines syntaktische Einsichten").
Relative Pronoun/Geach: instead, conceive it as meaning "and he": e.g. "I bought Fido from a man and he had found him." ((s) paratactic analysis).
Or with "when he" or "since he".
V 130
Geach calls this the "Latin prose theory". Def Latin Prose Theory/Geach: Thesis: it's wrong to consider "who had found him" as a terminus or independent grammatical entity at all.
Donkey Sentence/Geach's Donkey/Quine: E.g.
Everyone who owns a donkey beats it;
Some donkey owners do not beat them.
Problem: that would turn into nonsense:
Every donkey owner beats it
Some donkey owners do not beat it.
Solution/Geach: analysis of the relative pronoun "who" with "if he":
Every person, if he has a donkey, beats it.
Example (by Emmon Bach): ((s)> Brandom, Bach Peter's sentences)
A boy who fooled her kissed a girl that loved him.
Geach: here, you cannot consider "boy who fooled her" as a separate term, because then the floating pronoun "her" would have no reference, not even to "girl who loved him", because the floating pronoun "him" would then have no reference.
Solution/Geach:
A boy kissed a girl and she really loved him, but he only fooled her.
Quine: pro Geach.
((s) sequence of main clauses.)
V 131
Relative Clause/Bach Peter's Sentences/Donkey Sentence/Geach's Donkey/Geach/Quine: Geach focuses on the quantification (1) (Ex) (x is a man and I bought Fido of x and x had found Fido)
(2) (x) (y) (if x is a man and y is a donkey and x has y, then x beats y).
(3) (Ex) (Ey) (x is a man, and y is a a donkey and x has y and not (x beats y))
(4) (Ex) (Ey) (x was a boy and y was a girl and y kissed y and y really loved x, but x merely fooled y).
QuineVsGeach: the description of the correct grammar is one thing, a plausible description of a child's language learning is another. It would be nice if both matched, which is to be expected according to Hall, Bloomfield and Chomsky.
QuineVsGeach: before this is proven, I tend to a more dualistic view. Geach's Latin prose theory correctly describes the grammar, but not the learning process. Most examples of relative clauses correspond to the Fido example.
The child is torn between analogies,
V 132
which are in the end described properly by Geach. Relative Clause/Quantification/Language Learning/QuineVsGeach: a reformulation of the relative pronoun depending on circumstances in "and he" or "if", etc. is too complicated. In addition, the quantification would need to be learned before the relative clauses. Instead, the child comes to the quantification the other way round, through the relative clause.
- - -
Strawson I 198
QuineVsGeach/QuineVsFrege: Singular terms can take the places of quantifiable variables, general expressions cannot. Singular Term: quantifiable, General Term: not quantifiable.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Goodman, N. Bigelow Vs Goodman, N.
 
Books on Amazon
I 47
Quantities/Quine/Goodman/Bigelow/Pargetter: it could be that we, if we allow quantities, do not need any other universals anymore. Because almost everything that mathematics needs can be done with quantities. Armstrong: in contrast believes in universals, but not in quantities!
BigelowVsQuine/BigelowVsGoodman: for science we need more universals than quantities, E.g. probability and necessity.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Grice, P.H. Quine Vs Grice, P.H.
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Wright I 198
Disputational Supervenience/Wright: a discourse supervenes another one if disagreements in one depend on disagreements in the other. StrawsonVsQuine/GriceVsQuine: it is hopeless to deny that a discrimination exists when it is used not in a prearranged but in a mutually unifiable way within linguistic practice.
QuineVsStrawson/QuineVsGrice: this is fully consistent with a cognitive psychology of the practical use of the distinction, which does not assume that we are responding to instantiations of distinctions.
Strawson/Grice: E.g. our daily talk of analyticity is a sociological fact and therefore has enough discipline to be considered as minimally capable of truth.
QuineVsGrice/QuineVsStrawson: this is far from proving that a sort of intuitive realism can be seen in it. Obstacle: it remains to be explained how modal judgments generally exert cognitive coercion.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001
Hintikka, J. Quine Vs Hintikka, J.
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
I 73
Possibilia/Hintikka: Thesis: talk about human experience makes the assumption of possibilia necessary. (Unrealized possibilities). HintikkaVsQuine. Intentionality/Husserl/Hintikka: according to Husserl the essence of human thought is in relation with unrealized possibilities.
Possibilia/Hintikka: we need them to deal with logically incompatible entities of the same logical type.
Possible World Semantics/Hintikka: is the corresponding model theory.
I 137
QuineVsModal Logic: Problem of cross-world identification. Cross-World Identificatin/Cross-Identification/Quine/(s): Problem of identity conditions. If no identity conditions (IC) are given, the question is pointless whether an individual is "the same as" one in a different possible world.
HintikkaVsQuine: my modified approach goes beyond the scope of Quine's criticism.
Worldlines/Hintikka: are fixed by us, not by God. Nevertheless, they are not arbitrary. Their boundaries are given by the continuity of time and space, memory, location, etc.
I 138
It may even be that our presuppositions prove to be incorrect. Therefore, there can be no set of world lines that comprise all possible worlds we need in alethic modal logic. Modal Logic/Quantification/Quine/Hintikka: a realistic interpretation of quantified alethic ML is impossible. But for reasons more profound than Quine assumed.
Cross-World Identification/HintikkaVsQuine: is not intrinsically impossible.
Quine/Hintikka: has even accepted this lately, with limitations.
Solution/Hintikka: Cross-world identification as re-identification.
I 139
Propositional Attitude/Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: we will focus here on the problem of propositional attitudes.
I 140
Quantification in Epistemic Contexts/Belief Contexts/Intensional/Hintikka: Ex (1) Albert knows who wrote Coningsby
(2) (Ex) K Albert (x wrote Coningsby)
Notation: (Ex) perspective (perceptual) identification (acquaintance) in the book: not reflected E).
Uniqueness Condition/Hintikka: e.g. (2) can only then be inferred from
(3) K Albert (Beaconsfield wrote Coningsby)
i.e.
(3) * Albert knows that Beaconsfield wrote Coningsby.
... Only then can be concluded when we have an additional premise:
(4) (Ex) K Albert (Beaconsfield = x)
i.e.
(5) Albert knows who Beaconsfield is.
Quine per Hintikka: this solution is better than a criterion for rigid designators (rigidity, QuineVsKripke).
Everyday Language: it's of course simply very natural to speak in a way that you say you know who or what something is.
HintikkaVsQuine: he praises me for the wrong reasons. He turns things upside down. Although he does not commit the mistake I criticize, he forgives it.
I 141
Formal Language/Logic/Canonical Notation/HintikkaVsQuine: we should view logical language as our native language and not set so much store by the translation into everyday language. It is only about semantic clarity anyway.
I 145
HintikkaVsQuine: does not understand the role my uniqueness conditions play: Quine: says you can also transfer these conditions to belief, knowledge, etc.
Quine: Hintikka requires that the subject know who or what the person or thing is. Who or what the term designates.
HintikkaVsQuine: he thinks I only use some type of uniqueness condition.
Solution: the semantic situation shows the difference: the relation between the conditions for different propositional attitudes (beliefs, see, know) is one of analogy, not of identity.
Solution: the sets of compatible possible worlds in the case of knowing, seeing, memory, belief are different ones every time.
I 146
Identification/Belief/Quine/QuineVsHintikka: any belief world (possible worlds) will include countless bodies and objects that are not individually recognizable, simply because the believer believes his world contains countless such objects. Identity: questions about the identity of these objects are pointless.
Problem: if you quantify in belief contexts, how can you exclude them?
Solution: the scope of variables to those objects about which the subject has a sufficiently clear idea, would have to be limited.
Problem: how do you determine how clear these ideas must be?
HintikkaVsQuine: the solution is quite simple if we quantify about individuals in doxastic possible worlds:
Ex Operator: "in a world w1, compatible with everything Jack believes":
Solution/Hintikka: we can quantify about the inhabitants of such worlds, by simply using a quantifier inside the operator.
((s) i.e. Jack, but not we, distinguish).
Problem: it could be that we might want to consider the people as our neighbors from the real world w0. ("qua neighbors").
Hintikka: but that is a problem in itself and has nothing to do with uniqueness conditions.
Problem: is more due to the notation of conventional modal logic which does not allow that us to turn around the evaluation process which runs from outside to inside so that it extends from the inside out.
Solution/Saarinen: "retrospective" operators (see above)
Solution/Hintikka: it may still be that we can track an individual back from w1 to w0, even if it does not meet the uniqueness conditions like (16) - (127). (They require an individual to be identifiable in all the possible worlds).
HintikkaVsQuine: he is wrong in that the question of identity is pointless if not all the uniqueness conditions are met.
On the contrary, it has to make sense for us to ever able to determine that the conditions are not met!
Uniqueness Condition/Hintikka: if it is not met, it only means that we cannot find an individual ((s) or its counterpart) in any possible world.
Uniqueness Condition/QuineVsHintikka: Quine's most serious objection is that these conditions are always indicated (indexical) i.e. that they are context-dependent. I.e. only in a particular situation it is about whether an individual is the same.
I 147
Knowing-Who/Knowing-What/Context/Quine: E.g. "Who is he?" only makes sense in a given situation. HintikkaVsQuine: of course he is right that the truth conditions vary with the situation, but that does not destroy the uniqueness conditions for epistemic logic.
HintikkaVsQuine: he only misunderstands the role these conditions play.
Truth Value/Hintikka: the truth value of sentences of the form
(18) (Ex) K(b = x)
and equally of
(19) (Ex) K(b = x)
become independent of the truth value of other types of simplest sentences! Question/Answer/T Question/Hintikka: we get a new class of atomic sentences!
Solution: distinction between identification through acquaintance/description.
I 148
World Lines/Identification/Cross-World Identity/Hintikka: Thesis the world lines have to be drawn before the conditions are ever applied. Drawing the world lines is never part of the application of the uniqueness conditions. ((s) otherwise circular). Truth Conditions/Atomic/Atomic Sentence/Hintikka: for my theory, the interplay of specific atomic and non-atomic sentences is essential: it shows how e.g. the truth value of sentences of the form
"knows + -one-question-word" sentences depends on the truth value of sentences of the form (18) - (19).
HintikkaVsQuine: his criticism is similar to one that would criticize traditional truth value tables, because some of the sentences that are used to put them together are also blurred.
Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: is not affected by this criticism. All it claims is that once the world lines are drawn, the rest of the semantics remains as it was.
- - -
I 160
Def Knowledge/Hintikka: what is true in all knowledge possible worlds (knowledge worlds) of a subject. And, conversely, what is true in all knowledge possible worlds of a person is their knowledge. Important argument: the world lines can be drawn differently, however, while the evaluations (the non-logical constants) remain the same.
The variation of the world lines can then be "seen" in the variation of the semantic power of the phrase n of the form know + indirect question.
I 161
Quine has used such variation to the reject the possible world semantics of sentences with "knowing-that". HintikkaVsQuine: for him it was actually about the structural (not the referential) system. And this remained untouched.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Hobbes, Th. Rorty Vs Hobbes, Th.
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
II 125
Nominalism/Rorty: NominalismVsMetaphysics. Hobbes: Linked nominalism erroneously with materialism.
Quine still connects him with that.
Language/World/Order/RortyVsHobbes/RortyVsQuine: that leads to contradiction if they think that by words for the smallest particles of matter nature will be dissected in a manner that is not possible with other words!
A consistent nominalism must emphasize that the forecast success of such a vocabulary has no importance for the "ontological rank".

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Holism Rorty Vs Holism
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 190
RortyVsHolism/RortyVsQuine/RortyVsSellars: these holistic statements sound pointless and paradoxical, because the accuracy in question requires a theory privileged representations. Pro: justification is not a function of particular relations between ideas (or words) and objects, but a function of social practice. The justification of a conversation is holistic by nature, as it were.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Holism Millikan Vs Holism
 
Books on Amazon
I 10
Subject/predicate/coherence/language/world/Millikan: subject-predicate structure: I try to show how the law of non-contradiction (the essence of consistency) fits into nature (SVW?). For that I need Fregean meaning as the main concept. As one can err when it comes to knowledge, so one can err when it comes to meaning.
I 11
Holism/MillikanVsHolismus: we are trying to avoid it. Then we will understand why we still can know something of the world, despite everything. Realism/Millikan: I stay close to the Aristotelian realism.
properties/kind/Millikan: exists only in the actual world (WiWe).
MillikanVsNominalismus.
I 13
MillikanVsHolismus: it is about understanding without holism and without the myth of the given how to test our apparent skills to recognize things and our apparent meanings. Observational concepts/Millikan: we have a lot more of then than is commonly supposed.
For them, there are good - albeit fallible - tests that are independent of our theories.
Convictions: insofar as our meanings and our ability to recognize things are correct and valid,
I 14
most of our Convictions and judgments are true. ((S)> Davidson). Appropriateness/Millikan: by bringing our judgments to interact iwth those of others in a community, we have additional evidence that they are reasonable. That's also how new concepts are developed which may be tested independently of theories, or not.
- - -
I 67
conviction/Millikan: (see chapter 18, 19): Thesis: if one believes something, then normally on grounds of observational judgments. Problem: Background information that could prevent one from the judgment is not necessarily information, the denial of which would normally be used to support the conviction!
I 68
I will use this principle MillikanVsQuine. Theory/observation/Quine: thesis: both are insolubly twisted with each other.
MillikanVsHolismus.
Intentions according to Grice/Millikan: should not be regarded as a mechanism. However:
Engine: may also be regarded as a hierarchy, where higher levels can stop the lower ones. And I as a user must know little about the functioning of the lower levels.
- - -
I 298
Test/Millikan: Ex the heart can only be tested together with the kidneys. Language/meaning/reference/world/reality/projection/Millikan: We're just trying to understand how there can be a test that can historically be applied to human concepts in this world of ours, and the results of which are correlated with the world for reasons we can specify.
Problem: we are here more handicapped than realism.
I 299
It is about the possibility of meaningfulness and intentionality at all ("How is it possible?"). Holism/MillikanVsHolismus: epistemic holism is wrong.
Instead, a test for non-contradiction, if it is applied only to a small group of concepts, would be a relatively effective test for the adequacy of concepts.
concepts/adequacy/Millikan: if they are adequate, concepts exercise their own function in accordance with a normal explanation. Their own function is to correspond to a variant of the world. An adequate concept produces correct acts of identification of the references of its tokens.
- - -
I 318
Holism/theory/observation/concept/dependency/MillikanVsHolismus/Millikan: the view that we observe most of the things we observe just by observing indirect effects is wrong. Anyway, we observe effects of things, namely, on our senses.
I 319
Difference: it is about the difference between information acquisition through knowledge of effects on other observed things and the acquisition of information without such an intermediary knowledge of other things. Problem: here arises a mistake very easily: this knowledge does not have to be used.
- - -
I 321
Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: our findings about the outside world are not individually brought before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body. Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction.
Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our convictions are never brought before the tribunal of experience.
I 322
Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other convictions. Affirmation: only affirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my preferences.
From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well.
Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987
Kant, I. Putnam Vs Kant, I.
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 402ff
Knowledge/I/Kant/Putnam: Kant's picture of knowledge understood this as a "representation", a kind of game. I am the author of this game.
I: But the author of the game also appears in the game itself (as in Pirandello).
"Empirical I"/Kant/Putnam: the author in the game is not the "real author", he is the "empirical I".
transcendental ego/Kant/Putnam: is the "real" author of the game. (Outside the game).
I/internal realism/PutnamVsKant: I'd modify his picture in two respects:
1. The authors (in the plural, my picture is social) do not write one but several versions.
2. The authors in the stories are the real authors.
PutnamVsSkepticism: N.B.: that would be "crazy" if these are only fictions. Because a fictional character cannot be a real author. But these are true stories.
---
Putnam V 52
Determinism/Kant: said that such a defense component is of rationality itself. We do not discover the principle of determinism, but we impose it on the world. PutnamVsKant: this goes too far. The price would be a too great complication of our knowledge system.
---
V 88
Putnam: one could read Kant as if he had first obtained the position of the internalism. Of course, not explicitly. ---
V 89
I suggest to read it as if he said that Locke's thesis about the secondary qualities applies to all qualities: the simple, the primary and the secondary. ---
V 90
If all properties are secondary: then everything what we say about an object has the form: it is such that it affects us in this or that way. Our ideas of objects are not copies of mind independent things.
PutnamVsKant: today the concept of the noumenal world is considered an unnecessary metaphysical element in its thinking.
---
V 118
Rationality/Putnam: is not determined by unalterable rule directories, as Kant believed, described to our transcendental nature. PutnamVsKant: the whole idea of a transcendental nature (noumenal) is nonsense.
---
Putnam I 93
Reference/theory/Putnam: one can also say it very briefly. "electron" refers to electrons, how else should we say within a conceptual system with "electron" as a primitive term, whereupon "electron" refers to? This also solves to a certain extent the "dilemma of Quine" and Kant: "Quinean Dilemma"/Putnam: (also in Kant): there is a real world, but we can only describe it with our conceptual system.
PutnamVsQuine/PutnamVsKant: so what? How else should we describe it otherwise? should we use the term system of someone else?
---
I 169
Noumenon/noumenal world/PutnamVsKant: is now regarded as an unnecessary metaphysical element. Properties/Kant/Putnam: N.B.: the subtle point is that Kant thinks that all this also applies to sensation ("objects of the inner sense") as well as to external objects.
E.g. "E is like this here" (whereby you concentrate on E) means: "E is like E".: Kant: in reality no judgment has come about.
Puntam: merely an inarticulate sound, a noise.
---
I 169/170
Putnam: if "red" on the other hand is a real classification expression when I say that this sensation E belongs to the same class as sensations that I call "red" on other occasions, then my judgment goes beyond what is immediately given. Sensation/similarity/Noumenon/PutnamVsKant: whether the sensations that I have at different times, (noumenal) are "really" all similar, this question makes no sense.
Kant ignores this completely.
The sensations that I call "red", cannot be compared directly with noumenal objects to see if they have the same noumenal property as the objects which I call "gold", neither can they be directly compared with noumenal objects to see if they have the same noumenal property.
The objects are similar for me, they are red for me. That is my sensation.
Properties/PutnamVsKant: if he says that all properties are secondary (that is, they are assets) then this would be the property of a noumenal object, to invoke in us the impression of pinewood, for example.
---
I 170/171
At this point, he is close to saying that he gives up the correspondence theory. Definition Truth/Kant: "the agreement of knowledge with its object".
PeirceVsKant: this is a nominal definition of truth.
Assets/Kant: is attributed to the whole noumenal world.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Kant, I. Quine Vs Kant, I.
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Danto2 I 132
QuineVsKant, QuineVsAnalyticity: Kant’s conception of contradiction is quite unclear. It presupposes the notion of analyticity, instead of making it clear.   Quine: Def contradiction "P and not-P." But: "Bachelors are no unmarried, adult men" is not formally contradictory! This was not recognized by Kant.
- - -
Quine IV 407
Analyticity/QuineVsKant: talk of "containment" is a) metaphorical in terms of concepts. It is
b) too narrow, because it is tailored to subject-predicate sentences. It is not readily applicable to relations: E.g. "If Hans is the father of Peter, then Peter is not the father of Hans."
c) the indication that a proposition is analytic if its negation is contradictory does not help, since "contradictory" is just as much in need of explanation here.
Analytical/Kant/Quine: Kant does not even mention the meaning of concepts in this context!
- - -
Quine VII 20
Analyticity/Kant/Quine: derived from Hume's distinction between Relations of ideas and
Relations of facts.
Leibniz: distinguishing
Truths of fact and
Rational truths. (Of which we hear that their negation is supposed to be self-contradictory!)
VII 20/21
QuineVsKant: two shortcomings: 1) It is limited to statements of the subject-predicate form
2) It appeals to a concept of limitation, which moves on a metaphorical level.
Analytic/Quine: but can be reformulated as a true by virtue of the meanings and regardless of the facts.
- - -
Quine XI 72
Analytic/QuineVsLeibniz/Lauener: the concept of the possible world is itself in need of explanation. QuineVsKant: the self-contradiction we involve ourselves in, according to Kant, when denying analytic sentences is itself in need of explanation.
Stroud I 210
Experience/Empirical/Sensation/Sensory/Reality/World/Kant/Stroud: this is what it looked like for Kant: a completely general distinction between what we experience through the senses and truths about the world would exclude us forever from knowledge.
I 211
Stroud: perhaps these fatal consequences only exist within the traditional philosophical conception of the function of the epistemes. (>QuineVsTraditional Epistemology, QuineVsKant: no a priori knowledge). Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: would then only apply to the distant position (outside the frame of reference)! But then we could avoid skepticism and maintain the general distinction between the empirically given ((SellarsVs!) and what is true or false about the outside world.
All we would have to avoid, would be a "distant position" (outside the frame of reference).
Stroud I 214
Naturalized Epistemology/KantVsQuine/Stroud: Kant distinguishes philosophy from everything else (>"prima philosophia"). QuineVsKant: there is no a priori knowledge here.
Skepticism/Kant/Quine/Stroud: both accept the "Keptian Conditional" or the "conditional correctness" of skepticism. If the skeptic was able to ask a meaningful question, the skeptical conclusion (that we know nothing) would be correct.
I 215
Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: it is not clear whether Quine actually answers the skeptical question at all. Knowledge/Quine: asks how we obtain a theory of the world. This looks like a very general problem.
Input/Quine: is "lean": E.g. reflections of light, bright/dark contrasts, temperature variations, etc.
Output/Quine: in contrast, is extremely rich. This brings us to under-determination empiricism. We get an extremely sophisticated three-dimensional image and a history of the world only through the mediation of the surfaces of the objects and our nerve endings.
Reality/World/Knowledge/Quine: the relation between input and output itself is the subject of an investigation, it is itself a natural phenomenon.
- - -
Stroud I 248
Knowledge/Skepticism/Kant/Stroud: a completely general distinction between a) everything we learn through the senses on one side, and
b) what is true or false about the world on the other side
would forever exclude us from knowledge. (see above).
StroudVsQuine: that is fatal for the project of naturalized epistemology. Because it excludes us from our own knowledge of the world and leaves us no independent reason to accept that any of our projections are true.
I 249
QuineVsKant/QuineVsStroud: precisely this separation (differentiation) is a liberation of science. It shows us that all the information about external things I can get through the senses is limited to two-dimensional optical projections. Stroud: if this is really what "Science tells us" (NNK, 68), then how can the separation (differentiation) have the consequences that I draw from this? Would I not simply contradict scientific facts?
StroudVsQuine: No: nothing I say implies that I cannot observe any person in interaction with their environment and isolate some events on its sensory surfaces from everything else.
Important argument: we know - and he probably also knows - a lot of things that happen in the world beyond those events. He himself will also know little about the events that take place on his sensory surfaces.
Important argument: these events (which do not directly impact his senses) should be considered as part of what causes his belief ((s) and possibly generates knowledge).
Surely, without any sensory experience we would come to no belief about the world at all.


Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Kaplan, D. Stalnaker Vs Kaplan, D.
 
Books on Amazon
I 206
Def character/Kaplan: (= proposition meaning): a function of context to content. Context/Stalnaker: can be represented as centered world (centered poss.w.).
Centered world/centered possible world/ poss.w./Stalnaker: shall represent the context here.
I 207
Content: is here represented by propositions Proposition: function of poss.w. to truth values.
Character/Kaplan/Stalnaker: is then a two-dimensional intension. (Kaplan 1989b)
StalnakerVsKaplan: this paradigm does not answer the questions of basic semantics to the facts that determine the semantic values. It belongs to the descriptive semantics. That means it is not a theory on the interpretation of thoughts.
Thoughts/interpretation/Stalnaker: is a question of basic semantics that means of the facts.
Character/content/Kaplan/Stalnaker: the original motivation for the separation was that sentence meanings do not represent the expressed thoughts.
Content/Stalnaker: = secondary intension.
Content/Kaplan: that what is being said. The thought, the information that the speaker intends to transmit.
I 208
Solution/StalnakerVsKaplan: Kaplan's approach must be expanded by a theory of thoughts and a language theory. This allows us to treat a wider domain of expressions as context-dependent than normally. - - -
II 5
Double indexing/double index/Kaplan/Stalnaker: (Kaplan Demonstratives, 1968): thesis: 1. a) the meaning of a proposition determines the content relative to the context but
b) the content determines a truth value only relative to a poss.w.
Stalnaker: so Kaplan's theory was two dimensional or double indicated.
Context/Kaplan/Stalnaker: was represented by an index like the one of Montague and propositions were interpreted relative to this index
Content/Kaplan/Stalnaker: the actual values of the interpretation function were then, however, the contents and not the truth values, while
Def content/Kaplan: a function of poss.w. on truth values.
2. Kaplan second modification:
Index/Kaplan/Stalnaker: was limited:
Index/Montague/Stalnaker: only a list of time, speaker, place, maybe poss.w.)
Index/Kaplan: only: the relations between these must also be considered. That means an index can represent the content only when the agent is actually at the location in the poss.w..
II 6
Context dependence/Stalnaker: is, however, pervasive: adjectives like e.g. "large" are interpreted relative to contextually specific comparison classes. Likewise e.g. "I", "here", "now" (index words). StalnakerVsKaplan: Kaplan (1968) says nothing about this.
- - -
II 10
Character/Kaplan/Stalnaker: Kaplan was about proposition types. Propositional concept/p.c./StalnakerVsKaplan: are, however, associated with certain statement tokens.
This p.c. is dependent on the semantic properties that these tokens have in the poss.w. in which they occur.
This is no contradiction to Kaplan's and my theory. It is simply about different issues.
- - -
II 162
de re/belief/ascription/Kaplan/Stalnaker: ("Quantifying in", 1969) Kaplan has an intermediate position (between Quine and Stalnaker): Ascription/Kaplan: (like Quine) is not ascribed to a certain conviction.
de re/logical form/Quine/Kaplan: de re-ascription: existence quantification.
Truth conditions/tr.c./de re/KaplanVsQuine/Stalnaker: here Kaplan follows the semantic approach: ascriptions de re are only then true if the believer has to be in a relation with the knowledge.
Intensification: the name must denote the individual. E.g. "a is a spy": here a must not only denote Ortcutt, but there are additional conditions
1. for the content
2. for the causal relation between the name, the individual and the believer. Pointe/Stalnaker: it is still possible that all the conditions are fulfilled by two different names. Thus, the examples can be described without having to ascribe conflicting belief.
KaplanVsQuine/Stalnaker: his approach also covers cases in which Quine's analysis was too liberal.
StalnakerVsKaplan: his approach is an ad hoc compromise.
Knowledge/ascription/Stalnaker: in the semantic analysis knowledge is self-evident without it you cannot believe anything. You cannot believe a proposition without having detected the expressions occurring in the concepts in which they are defined.
StalnakerVsKaplan: 1. but the need for knowledge loses its motivation when it is grafted to Quine's approach.
2. Kaplan keeps the artificial assumption that de re-ascriptions ascribe no particular belief and he is bound to the sententialism (propositions as belief objects).
II 163
At least it have to be proposition-like objects with name-like constituents. de re/ascriptoin/belief de re/StalnakerVsQuine/StalnakerVsKaplan/Stalnaker: thesis: we instead accept propositions as sets of poss.w..

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Kripke, S. A. Quine Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Putnam I 247
Def "Small Realism"/Putnam: ( "realism with a lower case r"): here, to say what we say and do what we do means being a "realist". But that brings problems with realism and "reality":
Reality/Realism/Wittgenstein: (trees and chairs), "the this and that to which we can point" are paradigms for what we call real. (1971, Lecture 25).
Realism/Reality/Objects/Space-Time Points/Putnam: here Kripke, Quine, Lewis disagree: what is the relationship between the chair and the space-time region it occupies?
Quine: the chair and the electromagnetic and other fields that constitute it are one and the same. The chair is the spacetime region.
KripkeVsQuine: both are numerically different objects, but have the same mass (e.g. statue/clay). The chair could have occupied a different space-time region!
QuineVsKripke: this proof is worthless, because modal predicates are hopelessly vague.
Lewis: Quine is right as far as the chair is concerned, but wrong in terms of the modal predicates.
LewisVsKripke: not the chair but a counterpart to this chair could have been somewhere else. (Not "exactly this chair" within the meaning of the logical concept of identity (=).).
Putnam: so there are three questions:
1) is the chair identical with the matter or does the chair somehow coexist with the matter in the space-time region?
2) Is the matter identical to the fields?
3) Are the fields identical with the space-time regions?
Putnam: these questions are probably all three nonsense, but at least the first one is!
- - -
Quine II 209 ff
Replica on Saul Kripke The concept of possible worlds contributed to the semantics of modal logic. Kripke: meaningful model theory of modal logic.
Def Models/Quine: allow for proof consistency. They also have heuristic value, but they do not offer an explanation. >Model.
II 210
They can as clear as they want, nevertheless they can leave us completely in the dark regarding the primary, intended interpretation. QuineVsKripke: following questions regarding possible worlds: 1) When can objects between different worlds be equated 2) When is a designation expression rigid, 3) where is metaphysical necessity to testify?
The way in which Kripke refers to Bishop Butler is startling:
"As Bishop Butler said," Everything is what it is and not another thing." I.e. " heat is molecular motion" will not be contingent, but necessary." (Kripke p. 160)
QuineVsKripke: I can also interpret the bishop according to my own purposes: Everything is what it is, do not ask what it may be or must be.
Possible World/QuineVsKripke: allow proofs of consistency, but no unambiguous interpretation when objects are equal? Bishop Butler ("no other thing"): identity does not necessarily follow.
Kripke on the identity of mind and body: The identity theorist who thinks pain is a brain state ... has to claim that we are mistaken if we think it is conceivable that pain could have existed without brain states.
... The materialist therefore faces a very tricky objection: he has to prove that something whose possibility we deem to imagine is not possible in reality.
QuineVsKripke: the materialist will only feel the intricacy of Kripke's objection as far as he believes in metaphysical necessity. I can gratefully read Kripke in a way that he supports me in my desire to show what an intricate network the representative of the modality concept is spinning.
II 210f
KripkeVsIdentity Theory: imagine: Pain without a brain state - for materialists difficult to exclude. QuineVsKripke: only difficult if materialist believes in metaphysical necessity.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Kripke, S. A. Hintikka Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
Books on Amazon
I XIII
Possible Worlds/Semantics/Hintikka: the term is misleading. (Began in the late 50s). Kripke Semantics/HintikkaVsKripke: is not a viable model for the theory of logical rules (logical necessity and logical possibility). (Essay 1).
Problem: the correct logic cannot be axiomatized.
Solution: interpreting Kripke semantics as non-standard semantics,
XIV
in the sense of Henkin’s non-standard interpretation of higher-level logic, while the correct semantics for logical modalities would be analogous to a standard interpretation. Possible Worlds/HintikkaVsQuine: we do not have to give them up entirely, but there will probably never be a complete theory. My theory is related to Kant.
I call them "epistemology of logic".
I XVI
Cross World Identity/Hintikka: Quine: considers it a hopeless problem
HintikkaVsKripke: he underestimates the problem and considers it as guaranteed. He cheats.
World Line/Cross World Identity/Hintikka: 1) We need to allow that some objects in certain possible worlds do not only exist, but that their existence is unthinkable there! I.e. world lines can cease to exist - what is more: it may be that they are not defined in certain possible worlds.
Problem: in the usual knowledge logic (logic of belief) this is not permitted.
2) world lines can be drawn in two ways:
a) object-centered
b) agent-centered. (Essay 8).
Analogy: this can be related to Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and by description. (Essay 11)
I 2
Kripke Semantics/Modal Logic/Logical Possibility/Logical Necessity/HintikkaVsKripke/HintikkaVsKripke Semantics: Problem: if we interpreted the operators N, P so that they express logical modalities, they are inadequate: for logical possibility and necessity we need more than an arbitrary selection of possible worlds. We need truth in every logically possible world. But Kripke semantics does not require all such logically possible worlds to be included in the set of alternatives. ((s) I.e. there may be logically possible worlds that are not considered). (see below logical possibility forms the broadest category of options).
Problem: Kripke semantics is therefore inadequate for logical modalities.
Modal Logic/Hintikka: the historically earliest purpose for which it was developed was precisely dealing with logical modalities. This was the purpose for which the Lewis systems were developed.
HintikkaVsKripke: does not only have a skeleton in the closet, but said skeleton haunts the entire house.
Equivalence Relation/Hintikka: if R is required to be reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive, it does not provide the solution: it still does not guarantee that all logically possible worlds are contained in the set. It can (possibly together with with connectedness) only guarantee that w0 has a maximum number of sets as its alternatives that are, so to speak, already in SF.
I 3
KripkeVsVs/Hintikka: It could be argued that this does not yet show that Kripke semantics is wrong. It just needs to be reinforced. E.g. Nino Cocchiarella: Cocchiarella: additional condition: all models (in the usual 1st order sense) with the same domain of individuals do (w0) must occur among the alternative possible worlds to w0. ((s) No new individuals may be added or removed with regard to the original possible world w0).
Hintikka: technically it is of course possible.
"Old": (= Kripke semantics): non-standard semantics.
new: F must include all models that have the same individuals domain do(w0) of well-defined individuals as w0.
Individual/Individuals/Modal/Hintikka: an individual must be well-defined, but it does not have to exist! ((s) I.e. it can be expressed then that it is missing, E.g. the hero has no sister in a possible world).
Domain of Individuals: for each possible world is then a subset of the domain D.
I 4
HintikkaVs: Problem: this is unrealistically interpretative: this flexible approach namely allows non-well-shaped individuals. Then there is no point in asking whether this individual exists or not. Fusion/Fission: a flexible semantics must also allow fission and fusion between one possible world and the another.
Def Well-Defined/Individual/Hintikka: an individual is well-defined, if it can be singled out by name at a node of the world line.
World Line: can link non-existent incarnations of individuals, as long as they are well-defined for all possible worlds in which a node of the world line can be located.
Truth Conditions: are then simple: (Ex) p(x) is true iff there is an individual there, E.g. named z, so that p(z) is true in w.
Modal Semantics/Hintikka. About a so defined (new) semantics a lot can be said:
Kripke Semantics/Hintikka: corresponds to a non-standard semantics, while the "new" semantics (with a fixed domain of individuals) corresponds to a standard semantics. (For higher-order logic).
Standard Semantics/higher level: we get this by demanding that the higher level quantifiers go over all extensionally possible entities of the appropriate logical type (higher than individuals) like quantifiers in the standard semantics for modal logic should go over all extensionally possible worlds.
This is a parallelism that is even stronger than an analogy:
Decision problem: for 2nd order logic this is reduced to the 1st order standard modal logic.
Standard: does the same job in the latter sense as in the former sense.
Quantified 1st Order Standard Modal Logic/Hintikka: all of this leads to this logic being very strong, comparable in strength with 2nd order logic. It follows that it is not axiomatizable. (see above HintikkaVsKripke).
The stronger a logic, the less manageable it is.
I 12
Kripke/Hintikka: has avoided epistemic logic and the logic of propositional attitudes and focuses on pure modalities. Therefore, it is strange that he uses non-standard logic.
But somehow it seems to be clear to him that this is not possible for logical modalities.
Metaphysical Possibility/Kripke/HintikkaVsKripke: has never explained what these mystical possibilities actually are.
I 13
Worse: he has not shown that they are so restrictive that he can use his extremely liberal non-standard semantics.
I 77
Object/Thing/Object/Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke Thesis: the existence of permanent (endurant) objects must simply be provided as a basic concept. HintikkaVsKripke: this requirement is not well founded. Maybe you have to presuppose the criteria of identification and identity only for traditional logic and logical semantics. But that also does not mean that the problem of identification was not an enduring problem for the philosophers.
I 84
KripkeVsHintikka: Problem: the solutions of these differential equations need not be analytic functions or features that allow an explicit definition of the objects. Hintikka: it seems that Kripke presupposes, however, that you always have to be able to define the relations embodied by the world lines.
HintikkaVsKripke: that is too strict.
World Line: we allow instead that they are implicitly defined by the solutions of the differential equations.
I 86
HintikkaVsKripke: our model makes it possible that we do not necessarily have to presuppose objects as guaranteed like Kripke. ((s) it may be that a curve is not closed in a time section).
I 116
Cross World identity/Rigidity/HintikkaVsKripke: it’s more about the way of identification (public/perspective, see above) than about rigidity or non-rigidity. The manner of identification decides what counts as one and the same individual.
HitikkaVsKripke: his concept of rigidity is silently based on Russell’s concept of the logical proper name. But there is no outstanding class of rigid designation expressions.
Proper Names/Names/HintikkaVsKripke: are not always rigid. E.g. it may be that I do not know to whom the name N.N. refers. Then I have different epistemic alternatives with different references. Therefore, it makes sense to ask "Who is N.N.?".
Public/Perspective/Identification/Russell/Kripke/Hintikka: Russell: focuses on the perspective
I 117
Kripke: on public identification.
I 195
Identity/Individuals/Hintikka: it is much less clear how the identity for certain individuals can fail in the transition to another possible world. I.e. world lines can branch (fission). Separation/KripkeVsFission/SI/Hintikka: Kripke excludes fission, because for him the (SI) applies. A fission, according to him, would violate the transitivity of identity. After a fission, the individuals would by no means be identical, even if it should be after the transitivity. Therefore, for Kripke the (SI) is inviolable.
HintikkaVsKripke: that is circular:
Transitivity of Identity/Hintikka: can mean two things:
a) transitivity within a possible world.
b) between possible worlds.
The plausibility of transitivity is part of the former, not the latter.
To require transitivity of identity between possible worlds simply means to exclude fission. This is what is circular about Kripke’s argument.
I 196
Possible World/Individuals Domain/HintikkaVsKripke: it should not be required that the individuals remain the same when changing from possible world to possible world. Talk about possible worlds is empty if there are no possible experiences that might distinguish them. ((s) is that not possible with a constant domain? Also properties could be partly (not completely) exchanged). Possible World/Hintikka: should best be determined as the associated possible totalities of experience.
And then fission cannot be ruled out.
I 209
Re-Identification/Hintikka: also with this problem situation semantics and possible worlds semantics are sitting in the same boat. Situation semantics: rather obscures the problem. In overlapping situations, E.g. it assumes that the overlapping part remains the same.
Re-Identification/Quine/Hintikka: deems it hopeless, because it is impossible to explain how it works.
Re-Identification/Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke ditto, but that’s why we should simply postulate it, at least for physical objects.
HintikkaVsQuine/HintikkaVsKripke: that is either too pessimistic or too optimistic.
But mistaking the problem would mean to neglect one of the greatest philosophical problems.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Leibniz, G.W. Stegmüller Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
Books on Amazon
Stegmüller IV 388
Kontingenz/Leibniz: jedes Ding ist kontingent, weshalb es nicht so wäre, wenn ein anderes Ding anders wäre. Alle Dinge sind kausal verbunden. Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit dieser Dinge, weshalb die Welt als Ganzes ebenfalls kontingent ist!
Welt/Leibniz: es mag durchaus sein, dass die Reihe der Ursachen unbegrenzt ist. Leibniz nimmt nicht notwendig einen zeitlichen Anfang an!
zureichender Grund/Leibniz: muss dann außerhalb der Welt liegen! Es muss etwas anderes sein als die Welt!
IV 389
Er muss ein notwendiges Wesen sein. VsLeibniz: 1. Woher wissen wir, dass alles einen zureichenden Grund braucht?
2. Kann es ein notwendiges Wesen geben, das einen zureichenden Grund in sich selbst hat?
Sollte die zweite Frage negativ beantwortet werden, hat die Gesamtheit keinen zureichenden Grund!
KantVsLeibniz: der kosmologische Beweis beruht implizit auf dem (widerlegten) ontologischen Beweis. (s.o. KantVsDescartes).
IV 390
Existenz/StegmüllerVsKant/StegmüllerVsFrege/StegmüllerVsQuine: die Auffassung, der Begriff der Existenz gehe vollständig im Existenzquantor auf, ist umstritten! Existenz/Kontingenz/StegmüllerVsLeibniz: wir könnten notwendige Existenz als Negation von Kontingenz auffassen.
Problem: 1. Die Prämisse, die Welt als ganzes sei kontingent (es würde nicht existieren, wenn etwas anderes anders gewesen wäre), müsste fallengelassen werden: Selbst wenn jeder Teil der Welt kontingent ist, spricht nichts für die Annahme, dass die Welt als ganze nicht existieren würde, wenn nicht (sic?) etwas anderes anders wäre oder gewesen wäre.
Der Schluss von der Kontingenz jeden Teils auf die Kontingenz des Ganzen ist unzulässig.
2. Alternative: Kontingenz: etwas sei kontingent, wenn es auch nicht existieren könnte.
IV 392
Das muss man mit der obigen Bemerkung kombinieren, dass es nicht logisch unmöglich wäre, dass das behauptete notwendige Wesen auch nicht existieren könnte. Das aber ist unverständlich. zureichender Grund/VsLeibniz: (ad (i)): Woher wissen wir, dass alles einen zureichenden Grund haben muss? Bisher hat niemand eine Notwendigkeit a priori dafür zu zeigen vermocht. Das hätte auch keine Plausibilität:
1. Es ist richtig, dass wir immer nach Symmetrien suchen, aber es gibt keine Garantie, dass wir sie immer finden.
2. Wir halten uns immer innerhalb unserer Welt auf, Extrapolationen sind unzulässig!
Selbst wenn nun alles innerhalb der Welt einen zureichenden Grund hätte, hätten wir kein Recht, auf einen zureichend Grund außerhalb der Welt zu schließen.
Verbreitetes Argument: die Dinge müssen durch und durch verstehbar sein.
MackieVs: das stimmt überhaupt nicht!
IV 393
Wir haben keinen Grund anzunehmen, dass sich das Universum nach unseren intellektuellen Bedürfnissen richtet.

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Lewis, D. Martin Vs Lewis, D.
 
Books on Amazon
Arm II 182
Abwesenheit/Lewis: wie Quines "Anbetrachten" nur eine facon de parler eine "happenstance of idiom". MartinVsLewis/MartinVsQuine: das muß man überhaupt nicht deontologisieren.
Anbetracht/Martin: ("sake"): ist der angenommene Nutzen von etwas, durch Instantiation eines Zustands oder einer Bedingung durch eine Aktion oder Unterlassen. Es genügt, daß wir ungefähr wissen, nach was in der Welt wir Ausschau halten sollen, wenn von "Anbetracht" die Rede ist. Auch wenn meistens herauskommt, daß es in Begriffen der theoretischen Physik nicht darstellbar (zu vervollständigen) ist. Aber auf der Ebene, wo wir über die beobachtbare Welt reden ist solche Vollständigkeit unnötig.
Abwesenheit/Löcher/MartinVsLewis: auch hier ist eine Deontologisierung überflüssig.
Lösung: statt "wie die Dinge sind" sollte man besser sagen: "Wie die Welt ist" oder "Wie es ist" entweder zu einer bestimmten Zeit an einem bestimmten Ort, oder auch ganz allgemein. Dann werden "Dinge" gar nicht erwähnt.

Arm II 183
MartinVsLewis: aber der Satz "Es gibt keine Falschmacher für "es gibt keine arktischen Pinguine"" ist genauso ein negativer Existenzsatz. Lösung/Martin: es ist kein negativer Existenzsatz über Dinge, sondern es geht um einen Zustand einer Raumzeit Region. Der Satz über die Abwesenheit von Falschmachern braucht einen Satz über einen Weltzustand als Wahrmacher.
Problem: und zwar genauso wie "Es gibt keine arktischen Pinguine". Daher kann er auch nicht gebraucht werden, um zu zeigen, dass der letztere Satz keinen Zustand als Wahrmacher braucht.
II 186
Leere/Abwesenheit/MartinVsLewis: dieser will immer den Doughnut ansehen und nicht das Loch. Das kann man aber durchaus konkreter fassen: Bsp wenn wir ein Hemd ohne Flecken aussuchen, dann halten wir nicht nach dem reinen Nichts Ausschau, sondern nach der Abwesenheit von Flecken.

Mart I
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Metaphysics Dummett Vs Metaphysics
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 463
Metaphysics/Frege: the only solution for disagreement here is semantic ascent. Dummett: pro:
Rorty: we can go further and prohibit language philosophy to re-establish the alleged contrast between "objective reality" and "useful fictions".
DavidsonVsOntological Commitment/DavidsonVsMetaphysics/DavidsonVsQuine: the "ontological commitment" is like Dummett’s "facts": relics of metaphysics. They belong to the duality scheme/content.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Modal Logic Quine Vs Modal Logic
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Chisholm II 185
QuineVsModal Logic: instead space time points as quadruples. Reason: permanent objects (continuants) seem to threaten the extensionality. SimonsVsQuine: the Achilles heel is that we must have doubts whether anyone could learn a language that refers not to permanent objects (continuants).
---
Lewis IV 32
QuineVsModal Logic: which properties are necessary or accidental, is then dependent on the description. Definition essentialism/Aristotle: essential qualities are not dependent on description.
QuineVs: that is as congenial as the whole modal logic.
LewisVsQuine: that really is congenial.
---
I 338
But modal logic has nothing to do with it. Here, totally impersonal. The modal logic, as we know it, begins with Clarence Lewis "A survey of Symbolic Logic" in 1918. His interpretation of the necessity that Carnap formulates even more sharply later is: Definition necessity/Carnap: A sentence that starts with "it is necessary that", is true if and only if the remaining sentence is analytic.
Quine provisionally useful, despite our reservations about analyticity.
---
I 339
(1) It is necessary that 9 > 4 it is then explained as follows:
(2) "9 > 4" is analytically.
It is questionable whether Lewis would ever have engaged in this matter, if not Russell and Whitehead (Frege following) had made the mistake, the philonic construction:
"If p then q" as "~ (p and ~ q)"
if they so designate this construction as a material implication instead of as a material conditional.
C.I.Lewis: protested and said that such a defined material implication must not only be true, but must also be analytical, if you wanted to consider it rightly as an "implication". This led to his concept of "strict implication".
Quine: It is best to view one "implies" and "is analytical" as general terms which are predicated by sentences by adding them predicatively to names (i.e. quotations) of sentences. Unlike "and", "not", "if so" which are not terms but operators.
Whitehead and Russell, who took the distinction between use and mention lightly, wrote "p implies q" (in the material sense) as it was with "If p, then q" (in the material sense) interchangeable.
---
I 339
Material implication "p implies q" not equal to "p > q" (mention/use) "implies" and "analytical" better most general terms than operators. Lewis did the same, he wrote "p strictly implies q" and explained it as "It is necessary that not (p and not q)". Hence it is that he developed a modal logic, in which "necessary" is sentence-related operator.
If we explain (1) in the form of (2), then the question is why we need modal logic at all.
---
I 340
An apparent advantage is the ability to quantify in modal positions. Because we know that we cannot quantify into quotes, and in (2) a quotation is used. This was also certainly Lewis' intention. But is it legitimate?
---
I 341
It is safe that (1) is true at any plausible interpretation and the following is false: (3) It is necessary that the number of planets > 4
Since 9 = the number of planets, we can conclude that the position of "9" in (1) is not purely indicative and the necessity operator is therefore opaque.
The recalcitrance of 9 is based on the fact that it can be specified in various ways, who lack the necessary equivalence. (E.g. as a number of planets, and the successor to the 8) so that at a specification various features follow necessarily (something "greater than 4 ") and not in the other.
Postulate: Whenever any of two sentences determines the object x clearly, the two sentences in question are necessary equivalent.
(4) If Fx and only x and Gx and exclusively x, it is necessary that (w)(Fw if and only if when Gw).
---
I 342
(This makes any sentence p to a necessary sentence) However, this postulate nullifies modal distinctions: because we can derive the validity of "It is necessary that p" that it plays no role which true sentence we use for "p".
Argument: "p" stands for any true sentence, y is any object, and x = y. Then what applies clearly is:
(5) (p and x = y) and exclusively x
as
(6) x = y and x exclusively
then we can conclude on the basis of (4) from (5) and (6):
(7) It is necessary that (w) (p and w = y) if and only if w = y)
However, the quantification in (7) implies in particular "(p and y = y) if and only if y = y" which in turn implies "p"; and so we conclude from (7) that it is necessary that p.
---
I 343
The modal logic systems by Barcan and Fitch allow absolute quantification in modal contexts. How such a theory can be interpreted without the disastrous assumption (4), is far from clear. ---
I 343
Modal Logic: Church/Frege: modal sentence = Proposition Church's system is structured differently: He restricts the quantification indirectly by reinterpreting variables and other symbols into modal positions. For him (as for Frege) a sentence designated then, to which a modal operator is superior, a proposition. The operator is a predicate that is applied to the proposition. If we treat the modalities like the propositional attitude before, then we could first (1) reinterpret
(8) [9 > 4] is necessary
(Brackets for class)
and attach the opacity of intensional abstraction.
One would therefore interpret propositions as that what is necessary and possible.
---
I 344
Then we could pursue the model from § 35 and try to reproduce the modality selectively transparent, by passing selectively from propositions to properties: (9) x (x > 4) is necessary in terms 9.
This is so far opposed to (8) as "9" here receives a purely designated position in one can quantify and in one can replace "9" by "the number of planets".
This seemed to be worth in the case of en, as we e.g. wanted to be able to say
(§ 31), there would be someone, of whom is believed, he was a spy (> II).
But in the case of modal expressions something very amazing comes out. The manner of speaking of a difference of necessary and contingent properties of an object.
E.g. One could say that mathematicians are necessarily rational and not necessarily two-legged, while cyclist are necessarily two-legged but not necessarily rational. But how can a bicycling mathematician be classified?
Insofar as we are talking purely indicatively of the object, it is not even suggestively useful to speak of some of its properties as a contingent and of others as necessary.
---
I 344
Properties/Quine: no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal Logic) only more or less important properties Of course, some of its properties are considered essential and others unimportant, some permanently and others temporary, but there are none which are necessary or contingent. (> Properties).
Curiously, exactly this distinction has philosophical tradition. It lives on in the terms "nature" and "accident". One attributes this distinction to Aristotle. (Probably some scholars are going to protest, but that is the penalty for attributing something to Aristotle.)
---
I 345
But however venerable this distinction may be, it certainly cannot be justified. And thus the construction (9) which carries out this distinction so elegantly, also fails. We cannot blame the analyticity the diverse infirmities of modality.
There is no alternative yet for (1) and (2) that at least sets us a little on something like modal logic. We can define
"P is necessary" as "P = ((x) (x = x))".
Whether (8) thereby becomes true, or whether it is at all in accordance with the equation of (1) and (2), will depend on how closely we construct the propositions in terms of their identity. They cannot be constructed so tightly that they are appropriate to the propositional properties.
But how particularly the definition may be, something will be the result that a modal logic without quantifiers is isomorphic.
---
VI 41
Abstract objects/modal logic/Putnam/Parsons: modal operators can save abstract objects. QuineVsModal Logic: instead quantification (postulating of objects) thus we streamline the truth functions. Modal logic/Putnam/Parsons/Quine: Putnam and Charles Parsons have shown how abstract objects can be saved in the recourse to possibility operators.
Quine: without modal operators:
  E.g. "Everything is such that unless it is a cat and eats spoiled fish, and it gets sick, will avoid fish in the future."
((s) logical form/(s): (x) ((Fx u Gx u Hx)> Vx).
Thus, the postulation of objects can streamline our only loosely binding truth functions, without us having to resort to modal operators.
---
VI 102
Necessity/opportunity/Quine: are insofar intensional, as they do not fit the substitutivity of identity. Again, vary between de re and de dicto. ---
VI 103
Counterfactual conditionals, unreal conditionals/Quine: are true, if their consequent follows logically from the antecedent in conjunction with background assumptions. Necessity/Quine: by sentence constellations, which are accepted by groups. (Goes beyond the individual sentence).
---
VI 104
QuineVsModal logic: its friends want to give the necessity an objective sense. ---
XI 52
QuineVsModal Logic/Lauener: it is not clear here on what objects we are referring to. ---
XI 53
Necessesity/Quine/Lauener: ("Three Grades of Modal Involvement"): 3 progressive usages: 1. as a predicate for names of sentences: E.g. "N "p"": "p is necessarily true". (N: = square, box). This is harmless, simply equate it with analyticity.
2. as an operator which extends to close sentence: E.g. "N p": "it is necessarily true that p"
3. as an operator, too, for open sentences: E.g. "N Fx": through existence generalization: "(Ex) N Fx".

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Nominalism Bigelow Vs Nominalism
 
Books on Amazon
I 62
NominalismVsBigelow: will try to avoid our apparatus of relations of relations. BigelowVsNominalism: we need relations and relations of relations in science.
Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not claim to have proved him here. But he is the only way to solve the problem of the similar and the different (problem of quantities) (namely with the 3 levels).
Simplicity/BigelowVsNominalism: will never be able to be as uniform as our realistic explanation. Nominalism would have to assume complex relational predicates as primitive.
I 97
Quantities/BigelowVsNominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: if he eliminated quantities, they would come back in through the back door because of the rules of composition.
I 98
E.g. instead of refering to the quantity of rabbits, he might say it applies to all and only rabbits. BigelowVsNominalism: one could say this is just an abbreviation for "the quantity of all and only the rabbits". Be true/BigelowVsNominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter. "Is true" must be discussed further before this paraphrase could proof something ontological. ((s) BigelowVsQuine, > semantic ascent). Quantities/Bigelow/Pargetter: whether one believes in it, is not sure. The semantics does certainly not decide that.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Parsons, Ter. Hilbert Vs Parsons, Ter.
 
Books on Amazon
I 37
Nichtexistente Objekte/unverwirklichte Möglichkeiten/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: These: es gibt nichtexistente Objekte, und zwar in der wirklichen Welt (WiWe). (>Possibilia). HintikkaVsQuine: die Philosophen, die sie ablehnen, haben zu stark in syntaktischen Bahnen gedacht.
Hintikka. These: man muss die Frage eher semantisch (modelltheoretisch) beantworten.
Fiktion/Ryle: Test: gilt die Paraphrase?
Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryles test schlägt fehlt in Fällen wie Bsp „Mir. Pickwick ist eine Fiktion“.
HintikkaVsParsons: die Relevanz des Kriteriums ist überhaupt fraglich.
I 38
Ontologie/Sprache/sprachlich/HintikkaVsRyle: wie sollten linguistische Fragen wie Paraphrasierbarkeit über ontologischen Status entscheiden? Lösung/Hintikka: für die Frage ob es nichtexistente Objekte gibt: Modelltheorie.
Bsp Puccinis Tosca: her geht es darum, ob die Soldaten Kugeln in ihren Gewehrläufen haben. ((s) sic, von Puccini, nicht von Verdi).
Pointe: selbst wenn sie welche haben, wären es nur fiktive! ((s) innerhalb der Geschichte).
((s) D.h. damit die Geschichte überhaupt erzählt werden kann, muss man annehmen, dass über den entsprechenden Satz mit “wahr” oder “falsch” entschieden werden kann, abhängig davon, ob Kugeln in den Läufen sind. Sonst wäre der Satz unverständlich.)
Modelltheorie/Hintikka: liefert eine ernstzunehmende Antwort. ((s) „wahr im Modell“ heißt, in der Geschichte ist es wahr, dass Kugeln in den Läufen sind).
HintikkaVsParsons: man sollte nicht zu stark syntaktisch argumentieren, d.h. nicht bloß fragen, welche Schlußfolgerungen gezogen werden dürfen und welche nicht.
Akzeptanz/Akzeptierbarkeit/Inferenzen/Hintikka: fragen nach der Akzeptierbarkeit von Inferenzen und von Sprache und Intuitionen sind syntaktisch.
sing Term/ontologische Verpflichtung/Existenz/Parsons: Parsons spricht davon, dass der Gebrauch von sing Term uns zu einer existentiellen Generalisierung verpflichtet. Und damit auf eine Referenten. D.h. es ist eine Verpflichtung zu einer Inferenz.
HintikkaVsParsons.
I 41
Nichtexistente Objekte/mögliche Gegenstände/unverwirklichte Möglichkeiten/Hintikka: aber sind nicht einige dieser nichtexistenten Objekte in unserer eigenen aktualen Welt (WiWe)? Hintikka: These: ja, einige dieser bloß möglichen Objekte sind in der WiWe. bona fide Objekt/Hintikka: kann in einer Möwe existieren und in einer anderen fehlen.
Weltlinie/Hintikka: wenn es darum geht, welche gezogen werden können ist Existenz nicht das wichtigste Problem. Eher Wohldefiniertheit.
HintikkaVsLeibniz: wir erlauben auch, dass ein Objekt in mehreren MöWe existiert.
Frage: wenn Bewohner zweier verschiedener Möwe dann identisch sein können, wann sind sie dann identisch?
I 42
Existentielle Generalisierung/EG/HintikkaVsParsons: das zeigt, dass sein Kriterium der EG falsch ist, denn sie kann fehlschlagen aus Gründen, die nichts mit Nichtexistenz zu tun haben. Bsp
(1) Königin Victoria wußte, dass Lewis Carroll Lewis Carroll ist
daraus kann man nicht schließen, selbst obwohl Caroll existierte, und dies von der Königin gewusst wurde, dass
(2) (Ex)Königin Victoria wußte, dass Lewis Carroll x ist.
Und daher
(3) Jemand ist so, dass Königin Victoria wußte, dass er Lewis Carroll ist
(2) und (3) sagen dasselbe wie
(4) Königin Victoria wußte, wer Lewis Carroll ist.
Das ist aber nicht von (1) impliziert (entailed).
Existentielle Generalisierung/EG/Hintikka: die Äquivalenz von (2)-(3) mit (4) ist aber ganz unabhängig davon, ob die Quantoren nur über existente oder auch über nichtexistente Objekte gehen.
Der Grund für das Fehlschlagen der EG ist nicht ein Fehlschlagen der Eindeutigkeit.
Eindeutigkeit schlägt allerdings fehl, denn in verschiedenen Situationen, die mit dem Wissen der Königin kompatibel sind, kann der Name Lewis Carroll auf verschiedene Personen angewendet werden. Daher kann nicht nur ein einzelnes, bestimmtes Objekt als Wert von „x“ fungieren.
Daher findet die EG keine Anwendung und (1) und dennoch kann sie so verstanden werden, dass sie den Äußerer auf die Existenz von Lewis Carroll verpflichtet. Daher schlägt Parsons Kriterium fehl.
Platonism Searle Vs Platonism
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
V 170
SearleVsPlatonism/SearleVsQuine: simple proof: E.g. "q" is the proper name of the proposition, which is formed by the conjunction of all known true propositions. Then all the knowledge can be symbolized as follows (while for 'p' propositions are to be entered):
(Ep)(p = q . p is true)
According to Quine's criterion therefore the only thing we would have to assume would be one single proposition.
2. VsSearle: These arguments are based on the concept of synonymy that Quine rejects.
SearleVsVs: 1. No, because then the supposedly neutral criterion is drawn into the dispute.
2. More important: No, because the only synonymies here have been introduced by an explicit setting. Thus Quine's objections do not apply here.
3. VsSearle: Such "predicates" as "P" are illogical and nonsensical.
V 170/171
SearleVsVs: Quine himself could not make such an objection. He himself used such means against the modality.
V 245/246
SearleVsPlato: this is the basic error of metaphysics, the attempt to project real or imagined properties of the language in the world. The usual reply VsPlato:
1. That objects are merely complexes of properties. (Distinction between referencing and predicting).
2. Tautology that everything that can be said about an object, can be said in descriptions of the subject.
SearleVs: both are useless. It is absurd to assume that an object is a combination of propertyless being and properties. Equally absurd: group of properties.
- - -
IV 80
Fiction/literature/Searle: not all fiction is literature (> Comic), not all literature is fiction. I do not consider it possible to study literature as I'm going to do it with fiction.
IV 81
There is no common feature of all literary forms or works. By contrast, a continuous transition from literary to non-literary. SearleVsPlato: it is wrong to take fiction for a lie.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Popper, K. Quine Vs Popper, K.
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Quine XI 32
HolismVsPopper/Quine/Lauener: holism prevents extreme falsificationism.
XI 106
QuineVsPopper/Lauener: less extreme attitude: allows the psychological moment of acquiring conditioned reflexes, i.e. to live up to habituation and learning.
XI 125
Observation Sentence/Convention/QuineVsPopper/Lauener: observation sentences are not temporarily fixed by conventions, but they are maintained by a conservative strategy, as long as nothing speaks against it. Quine pro Popper: all sentences are in principle revisable.
Standards/Quine/Lauener: should belong to the inventory of nature, but not to science.
XI 126
LauenerVsQuine: Problem: how do you explain to the step from "being" to "ought". (>Naturalistic fallacy). - - -
XII 95
Falsification//Holism/QuineVsPopper: only shows that one or more statements of a network are false, but not which.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Putnam, H. Quine Vs Putnam, H.
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Schurz I 211
Realism/Philosophy of Science/Schurz: two kinds: a) metaphysical
I 212
b) hypothetical constructive realism: Thesis: the question of whether a theoretical term (TT) refers cannot be decided a priori. It depends on the success of the concept in empirical insight. Then realistic question of reasons converges with the instrumentalist question of meaning!
Miracle Argument/PutnamVsQuine/PutnamVsUnder-Determinacy: (pro realism): it would be a miracle if theories that have long been empirically successful, were not also realistically true.
Underdeterminacy/QuineVsPutnam/QuineVsRealism: Thesis: it is always possible to construct empirically equivalent theories T* to a given theory T with greatly different or even incompatible theoretical superstructure, so that it is impossible for T and T* to be true at the same time. However, such empirically equivalent theory transformations are always post hoc.
Miracle Argument: (Worrall 1997 153ff, Carrier 2003 §4): can only be valid if we mean by empirical success the ability to make qualitatively new predictions.
CarrierVsQuine/WorrallVsQuine//Schurz: no post hoc constructed theory T* was ever able to do that.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Quine, W.V.O. Block Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon:
Ned Block
Fodor/Lepore IV 184
Block/Fodor/Lepore: is not a holist himself and accepts the distinction analytic/synthetic. BlockVsQuine: pro distinction analytic/synthetic. (> Stock).
His argument in favor is perhaps to avoid the holism by proposing a principle of individuation, which is coarse enough to individuate inferential roles.
Block can recognize what we have said about the connection between analyticity and compositionality.
Conceptual role/CRT/Block: the problem: a criterion for individuation of inferential roles is not in sight.

Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007
Quine, W.V.O. Brandom Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
I 577
E.g. Gavagai: sentences are the smallest units that can make a move in the language game. Therefore, there remains a margin for dividing the responsibility between the subsentential linguistic units.
I 578
BrandomVsQuine: sentences about rabbit parts predict pruned properties, namely by reference to the merged objects to which they belong!. If you want to use singular terms for parts, there must be predications of them which they do not only address through the entities in which they occur.
I 579
Some symmetrical SMSICs must be essential for the use of sentences as translated ones - allow substitutions from one rabbit-part term to another - and exist on a finer distinction than that they belong to the same entitiy. If "Gavagai" is to be a real sortal, then language must be able to individuate objects which it sorts. There must be a concept of ​​"the same Gavagai". (In derived scheme).
The native language cannot have expressions for rabbit molecules without absurd pullups.
I 580
VsQuine: because no natural language can be non-autonomous to that effect - only an artificial language whose use is established in a richer metalanguage can be that - the way towards a non-circumstantial translation is preferable. Unqualified proposal for solution: "re-individuating translations": speaking of "integral parts of rabbit" instead of talking about rabbits, or even coarser individuations: "Rabbitness": not enough.
BrandomVsQuine: here it comes to the accuracy of inferences, not to Quine’s dire basis of superficial stimuli.
I 601
Gavagai: how do you decide whether the rabbit fly or a flash of the bright stub tail triggers the expression? You cannot know, the RDRDs and the corresponding causal chains do not matter, but their inferential role. It can, for example, specify whether it is about something flying or something flashing.
I 666
BrandomVsQuine: fluctuates constantly whether his "networks of beliefs" or "general theories" are of an individual or communal nature. Therefore, it is not clear whether he sees our communication in general from this perspective.
II 217/218
The significance of a belief depends on what else one convinced of. (Holism).
II 224
BrandomVsQuine: but then two interlocutors refer to different things if they have different beliefs. (With the same utterances). So it is not clear how the communication can be made understandable as a matter of sharing of meanings.
BrandomVsQuine: stuck too much to his dislike of singular terms, grappling with the question of when the "exportation" is legitimate.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Quine, W.V.O. Burge Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon:
Tyler Burge
Wol I 260
Names/Christening/Burge: Thesis: (as Kripke): a name is true when the object has been named in an appropriate manner. The name itself goes into the conditions of its applicability. In this, names differ from many predicates. E.g. the predicate "is a dog": an object could also be a dog, if the word "dog" was never used as a symbol.
But an object could not be a Jones, unless someone used "Jones" as a name.
E.g.
(2) Jones is necessarily a Jones
(3) This entity named "Jones" is necessarily an entity named "Jones"
Both turn out to be wrong! Names behave like ordinary predicates: they do not necessarily apply to objects.
I 261
BurgeVsQuine/BurgeVsRussell: we avoid the artificiality by we not assuming that names abbreviate any predicates, nor produce artificial predicates. Our theory also seems to counter the accusation that proper names do not convey information on the subject and do not attribute properties.
Burge: you give at least the information that E.g. someone was called Aristotle.

Burge I
T. Burge
Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010
Quine, W.V.O. Carnap Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
II 173
Analytic/Synthetic: CarnapVsQuine: trying to overcome the difficulties in order to maintain the distinction. Restriction: the distinction should apply only to the so-called constructed languages. Here there are clear rules as to when a composition is allowed.
VII 147
Pragmatics/Carnap: additional problem: whether the objects exist. Quine: doubts that in the case of absence an explication of the words is possible, since he requires clear behavioral criteria. So these words become meaningless. CarnapVsQuine: it is theoretically possible to show the fruitfulness of semantic concepts through the evolution of language systems without pragmatic basis (language use, behaviourist). (operational procedures).
VII 151
Intensionalist thesis of pragmatics/CarnapVsQuine: determining the intension is an empirical hypothesis that can be checked by observing the language habits. Extensionalist thesis/QuineVsCarnap: determining the intention is ultimately a matter of taste; the linguist is free, because it cannot be verified. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise, either. Quine: the completed lexicon is e.g. pede Herculem, i.e. we risk an error if we start at the foot. But we can draw an advantage from that. On the other hand, if we postpone a definition of synonymy in the case of the lexicon, no problem appears as nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false.
VII 152
Solution/CarnapVsQuine: the linguist must provide not only the real cases, but also the possible ones.
VII 153
CarnapVsQuine: The extensionalist thesis is inappropriate: E.g. entry in the lexicon: (3) Einhorn, unicorn Kobold, goblin On the other hand the wrong registration: (4) Einhorn, goblin Kobold, unicorn Carnap: The two German words here have the same extension, namely the zero class (Carnap pro). If the extensionalist thesis is correct, then there is no essential, empirically verifiable difference between (3) and (4).
VII 154
QuineVsCarnap: might answer that the man in the street was unwilling to say anything about nonexistent objects.
VII 155
CarnapVsQuine: the tests concerning the intentions are independent of existential questions. The man in the street is very well able to understand issues related to assumed counterfactual situations.
Quine XI 150
Ding/Gegenstand/Carnap/Lauener: Dinge anzunehmen bedeutet nur die Wahl einer gewissen Sprache. Es heißt nicht, an diese Dinge zu glauben.
XI 151
CarnapVsQuine: sein Existenz Kriterium (Wert einer gebunden Variablen zu sein) hat insofern keine tiefere Bedeutung, als darin nur eine Sprachwahl zum Ausdruck kommt. QuineVsCarnap: Sprache und Theorie können nicht so getrennt werden. Wissenschaft ist die Fortsetzung unserer täglichen Praxis.
Stroud I 221
Traum/Quine/Stroud: Quine schließt an keiner Stelle die Möglichkeit aus, dass wir die ganze Zeit träumen. (>Descartes). Skeptizismus/Empirie/Carnap: kann nicht empirisch beantwortet werden.
Wissen/Carnap: allerdings kann es empirische Untersuchungen geben, die zeigen, wie wir zu Wissen gelangen.
Naturalized Epistemology/Quine: soll das leisten.
CarnapVsQuine: Pointe: eben weil sie eine empirische Untersuchung ist, kann sie die traditionelle Frage des Philosophen nicht beantworten.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Quine, W.V.O. Chomsky Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 319
Language/Quine: interweaving of sentences. Theory/Language/ChomskyVsQuine: Quine himself must even presuppose that both are separated here: he certainly does not believe that two monolingual speakers of the same language can have no differences of opinion.
((s) If language and theory were identical, one could not argue, since even according to Quine the theories must have a certain unity.
Chomsky: otherwise, according to Quine, every dispute would be completely irrational, as between two speakers of different languages.
---
I 320
Definition Language/Quine: "Complex of present dispositions to verbal behavior, in which speakers of the same language have necessarily corresponded to one another." (W + O, 27) Language/ChomskyVsQuine: then our disposition would have to be explained to a certain verbal behavior by a certain system. This is certainly not the case.
---
I 321
Reinforcement/ChomskyVsQuine: his concept of "reinforcement" is almost empty. If reinforcement is needed to learn, this means that learning cannot go without data. This is even more emptier than with Skinner, who, unlike Quine, does not even require that intensifying stimuli influence. It is sufficient here that the reinforcement is merely imagined.
---
I 324
Language learning: behavioristic/Quine: conditioning, association ChomskyVsQuine: additional principles, only so endlessly many sentences explainable. Probability/Language/ChomskyVsQuine: the concept of the "probability of a sentence" is completely useless and empty:
---
I 325
Translation indeterminacy, indeterminacy: ChomskyVsQuine: disposition either with regard to stimulus, or with regard to the total body of the language: then all sentences are equally probable (reference classes). ---
I 326
Logical truth/Quine: is derived by him by conditioning mechanisms that associate certain sentence pairs with each other, ---
I 327
so that our knowledge of the logical relations can be represented as a finite system of linked propositions. ChomskyVsQuine: it remains unclear how we distinguish logical from causal relations.
Truth functions/Quine: allow a radical translation without "non verifiable analytical hypotheses", so they can be directly learned from the empirical data material (W + O § 13)
ChomskyVsQuine: his readiness to settle these things within the framework of the radical translation may show that he is ready to regard logic as an innate experience-independent basis for learning.
Then it is, however, arbitrary to accept this framework as innate, and not much else that can be described or imagined.
---
I 328
ChomskyVsQuine: his narrowly conceived Humean frame (Chomsky pro) with the language as a finite (!?) interweaving of sentences is incompatible with various triusms, which Quine certainly would accept. ---
I 329
Analytical hypothesis/stimulus meaning/Quine: stimulus meaning invloves, in contrast to the analytical hypothesis only "normal inductive uncertainty". Since the corresponding sentences can contain truth functions, they lead to "normal induction". This is not yet a "theory construction" as in the case of analytical hypotheses.
ChomskyVsQuine: the distinction is not clear because the normal induction also occurs within the radical translation.
---
I 330
ChomskyVsQuine: Vs "property space": not sure whether the terms of the language can be explained with physical dimensions. Aristotle: more connected with actions. VsQuine: not evident that similarities are localizable in space. Principles, not "learned sentences". ---
I 333
VsQuine: cannot depend on "disposition to reaction", otherwise moods, eye injuries, nutritional status, etc. would be too authoritive. ---
I 343
Language may not be taught at all. ---
I 335
Synonymy/ChomskyVsQuine: (he had suggested that synonymy "roughly speaking" exists in approximate equality of situations, and approximately equal effect). Chomsky: there is not even an approximate equality in the conditions that are likely to produce synonymous utterances.
ChomskyVsQuine: Synonymy can thus not be characterized by means of conditions of use (conditions of assertion) or effects on the listener. It is essential to distinguish between langue and parole, between competence and performance.
It is about meaningful idealization, Quine's idealization is meaningless.
---
I 337
Translation indeterminacy/ChomskyVsQuine: the reason for the thesis is, in a psychological context, an implausible and rather contentless empirical assertion, namely, which innate qualities the mind contributes to language acquisition. In an epistemic-theoretical context, Quine's thesis is merely a version of the well-known skeptical arguments, which can equally well be applied to physics or others.
---
I 337
Inconsistency/indeterminacy/theory/ChomskyVsQuine: any hypothesis goes beyond the data, otherwise it would be uninteresting. ---
Quine V 32
Definition Language/Quine: "Complex of dispositions to linguistic behavior". ((s) that could be called circular, because "linguistic" occurs. Vs: then it should be expressed by the fact that there is not yet a language besides the behavior.)
Disposition/ChomskyVsQuine: such a complex can presumably be presented as a set of probabilities to make an utterance under certain circumstances.
Vs: the concept of probability fails here: the probability with which I utter a certain English sentence cannot be distinguished from the probability with which I express a particular Japanese sentence.
QuineVsChomsky: one should not forget that dispositions have their conditions.
---
V 33
We find this through the procedure of question and consent. ---
Quine XI 115
Language/Theory/ChomskyVsQuine/Lauener: the language of a person and their theory are in any case different systems, even if one would agree with Quine otherwise. ---
XI 116
Quine: (dito). Indeterminacy of the translation: because of it one cannot speak of an invariant theory opposite translations.
Nor can we say that an absolute theory can be formulated in different languages, or vice versa, that different theories (even contradictory ones) can be expressed in one language.
((s)> Because of the ontological conclusion that I cannot argue about ontology, by telling the other that the things that exist with him are not there, because I then make the self-contradiction that there are things that do not exist).
Lauener: that would correspond to the error that the language contributes the syntax, the theory but the empirical content.
Language/Theory/Quine/Lauener: that does not mean that there is no contradiction between the two: insofar as two different theories are laid down in the same language, it means then that the expressions are not interchangeable in all expressions.
But there are also contexts where the distinction language/theory has no meaning. Therefore, the difference is gradual. The contexts where language/theory are interchangeable are those where Quine speaks of a network.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Quine, W.V.O. Churchland Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon:
Patricia Churchland
Fodor/Lepore IV 78
ChurchlandVsQuine: wir haben keinen Grund anzunehmen, dass es einen "anglophonen Hyperraum" mit einer anglophonen Hyperfläche für englische Sätze gäbe.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014
Quine, W.V.O. Davidson Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
I 41
Quine connects meaning and content with the firing of sensory nerves (compromise proposal) This makes his epistemology naturalistic. - DavidsonVsQuine: Quine should drop this (keep naturalism) but what remains of empiricism after deducting the first two dogmas. - DavidsonVsQuine: names: "Third Dogma" (> Quine, Theories and Things, Answer) dualism of scheme and content. Davidson: Scheme: Language including the ontology and world theory contained in it; I 42 - Content: the morphological firing of the neurons. Argument: something like the concept of uninterpreted content is necessary to make the concept relativism comprehensible. In Quine neurological replacement for sensory data as the basis for concept relativism. Davidson: Quine separation of scheme and content, however, becomes clear at one point: (Word and Object). Quine: "... by subtracting these indications from the worldview of people, we get the difference of what he contributes to this worldview. This difference highlights the extent of the conceptual sovereignty of the human, the area where he can revise his theories without changing anything in the data." (Word and Object, beginning) I 43 - Referring to QuineVsStroud: "everything could be different": we would not notice... -DavidsonVsQuine: Is that even right? According to the proximal theory, it could be assumed: one sees a rabbit, someone else sees a warthog and both say: Gavagai! (Something similar could occur with blind, deaf, bats or even with low-level astigmatism. The brains in the tank may be wrong even to the extent that Stroud feared. But everyone has a theory that preserves the structure of their sensations.
I 55
So it is easy to understand Cresswell when he says CreswellVsQuine: he has an empire of reified experiences or phenomena which confronts an inscrutable reality. QuineVsCresswell> Quine III) -
I 64
DavidsonVsQuine: he should openly advocate the distal theory and recognize the active role of the interpreter. The speaker must then refer to the causes in the world that both speak and which are obvious for both sides.
I 66
DavidsonVsQuine: His attempt is based on the first person, and thus Cartesian. Nor do I think we could do without some at least tacitly agreed standards. ProQuine: his courageous access to epistemology presented in the third person.
II 93
 Quine: ontology only physical objects and classes - action not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action: event and reference object. Explicating this ontology is a matter of semantics. Which entities must we assume in order to understand a natural language?
I 165
McDowell: World/Thinking/Davidson: (according to McDowell): general enemy to the question of how we come into contact with the empirical world. There is no mystery at all. No interaction of spontaneity and receptivity. (DavidsonVsQuine) Scheme/Content/Davidson: (Third Dogma): Scheme: Language in Quine - Content: "empirical meaning" in Quine. (I 165) Conceptual sovereignty/Quine: can go as far as giving rise to incommensurable worldviews. DavidsonVsQuine: experience cannot form a basis of knowledge beyond our opinions. It would otherwise have to be simultaneously inside and outside the space of reason.

Fodor/Lepore IV 225
Note
13.> IV 72
Radical Inerpretation/RI/Quine: his version is a first step to show that the concept of linguistic meaning is not scientifically useful and that there is a "large range" in which the application can be varied without empirical limitation. (W + O, p. 26> conceptual sovereignty). DavidsonVsQuine: in contrast to this: RI is a basis for denying that it would make sense to claim that individuals or cultures had different conceptual schemes.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
Quine, W.V.O. Dennett Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
II 132
de re/de dicto/DennettVsQuine: hopeless philosophical doctrine that there are two different types of belief. The only exception: E.g. I have to follow an object with my eyes before I can describe it. "Priority of tracking before the description."
But we can also take the most direct, most primitive cases of tracking with the senses in the de dicto mode: "the what-ever-it-is" that is responsible for the current pixel cluster. (> Disjunction)
De re/De dicto/Dennett: the difference is in the point of view, not the phenomenon.
Münch III 343
DennettVsQuine: too strongly behavioristically bound. What happens to the task of the translator, if you separate yourself from behaviourist terminology?
Münch III 362
Gavagai/Dennett: Quine presupposes that the linguist has already convinced himself of the communicative nature of the natives. (s) Question: can behaviorism presuppose communication at all?.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Mü I
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Quine, W.V.O. Dummett Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
Dummett I 142
Since the vocabulary changes and can be used differently, Davidson no longer considers the language of a particular individual as a starting unit, but the disposition to language usage. DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: not idiolect, but common language prevalent
DummettVsDavidson, DummettVsQuine: It is not permissible to assume that meaning and understanding of the private and non-communicable knowledge depend on a theory. It is not natural to understand precisely the idiolect primarily as a tool of communication. It is rather tempting to consider an internal state of the person concerned as that which gives the expressions of idiolect their respective meanings.
I 149
E.g. What a move means is not derived not from the players’ knowledge of the rules, but from the rules themselves.
Fodor/Lepore IV 34
Language Philosophy/Fodor/Lepore: current status (1992): 1. It may turn out that the semantic anatomism is correct (and atomism is false), and yet holism does not follow, because the distinction analytic/synthetic must be maintained nevertheless. (VsQuine).
Representatives: DummettVsQuine: the smallest language in which the proposition that P can be expressed is the one that can express those propositions with which P is analytically connected.
2. It may turn out that the semantic anatomism is correct (and atomism is false), and yet holism does not follow, because even though the distinction analytic/synthetic cannot be maintained because there is a different way of distinction for those propositions, which are constitutive of content, and those that are not.
3. It may turn out that holism follows the assumption that semantic properties are anatomical, but that semantic properties are not anatomical at all! This would mean that the semantic atomism was true.

If 3 should be true, someone needs to invent a new story about the relation symbol/world that is not based on similarity or behaviorist stimulus-response scheme,.
Fodor/Lepore: Thesis: what we doubt is that the previous arguments show that atomism could not be true.
But we want to be moderate. ("Modesty is our middle name").

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
Quine, W.V.O. Esfeld Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
I 27
Modallogik/Holismus/EsfeldVsQuine: wir können auf ML nicht verzichten, wenn wir den Holismus präzise ausarbeiten wollen.
I 61
semantischer Holismus/SH/EsfeldVsQuine: wir brauchen ein besseres Argument für ihn als da aus Two Dogmas: denn es ist noch nicht klar, ob er am besten zum Typ B (top down) gezählt werden soll. Quines einziges Argument dafür ist der von ihm vorausgesetzte Verifikationismus (Bedeutung als Methode der Verifikation).
Two Dogmas: Schluß: wenn ich die Grenze zwischen analytischen und synthetischen Aussagen ablehne, verpflichte ich mit einem strikteren Pragmatismus: jeder hat einerseits sein wissenschaftliches Erbe und andereseits ist er einem unaufhörlichen Sperrfeuer sinnlicher Reize ausgesetzt. Die Anpassungen dieses Erbes sind, sofern sie rational sind, pragmatisch.
I 64
Erfahrung/Quine: (seit W + O) begrifflich! Aber VsKuhn! Statt dessen: Beobachtungsaussagen stehen außerhalb des semantischen Holismus. Jede dieser Aussagen hat eine Bedeutung unabhängig von den anderen. Hier ist Bedeutung nicht eine Eigenschaft, die an Beziehungen zu anderen Aussagen oder Überzeugungen gebunden ist.
EsfeldVsQuine: es ist jedoch unklar, wie eine Trennung zwischen Beobachtungsaussagen und Theorieaussagen bestehen kann.
I 66
semantischer Holismus/Esfeld: folgt nur, wenn die Bedingungen dafür, Überzeugungen zuzuschreiben, zugleich die Bedingungen dafür sind, die den begrifflichen Inhalt der Überzeugungen determinieren. Quine: geht vom Bestätigungs Holismus zum Bedeutungs Holismus.
VsQuine: setzt Verifikationismus voraus.
EsfeldVsVs: man könnte sagen, daß das Argument für die Verbindung eine transzendentales ist.
Transzendental/(nach Kant): die notwendigen Bedingungen dafür, daß man jemand Überzeugungen zuschreibt, sind zugleich die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit dafür, daß der Sprecher Überzeugungen hat. Das läuft darauf hinaus:
Esfeld These: von einer anderen Person interpretiert zu werden ist eine notwendige Bedingung dafür, daß eine Person Überzeugungen hat.
Transzendental/Stroud: (1968): transzendentale Argumente implizieren eine verifikationistische Prämisse!
I 67
Esfeld: ein Argument für die These könnte sein, daß begrifflicher Inhalt öffentlich ist. Wenn wir hier Wittgenstein folgen, reicht das aus.
I 116
Kripkes Wittgenstein/Quine/"Ontologische Relativität": in der Muttersprache können wir Unbestimmtheit letztlich vermeiden, wenn wir ihre Wörter wörtlich verstehen. EsfeldVsQuine: der soziale Holismus zeigt hingegen, warum wir uns mit der Muttersprache zufriedengeben können.
- - -
I 366
Bedeutung/Unbestimmtheit/Holismus/EsfeldVsQuine: (2.3.4, 2.3.1) inferentielle Semantik kann begrifflichen Inhalt durch normative Pragmatik bestimmen. (Keine Unbestimmtheit mehr). Überzeugungs Holismus: (4.2) außerdem Perspektive auf eine direkten Realismus.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Quine, W.V.O. Field Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
I 129
Nominalism/Philosophy of Science/FieldVsQuine-Putnam Argument: An argument to show that nominalistic resources are adequate for good science would be: (E) For each Platonic scientific theory there is a nominalist theory to which the Platonic one is a conservative extension. But this is trivial if there are no restrictions regarding which sets of sentences that have been completed under a logical entailment count as theories. Of course, any Platonic theory T is a conservative extension of the "theory" which consists of nominalistic inferences from T. We have to reinforce (E) so that uninteresting nominalistic theories are excluded. Science Without Numbers: here I did not argue with (E). (E) or any amplifying extension is an existence assertion of a sufficiently wide variation of nominalist theories, and that goes beyond the assertion of the conservatism of mathematical theory.
I 241
Conservatism/Mathematics/Field: Truth does not require conservatism! True empirical theories are obviously not conservative! But conservatism is certainly also recognized by most realists for mathematics. For they say that good mathematics is not only true, but necessarily true! Conservatism/Field: (see above) conservative mathematics has the properties of necessary truth, without having to be true itself! Quine: is a realist in terms of mathematics. He wants to nip talk of mathematical necessity in the bud. But for that he needs conservatism. FieldVsQuine: for that he would have to make a major renovation to his thesis that mathematics continuously flows into the rest of the other sciences. Logic/Empiricism/Quine: Thesis: logic could be empirically refuted. Conservatism/Field: The fact that mathematics is empirically refuted is consistent with that, while the logic remains intact.
Horwich I 407
Internal Realism/IR/Existence/Ontology/Property/Putnam: what kind of objects exist can only be decided within a theory, according to the IR. FieldVsPutnam: I’m not sure I understand what he means. I suppose he thinks there are several correct theories that answer the question of ontology differently. But this is too trivial. sharper: (Put p 72 74.) two equally correct theories may have different ontologies. PutnamVsRedundancy Theory: does not offer an explanation of our understanding. FieldVsPutnam: this implied neither mind-independence nor theory-dependence, however! And it does not refute the correspondence theory. E.g. you can explain the behavior of electrically charged bodies with or without the assumption of fields. Ontology/Existence/Field: most of us would say that there is more than we are forced to assert. FieldVsQuine: E.g. is rarely critical to assert the existence of unseparated rabbit parts in addition to the existence of rabbits. FieldVsPutnam: if this is clear, then you can hardly draw anti-realistic conclusions from the fact that two equally good theories may differ in ontology.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Quine, W.V.O. Fodor Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
Esfeld I 62
FodorVsQuine: (and Lepore): the confirmation holism and verificationism refer to different things: Verificationism: refers to linguistic things. Confirmation holism: refers to cross-language entities like propositions. EsfeldVsFodor: However, if we assume beliefs, we can summarize both.
Fodor II 114
Language/Behavior/Meaning/Quine/Fodor: but even if there were an identifiable property, how could we justify the assertion, assuming we had found it? Quine: (The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics): Test for the question of whether S is a grammatical phoneme sequence: whether the expression triggers puzzlement. FodorVsQuine: that will fail in both directions: 1) almost all expressions in everyday language are ungrammatical! 2) Almost every grammatical sentence may cause puzzlement in certain situations! Our intuitions about grammar are often not consistent with grammar as such. On the other hand, intuition in semantics is far less reliable than in grammar.
Fodor/Lepore IV 54
Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: his argument is a fallacy of equivocation! ((s) Between statement and formula). (Namely:
IV 52
Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Def immanence of confirmation: the thesis that, because confirmation is defined through types of entities whose connection IV 53 to a particular theory is essential, it does not have to be possible to construct such questions as if it were about whether two theories match regarding their confirmation conditions.).
IV 76/77
Child/Language Acquisition/Language Learning/Quine: perhaps the child has a background (perhaps innate), E.g. about the character of his dialect? Anyway, in that case it differs from that of the linguist in that it is not a bootstrapping. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: this is totally unjustified. His choice of a WT does not justify true belief and provides no knowledge. But then you cannot attribute any knowledge of the language to the child! Solution: Children know the language in the sense that they can speak it, therefore they have any possible true belief that the speaking may require ((s) and that is compatible with it, i.e. goes beyond that). Not even Quine believes that the epistemic situation of the child is fully characterized by the fact that the observational data are determined. Somehow, even the child generalizes. Problem: the principles of generalization, in turn, cannot have been learned. (Otherwise regress). They must be innate. Solution/Quine: similarity space. Likewise: Skinner: "intact organism" with innate dispositions to generalize in one, but not in the other direction. Hume: Association mechanisms, "intrinsic" in human nature, etc. - - - Note
IV 237
13> IV 157 o
Causal Theory: many philosophers consider causal relationships constitutive of semantic properties, but their examples always refer to specific intuitions about specific cases, E.g. that we need to distinguish the mental states of twins (Twin Earth?). Quine: he has, in contrast, no problem in explaining why that which causally causes consent must be the same that specifies the truth conditions. For Davidson rightly writes that, for Quine, these are the "sensory criteria" which Quine treats as evidence. And as a verificationist, Quine takes the evidence relation (evidence) as ipso facto constitutive of semantic relations. ((s): relation/relation). VsQuine: the price he has to pay for it is that he has no argument against skepticism!.
IV 218
Intuitionism/Logic/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Quine favors an ecumenical story, according to which the logical connections (connectives) signify different things, depending on whether they are used in classical or intuitionistic logic. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: as long as there is no trans-theoretical concept of sentence identity, it is unclear how it is ever to be detected.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Quine, W.V.O. Frege Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
Quine III 297
Numeral/Numbers/Quine: the singular terms as names for numbers can be constructed in the form of abstracts. E.g. Def 0: is the class of all and only those classes that contain no elements.
"0" for "a^~(Ex)(x e a)".
III 298
i.e. 0 is the class whose only element is the empty class. ((s) FregeVsQuine: empty class yes, but not as an element). ((s) 0 here without quotation marks, i.e. not numeral?). Def One/Numeral/Quine: 1 is the class of all classes a, each of which contains exactly one element y:
"1" for "a^(Ey)(x)(x e a . ↔ . x = y)".
Def "Two"/"Three"/"2"/"3"/Numeral/Quine: can then be explained by "1 + 1", "1 + 2", etc., as soon as we have a definition of "+" (plus sign).

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Quine, W.V.O. Goodman Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
IV 21
Quine: individuation is determined by a bunch of mutually interrelated grammatical particles and constructions. Plurals, pronouns, numerals, the "is" (of identity) and its derived "same" and "other". GoodmanVsQuine: he failed to declare that the interpretation of these particles can not be made without consideration of the places they individuate. The interpretation changes when they are used in different systems.
IV 22
E.g. sunset. Whether we see the same thing as yesterday, depends on whether we are employed with the identification of suns or sunsets. (> description).
Quine V 30
Disposition/GoodmanVsQuine: a disposition expression is a change to a finally mechanical description and therefore circular. The mechanistic terms will ultimately be implicit disposition terms. QuineVsGoodman/QuineVsCarnap: I am, unlike the two, satisfied with a theoretical vocabulary of which some of the physical basic predicates were initially learned by using the dispo way of speaking. (Heuristic role).

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G II
N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

G III
N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Quine, W.V.O. Hacking Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
I 278
Semantic Ascent/Quine/Hacking: fashion trend: "Do not talk about things, but about the way we talk about things."   VsTheoryladenness of Observation. Hacking pro.
I 301
Observation/Quine: depending on the community in which you are staying; already recognizable by the fluency of dialogue. Observation/HackingVsQuine: is a skill, not something that is present in a community.
I ~ 300
QuineVsTheoryladenness of Observation! Observations are that on which the witnesses on site agree. HackingVsQuine: the competence to assess the discoveries of Karoline Herrschel (comets) had only she herself and, to a lesser extent, her brother Willhelm.
       How is it that an experiment comes across as convincing? Observation has precious little to do with that!

Hack I
I. Hacking
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996
Quine, W.V.O. Harman Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
Brandom I 666
Gilbert HarmanVsQuine: E.g. If a cloud passes the sun, will it change the meaning of my words? At least the conditional "If a cloud is from the sun, then p" gets another potential to transform my commitments.
Rorty I 220
HarmanVsQuine/Rorty: (Two Dogmas): the behavioral treatment of "truth by virtue of meaning" in this essay is actually uninteresting (Harman): E.g. "the president went to Vietnam" and "Johnson went to Vietnam".

Harm I
G. Harman
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Quine, W.V.O. Kant Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
Danto2 I 133
KantVsQuine: synthetic judgments a priori can be seen prior to any exploration of the world. By this he linked the mere possibility at all to doing philosophy. Because it is not an empirical science. E.g. That bachelors are unmarried only expresses what is included in the term.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03
Quine, W.V.O. Kaplan Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
Stalnaker II 162
De re/Glauben/Zuschreibung/Kaplan/Stalnaker: ("Quantifying in", 1969) Kaplan hat eine Zwischenposition (zwischen Quine und Stalnaker): Zuschreibung/Kaplan: (wie Quine) es wird keine bestimmte Überzeugung zugeschrieben.
De re/logische Form/Quine/Kaplan: de re-Zuschreibung: Existential qquantifivation.
Truth conditions/tr.c./de re/KaplanVsQuine/Stalnaker: hier folgt Kaplan dem semantischen Ansatz: Zuschreibungen de re sind nur dann wahr, wenn der Glaubende in einer Relation der Bekanntschaft stehen muss.
Verstärkung: der Name muss das Individuum denotieren. Bsp "a ist ein Spion": hier muss a nicht nur Ortcutt denotieren, sondern es gibt zusätzliche Bedingungen
1. für den Inhalt
2. für die Kausalrelation zwischen dem Namen, dem Individuum und dem Glaubenden. Pointe/Stalnaker: immer noch ist es möglich, dass alle Bedingungen von zwei verschiedenen Namen erfüllt werden. Damit können die Beispiele beschrieben werden, ohne widersprüchlichen Glauben zuschreiben zu müssen.
KaplanVsQuine/Stalnaker: sein Ansatz deckt auch Fälle ab, wo Quines Analyse zu liberal war.
StalnakerVsKaplan: sein Ansatz ist ein ad hoc-Kompromiss.
Bekanntschaft/Zuschreibung/Stalnaker: in der semantischen Analyse ist Bekanntschaft selbstverständlich, ohne sie kann man nichts glauben. Man kann nicht eine Proposition glauben, ohne dass man die vorkommenden Ausdrücke in den Begriffen erfasst, in denen sie definiert sind.
StalnakerVsKaplan: 1. das Erfordernis der Bekanntschaft verliert aber seine Motivation, wenn es dem Quineschen Ansatz aufgepfropft wird.
2. Kaplan behält die künstliche Annahme, dass de re-Zuschreibungen keinen bestimmten Glauben zuschreiben und er ist an den Sententialismus (Sätze als Glaubensobjekte) gebunden.
II 163
Wenigstens müssen es satz-ähnliche Objekte mit Namen-ähnlichen Konstituenten sein.
D. Kaplan
Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Quine, W.V.O. Kripke Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
EMD II 368
Branched Type Theory/vTT/QuineVsRussell/Kripke: Is intended for propositions. QuineVsRussell: Does not give significant ontological improvement vis-à-vis normal set theory.
KripkeVsQuine: Our ability to apply the substitutional quantification at higher levels (in strong resemblance to vTT) shows that it is not irrelevant to semantic paradoxes. The failure of not branching brought in problems for the pseudo substitutional language.
II 411
KripkeVsQuine: Uses criteria to reduce and others to revalue his favored things, and does not discuss why he uses these criteria.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Quine, W.V.O. Lewis Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
IV IX
LewisVsQuine: Realismus in Bezug auf unverwirklichte Möglichkeiten.
IV 27
Möglichkeit/Quine: Vs unverwirklichte Möglichkeiten: die Identitätskriterien sind nicht klar. LewisVsQuine: Identität ist aber kein besonderes Problem für uns.
Individuation/mögliche Welt/MöWe: in jeder Welt werden die Dinge jeder Kategorie so individuiert wie in der aktualen Welt.
Identität/MöWe: Dinge in verschiedenen Welten sind niemals identisch. (Wegen P2)
Die Gegenstück Relation ist die Entsprechung von Identität über Welten hinweg (cross world identity).
Lewis: während einige Autoren sagen, sie können in verschiedenen Welten verschiedene Dinge tun und andere Eigenschaften haben, bevorzuge ich zu sagen, dass Sie nur in der aktualen Welt sind und in keiner anderen aber dass sie Gegenstücke in anderen Welten haben.
- - -
IV 32
Essentialismus/LewisVsQuine: wir haben tatsächlich die Möglichkeit, zu sagen, welche Eigenschaften beschreibungsunabhängig wesentlich sind. Und auch unabhängig davon, ob das Attribut analytisch aus irgendwelchen anderen Beschreibungen des Dings folgt. Bsp der einstellige Satz φ und ein Objekt das von dem sing Term ζ bezeichnet wird.
Zu sagen, dass dies Attribut wesentlich ist, heißt, die Übersetzung von N φ ζ zu behaupten. (N = notwendig).
- - -
IV 147
Zentrierte mögliche Welten/MöWe/de re/de se/Quine/Lewis: (Ontologische Relativität, "Propositional Objects"): Bsp eine Katze, die von einem Hund gejagt wird, will aufs Dach in Sicherheit.
de dicto: die Katze will einen Zustand (Sachverhalt, state of affairs), der die Klasse aller MöWe ist in der sie auf dem Dach ist. Sie fürchtet die Klasse aller MöWe. wo der Hund sie erwischt
Problem: Querwelteinidentität. Frage: welche der vielen ähnlichen Katzen in den vielen MöWe (mit vielen Hunden und Dächern) ist sie? Einige Katzen sind auf Dächern, einige in den Klauen des Hundes. Gehört die Katze nun zu beiden, den erwünschten und den gefürchteten Zuständen?
Lösung: zentrierte MöWe: Paare, bestehend aus einer Welt und einem bezeichneten Raumzeitpunkt darin, der gewünschte Zustand ist dann eine Klasse zentrierter Welten. Tatsächlich ist das Gravitationszentrum die Zirbeldrüse der Katze.
Keine zentrierte Welt gehört zu zwei Klassen (gewünschten und gefürchteten). Problematisch wäre es, wenn der Wunsch unter einer Zentrierung erfüllt und unter einer anderen nicht erfüllt wäre.
Quine: akzeptiert diese Lösung am Ende nicht. Er zieht die geteilte Theorie vor, nach der die Objekte von "einfachen Einstellungen" Klassen von Reizmustern sind, während die komplexeren Einstellungen linguistisch sind.
LewisVsQuine: die Vorteile einheitlicher Objekte (nämlich nur Eigenschaften) sollte nicht verschenkt werden.
Eigenschaft/Lewis: entspricht einer Klasse zentrierter Welten, genauer gesagt einer Eigenschaft von Raumzeit Punkten, aber auch einer Eigenschaft von Katzen.
Sei X eine Klasse zentrierter Welten, Y sei eine Eigenschaft. Dann entspricht ihr die Klasse genau jener zentrierten Welten, die zentriert sind auf eine Katze mit der Eigenschaft Y.
Sie kann nicht auf zwei verschiedene Katzen zentriert sein. Um das auszuschließen, können wir zentrierte Welten redefinieren als Paare aus einer Welt und einem bezeichneten Einwohner darin.
Quine/Lewis: dieser hat durch die Zentrierung tatsächlich Propositionen durch Eigenschaften ersetzt.
IV 148
Ich bin nicht sicher, was seine Gründe dafür sind. Sie sind nicht dieselben in Bezug auf Bsp Catilina und Bsp die Große Pyramide (.> Ontologische Relativität) (hier will er die Gegenstück Relation vermeiden) aber sicher im Bsp Katze. MöWe/LewisVsQuine: große Differenz: mit MöWe meine ich einfach nur große Einzeldinge, von denen unsere aktuale Welt eine ist.
MöWe/Quine: meint gewisse abstrakte Entitäten gewisse Klassen von Klassen von Quadrupeln von reellen Zahlen. ((s) Raumzeit Punkte).
Quine/Lewis: ich vermute, dass er unsere konkrete Welt immerhin unterscheidet von der abstrakten "ersatz world" die sie repräsentiert! Nennen wir sie "aktualisierte ersatz world", um sie von der Welt selbst zu unterscheiden.
Lewis: Vielheit von konkreter Welten.
Quine: Vielheit abstrakter Ersatzwelten, von denen eine einzige unsere spezielle repräsentiert.
Stalnaker: pro Quine: entspricht besser der Alltagssprache die Möglichkeiten als "wie es hätte sein können" bezeichnet.
Lewis: die aktuale Ersatzwelt ist speziell nur, weil sie nun mal unsere konkrete wirkliche Welt repräsentiert. Und sie ist speziell nicht nur von ihrem eigenen Standpunkt aus, sondern von jeder Welt aus gesehen.
Nun könnte man folgendes vermuten: daher ist sie nicht kontingent speziell, denn Kontingenz ist Variation von einer MöWe zur anderen.
LewisVs: so sieht es aus, als sei es eine nicht kontingente Tatsache, welche von den vielen MöWe aktualisiert ist. Und das ist falsch!
((s) Dann wäre jede Tatsache in der actual world notwendig, also jede Bewegung. > Determinismus.)
- - -
Schwarz I 46
Möglichkeit/LewisVsQuine: es muss in einer Theorie Aussagen darüber, was unter den und den Bedingungen wahr wäre, geben können. Unter anderem aber nicht nur, weil man sie für die Analyse von Dispositionen und Kausalität benötigt. - - -
Schwarz I 132
Def Ereignis/Quine/Schwarz: (1960b,171): Vorschlag: sie mit der Raumzeit-Region zu identifizieren, in der sie geschehen. Vs: das ist zu grobkörnig für Wirkungen und Ursachen. Bsp wenn ein Ball durch die Luft fliegt und rotiert, dann nehmen Flug und Rotation dieselbe Region ein, aber nur der Flug verursacht das Zerbrechen der Fensterscheibe.
kontrafaktische Analyse/kontrafaktisches Konditional/KoKo/MöWe/Ähnlichkeit/Lewis: die nächsten MöWe, in denen die Rotation ausbleibt, sind nicht die nächsten MöWe, in denen der Flug ausbleibt. Den beiden Ereignissen entspricht zwar in der WiWe, nicht aber in allen MöWe dieselbe Raumzeit-Region. ((s) „Nächste“ ist hier nicht entscheidend).
Ereignis/Identität/LewisVsQuine: Modifikation: Ereignisse sind identisch, wenn sie in allen MöWe dieselbe RZ Region einnehmen.
Def Ereignis/Lewis: ist dann die Klasse aller Regionen (in allen MöWe), in denen es geschieht. (1986d).
- - -
Schw I 220
Def analytische Wahrheit/LewisVsQuine/Schwarz: ein Satz ist analytisch, wenn seine primären Wahrheitsbedingungen alle Situationen umfassen. Schwarz: interessanter ist seine These, dass praktisch jeder Satz sich empirisch als falsch erweisen kann. Unsere Theorien können nicht in eine revidierbare empirische und eine nichtrevidierbare analytische Komponente zerlegt werden.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Quine, W.V.O. McDowell Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
I 162
McDowellVsQuine: contradiction: If experience is not part of the order of justification, it can not be exceeded by worldviews. But that is what "conceptual sovereignty" requires. The whole thesis of the indeterminacy of translation would become meeaningless if we can not talk about how someone comes to a worldview but only about causal acquired dispositions.
On the other hand, if we were to abandon the "Tribunal," we would lose the right to speak of a more or less reasonable worldview.
I 184
McDowellVsQuine: if we reject the Third dogma there are fatal consequences for Quine: for his argument he needs to maintain the duality endogenous/exogenous, which DavidsonVsQuine also rejects.
I 185
McDowell: the "empirical significance" cannot be a proper meaning anyway, since - as a counterpart to "conceptual sovereignty" - it cannot have anything to do with reasons and justification. McDowellVsQuine: but that does not indicate that meaning is generally underdetermined! To that end one would have to show that we have an indelible leeway when we look for a kind of understanding that leads us outside the field of "empirical significance." An understanding, that shows how life phenomena are structured in the order of the justification, the space of reason. That can not be learned from Quine.
I 186
Scheme/McDowellVsQuine: the idea of a structure that must be found in every understandable conceptual scheme must not have the effect that one imagines the scheme as one side of the dualism of world and schema.
I 188
DavidsonVsQuine: If "empirical meaning" cannot be divided sentence by sentence among individual sentences, this does not mean that rational accountability towards experience cannot be dvided sentence by sentence among individual sentences. But then experience must really be regarded as a tribunal. Theory/Quine/Duhem: the contestability through experience (Ex a black swan) can not be distributed among the sentences of the theory. McDowell: This is actually an argument for the indeterminacy of meaning.
McDowellVsQuine: but the argument is only tenable if our experiential language is distinct from the theoretical language, so that the relevant experience does not already speak the language of theory.
I 189
Theoretical Language/observational language/McDowellVsQuine: now it may be that both are actually distinguishable. Then, the observational significance of a single theoretical sentence would be indeterminate. But we could not derive a general indeterminacy of meaning from that! If we try, we are confronted with the third dogma.

Esfeld I 63
Semantic holism/Quine: is conceived by him as a Type B (top down). Conceptual content is mainly the system of beliefs of each person as a whole. No two people ever have the same belief system.
VsQuine: Problem: 1. How can two people share a belief at all if they do not share the whole system?
2. Confirmation: how can expereince confirm propositions or beliefs at all? how should we understand the metaphor of the "tribunal of experience"?
Experience: if it is conceptual, it consists in beliefs or statements. Then it is not even outside the system of beliefs. So it can not be confronted with the system!
Experience: On the other hand if it were non-conceptual, it is unclear how it can exercise a rational control over a system of beliefs.
Quine: "The core idea of the third dogma." "Tribunal." nothing more than excitation of receptors!
Experience in this sense may cause beliefs. (DavidsonVs).
Esfeld: but how then can experience be a reason?
I 64
(S.McDowell I 157ff).

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Quine, W.V.O. Prior Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
I 37
Higher-Order Quantification/Prior: It's true, we still have to admit that "for some p, p" is no idiomatic (real) Indo-European. But it is still not difficult to find ordinary language equivalents!
We have common quantifiers, nominal and not nominal ones, as "whoever" from "who" or "wherever" from "there", or "somewhat", etc.
Grammatically, this corresponds to the adverbs: "I met him somewhere," e.g: in Paris. that's alright.
Quine: could say: then we would be "ontologically committed" to the existence of "places" as of ordinary objects.
PriorVsQuine: but we do not need to respond to that!
- - -
I 48
Extensionalism/Fallacy of/Extensionality/Extension/Extensional/Prior: Ontology/PriorVsQuine: existence as "being the value of a bound variable" is just a unproven dogma.
Quantifiers: There is another unproven dogma: that mixed constructions such as "__ is green and __" or "believes that __" cannot fall into the same category as the single ones.
In particular, it is meant that "X believes __" should not fall into the same category as "It's not the case, that __".
I.e. they are both supposedly not single-digit constructions.
Resistance comes from the formal logicians who want to simplify their systems by saying that if the sentences S1 and S2 have the same truth value, then each composite sentence, which differs only in that it has S1 as sub-sentence where the other has S2 as a sub-sentence, has the same truth value.
This is the "law of extensionality".

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Quine, W.V.O. Putnam Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
Esfeld I 57
Analytical/synthetical/Quine/Esfeld: quantum mechanics is a strong argument for Quine to abolish the separation between the two. One can doubt whether it is reasonable to change the law of the excluded third.
N.B.: but it is not an argument against such suggestions to assert that a sentence represents an analytical truth.
---
I 58
However, the simple availability of such a proposed amendment cannot be regarded as a sufficient reason for that there is no separation between analytic and synthetic. (PutnamVsQuine). ---
Putnam V 117
PutnamVsQuine: I think he went too far in some respects: he claimed that "no statements are immune against revision". This is obviously wrong: because under which circumstances would it be rational to say "not every statement is true", i.e. to accept "all statements are true"? Such revisions cannot be unlimited, otherwise we would have no idea of something that we can call rationality. Apart from trivial cases (e.g. "not every statement is true"), we cannot be sure that it will never be rational and not in any connection to drop a statement (rightly in a particular context) that is a "necessary" truth.
---
Rorty I 218
PutnamVsQuine: why should we not just say: translation in accordance with those manuals that have this property? This is a variant of essentialism: according to which we know from the outset that something that cannot be packed into the vocabulary of physics of the day, is so insignificant that "it exists merely in the eyes of the person concerned." (Subjective convenience).

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Quine, W.V.O. Quine Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
II 131
Def Unfounded/Quine: is a class if it contains an element that contains an element.... ad infinitum without ever reaching firm ground. QuineVsQuine: self-criticism: my "New Foundations" and "Mathematical Logic" both contain unfounded classes. I could argue that there is no principle of individuation for such classes. They are identical as long as their elements are identical, and they are identical as long as their elements are identical ..., without stopping.
Our study shed light on a strange comparison between three degrees of stringency. a) table, b) with Russell's definition we can define the identity of properties, however, c) the individuation of properties is still not okay. This suggests that
a) specification makes the most stringent demands,
b) individuation is less strict, and
c) the mere definition of identity is even more undemanding.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Quine, W.V.O. Rorty Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 191
Instrumentalism/RortyVsQuine: his concept of science is still remarkably instrumentalist:
I 192
"Stimuli" and "settlements". Nevertheless, Quine transcends both distinctions by acknowledging that stimuli of the sensory organs are "settlements" in equal measure as all the rest. RortyVsQuine: But he is not quite able to dispense with the distinction between what is given and what is postulated.
I 222
Reference/Rorty: if we can do without reference, then we can do without an ontology as well. Quine would agree to that.
I 223
Clarity/Quine: eliminate any ambiguities (indirect speech, propositional attitudes, etc.). RortyVsQuine: there's a catch: how do we know what "darkness" and "clarity" consist in?
I 225
RortyVsQuine: if conventionality depends on a special indeterminacy of translation, we cannot - as Quine earlier - say that physical theory is a "conventional matter that is not dictated to us by reality." RortyVsQuine: Differences:
1) There is such a thing as an ontology.
2) No sentence has a special, independent epistemological status.
3) There is no such thing as direct acquaintance with sense-data or meaning.
4) Accordingly, epistemology and ontology do not touch at any point.
5) Nevertheless a distinction can be made between the parts of our opinion network, expressing the facts to those who do not. And ontology ensures that we are able to uncover this difference.
RortyVsQuine: if Quine wanted to represent also (5) together with (1) to (4), he must give sense to the distinction between the "Actual" and the "Conventional".
I 226
Quine can only do this by picking out the elementary particles as the paradigmatic "Actual" and explaining that different opinions do not change the movement of the particles. RortyVsQuine: his decision for physics and against psychology is purely aesthetic. Moreover, it does not even work, since various biochemical theories will be compatible with the movement pattern of the same elementary particles.
I 231
RortyVsQuine his conviction that symbolic logic would need to have some "ontological implications" repeatedly makes him make more of "the idea of ​​the idea" than necessary.
I 250
Def Observation Statement/Quine: a sentence about which all speakers judge in the same way if they are exposed to the same accompanying stimuli. A sentence that is not sensitive to differences in past experiences within a language community. RortyVsQuine: excludes blind, insane and occasional deviants.
- - -
IV 24
RortyVsQuine: if we undermine the Platonic distinction between episteme and doxa with Kuhn, we also turn against the holism of Quine. We will no longer try to delineate "the whole of science" against "the whole of the culture". Rather all our beliefs and desires belong to the same Quinean network.
- - -
VI 212
RortyVsQuine: the problems are not posed by dichotomies of being, but by cultural imperialists, by people like Quine and Fichte who suffer from monotheistic megalomania.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Quine, W.V.O. Russell Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
Prior I 39
Branched type theory/VTT/Prior: first edition Principia Mathematica: here it does not say yet that quantification on non-nouns (non nominal) is illegitimate, or that they are only apparently not nominal. (Not on names?) But only that you have to treat them carefully. ---
I 40
The branched type theory was incorporated in the first edition. (Special characters) (The "simple type theory" is, on the other hand, little more than a certain sensitivity to the syntax.)
Predicate: makes a sentence out of a noun. E.g. "φ" is a verb that forms the phrase "φx".
But it will not form a sentence when a verb is added to another verb. "φφ".
Branched/branch: comes into play when expressions form a sentence from a single name. Here we must distinguish whether quantified expressions of the same kind occur.
E.g. "__ has all the characteristics of a great commander."
logical form: "For all φ if (for all x, if x is a great commander, then φx) then φ__".
ΠφΠxCψxφx" (C: conditional, ψ: commander, Π: for all applies).
Easier example: "__ has the one or the other property"
logical form: "For a φ, φ __"
"Σφφ". (Σ: there is a)
Order/Type: here one can say, although the predicate is of the same type, it is of a different order.
Because this "φ" has an internal quantification of "φ's".
Branched type theory: not only different types, but also various "orders" should be represented by different symbols.
That is, if we, for example, have introduced "F" for a predicative function on individuals" (i.e. as a one-digit predicate), we must not insert non-predicative functions for "f" in theorems.
E.g. "If there are no facts about a particular individual ..."
"If for all φ, not φx, then there is not this fact about x: that there are no facts about x that is, if it is true that there are no facts about x, then it cannot be true. I.e. if it is true that there are no facts about x, then it is wrong, that there is this fact.
Symbolically:
1. CΠφNφxNψx.
---
I 41
"If for all φ not φ, then not ψx" (whereby "ψ" can stand for any predicate). Therefore, by inserting "N" for "": 2. CΠφNφxNΠφNφx
Therefore, by inserting and reductio ad absurdum: CCpNpNp (what implies its own falsehood, is wrong)
3. CΠφNφx.
The step of 1 to 2 is an impermissible substitution according to the branched type theory.
Sentence/branched type theory/Prior: the same restriction must be made for phrases (i.e. "zero-digit predicates", propositions).
Thus, the well-known old argument is prevented:
E.g. if everything is wrong, then one of the wrong things would be this: that everything is wrong. Therefore, it may not be the case that everything is wrong.
logical form:
1. CΠpNpNq
by inserting: 2. CΠpNpNPpNp
and so by CCpNpNp (reductio ad absurdum?)
3. NΠpNp,
Branched type theory: that is now blocked by the consideration that "ΠpNp" is no proposition of the "same order" as the "p" which exists in itself.
And thus not of the same order as the "q" which follows from it by instantiation, so it cannot be used for "q" to go from 1 to 2.
RussellVsQuine/Prior: here propositions and predicates of "higher order" are not entirely excluded, as with Quine. They are merely treated as of another "order".
VsBranched type theory: there were problems with some basic mathematical forms that could not be formed anymore, and thus Russell and Whitehead introduce the reducibility axiom.
By contrast, a simplified type theory was proposed in the 20s again.
Type Theory/Ramsey: was one of the early advocates of a simplification.
Wittgenstein/Tractatus/Ramsey: Thesis: universal quantification and existential quantification are both long conjunctions or disjunctions of individual sentences (singular statements).
E.g. "For some p, p": Either grass is green or the sky is pink, or 2 + 2 = 4, etc.". (> Wessel: KNF, ANF, conjunctive and adjunctive normal form)
Propositions/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: no matter of what "order" are always truth functions of indiviual sentences.
Branched Type TheoryVsRamsey/VsWittgenstein: such conjunctions and disjunctions would not only be infinitely long, but the ones of higher order would also need to contain themselves.
E.g. "For some p.p" it must be written as a disjunction of which "for some p, p" is a part itself, which in turn would have to contain a part, ... etc.
RamseyVsVs: the different levels that occur here, are only differences of character: not only between "for some p,p" and "for some φ, φ" but also between
"p and p" and "p, or p", and even the simple "p" are only different characters.
Therefore, the expressed proposition must not contain itself.

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Quine, W.V.O. Searle Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
I 20
SearleVsQuine: Occasionally mistakes in philosophy entail mistakes in the linguistic philosophy. Beliefs that - when it comes to what linguistic signs mean - there are no facts that go beyond speech pattern behavior. (Quine 1960): it is no question of fact, if anyone, you or I, say the "Rabbit" meaning a rabbit by it or a separate part or a portion of the rabbit story. (> Gavagai). - - -
II 269
Generality/de re/de dicto/representation/SearleVsQuine: he confuses the distinction between particular and general propositional attitudes of re and such de dicto with a distinction between attitudes. No one may have wish for something indefinite, without somehow representing the object itself. (E.g. "General sailboat").
II 270/271
SearleVsQuine: (SearleVs attitudes that are supposedly irreducible de re). Belief in such attitudes is due to a Wittgensteinian diagnostic. Our language provides two ways to report about propositional attitude: with de re-reports or de dicto-reports. E.g. Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is a spy. (de dicto)
Or: of the man with the brown hat Ralph believes that he is a spy. (De re).
As these two reports can even have different truth values, we believe that there must be also a difference in the phenomena (falsely).
The following dialogue is completely absurd:
Quine: as far as the man with the brown hat is concerned, Ralph, do you believe that he is a spy?
Ralph: no, Quine. You asked me if I have one of the re-conviction, but it is not the case that I believe of the man with the brown hat that he was a spy. Rather, I have the de dicto-belief: I believe that the man with the brown hat is a spy.
SearleVsQuine: the opinion that intentional states are somehow intensional themselves is based on the confusion of logical properties of reports of intentional states with logical properties of the states themselves.
Searle: there is a de re/de dicto distinction, but that is a distinction between different types of report.
V 14
Analyticity/SearleVsQuine: some analytical authors: there is no adequate analysis of the concept of analyticity. Therefore, the concept supposedly does not exist: if there is no analysis and no criteria, we cannot understand him. It is illicit. (SearleVs). The definitions of analyticity and synonymy supposedly require the concept of meaning. As criterion then observable behavior is required.
V 15
SearleVsQuine: it is not enough to simply say that we lack the criteria.
V 16
SearleVsQuine: false requirements regarding the relation between our understanding of a concept and our ability to establish criteria for its application.
V 17
Criteria/Searle: how do we know that one criterion is inadequate? Criteria need projective force. They must lead to specific results.
V 18
Analyticity/SearleVsQuine: reversed: instead of proving that we do not understand the concept of analyticity, is our inability to find criteria, rather just requires that we understand what is analyticity. Analyticity/Quine/Searle: Quine chose the example wisely! "I do not know if the statement "All Green is extended" is analytic or not". One can namely deny the extent of sensory data!
V 19
E.g. someone might be unsure whether a glass of chartreuse green. All this is a sign that we understand the concept of analyticity very well. - - -
V 163
Ontology: the main question: are there criteria for ontological conditions?
V 164
Existence/Quine: "to accept something as an entity means to consider it as the value of a variable." Existence/SearleVsQuine: this criterion (value of a variable for existence) is confusing and inane.
Alternative criterion: a theory requires those and only those entities of which it says that they exist. (Does not have to be done intentionally.)
V 165
Ontology/Searle: a notation is as good as another, ontological conclusions should not necessarily be taken from it. It is also possible that no translation method exists, by which it could be determined which statement is the easier or better.
SearleVsQuine: according to Quine's criterion two statements that in reality include the same conditions would include different conditions! (This argument was put forward by William AlstonVsQuine).
V 166
Fictional dialogue Quine/Alston: criteria/existence/AlstonVsQuine: (according to Searle) Q: Instead of saying, "There are four miles from Nauplion to Tolon" one should say: "distance in miles between ... = four."
A VsQuine: the first formulation does not include a condition that would not be included in the second! How could it be? The second is only a paraphrase of the first. Existence assumptions depend on statements, not propositions!
Q: The objection misses the key point: by the translation we show that the condition is made only apparantly and not necessary. The criterion itself is ontologically neutral! Furthermore, no claim to synonymy is connected to the paraphrase.
V 167
A VsQuine: that is confused: according to Quine's criterion, it seems as if every statement could be reproduced in equivalent but in the notation different statements that lead to different results according to Quine's criterion, even though the conditions are the same. Q: The condition of abstract entities in a sentence like
(2) "For the property of being a chair there is at least one example"
is completely unnecessary, since such a proposition can always be represented by a different proposition. Paraphrase:
(1)(E.g.)(x is a chair). This paraphrase shows that we got rid of the unwelcome conditions of being a chair.
V 171
Existence/ontology/AlstonVsQuine: ~ what somebody says is important for his assumptions, not how he says it. (Searle pro). Ontology/ontological condition/SearleVsQuine: so the question arises whether the concept of ontological conditions itself is so clear. Perhaps there is no class of irreducible ontological conditions. There is no abstract problem of ontological conditions. But the problem, how we know those facts which we require in our statements.
V 172
SearleVsQuine: his stilted way of expressing: "to tolerate", "to shun": it is something completely different if I tolerate or shun tobacco than if I endure or shun universals. Universals/Searle: misunderstanding that we imply anything at all: E.g. "None of us has holiness" is just another way of saying that none of us is sacred. This is quite harmless.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Quine, W.V.O. Sellars Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
McDowell I 168
Sensations/Sellars: are distinguished from pieces of what is given. No direct relationship to knowledge. Active receptivity. But receptivity cannot interact in a rational way with spontaneity. (VsQuine).

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
Quine, W.V.O. Strawson Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
NS I 149
Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: pro descriptive metaphysicsVsRevisionist metaphysics. Definition descriptive metaphysics/Strawson: detects which ontology suggests our every day doing and speaking.
Definition revisionists Metaphysics/StrawsonVsQuine: a physicalist ontology. This stands in contrast to the everyday's way of thinking.
StrawsonVsQuine: for Strawson it is just about the everyday language, not about the ontology of any language.
Ontology/language/Strawson: Thesis: pro-thing-property-ontology. This is necessarily the most elementary. Because of the similarity to the subject-predicate form.
---
NS I 150
Space/Time/Strawson: are tools to differentiate different cases. Transcendental/Kant: are arguments that relate to the conditions of possibility.
Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: his arguments are transcendental.
---
Strawson I 198
QuineVsGeach/QuineVsFrege: singular expressions (singular term) can occur at the points of quantifiable variables, general expressions cannot. Singular Term: can be quantified, general term: not quantifiable.
StrawsonVsQuine: on closer inspection, these differences of approach seem far less significant.
Quine strongly distinguishes between types of non-linguistic objects on one side and the distinction between singular and general terms, on the other side. (Word/object).
In Quine "piety" and "wisdom" are singular expressions, namely names of abstract objects like the nouns "Socrates" and "earth" are the names of concrete objects.
Abstract Singular Term/Quine: E.g. "piety" (Universal).
The distinction between singular and general term is more important for Quine from the logical point of view.
The singular term gives the impression, and to name only one object, while the general term does not claimed at all, to name something, although it "may be true of many things."
StrawsonVsQuine: this is an unsatisfactory way of explaining that the word "philosopher" should be a general and not a singular term. We would not like to say that this expression is true of many things or people.
---
Strawson I 252
Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: regardless of their captivating simplicity of this analysis, I believe that it will be unacceptable by the form in which it is created. The language terms, in which the analysis is drawn up, presuppose the existence of subject expressions of linguistic singular terms. Other consequence: we are invited, to see the expressions that replace the "Fs" and "Gs" in the quantified sentences as ordinary predicate expressions. That is allright.
---
I 253
Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: but again these forms have only their place in normal language because singular terms, subject expressions occupy the place they have there. Circularity: because we cannot simultaneously regard Fs and Gs as predicate expressions and accept that they all resolve subject expressions totally in the form of quantified sentences.
Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: the argument is based on the linguistic forms that require in turn the use of these expressions.
StrawsonVsGadamer/StrawsonVsQuine: one could argue against that this is too narrow, one must proceed inventively. In the case one would have to say what a teaching really should say, which is, taken literally, unacceptable.
---
Strawson IV 69
StrawsonVsQuine: Suppose we want to manage without quantification over properties. Does it follow that the belief in objects would be justified, but not the belief in properties? ---
IV 70
Strawson: we can accept a different kind of existence. A secondary, although a usual sense of existence, which applies to properties and relations. ---
IV 71
Vs: E.g. a) "There is at least one property that has no machine, namely perfect efficiency". b) "no machine is completely efficient." In a) I quantify, in b) I do not.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Quine, W.V.O. Tarski Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
Field II 25
Wahrheit/QuineVsTarski/Field: das Schema (T) ist alles was wir brauchen. (Oder zusätzlich noch eine Übersetzungstheorie). TarskiVsQuine/Field: das war nicht Tarskis Ansicht!
FieldVsTarki: maß Pseudo-Theorien wie D2, A2 und F2 zu viel Bedeutung bei.
Field These T1 repräsentiert Tarskis echten Beitrag zur W-Theorie adäquat.

Tarsk I
A. Tarski
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Quine, W.V.O. Wittgenstein Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
II 238
Logic/convention/arbitrariness/Wittgenstein:. The laws of logic, such as the records of the excluded third (SaD) and the one of the to be excluded contradiction (SVW) are arbitrary. Prohibiting the occurrence of this sentence, means, that one adopts a possibly highly recommended expression system.
In reality, contradictions are used e.g. in the statement "I like it and I do not like it". What should be the obstacle to use this expression like this?
WittgensteinVsQuine: to the objection that "opposition" is not used like this, I answer, that's right, as far as one conceives our system as primary. A recognized expression system is like a once-introduced scale. But perhaps we sometimes want flexibility.
---
VI 232
Network/WittgensteinVsQuine/Schulte: against his system of sentences that are, more or less, central depending on whether they are more formal, but more supported by experience (peripheral). Wittgenstein: not only propositions of logic belong to the foundation, but precisely also propositions about objects.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Quine, W.V.O. Verschiedene Vs Quine, W.V.O. Davidson I 55
CreswellVsQuine : er habe ein Reich reifizierter Erfahrungen oder Erscheinungen, welches einer unerforschlichen Realität gegenüberstehe. Davidson pro - - QuineVsCresswell >Quine III) - - -
Kanitscheider II 23
Ontologie/Sprache/Mensch/Kanitscheider: die sprachlichen Produkte des Organismus sind keinesfalls durch eine ontologische Kluft von seinem Produzenten getrennt. Ideen sind bestimmte neuronale Muster im Organismus.
KanitscheiderVsQuine: Schwachpunkt: sein Empirismus. Man muß seine Epistemologie daher mehr als ein Forschungsprogramm ansehen.
- - -
Quine VI 36
VsQuine: man hat mir vorgehalten, dass es sich bei der Frage "Was gibt es?" allemal um eine Tatsachenfrage handelt, und nicht um ein rein sprachliches Problem. Ganz recht. QuineVsVs: doch sagen oder voraussetzen, was es gibt, bleibt eine sprachliche Angelegenheit und hier sind die gebundenen Variablen am Platz.
- - -
VI 51
Bedeutung/Quine: die Suche nach ihr sollte bei den ganzen Sätzen beginnen. VsQuine: die These der Unbestimmtheit der Übersetzung führe geradewegs zum Behaviorismus. Andere: sie führe zu einer reductio ad absurdum von Quines eigenen Behaviorismus.
VI 52
Übersetzungsunbestimmtheit/Quine: sie führt tatsächlich zum Behaviorismus, an dem kein Weg vorbei führt. Behaviorismus/Quine: in der Psychologie hat man noch die Wahl, ob man Behaviorist sein will, in der Sprachwissenschaft ist man dazu gezwungen. Man erwirbt Sprache über das Verhalten anderer, das im Lichte einer gemeinsamen Situation ausgewertet wird.
Es ist dann buchstäblich gleichgültig, welcher Art außerdem noch das psychische Leben ist!
Semantik/Quine: in die semantische Bedeutung wird mithin nicht mehr eingehen können als das, was wahrnehmbarem Verhalten in beobachtbaren Situationen auch zu entnehmen ist
- - -
Quine XI 146
Stellvertreterfunktion/Quine/Lauener: braucht gar nicht eindeutig zu sein. Bsp Charakterisierung von Personen aufgrund ihres Einkommens: hier werden dadurch einem Argument verschiedene Werte zugeordnet. Dazu brauchen wir eine Hintergrundtheorie: wir bilden das Universum U in V so ab, dass sowohl die Objekte von U als auch ihre Stellvertreter in V enthalten sind. Falls V eine Teilmenge von U bildet, kann U selbst als
Hintergrundtheorie funktionieren, innerhalb der ihre eigene ontologische Reduktion beschrieben wird.
XI 147
VsQuine: das ist gar keine Reduktion, denn dann müssen die Objekte doch existieren. QuineVsVs: das ist mit einer reductio ad absurdum vergleichbar: wenn wir zeigen wollen, dass ein Teil von U überflüssig ist, dürfen wir für die Dauer des Arguments U voraussetzen. (>Ontologie/Reduktion).
Lauener: das bringt uns zur ontologischen Relativität.
Löwenheim/Ontologie/Reduktion/Quine/Lauener: wenn eine Theorie von sich aus einen überabzählbaren Bereich erfordert, können wir keine Stellvertreterfunktion mehr vorlegen, die eine Reduktion auf einen abzählbaren Bereich ermöglichen würde.
Denn dazu brauchte man eine wesentlich stärkere Rahmentheorie, die dann nicht mehr nach Quines Vorschlag als reductio ad absurdum wegdiskutiert werden könnte.
- - -
Quine X 83
Logisch wahr/Gültigkeit/Quine: unsere Einsetzungs Definitionen (Sätze statt Mengen) gebrauchen einen Begriff der Wahrheit und der Erfüllung, der über den Rahmen der Objektsprache hinausgeht. Diese Abhängigkeit vom Begriff der ((s) einfachen) Wahrheit beträfe übrigens genauso die Modell Definition der Gültigkeit und logischen Wahrheit.
Daher haben wir Anlass, uns noch eine 3. Möglichkeit der Definition der Gültigkeit und der logischen Wahrheit anzusehen: sie kommt ohne die Begriffe der Wahrheit und Erfüllung aus: wir brauchen dazu den Vollständigkeitssatz ((s) >Beweisbarkeit).
Lösung: wir können einfach die Schritte festlegen, die eine vollständige Beweismethode bilden und dann:
Def gültiges Schema/Quine: ist eines, das mit solchen Schritten bewiesen werden kann.
Def logisch wahr/Quine: wie vorher: ein Satz der aus einem gültigen Schema durch Einsetzen anstelle seiner einfachen Sätze hervorgeht.
Beweisverfahren/Beweismethode/Quine: einige vollständige beziehen sich nicht notwendig auf Schemata, sondern lassen sich auch direkt auf die Sätze anwenden,
X 84
Die aus dem Schema durch Einsetzen hervorgehen. Solche Methoden erzeugen wahr e Sätze direkt aus anderen wahren Sätzen. Dann können wir Schemata und Gültigkeit beiseite lassen und logische Wahrheit als Satz definieren, der durch diese Beweisverfahren erzeugt wird.
1. VsQuine: das pflegt Protest auszulösen: die Eigenschaft, „durch eine bestimmte Beweismetoode beweisbar zu sein“ sei an sich uninteressant. Interessant sei sie erst aufgrund des Vollständigkeitssatzes, der die Beweisbarkeit mit der logischen Wahrheit gleichzusetzen erlaubt!
2. VsQuine: wenn man logische Wahrheit indirekt durch Bezug auf eine geeignete Beweismethode definiert, entzieht man damit dem Vollständigkeitssatz den Boden. Er wird inhaltsleer.
QuineVsVs: die Gefahr besteht gar nicht: Der Vollständigkeitssatz in der Formulierung (B) hängt nicht davon ab, wie wir logische Wahrheit definieren, denn sie wird gar nicht erwähnt! Ein Teil seiner Bedeutung liegt aber darin, dass er zeigt, dass wir logische Wahrheit durch die bloße Beschreibung der Beweismethode definieren können, ohne etwas von dem zu verlieren, was die logische Wahrheit erst interessant macht.
Äquivalenz/Quine: wichtig sind Lehrsätze, die eine Äquivalenz zwischen ganz verschieden Formulierungen eines Begriffs – hier der logischen Wahrheit – feststellen. Welche Formulierung dann die offizielle Definition genannt wird, ist weniger wichtig.
Aber auch bloße Bezeichnungen können besser oder schlechter sein.
Gültigkeit/logische Wahrheit/Definition/Quine: die elementare Definition hat den Vorteil, dass sie für mehr Nachbarprobleme relevant ist.
3. VsQuine: bei der großen Willkür der Wahl des Beweisverfahrens ist nicht ausgeschlossen, dass das Wesentliche der logischen Wahrheit nicht erfasst ist.
QuineVsVs: wie willkürlich ist denn die Wahl eigentlich? Sie beschreibt das Verfahren unhd spricht über Zeichenfolgen. In dieser Hinsicht entspricht sie der Satz .Einsetzungs Definition. Sie bewegt sich effektiv auf der Ebene der eZT. Und sie bleibt auf der Ebene, während die andere Definition den Begriff der Wahrheit gebraucht. Das ist ein großer Unterschied.





D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Kan I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kan II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Quine, W.V.O. Martin Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
Arm II 73
Unterscheidung/Martin: immer auf Basis von Eig nicht Objekten. Kinder und auch Erwachsene sehen davon ab, was die Eig hat. Auch wenn wir Objekte durch Raum Zeit Segmente oder Felder ersetzen sind die Eig das entscheidende, was man dort antrifft.
Eig sind dann immer noch mehr als bloße Mathematisierungen: Die Repräsentation von RZ Punkten braucht mehr als Zahlen oder Quantitäten.
Maß: jede Quantität ist von einer Eig!
MartinVsQuine: Vs dessen "Wither physical objects" ("Obj. austrocknen").
Bsp Martin: das folgende Bsp wurde in den 50er Jahren in Adelaide entwickelt und
II 74
in den früher 60ern in Harvard und Columbia weiterentwickelt. Dispo/MartinVsQuine: (Word and Object): Vs Gleichsetzung von Dispo mit (unmanifestierten) strukt. Eig mit angenommener manifestierter Dispo.
Bsp ein Fall von komischer geographischer Tatsache, die die raumzeitliche Verteilung von Elementarteilchen (ET) betrifft, Angenommen, es gibt ET isoliert in einer Region des Universums, so daß sie verschieden sind von denen in unserer eigenen Region und sie sind so entfernt, daß sie die vielen Dispo zur Interaktion niemals mit irgend etwas anderem im Universum entfalten. Sie ähneln aber nichts anderem im Universum.
disp/kat/MartinVsArmstrong: die Unterscheidung suggeriert, daß Dispo nicht real in dem Objekt seien.
MartinVsQuine: ein ergebener Quineaner sagte in einer Diskussion: "Und wenn Schweine Flügel hätten, würden sie fliegen". Ich sagte, dass wir beide nicht wüssten, ob das wahr ist und er wiederholte den Satz einfach. Ich hätte damals sagen sollen, dass Schweine dann immer noch nicht fliegen können.

Mart I
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Quine, W.V.O. Schiffer Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon:
Stephen Schiffer
I 137
Paul and Elmar/SchifferVsQuine: Quine: there are no countable belief objects. E.g. If John believes that snow is white, and Mary believes that snow is white, there must be something that both believe. Schiffer: this conditional is wrong:
I 138
either that or the alleged quantification for belief objects is not what it appears to be in the Quine's eye.
I 144
SchifferVsQuine: harmless apparent quantification.
I 235
Substitutional Quantification/Schiffer. E.g. (c ) There is something that Mother Teresa, (namely modesty) is true because a substitution instance of "Mother Teresa X" is true,
namely (b): Mother Teresa has the property to be modest.
ontological commitment: at substitutional quantification: are only those of the true substitution instances.
Universals/Quine: (On what there is, 1953, 10): it is misleading to say that red houses, red roses and red sunsets have something in common.
SchifferVsQuine: for whom these everyday speech would it misleading? One can therefore say something true, assuming substitutional quantification. Similarly E.g. "there is a chance that you will win".
there are/exist/substitutional quantification/substitutional quantification/Lycan: (1979): Allowed e.g. "There are many things that do not exist". E.g. Loch Ness monster, etc.
Properties/Schiffer: in most books of Non-Platonists there is quantification over properties. ((s)> Logic 2nd stage!). Quine himself gives an e.g.
Properties/Attribute/Existence/"There is"/quantification/second order logic/Schiffer: Quine 1966, p 164): "is valid" is a verb that can be appended to the name of a sentence, and expresses an attribute of the designated sentence.
I 237
Schiffer: nobody would assume here that Quine hereby makes an ontological commitment to the existence of attributes. Solution: It is "apparent" quantification that is true, if it is understood as a substitutional quantification.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Quine, W.V.O. Loar Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
Avramides I 37
prop Einst/Physikalismus/LoarVsQuine: Variante: erlaubt, daß die Propositionen von A durch solche von B ersetzt werden, aber dadurch hat sich nichts geändert in der Weise, wie Menschen die Dinge sehen. Insbesondere erlauben wir, daß die Propositionen irgendeiner physikalischen Theorie durch Propositionen über Glauben usw. ersetzt werden, aber das ändere nicht die Art, wie wir über einander denken. Das ist die "konservative Erklärung".
Pointe: nicht, daß der Theoretiker keine Glaubenseinstellungen geändert hätte vielmehr ist seine kognitive Situation so, als hätte er das nicht. Wie kann das sein? Ich kann es nicht erklären, aber es kommt vor. Und es kann als kognitive Lösung für etwas herhalten, was als ernstes theoretisches Problem gilt.
Aber: damit die Ersetzung korrekt ist, müssen die Wahrheiten von B (Menge von Propositionen) denen von A (physikalische Theorie) weichen. ((s) Also Propositionen über Glauben physikalistisch werden).
I 38
AvramidesVsLoar/AvramidesVsReduktionismus: ich kann nicht zulassen, daß die Wahrheiten von B denen von A weichen müssen. (s.u. Kapitel 3 und 4) werde ich zeigen, daß die Gründe, die uns am Festhalten an Propositionen über Glauben zwingen, Gründe dafür sind, die imperialistische (physikalistische) Sicht aufzugeben. Das entspricht sogar Loars Linie.

Loar I
B. Loar
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Quine, W.V.O. Church Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon:
Alonzo Church
Quine XI 133
Ontologie/Modalität/LauenerVsQuine: es fällt auf, dass in seinen Formulierungen intensionale Ausdrücke wie „müssen unter den Werten der Variablen vorkommen“, „müssen wahr sein von“ usw. vorkommen. Oder auch psychologische Konnotation wie „wir betrachten“. ChurchVsQuine: „ontologische Verpflichtung“ ist intensional.
leere Menge/Identität/Existenz/ChurchVsQuine: die Annahme von Kentauren und Einhörnern kann nicht das gleiche bedeuten, obwohl die beiden Klassen die gleiche Extension haben, nämlich leer sind.
Def Existenz/Gegenstand/Theorie/Richard Cartwright: eine elementare Theorie T setzt Objekte der Art K voraus, gdw. es in T einen offenen Satz φ gibt, der a als einzige freie Variable enthält, dass
1. [(Ea) φ] ein Theorem von T ist und
2. aus den semantischen Regeln (Sprachregeln) von T folgt, dass für jedes x gilt:
φ trifft auf x nur dann zu, wenn x ein Element von K ist“.
XI 134
Lauener: dass Cartwright sich auf Sprachregeln beruft, zeigt, dass er auf Intensionen angewiesen ist, dass die Definition aber eine extensionale Interpretation der Theorie, auf die sie angewendet wird, zulässt. - - -
Quine XII 38
Satz/Bedeutungsgleichheit/Übersetzung/propositionale Einstellungen/ChurchVsQuine/LangfordVsQuine: Problem: wenn das, was geglaubt wird, bloße Sätze sind,
XII 39
Dann überträgt sich Bsp „Edwin glaubt den deutschen Satz S“ korrekterweise in das englische „Edwin believes the German sentence S“. mit unverändertem S. Problem: eine ebenso korrekte englische Wiedergabe ist aber:
Bsp „Edvin believes,...“ gefolgt von einer englischen Übersetzung des deutschen Satzes S in indirekter Rede.
Pointe: diese beiden englischen Berichte müssen dann ebenfalls äquivalent sein, sie sind es aber nicht! Denn ein des Deutschen nicht mächtiger Brite kann sie nicht gleichsetzen.
QuineVsVs: das stützt sich auf den fraglichen Begriff der alltagssprachlichen Äquivalenz.
Quine: dennoch sollte man sprachliche Formen nicht als Objekte von propositionalen Einstellungen oder attributärer Einstellungen annehmen: das ist zu künstlich.

Chur I
A. Church
The Calculi of Lambda Conversion. (Am-6)(Annals of Mathematics Studies) Princeton 1985

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Quine, W.V.O. Foster Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
EMD II 28
Mögliche Welten/MöWe/Quine: Quadrupeln reeller Zahlen in der Raumzeit. Dann sind die Welten ontologisch respektabel. "Welt" kann rein extensional beschrieben werden.
Eine Welt ist dann eine Menge von Mengen von Quadrupeln reeller Zahlen, so das irgend zwei Mengen, die sie enthält, dieselbe raumzeitliche Verteilung auf einem relativistischen Begriff von Position und Abstand repräsentieren.
Nominalismus/GoodmanVsQuine.
II 29
MöWe/Foster: meine eigene Sicht auf MöWe ist phänomenalistisch und hier nicht in der Kürze darzustellen. MöWe/Quine/FosterVsQuine: Problem: in Quines MöWe hat weder "Sokrates ist sterblich" (als rein qualitativ) noch "sokratisiert" Platz.
Jede MöWe hat ihren eigenen Rahmen, in dem wir die materiellen Objekte in ihr identifizieren und wiedererkennen können.
Aber nicht über MöWe hinaus.
Kein Querwelteinidentität.
Wir wissen nicht, wie wir Sokrates in einer anderen Welt lokalisieren sollten.
J. Foster
II Evans/McDowell (Hg) Truth and Meaning, Oxford 1977
J.Foster Thruth and meaning theory

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Quine, W.V.O. Hintikka Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
I 184
Intentionality/Hintikka: if it is to be defined by the need to explain it with possible worlds, we have to examine possible counterexamples. Counterexample/(s): shall be something that also requires possible worlds without being intentional. However, the thesis was not that intentionality is the only thing that requires possible worlds.
Possible counter-examples to the thesis that intentionality is essentially possible-world based:
1) E.g. physical modalities: E.g. causal necessity really does not seem to be intentional.
I 185
Vs: but this is deceptive: Solution: Hume has shown that causality is what the mind adds to regularity. To that extent, causality is quite intentional. It points to something behind the perception.
2) E.g. logical (analytical) modalities. They are certainly objective and non-psychological. Nevertheless, they are best explained by possible worlds.
I 186
Solution: Meaning/Intentionality/Quine/Hintikka: Quine has shown that meanings are indeed intentional, in that they are dependent on the beliefs (convictions) of the subject. Thesis: According to Quine, we must always ask what are the beliefs of a person are to understand what are their meanings are.
DavidsonVsQuine.
QuineVsDavidson: belief and meaning cannot be separated. Quine/Hintikka: for meanings what Hume was for causality.
3) E.g. Probability/Probability Theory/de Finetti/L.J.Savage/Hintikka: according to the two authors all probability is subjective.
Def Probability/Prob/Mathematics/Hintikka: measure in a sample space.
Samples: are "small possible worlds".
I 187
Possible Worlds/Dana Scott: "Is there life in possible worlds?". Intentionality/Hintikka: if probability can only be subjective (Thesis: there is no objective probability), this corresponds, in the turn, to what Hume says regarding causality and Quine in relation to meanings.
Probability/Prob/Hintikka: is then not a real counterexample to the thesis that intentionality is possible-world based, because even probabilities are in a way intentional. (If probability is possible-world based, in any case).
Gradually/Degree/Yes-No/Explanation/Method//Definition/Hintikka: Thesis: seemingly dichotomous concepts can often be better explained if they are conceived as gradual.
Definability/Rantala/Hintikka: Rantala: Thesis: we do not begin by asking when a theory clearly specifies a concept, but how much freedom the theory leaves the term.
I 188
Determinacy/Hintikka: is a gradual matter, and definability sets in when the uncertainty disappears. This is an elegant equivalence to the model theory. Qualitative/Comparative/Hintikka: by assuming that a property is gradual, a qualitative concept can be transformed into a comparative one. Then we no longer only deal with yes-no questions.
Intentionality/Hintikka: thesis is a gradual matter. This is obvious, given that in case of intentionality we must always consider unrealized possibilities.
"Ontological Power"/Hintikka: the greater the ontological power of a mind, the farther you can go beyond the real world.
Degree of Intentionality/Hintikka: is measured by the distance to the actual world.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Quine, W.V.O. Wiggins Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
EMD II 285
Notwendigkeit/QuineVsAristoteles: kann nicht unabhängig von der Weise betrachtet werden, wie die Objekte spezifiziert werden. Wiggins: Quine verspottet den Essentialismus.
WigginsVsQuine: bewegt sich seine Kritik auf der Ebene einer unreflektierten Akzeptanz der Aristotelischen dreidimensionalen Fiktion unserer Welt? Oder behauptet er, daß wir, selbst wenn wir in dieser provinziellen Ontologie verharren, die Wahl haben zu wählen ob wir unterscheiden wollen oder nicht unterscheiden wollen zugunsten einiger der Begriffe unter die die Dinge fallen, die wir wahrnehmen?
II 286
Begriff/Sprache/WigginsVsQuine: Quines Haltung ist hier nicht völlig klar. These nur ein bewußtes System von Unterscheidungen zugunsten von Substanzbegriffen und gegen Zufallsbildungen könnte die Bestimmtheit erklären, mit der unsere Kultur Fragen der Identität in der Zeit oder Dauerhaftigkeit behandelt.
II 303
WigginsVsKripke: auch wenn Namen starre Designatoren sind: Frage, ob wir Sätze mit Namen für alle MöWe bewerten können ("notwendige Existenz") Problem: Querwelteinidentität

Wigg I
D. Wiggins
Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Quine, W.V.O. Stalnaker Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
I 71
Essentialism/today/VsQuine: most modal logicians today contradict Quine and accept the connection between modal logic (ML) and essentialism and accept the essentialism. Instead of, like Quine back then, saying: "so much the worse for quantified ML" they say, "so much the better for the essentialism".
I 72
Essence/essentialism/essential property/LeibnizVsQuine/Stalnaker: contradicted Quine in the first way: thesis: each property of each individual constitutes his nature and only the existence of the thing as a whole is contingent. today: David Lewis with his counterpart theory is a modern successor of Leibniz.
Counterpart/Lewis: things of the actual world have counterparts in other possible worlds (poss.w.). Things that resemble them more than any other thing. Therefore, no individual can have accidental properties, properties that they are lacking in another poss.w..
- - -
I 201
Quine/Stalnaker: taught us to be skeptical about the idea of necessity, analyticity and knowledge a priori. However, he did not question the empiricist assumptions that these concepts stand and fall with each other. KripkeVsQuine/Stalnaker: only Kripke pulled apart these concepts by finding examples of truths that are necessary although they are only a posteriori knowable and those that still are contingent but still a priori knowable.
- - -
II 24
Belief/Mentalese/Field/Stalnaker: his thesis was to reinterpret the intentional-psychological relation into a psychological but non-intentional and a semantic but not psychological relationship - between a sentence and the expressed proposition.
Belief ascription/Quine/Stalnaker: his goal was to generalize the ascription. By this an obligation to singular propositions should be avoided.
StalnakerVsQuine: but the project changes its character when it comes to the general case.
De re-ascription/Stalnaker: should better not be regarded as indirect and vague,
II 25
but simply as examples that show the essential characteristics of the intentional: Ascription: if we ascribe intentional states, the types, properties and relations to which we refer here, we see the world and with them we characterize the world as someone sees it.
Important argument: that is just not an indirect but a direct way to get to the content.
- - -
II 160
Def singular proposition/Stalnaker: here e.g. a singular proposition ascribes Ortcutt to be a spy. Structured singular proposition/Stalnaker: (for those for whom propositions are structured entities): then singular propositions are those which have an individual as a constituent. (StalnakerVsStructured propositions).
Singular proposition/poss.w.-semantics/semantics of possible worlds/Stalnaker: for those for whom the propositions are sets of poss.w., (Stalnaker pro)): then a singular proposition is a proposition whose truth depends on the properties of a particular individual.
Singular proposition/Stalnaker: the identity of a singular proposition is a function of an individual instead of a concept or givenness of an individual.
StalnakerVsQuine: this semantic approach is simpler and less ad hoc than that of Quine.
II 161
De re/ascription/belief de re/singular proposition/sing Prop/StalnakerVsQuine/Stalnaker: the semantic approach understands the ascription of a belief de re then as ascription of a particular faith (unlike Quine). What it means to believe a singular proposition? How is it to believe that Ortcutt himself is a spy? And not only that the person fulfills the description or a belief subject that is given in a certain way?
Problem: suppose Ralph knows Ortcutt in two different ways (beach, brown hat). Which singular proposition about Ortcutt does he believe?
bad solution: many authors think that there would have to be a special relation of acquaintance here.
Acquaintance/Stalnaker: problem: to provide a semantic relation for them.
1. the first strategy makes belief de re then too easy: e.g. Poirot believes that it was the butler simply due to the two facts that 1. the butler was it and 2. Poirot believes that it was the person who was it.
2. the second strategy makes belief de re too difficult: then Ralph, who knows Ortcutt, has two contradictory convictions.
Solution: a) to strengthen the relation of acquaintance so that misidentifications are impossible.
Vs: such mistakes are almost always possible! Then you could have only de re-convictions about yourself.
b) the "divide-and-conquer" argument: we tell the story of Ralph in two parts.
1. Ralph sees Ortcutt with a brown hat
2. Ralph sees Ortcutt at the beach.
II 162
Then it is quite natural that in Ralph believes in one story that Ortcutt is a spy, and not in the other story. There is no reason to assume that Ralph would have had to change his mind in between.
II 163
De re/ascription/belief de re/StalnakerVsQuine/StalnakerVsKaplan/Stalnaker: thesis: we assume instead propositions as sets of poss.w.. Pragmatic Analysis/pragmatics/Stalnaker: has in common with the semantic that certain convictions are ascribed but - unlike the semantic - it does not assume a particular type of propositions and also does not require an increased acquaintance relationship.
That means the individuals of which something is believed are not constituents of the proposition.
Proposition: its purpose is to pick out a subset of the relevant context set.
Ascription/de re/Stalnaker: (all authors): the way how the ascribing formulates its ascription is independent of the way the believer would formulate his conviction or the way how he thinks about the individual
Pragmatic approach/Stalnaker: (…+…)

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Quine, W.V.O. Stroud Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
I 183
Intern/extern/Carnap/StroudVsQuine: in Carnaps Unterscheidung muss noch etwas anderes geben. Dass sie als interne Frage beantwortbar ist, als (gleichlautende) externe jedoch nicht, zeigt, dass die beiden nicht verwechselt werden dürfen. Sprache/Carnap/Stroud: daher unterscheidet Carnap verschiedene "Sprachen" oder "Systeme". Diese beantworten jeweils nur interne Fragen.
Ausdruckskraft: dass eine "philosophische" (externe) Frage dann sinnlos ist, liegt nicht bloß an der Terminologie.
I 184
Die Terminologie ist jeweils bedeutungsvoll. Bsp innerhalb der Mathematik ist "Es gibt Zahlen" sinnvoll. - - -
I 223
Wissen/Skeptizismus/Quine: wenn alles Wissen zugleich auf dem Prüfstand steht, kann man sich auf keinen Teil des Wissens berufen. ((s) > Bsp "Alles was er sagte ist wahr"). Empirie/Wissen/Lösung/Quine: das ist der Grund, warum Wissen auf Basis der Sinneserfahrung gerechtfertigt werden muss.
Psychologie/Wissen/Erklärung/Rechtfertigung/Quine: eine Preisgabe der Erkenntnistheorie an die Psychologie führt zur Zirkularität. ((s) Weil die Psychologie selbst über das bloße Feststellen von Reizen hinausgeht).
StroudVsQuine/StroudVsNaturalised Epistemology: ist genauso eine Preisgabe der Erkenntnistheorie an die Psychologie. Und damit genauso zirkulkär!
Erkenntnistheorie/Stroud: kann es sein, dass damit wohl die traditionelle Erkenntnistheorie widerlegt ist, nicht aber Quines naturalisierte Erkenntnistheorie selbst? Liegt die Lösung in der Relation zwischen beiden?
Quine: legt manchmal nahe, dass die beiden Standpunkte (naturalisierteVstraditionelle Erkenntnistheorie) sich unterscheiden: die "doktrinäre" Frage sollte als falsche Hoffnung ad acta gelegt werden.
Bewusstsein/Kenntnis/Tradition/Erkenntnistheorie/Rechtfertigung/Stroud: die traditionelle Erkenntnistheorie insistiert auf einer Isolation gewisser Objekte des Bewusstseins, um unzweifelhafte Information zu identifizieren.
Bewusstsein/QuineVsTradition: wir können die Frage des Bewusstseins umgehen und einfach versuchen zu erklären,
I 224
wie unser reichhaltiger Output aus den Ereignissen entsteht, die an unserer sensorischen Oberfläche (Nervenenden) geschehen. Pointe: das kann man wissenschaftlich angehen.
Dann kann man zwei Arten von Ereignissen in der beobachtbaren physikalischen Welt unterscheiden, und das ist dann das wissenschaftliche Ziel.
StroudVsQuine: das sieht nun so aus, als hätte Quine nur das Thema gewechselt. Skeptizismus droht dann noch immer. Und das will Quine nicht.
„befreite“ Erkenntnistheorie/Quine: (Wurzeln der Referenz, 3): ist nicht dasselbe wie empirische Psychologie, es ist eher ein "erleuchtetes Fortbestehen" (enlightened, "Erleuchtung") des traditionellen epistemischen Problems.
Empirie/Wissen/Rechtfertigung/Begründung/Zirkel/Quine: (s.o.) Tradition: unser Wissen kann nicht empirisch gerechtfertigt werden, weil sonst zirkulär.
QuineVsTradition: diese Angst vor Zirkularität ist unnötige logische Schüchternheit.
„Erleuchtung“/“befreite“ Erkenntnistheorie/Quine: die Einsicht in die Tatsache, dass der Skeptizismus aus der Wissenschaft selbst entspringt. Und um ihn zu bekämpfen sind wir berechtigt, wissenschaftliches Wissen einzubringen.
QuineVsTradition: hat die Stärke ihrer Position gar nicht erkannt.
I 225
Wissen/Skeptizismus/QuineVsTradition: die traditionelle Erkenntnistheorie hat nicht erkannt, dass die Herausforderung des Wissens aus dem Wissen selbst heraus entstand. These: die Zweifel an seiner Verlässlichkeit waren immer wissenschaftliche Zweifel. Bewusstsein/Quine: die Verwirrung beruhte auf der Konzentration auf das Bewusstsein.
Introspection/Tradition: dachte, Fakten über unseren "mageren" Input würden durch Introspektion ans Licht gebracht.
QuineVsIntrospection: die Gründe dafür, den Input mager zu finden, kommen aus der Wissenschaft.
I 227
Täuschung/Skeptizismus/QuineVsTradition: der Begriff der Illusion beruht selbst auf der Wissenschaft, denn die Qualität der Täuschung besteht einfach in dem Abweichen von externer wissenschaftlicher Realität. (Quine, Roots of reference, RR 3) Illusionen gibt es nur relativ zu einer vorher akzeptierten Annahme echter Körper.
Gegebenes/QuineVsSellars/Stroud: das kann der Grund sein, ein unverbindliches Gegebenes anzunehmen. (SellarsVsQuine).
QuineVsDescartes/Stroud: Pointe: dann könnte es so scheinen, dass es unmöglich ist, sich auf die Möglichkeit der Täuschung zu berufen, weil ein gewisses Wissen über die äußere Realität notwendig ist, um den Begriff der Illusion zu verstehen!
Stroud: wir haben Argumente dieser Form schon früher behandelt (s.o. >Verzerrung der Bedeutung). Verletzung der notwendigen Bedingungen für die Anwendung gewisser Begriffe.
Quine/Stroud: ihm könnte man jetzt analog zu StroudVsAustin, MooreVsAustin antworten, aber Quine macht diese Fehler nicht.
Sprache/Skeptizismus/Quine/Stroud: sein Ansatz in Bezug auf die Sprache (QuineVsAnalyticity, QuineVsSynonymy) lässt ihm keine Möglichkeit, sich auf das zu berufen, was in der Bedeutung eines bestimmten Terms liegt.
StroudVsQuine: aber, wenn er denkt, dass die wissenschaftlichen Ursprünge nicht zum Skeptizismus führen, warum denkt er, dass weil die "skeptischen Zweifel wissenschaftliche Zweifel" sind,
I 228
der Erkenntnistheoretiker "klarerweise" berechtigt ist, empirische Wissenschaft einzusetzen? Die Frage wird noch schwieriger durch Quines explizite Leugnung, dass:
Skeptizismus/Quine: ich sage nicht, dass er die Frage unbeantwortet lässt, er hat Recht darin, Wissenschaft zu bemühen, um Wissenschaft zurückzuweisen. Ich sage eben bloß, dass skeptische Zweifel wissenschaftliche Zweifel sind.
TraditionVsQuine/Stroud: das ist wichtig für die Verteidigung des traditionellen Erkenntnistheoretikers: wenn es kein logischer Fehler ist, Zweifel aus der Wissenschaft selbst heraus letztlich zu widerlegen, so dass am Ende Gewissheit steht, was ist denn dann noch der entscheidende logische Punkt, den er verfehlt hat?
StroudVsQuine: wenn sein "einziger Punkt" ist, dass skeptische Zweifel wissenschaftliche Zweifel sind, dann wird Erkenntnistheorie ein Teil der Naturwissenschaft.
SkeptizismusVsQuine/Stroud: aber der Skeptiker könnte mit einer "reductio ad absurdum" antworten, und dann wäre Erkenntnistheorie nicht mehr Teil der Wissenschaft:
"reductio ad absurdum"/SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: entweder
a) Wissenschaft ist wahr und gibt uns Wissen oder
b) Sie ist nicht wahr und gibt uns kein Wissen. Nichts was wir über die äußere Welt glauben, ist Wissen.
I 230
Moore/Stroud: auch Moore soll damit nicht verleumdet werden. Nach Kant und Carnap ist es völlig legitim was er sagt. Skeptizismus/StroudVsQuine: Pointe: die Ergebnisse einer unabhängig durchgeführten wissenschaftlichen Untersuchung wären im selben Boot wie Bsp Moores Hände. Sie wären "wissenschaftliche" Versionen von Moores Argument mit dem Common Sense.

Philosophie/Wissenschaft/Quine: beide gehen kontinuierlich in einander über.
Stroud: damit könnten sich Descartes und andere traditionellen Philosophen einverstanden erklären.
StroudVsQuine: Problem: dann haben wir eben vielleicht auch gar kein wissenschaftliches Wissen. Wir haben nicht mehr Grund daran zu glauben, wie nicht daran zu glauben. Keine wissenschaftliche Untersuchung könnte hier Klarheit verschaffen.
I 231
Es wäre auch keine Herausforderung "von innen" denkbar. Also würde der Skeptizismus folgen.
I 233
Skeptizismus/StroudVsQuine: aber ob er korrekt ist oder nicht, ist nichts, was durch zukünftige Erfahrung oder durch Experimente entschieden wird! Wenn die erkenntnistheoretische Frage richtig gestellt sie - so wie Quine sie stellt – dann wissen wir schon jetzt, wie zukünftige Erfahrung geartet sein wird! Wir werden immer mit der Frage nach dem Überschuss unseres reichhaltigen Outputs über den mageren Input konfrontiert sein. Sicher, wenn wir heute mit einer Erfahrung konfrontiert werden, die unseren Glauben unterminiert, wird der Skeptizismus heute gerechtfertigt. Aber: Pointe: genauso war er schon 1630 gerechtfertigt!
I 234
Naturalismus/StroudVsQuine: wird nicht genug sein, wenn der Skeptizismus mit der reductio ad absurdum argumentiert. Wir müssen eben das Schiff auf hoher See umbauen. Der traditionelle Erkenntnistheoretiker kann das Stück aus dem Schiff heraussägen (identifizieren!), das den mageren Input repräsentiert.
I 240
Wissen/StroudVsQuine: selbst wenn ich den „mageren „Input dafür verantwortlich machte, dass er eine "Projektion" angenommen hat, wäre das keine Erklärung seines Wissens oder wahren Glaubens.
I 245
Wissen/Wissenstheorie/Erklärung/Projektion/StroudVsQuine: Angenommen, ich nehme mit Quine an, dass alle meine Glaubenseinstellungen nur "überfließender Output aus magerem Input" (also Projektion) sei, dann heißt das nicht, dass ich nicht denken könnte, dass ich wahre Glaubenseinstellungen habe, in dem Sinn, dass es nichts gibt, was meinen Glauben davon abhalten könnte, wahr zu sein. Problem: selbst wenn sie alle wahr wären, wäre ich nicht in der Position erklären zu können, oder auch zu verstehen, wie eine Wissenstheorie sie erklären und verstehen sollte. Ich kann nicht erklären, wie mein ((s) zufällig) wahrer Glauben zum Wissen beiträgt.

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Quine, W.V.O. Chisholm Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
III 86
Analytic/Synthetic/Chisholm: many authors maintain that the distinction is untenable.
III 87
1. for that one would have to speak of necessity 2. from the behavior of people it is not evident that their language is such that it is necessarily true: if a certain expression applies to something, then it applies also another way of saying the same thing.
3. The behavior does also not show the need that two expressions must apply to the same thing.
ChisholmVsQuine/Chisholm: That together, if it were true, would be insufficient to show that the distinction is untenable. An additional premise would have to contain a philosophical generalization on the conditions for such a distinction.
Generalization/Chisholm: how would it be defended: we see that in connection with the question of the criterion (see below) and skepticism (see below) -
ChisholmVsQuine: none of the possible generalizations was ever defended. Therefore, it is not true that the distinction analytic/synthetic was proved untenable.
- - -
Simons I 124
Ereignis/occurrents/Ontologie/Chisholm/Simons: Chisholm widerlegt drei Argumente für die Ontologie von Ereignissen (Vorkommnissen): (Chisholm 1976, Anhang A) 1. Argument der räumlichen Analogie: es gibt eine große Disanalogie zwischen Raum und Zeit: ein Ding kann nicht an zwei verschiedenen Orten zur selben Zeit sein, aber ein Ding kann zu zwei verschiedenen Zeiten am selben Ort sein.
ChisholmVs: das ist nicht schlüssig, ein Verteidiger von zeitlichen Teilen kann dagegen argumentieren. Aber dann kann er dieses Argument gebrauchen um für seine These ohne Zirkularität zu argumentieren.
2. Argument der Veränderung (Wechsel): Bsp wie kann Philip einmal betrunken und einmal nüchtern sein? Für ihn ist beides zusammen widersprüchlich.
ChisholmVsFour dimensionalism/Lösung: statt zu sagen ein Zeitstadium von Philip ist (zeitlos) betrunken) sagen wir einfach alltagssprachlich: er war letzte Nacht betrunken und ist jetzt nüchtern.
Entweder gebrauchen wir grammatische Zeiten wie in der Alltagssprache oder wir relativieren unsere Prädikate auf die Zeit ((s) "have-at-t", "be-at-t".)
3. Argument vom Flux (nicht "flux-argument"): Bsp
Fluss/QuineVsHeraclitus: Quine gebraucht die zeitliche Ausdehnung des Flusses auf gleicher Stufe wie die räumliche Ausdehnung.
ChisholmVsQuine: nicht jede Summe von Flussstadien ist ein Fluss-Prozess.
I 125
Lösung/Chisholm: wir müssen sagen, welche Bedingungen eine Summe erfüllen muss, um ein Fluss-Prozess zu sein. ChisholmVsQuine: Problem: das setzt wiederum continuants voraus: (Flussufer, menschliche Beobachter) oder eine Theorie des absoluten Raums oder die Einführung eines technischen Terms ((s) Prädikat) "is cofluvial to".)
Problem: das kann nur verstanden werden in Begriffen von „ist derselbe Fluss wie“. Also zirkulär.
VsVierdimensionalismus/VsProzess-Ontologie hat es damit nicht geschafft, alle singulären oder allgemeinen Termini zu eliminieren, die continuants denotieren.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Quine, W.V.O. Simons Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
I 60
Ontology/variables/quantification/Lesniewski/Simons: because of his understanding of quantification Lesniewski can quantify over variables (otherwise 2nd order logic).
I 61
But by this he does not enter into any commitment. Quantification/Lesniewski: was described by Quine as substitutional quantification but:
SimonsVsQuine: Lesniewski does not quantify over expressions and he also does not assume an infinite number of expressions. That would be for him as nominalists also implausible.
Küng/Canty/solution: Lesniewski does not quantify over expressions but on their extensions. Thus abstract entities are still allowed by the back door.
Simons: you could say that Lesniewski developed a combinatorial semantics, that is based on a simple idea of an "extensional" meaning so that an expression of the form "Π ... [__]" is true iff. the matrix is true regardless of the meaning of the variables.
"∏"/Lesniewski/ordinary language translation/Simons: simply "for all".
I 123
Four dimensionalism/Quine: (1960, W. + O.): physical objects in four-dimensional space-time are not distinguishable from events (more concrete: processes).
I 124
Substance/Quine: differs from other physical objects in that there are relatively few atoms that (temporary) lie partly in it partly outside of it. Substance/SimonsVsQuine: this is simply wrong: material substances are not simply those who win or lose few atoms.
I 128
Extension/Quine: Quine called their occupants: "content of a portion of space-time". SimonsVs: instead superposition (different individuals with identical parts in the same place at the same time.
continuants/SimonsVsQuine: if such occupants exist at all, they have to be continuants.
Events/Simons: seem at least to have a chance to meet the extensionalist principle no matter whether arbitrary sums are approved. Here we need definitions of the concepts of temporal and spatial part.
Masses: here we need different meanings of "part" to capture the relations between individuals, between classes or between masses. But this is different than the criticism in the last chapter because here it is about that there may be various analog applications.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Quine, W.V.O. Leeds Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 376
LeedsVsStandard Interpretation/Theory/Leeds: Theories which assume that there must be a SI for our language, are based on a wrong premise, namely that the question on whether our theories "depict" the world is dependent on whether "electrons really exist". Reference/Gavagai/Theory/Relation/World/LeedsVsQuine: (Quine seemed to defend this view as well once): that "rabbit" does not really have the relation R to rabbits. (Or only in a "relative sense"). (I have criticized this elsewhere).
Indeterminacy of the translation/Quine:
1. the results of word and object do not determine an unambiguous translation
2. there is no standard reference scheme for every language, e.g. we cannot add "obtain reference" or "obtain truth" as a condition for a translation.
3. demands as "conserve the psychological isomorphism" or "conserve the linguistic role" cannot be made precise
I 377
Naturalism/Quine/Leeds: Quine's naturalism is revealed early and at the end of his work, e.g. in "Ontological Relativity". Idealism/VsQuine/Leeds: Many authors have thought him to be an idealist in disguise because it is so difficult to see that Naturalistic Instrumentalism (NI) is not inconsistent. These authors have thought that someone who is so obviously an instrumentalist cannot simultaneously believe that electrons exist in an unambiguous manner like the naturalist believes.
NI/Leeds: Is coherent at any rate. The great question is whether it is true!

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Quine, W.V.O. Grover Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 356
T-Predicate/Generalization/Semantic Ascent/Quine: (1970): the T-predicate is not used to generalize E.g. "Dick is mortal", "Tom is ..." ((s) that is possible with "x"), but for the generalization of "Tom is mortal or not mortal." ((s) If "a or b" is true, then a is true or b is true or both. Where now "a" represents an entire sentence and unlike "x" which stands for an individual). Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB: pro.
CGBVsQuine: For that, however, you need no quantification over sentences or propositions in the sense that we attribute a characteristic with the T-predicate.
Pro-sentence: is used quantificatorically here, therefore English* without T-predicate is sufficient.
Solution: for every proposition, either it is true or it is not true that it is true.
Important argument: "is true" has a dual role here:
1) It seems necessary in order to make the link "it is not true that".
2) It works as quantificatorical pro-sentence. With it, the quantifying expression is anaphorized "for each proposition".
CGBVsQuine: this should be called semantic ascent.

Gro I
D. L. Grover
A Prosentential Theory of Thruth Princeton New Jersey 1992

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Quine, W.V.O. Kanitscheider Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
II 23
Ontologie/Sprache/Mensch/Kanitscheider: die sprachlichen Produkte des Organismus sind keinesfalls durch eine ontologische Kluft von seinem Produzenten getrennt. Ideen sind bestimmte neuronale Muster im Organismus.
KanitscheiderVsQuine: Schwachpunkt: sein Empirismus. Man muss seine Epistemologie daher mehr als ein Forschungsprogramm ansehen.

Kan I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kan II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Quine, W.V.O. Barrow Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
I 58
BarrowVsQuine: wäre die Welt zutiefst holistisch, träfe die dritte Annahme nicht zu. (3. Die Welt läßt sich lokal erforschen, ohne daß ihre wesentliche Struktur verloren geht.)
Prinz von Dänemark: "O Gott, ich könnte in eine Nußschale eingesperrt sein und mich für einen König von unermeßlichem Gebiet halten."

B I
John D. Barrow
Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996

B II
John D. Barrow
Die Natur der Natur: Die philosophischen Ansätze der modernen Kosmologie Heidelberg 1993

B III
John D. Barrow
Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001
Quine, W.V.O. Millikan Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
I 215
descriptive/referential/denotation/classification/Millikan: you can force a descriptive denotation to work referentially, Ex "He said that the winner was the loser." Ex (Russell) "I thought your yacht was larger than it is."
I 216
Solution: "the winner" and "larger than your Yacht" must be regarded as classified according to the adjusted (adapted) sense. On the other hand:
"The loser" probably has only descriptive of meaning.
"Your Yacht" is classified by both: by adjusted and by relational sense, only "your" is purely referential.
Quine: (classic example) Ex "Phillip believes that the capital of Honduras is in Nicaragua."
MillikanVsQuine: according to Quine that's not obviously wrong. It can be read as true if "capital of Honduras" has relational sense in that context.
referential/descriptive/attribution of belief/intentional/Millikan: there are exceptions, where the expressions do not work descriptively, nor purely referential, but also by relational sense or intension.
Ex "the man who us drove home" is someone the speaker and hearer know very well. Then the hearer must assume that someone else is meant because the name is not used.
Rule: here the second half of the rule for intentional contexts is violated, "use whichever expression that preserves the reference". This is often a sign that the first half is violated, "a sign has not only reference but also sense or intension, which must be preserved. Why else use such a complicated designation ("the man who drove us home"), instead of the name?
Ortcutt/Ralph/spy/Quine/Millikan: Ex there is a man with a brown hat that Ralph has caught a glimpse of. Ralph assumes he is a spy.
a) Ralph believes that the man he has caught a glimpse of is a spy.
I 217
b) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is a spy. Millikan: The underlined parts are considered relational, b) is more questionable than a) because it is not clear whether Ralph has explicitly perceived him as wearing a brown hat.
Quine:
In addition, there is a gray-haired man that Ralph vaguely knows as a pillar of society, and that he is unaware of having seen, except once at the beach.
c) Ralph believes that the man he saw on the beach is a spy.
Millikan: that's for sure relational. As such, it will not follow from a) or b).
Quine: adds only now that Ralph does not know this, but the two men are one and the same.
d) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is not a spy.
Now this is just wrong.
Question: but what about
e) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.
f) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy.
Quine: only now Quine tells us the man's name (which Ralph is unaware of).
Millikan: Ex Jennifer, an acquaintance of Samuel Clemens, does not know that he is Mark Twain.
I 218
She says: "I would love to meet Mark Twain" and not "I'd love to meet Samuel Clemens". language-dependent: here, "Mark Twain" is classified dependent on language. So also language bound intensions are not always irrelevant for intentional contexts. It had o be language-bound here to make it clear that the name itself is substantial, and also that it is futile to assume that she would have said she wanted to meet Samuel Clemens.
Ralph/Quine/Millikan: Quine assumes that Ralph has not only two internal names for Ortcutt, but only one of them is linked to the external name Ortcutt.
Millikan: Description: Ex you and I are watching Ralph, who is suspiciously observing Ortcutt standing behind a bush with a camera (surely he just wants to photograph cobwebs). Ralph did not recognize Ortcutt and you think: Goodness, Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy ".
Pointe: in this context, the sentence is true! ((S) Because the name "Ortcutt" was given by us, not by Ralph).
referential/Millikan: Solution: "Ortcutt" is classified here as referential.
referential/Millikan. Ex "Last Halloween Susi actually thought, Robert (her brother) was a ghost." ((S) She did not think of Robert, nor of her brother, that he was a ghost, but that she had a ghost in front of her).
MillikanVsQuine: as long as no one has explicitly asked or denied that Tom knows that Cicero is Tullius, the two attributions of belief "Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline" and "... Tullius ..." are equivalent!
Language-bound intension/Millikan: is obtained only if the context makes it clear what words were used, or which public words the believer has as implicit intentions.
Fully-developed (language-independent) intension/Millikan: for them the same applies if they are kept intentionally:
I 219
Ex "The natives believe that Hesperus is a God and Phosphorus is a devil." But:
Pointe: It is important that the intrinsic function of a sentence must be maintained when one passes to intentional contexts. That is the reason that in attribution of belief one cannot simply replace "Cicero is Tullius" by "Cicero is Cicero". ((S) trivial/non-trivial identity).
Stabilizing function/statement of identity/Millikan: the stabilizing function is that the listener translates "A" and "B" into the same internal term. Therefore, the intrinsic function of "Cicero is Cicero" is different from that of "Cicero is Tullius". Since the intrinsic function is different one can not be used for the other in intentional contexts.
Eigenfunction: Ex "Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy": has the Eigenfunkion to be translated into an internal sentence that has a subject and two predicates. No record of this form can be found in Ralph's head. Therefore one can not say that Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy you.
- - -
I 299
Non-contradiction/Millikan: the test is also a test of our ability to identify something and whether our concepts represent what they are supposed to project. MillikanVsQuine: but this is not about establishing "conditions for identity". And also not about "shared reference" ("the same apple again"). This is part of the problem of uniformity, not identity. It is not the problem to decide how an exclusive class should be split up.
I 300
Ex deciding when red ends and orange begins. Instead, it's about learning to recognize Ex red under different circumstances.
Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: for Quine a criterion for right thinking seems to be that the relationship to a stimulus can be predicted.
MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction?
Agreement/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what agreement in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If you do not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree.
Solution/Millikan: agreement is to say the same about the same.
Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted.
One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow "Ouch!" as a sentence. He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer.
Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra).
Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree to a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in nature (natural necessity).
- - -
I 309
Thesis: lack of Contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. agreement/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: both do not see the importance of the subject-predicate structure with negation. Therefore, they fail to recognize the importance of the agreement in the judgment.
agreement: this is not about two people getting together, but that they get together with the world.
agreement/mismatch/Millikan: are not two equally likely possibilities ((s)> Nozick inegalitarian theory.). There are many more possibilities for a sentence to be wrong, than for the same sentence to be true.
Now, if an entire pattern (system) of coinciding judgments appears that represent the same area (for example color) the probability that each participant reflects an area in the world outside is stupendous. ((S) yes - but not that they mean the same thing).
Ex only because my judgments about the passage of time almost always matches with those of others, I have reason to believe that I have the ability to classify my memories correctly in the passage of time.
Objectivity/time/perspective/mediuma/communication/Millikan: thesis: the medium that other people form by their remarks is the most accessible perspective for me that I can have in terms of time.
- - -
I 312
Concept/law/theory/test/verification/Millikan: when a concept appears in a law, it is necessary
I 313
to test it along with other concepts. These concepts are linked according to certain rules of inference. Concept/Millikan: because concepts consist of intensions, it is the intensions that have to be tested.
Test: does not mean, however, that the occurrence of sensual data would be predicted. (MillikanVsQuine).
Theory of sensual data/today/Millikan: the prevailing view seems to be, thesis: that neither an internal nor an external language actually describes sensual data, except that the language depends on the previous concepts of external things that usually causes the sensual data.
I 314
Forecast/prediction/to predict/prognosis/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: we project the world to inhabit it, not to predict it. If predictions are useful, at least not from experiences in our nerve endings. Confirmation/prediction/Millikan: A perceptual judgment implies mainly itself Ex if I want to verify that this container holds one liter, I don't have to be able to predict that the individual edges have a certain length.That is I need not be able to predict any particular sensual data.
I 317
Theory/Verification/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: is it really true that all concepts must be tested together? Tradition says that not just a few, but most of our concepts are not of things that we observe directly, but of other things.
Test/logical form/Millikan: if there is one thing A, which is identified by observing effects on B and C, isn't then the validity of the concepts of B and C tested together with the theory that ascribes the observed effects onto the influence of A, tested together with the concept of A?
Millikan. No!
From the fact that my intension of A goes back to intensions of B and C does not follow that the validity of the concepts, that govern B and C, is tested when the concept that governs A is tested and vice versa.
Namely, it does not follow, if A is a specific denotation Ex "the first President of the United States" and it also does not follow, if the explicit intention of A represents something causally dependent. Ex "the mercury in the thermometer rose to mark 70" as intension of "the temperature was 70 degrees."
I 318
Concept/Millikan: concepts are abilities - namely the ability to recognize something as self-identical. Test/Verification: the verifications of the validity of my concepts are quite independent of each other: Ex my ability to make a good cake is completely independent of my ability to break up eggs, even if I have to break up eggs to make the cake.
Objectivity/objective reality/world/method/knowledge/Millikan: we obtain a knowledge of the outside world by applying different methods to obtain a result. Ex different methods of temperature measurement: So we come to the conclusion that temperature is something real.
I 321
Knowledge/context/holism/Quine/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: doesn't all knowledge depend on "collateral information", as Quine calls it? If all perception is interwoven with general theories, how can we test individual concepts independently from the rest? Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: ~ "Our findings about the outside world do not stand individually before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body."
Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction.
Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our beliefs never stand before the tribunal of experience.
I 322
Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other beliefs. Confirmation: single confirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my attitudes.
From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well.
Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987
Quine, W.V.O. Newen Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
New I 129
Concept/Holism/Quine/NewenVsQuine/Newen: not all concepts are linked to all others. E.g. color concepts are independent of the concept of the electron. - - -
NS I 68
Meaning/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: Quine is a meaning skeptic. His raw material for a reconstruction of a theory of meaning are the empirical sciences. Two Dogmas/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: is Quine's largest "Wrecking Ball".
NS I 69
Two Dogmas/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: 1. Dogma: distinction analytic/synthetic
2. Dogma: reductionism: any meaningful synthetic sentence is equivalent to a sentence whose terms all refer to the sensory experience.
Meaning/Two Dogmas/Quine: the concept of meaning is not well defined.
Analyticity/Analytical/Two Dogmas/Quine: 1) Experimental Definition: "... true because of the meanings of the words in it, regardless of empirical facts. Vs: Problem: the transition from
e.g. "every unmarried man is unmarried" to "every bachelor is unmarried".
Analytical: its definition thus depends on the concept of meaning.
Meaning/Quine: Problem: reference objects cannot always serve: e.g. creatures with heart/kidneys. Same Extension. But only because of the (random) evolution), not because of the meaning of words.
It cannot always be true solely on the basis of the meaning of words, because the words are different ((s) and "heart" and "kidneys" just are not synonymous.)
NS I 70
Today: VsQuine/Newen/Schrenk: recent developments have advanced: although meaning is not the same as the reference object, the reference object may be part of the meaning. (see below >natural soecies). Synonymy/Quine: is closely linked to the concept of meaning. If you wished that the meaning was an abstract object, then the class of all synonymous terms/sentences can serve as this abstraction. It follows a new definition:
Analyticity/Analytical/Two Dogmas/Quine: 2) Experimental Definition: a statement is analytically true if it is true because of synonymy relations and regardless of facts. Point: "meaning" does not occur here anymore. New: the class of the synonymous sentences of w.g. "every bachelor is unmarried" contains the sentence "all unmarried men..."
NS I 71
Dictionary/Two Dogmas/Lexicon/Quine: the dictionary already presumes the concept of synonymy. Dictionaries are empirical hypotheses about the use. Synonymy/Two Dogmas/Quine: Problem: the concept is based on interchangeability salva veritate. Vs: example Bachelor/unmarried man: "... has n letters". Here, interchangeability salva veritate is not given, although the words are synonymous. Variant: it must be possible to exchange them in simple sentences without quotation marks. Vs: e.g. heart/kidneys Variant: in simple modal contexts without quotation marks... Solution: for example heart/kidneys, because it was not necessary but contingent that living creatures with hearts have only evolved if they also had kidneys. NS I 72 QuineVs: QuineVsEssentialism/QuineVsAristotle.
Essentialism/VsQuine/Newen/Schrenk: in modern metaphysics and philosophy of science essentialism is experiencing a comeback. (Lit 4-4).
- - -
NS I 74
Analyticity/Synonymy/Meaning/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: these expressions are not well defined. Solution/Quine: stimulus meaning: consists of positive and negative stimulus meaning: also contains irrelevant stimuli, i.e. the total package of stimuli on one occasion that lead a particular speaker to accept or decline. It is only a pale imitation of the original concept of meaning. This is part of Quine's meaning nihilism. NS I 75 Stimulus Synonymy: only for defined speaker. The same stimulus meaning. Stimulus Analyticity: only for defined speaker. Agreement with each stimulus. Differs from the original analyticity concept.
NS I 76
Indeterminacy/Gavagai/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: 1) inscrutability of reference: E.g. unseparated rabbit parts comply with the same observation situations 2) indeterminacy of translation: E.g. unseparated rabbit part: can a) "be the same" b) "belong to the same thing" (both in the foreign language! This goes beyond the inscrutability of reference 3) underdetermination (of a theory) by the data: (corresponds to translation indeterminacy): there may be rival theories that match the same number of observations. VsQuine: some argue that it never comes to radical translations, because many aspects of language are evolutionarily enscribed in the brain and cannot vary so widely (literature: 4-2). I.e. only the third uncertainty remains.

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005
Quine, W.V.O. Smullyan Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
XI 56
Identität/notwendige Identität/Notwendigkeit/Quine/Lauener: betrachten wir folgendes Postulat (1) ((w)(Fx w = x) u (w)(Gw w = x)) > N(w) (Fw Gw)
Das fordert, dass wenn immer zwei offene Sätze dasselbe Ding x als einziges bestimmen, sie notwendig äquivalent sein sollen.
XI 57
Aus der Wahrheit von (1) und von « p » haben wir auf « Np » geschlossen, womit der zerstörerische Effekt des Postulats gezeigt wurde. (WO engl. S.197) SmullyanVsQuine/Lauener: sein Argument beruht auf einer Missachtung des unterschiedlichen Funktionierens von Eigennamen und Kennzeichnungen.
bestimmte Kennzeichnung/Bereich: hier kann es Mehrdeutigkeit in Bezug auf die Reichweite des Iota Operators geben (Bsp Planeten).
Wir können aber mit Russell die Kennzeichnung eliminieren: so dass wir aus
F(ix) Gx a
je nach Reichweite des Operators entweder
(1) N(Ey)((x) Gx x = y) u Fya
oder
(2) (Ey)((x) Gx x = y) u N Fya
erhalten.
Da Quine die Konklusion in seinem Beispiel für falsch hält, nimmt er offenbar (1) als die richtige Interpretation a.
Smullyan: es folgt jedoch nicht (1) sondern (2) aus den Prämissen, was einleuchtet, als (2) intuitiv wahr ist. Es gibt tatsächlich ein Ding; nämlich die Zahl neun – das die Zahl der Planeten ist, und dieses ist notwendig größer als sieben.
QuineVs: er kann nicht zustimmen, und das macht die kanonische Notation deutlich: In (2) wird in einen modalen Kontext hineinquantifiziert.
Quine, W.V.O. Follesdal Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
XI 174
Namen/Kripke/Lauener: haben nach Kripke keinen deskriptiven Gehalt. Kripke/Lauener: daher sind sie nicht eliminierbar. D.h. man kann sie nicht in Prädikate verwandeln.
XI 175
Namen/Prädikat/Quine/Lauener: Quine belässt den Prädikaten nach Umformulierung alle Besonderheiten, die den Eigennamen zugesprochen wurden,: wenn dieser keinen deskriptiven Gehalt hat, so hat auch das entsprechende Prädikat keinen. sing Term/allg Term/Modallogik/Follesdal/Lauener: eine Semantik der Modalitäten muss zwischen sing Term einerseits und allg Term und Sätzen andererseits unterscheiden: d.h. zwischen Ausdrücken, die eine Referenz haben, und Ausdrücken, die eine Extension haben.
Quantifikation in opake Kontexte/Lösung/FollesdalVsQuine: um in opake Kontexte hineinquantifizieren zu können, müssen wir dann diese Kontexte referentiell durchsichtig machen und zugleich extensional opak!
Essentialismus: das ist es, was der Essentialismus meint:
Def referentielle Durchsichtigkeit/Follesdal/Lauener: was für einen Gegenstand wahr ist, trifft auf ihn zu, egal wie wir auf ihn verweisen.
Def extensionale Opazität/Follesdal/Lauener: unter den Prädikaten, die von einem Gegenstand wahr sind, treffen einige notwendig und andere akzidentell zu. (>Essentialismus).

Folle I
D. Follesdal
Alle 2 Bilder anzeigen Referential Opacity and Modal Logic London 2009
Quine, W.V.O. Schurz Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon:
Gerhard Schurz
I 57
Theorieabhängigkeit/Beobachtung/Schurz: gegenwärtig wird sie von der Mehrheit der Wissenschaftler halbherzig akzeptiert. (Chalmers 1994,20 31, Nagel, 1979,79). Bsp Angenommen, zwei Theorien mit sich widersprechenden Voraussagen: wäre eine vollständige Theorieabhängigkeit gegeben,
I 58
dann wären die Beobachtungen der Vertreter nur durch ihre theoretischen Erwartungen bestimmt! Das wären dann selbsterfüllende Prognosen Totaler Rechtfertigungszirkel: man glaubt an die Theorie, weil man deren Prognose beobachtet hat und dies deshalb, weil man an die Theorie glaubt. Theorieabhängigkeit/Schurz: fünf Argumente dafür:
1. Erfahrung ist theoriegeleitet: eine Selektion der Erfahrung hinsichtlich Relevanz ist unerlässlich. Diese Selektion ist theoriegeleitet: danach bestimme ich, nach welchen Beobachtungen ich suche.
Vs: das ist richtig, aber daraus folgt nicht, dass die Beobachtung selbst theoriegeleitet ist. Vertreter widersprechender Theorien können die gleichen Beobachtungen machen.
2. Wahrnehmung ist ein (unbewusster) Konstruktions- und Interpretationsprozess: Bsp Ambiguitäten und Täuschungen, Bsp rabbit-duck-head (Jastrow), Kippbilder: sollen die Theorieabhängigkeit der Wahrnehmung belegen.
Vs: Die kognitionspsychologischen Befunde wiederlegen nur den sogenannten direkten Realismus, nach dem wir die Dinge so sehen, wie sie sind. Sie zeigen aber auch etwas anderes: dass unsere Wahrnehmung radikal unabhängig von Hintergrundannahmen und Hintergrundwissen sind! (Fodor 1984, Pylyshyn, 1999)
Täuschung/Fodor: stellen sich für jedermann gleichermaßen ein, egal wie weit die Person darüber aufgeklärt wurde, dass es sich um eine Täuschung handelt.
I 59
Lösung: die Wahrnehmungsprozesse beruhen auf angeborenen Mechanismen. Theorieabhängigkeit/Wahrnehmung/Lösung/Schurz: ist dann die Abhängigkeit von erworbenem Hintergrundwissen (nicht von angeborenen Mechanismen).
Theorieunabhängigkeit/Wahrnehmung/Schurz: Personen mit unterschiedlichstem Hintergrundwissen machen dieselben Wahrnehmungen.
3. Wissenschaftliche Beobachtungsdaten sind theorieabhängig: hier geht es um Beobachtung mittels Instrumenten (Teleskop, Mikroskop usw.). Dann handelt es sich bei den Theorien meist um Theorien über das Funktionieren der Messinstrumente.
pragmatischer Beobachtungsbegriff/VsQuine: man kann nicht alles gleichzeitig überprüfen.
I 60
4. Continuity argument/Maxwell 1962/Carnap 1962/Hempel 1974/Schurz: Thesis: es gibt einen kontinuierlichen Übergang von Beobachtbarkeit mit dem bloßen Auge, über Brille, Lupe usw. bis letztlich zum Elektronenmikroskop. Dann ist "Beobachtung" willkürlich. Vs: 1. impliziert die Tatsache, dass es einen kontinuierlichen Übergang zwischen Schwarz und Weiß gibt nicht, dass es keinen Unterschied zwischen Schwarz und Weiß gibt. 2. Gibt es in diesem Übergang markante Schnitte.
5. Beobachtung ist sprach- und kulturabhängig/Kulturrelativismus: >Humboldt, Sapir, Whorf. Thesis: wir können nur das wahrnehmen, was in unserer Sprache durch Begriffe vorgezeichnet ist,
Vs: daraus, dass Sprachen besondere Begriffe haben, folgt nicht, dass man bestimmte Sinneserfahrung nicht machen kann.
Sinneserfahrung/VsWhorf: ist selbst nicht sprachabhängig. Das wäre nur so, wenn Andere nicht in der Lage wären, fremde Beobachtungsbegriffe durch Ostension zu lernen. Diese Lernfähigkeit ist jedoch immer vorhanden.
I 61
Ostension/VsWhorf: funktioniert ja gerade wesentlich nonverbal! - - -
I 106
analytisch/synthetisch/SchurzVsQuine: sein Verwerfen der Unterscheidung ist problematisch: der Bezug zwischen Sprache und Welt enthält ein konventionelles Element. Bsp wenn nicht klar ist , was "Rabe" bedeutet, kann man keine Hypothesen aufstellen. Und dieses konventionelle Element soll gerade das Analytische erfassen. ((s) analytisch/Schurz/(s): ist das Ergebnis der konventionellen Bedeutungsfestsetzung in der Sprache.)
Quine/Schurz: sein Problem liegt darin, dass dieses konventionelle Moment vorwiegend in ostensiver Weise funktioniert.

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Quine, W.V.O. Stegmüller Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
Stegmüller IV 390
Existenz/StegmüllerVsKant/StegmüllerVsFrege/StegmüllerVsQuine: die Auffassung, der Begriff der Existenz gehe vollständig im existential quantifier auf, ist umstritten!

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Quine, W.V.O. Wessel Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
I 352
Intension/WesselVsFrege/WesselVsQuine: Vs Unterscheidung Intension/Extension: hilft bei den Problemen nicht weiter. Allein der Hinweis, dass es sich um intensionale Kontexte handelt, reicht nicht. Extensionalitätsregel/Wessel: nach ihr können nur Vorkommen von sprachlichen Gebilden als Termini bzw. als Aussagen durch bedeutungsgleiche ersetzt werden, jedoch nicht beliebige graphische Teile.
Man kann deshalb nicht sagen, dass sie hier nur eingeschränkt gilt, denn sie ist überhaupt nicht anwendbar!
Zu der fälschlichen Auffassung kommt es, weil es in intensionalen Kontexten aufgrund ihrer Definitionen logische Regeln gelten, die der Extensionalitätsregel sehr ähnlich sind und die es, eventuell unter zusätzlichen Bedingungen gestatten, auch bloße Vorkommen von graphischen Teilen durch bestimmte Termini und Aussagen zu ersetzen.
I 353
Wessel: allgemein kann man das aber nicht sagen: Bsp "a sagte die Aussage A" diese Wendung wird in zwei unterschiedlichen Bedeutungen verwendet: bei der einen kommt es auf die genaue Wort und Buchstabenfolge an, bei der anderen nur auf die Information. (indirekte Rede).
Planeten Bsp/WesselVsQuine: dieser verwendet nicht die Beziehung der Bedeutungsgleichheit von Termini und die Ersetzbarkeit für bedeutungsgleiche Termini, sondern die Identitätssätze "Abendstern = Morgenstern" und die Ersetzbarkeitsregel für Identitäten.
Wessel: unsere Formulierung mit Bedeutungsgleichheit ist allgemeiner. Sie gilt aber auch für Identitäten.
Quine: unterscheidet nicht zwischen einem Vorkommen als Term und als bloß graphischem Teil!
Quine deutet die Sätze im Zusammenhang mit dem Planeten Bsp sämtlich als logische Modalitäten.
(Deshalb spricht Stegmüller von der Besonderheit der Kopula "ist" und zweifelt an der Möglichkeit einer Modallogik).
Modallogik/Quine/Wessel: die in den Aussagen von Quine vorkommenden Modalitäten können sowohl als alethische als auch epistemische Modalitäten gedeutet werden.
I 354
WesselVsQuine: dieser schließt aus einer falschen Prämisse: Ms(9 ‹ 7) > ~Wit(9 ‹ 7). (Ms wenn der Sachverhalt möglich ist, ~Wi: = nicht widerlegbar)
Morgenstern/Abendstern/einfach/zusammengesetzt/Wessel: man kann beide als einfache Termini ansehen, dann löst sich das Paradox auf: ta ‹_› tb bzw. a = b). (Der Morgenstern ist derselbe Gegenstand wie der Abendstern).
2. als zusammengesetzte Termini:
dann gilt: ~(ta ‹_› tb) bzw. ~(a = b). Sie sind dann nicht bedeutungsgleich.
WesselVsQuine: in diesem Fall ist eine von seinen Voraussetzungen falsch.
Quine ersetzt in seiner Konstruktion der Paradoxe Teile von Ausdrücken, die nicht als Termini, sondern nur als graphischer Teil vorkommen.
VsVs: der Einwand hat aber wenig Gewicht, da sich für modale Kontexte zusätzliche Ersetzbarkeitsregeln beweisen lassen.

We I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999
Relativism Field Vs Relativism
 
Books on Amazon
II 204
FieldVsQuine: However, (4) only defines Quine’s relativized concept of signification in terms of an unrelativized concept of signification, applied to our own language (into which we translate). So we need to understand the unrelativized concept before we can understand the relativized one. Underdetermination/Reference/Quine/Field: this was responsible for the fact that the unrelativized concepts of denotation and signification are not physicalistically acceptable. FieldVsRelativized Denotation: now we see that the relativized concepts do not help either. FieldVsQuine: with the relativized signification and denotation Quine himself has become a victim of his museum myth.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Skepticism Quine Vs Skepticism
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Stroud I 231
QuineVsSkepticism/Stroud: what is wrong with it in Quine's view? How can it be avoided? Naturalism/Quine: Solution: reflection on knowledge takes place within science, not beyond it.
QuineVsSkeptcism: Thesis: is an overreaction to the uncertainty of individual possibilities of deception. But skepticism is not inconsistent in itself.
"Overreaction"/Stroud: it would be an overreaction if I rejected the entire science because of certain insecurities. E.g. if my car did not start on a particularly cold day and I scrapped it because of that, it would be an overreaction. But from the simple fact that deceptions sometimes happen we cannot infer that deceptions always happen or that we know nothing about the world. ((s) This is Quine's position!).
I 232
Skepticism/Stroud: comes into play when all sensory experience is compatible with competing theories. And that would be no overreaction. E.g. If I cannot say on the basis of my sensory experience whether it's a goldfinch, it is not an overreaction to say I do not know that it's a goldfinch. Stroud: it looks as if the skepticism is not as well confirmed as other views.
ScepticismQuine/Stroud: what Quine calls like this is far from where Descartes gets at the end of his first meditation.
DescartesVsQuine: does not claim that we should base our predictions on dreams. And if he rejects science as a source of knowledge, it does not mean that we cannot make predictions any more if we adhered to the science.
Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: Quine speaks of future experience that could possibly support the skeptic, as if these doubts were not justified in this precise moment!
I 233
Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: but whether it is correct or not, is not something that will be decided by future experience or through experiments! If the epistemological question is correctly asked - as Quine does - then we already know what future experience will be like! We will always be up against the question of the surplus of our rich output over the lean input. Certainly, if we are confronted with an experience today that undermines our belief, then skepticism is justified today. But: Important argument: it was just as justified in 1630!
I 234
Naturalism/StroudVsQuine: will not be enough if skepticism argues with reductio ad absurdum. We'll have to rebuild the ship out at sea. The traditional epistemologist can saw out (identify!) the piece of the ship which represents the lean input.
I 248
QuineVsSkepticism/Stroud: Quine's idea is that if we deprive philosophy of its alleged "external position" that is sufficient to exclude that we arrive at a completely skeptical result in terms of our knowledge. That comes down to the naturalized as the only possible theory of knowledge. StroudVsQuine: I have shown, however, that this does not work as long as we understand our own knowledge as a projection.
This corresponds to Kant's objection:
Knowledge/Skepticism/Kant/Stroud: a completely general separation between
a) everything we learn through the senses on one side,
b) what is true or false about the world on the other side
would exclude us forever from knowledge (see above).
StroudVsQuine: that is fatal for the project of naturalized epistemology. Because it excludes us from our own knowledge of the world and leaves us with no independent reason to assume that any of our projections are true.
I 249
QuineVsKant/QuineVsStroud: precisely this separation (differentiation) is a liberation of science. It shows us that all information of external things I can get through the senses is limited to two-dimensional optical projections. Stroud: if this is really what "science tells us" (NNK, 68), then how can the separation (differentiation) have the consequences that I draw from it? Do I not just contradict scientific facts?
StroudVsQuine: No: nothing I say implies that I cannot observe any person in interaction with their environment, and isolate some events on its sensory surfaces from everything else.
Important argument: we know - and he may also know - a lot of things that happen in the world, beyond those events. He himself will also know little about these events that take place on his sensory surfaces.
Important argument: these events (which do not directly impact his senses) should be considered as part of what causes his belief ((s) and possibly generates knowledge).
Surely, without any sensory experience we would not come to any beliefs about the world at all.
I 250
Consciousness/Quine: we avoid the issue of consciousness by directly talking about the input.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Supervaluation Quine Vs Supervaluation
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Field II IX
Supervaluation/Semantics/Lewis/Fine/Field: (Lewis 1970a), (Kit Fine 1975): both propagate supervaluationist semantics for vague languages. Field: both are right: indeterminacy is not a big problem for the correspondence theory.
Indeterminacy: seems to be a bigger problem for deflationism at first. Because it does not seem clear how indeterminacy can be solved within their own language.
Quine/Field: had a big problem with that (see section 7).
SomeVsQuine: Indeterminacy within their own language would simply be incoherent.
- - -
II 24
Propositional Conditions/Truth/T-Theory/Quine: (1953b, p 138) Propositional conditions are all it takes to make the term "true" clear. (Field ditto). Reference/Field: then we may wonder why we ever need causal theories of reference? "Denoted" and "true" become sufficiently clear through scheme (T).
If we want more to pin language to reality, we overlook that we are on Neurath's ship!
Quine/Field: has hinted at something like that in § 6 of W + O (Quine 1960).
FieldVsQuine: but that is not due to the inscrutability of reference, to the under-determinacy of theories or to the ontological relativity. In a T theory or a theory of primitive reference we try to explain a connection between language and the world. We do not try to put ourselves outside of theories.
Reference/Field: here, psychological and neurophysiological models will be important.
Conceptual Scheme/Field: but we do not need to stick our conceptual scheme to the outside of reality, but without access via psychological models our conceptual scheme collapses from the inside.
According to our theory, it would be extremely unlikely in any case that there should be non-physical connections between the word and the world.
- - -
II 63
Synonymy/Quine/Field: intralinguistic synonymy is much easier than inter-linguistic. Quine e.g. Everest/Gaurisankar/Field: (1960, W + O, § 9, 11): (designed as a one-word sentences): here, the fact that the stimulus is different was to make the speaker prefer one over the other.
The different meaning is revealed by the fact that the sentences are not intra-subjectively synonymous for most members of the language community.
FieldVsQuine: "consent initiative" is too behavioristic. That causes Quine to unnecessary concern about the second intention.
Second Intention/Quine/Field: verbal stimulation as e.g. "Agree to one-word sentences beginning with "E" or I'll beat the brains out of you." (W + O § 48-9).
Field: nevertheless Quine's argumentation seems to be generally correct: we can explain intra-linguistic differences by evidence considerations.
Advantage: that explains meaning differences where they are suspected, but without referring to possible worlds.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Tradition Quine Vs Tradition
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
IV 403
Logical particles: are treated by Quine as syncategorematic expressions! (Derives from Russell: e.g. Socrates "is a man"). Logical particles: prepositions, conjunctions, copula, etc.:
Locke: links between ideas or propositions.
Tradition: the generated concrete terms.
QuineVsTradition: actually to be treated as syncategorematic expressions. Superficially they resemble designating expressions.
- - -
V 58
Idea/Notion/Berkeley/Hume/Quine: the two were not guileless and even drew the line at the abstract idea of ​​a triangle, accepting only ideas of certain triangles. QuineVsTradition: vain questions about the causal connection of ideas.
- - -
VII 11
Universals/Predicate/Attribute/Meaning/Tradition/"McX"/Quine: one possibility was excluded beforehand: McX cannot argue that such predicates as "red" or "is red" (which we all use) should be considered names of individual universals to be at all meaningful (of "universal entities").
Names/Quine: we have seen that being a name is a much more specific property than having a meaning.
McX cannot pin us down to that with the predicate "pegasated" we have introduced the attribute of "pegasating".
Difference predicate (concept)/attribute (universal).
McXVsQuine: different strategy: let us concede:
1) distinction between mention and use (naming and meaning)
2) that "is red" and "pegasated" are not names of attributes. Nevertheless, they are to have meaning. But these meanings, whether they are mentioned (named) or not, are nevertheless universals! And some of them I call attributes, or something with ultimately the same purpose.
QuineVsVs: here one could only resist by refusing to ever concede meaning. But I do not want that, because I do not want to reject the meaning of words and sentences at the same time.
QuineVsMcX: we both agree to divide linguistic forms into meaningful and meaningless ones, but he constructs "meaningful" as "having an "abstract entity" like "a meaning", and I do not.
Meanings are not entities. Better: a linguistic expression is meaningful or significant (designating).

Meaning/Quine: generally, there is talk about two problems with it:
1) "Having" of meaning
2) synonymity or "meaning equality".
VII 12
Quine: we can best handle this with the study of behavior. But we need not speak of an entity called meaning. Tradition/McX: wonders at this point: is there nothing that commits us to universals then if we do not wish to welcome them?
Quine: No, (see above) we have our bound variables instead.
Example We can definitely say that this (bound variable) is something that red houses and sunsets have in common.
Example or that there is "something" which is a prime number greater than a million.
Ontology: but that (bound variable) is the only way to impose our ontological commitments.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Various Authors Simons Vs Various Authors
 
Books on Amazon
I 89
Sharvy/quasi-mereology/Simons: Sharvy is actually about a general approach of reference and specific descriptions for all types of nouns: sing term, general term and mass terms ("count singular, plural count and mass"). Sharvy: considering quasi-Mereologien only for areas which are the extensions of predicates corresponding to such nouns.
I 90
Part-Relation/Sharvy: pointe: accumulation, group). Simons: with that we have a non-random similarity to the ontological functor <, which can also be read as "are some of".
Part-Relation: may be the identity in the limit, e.g. if the only part of an object is the object itself (e.g. English "boot"?).
Mass term/Part-Relation: water parts are themselves water but that is not trivial because they can also be hydrogen.
quasi-mereology/solution/Sharvy: the part-relation or "some-of"-relation has to be put into perspective. Thus it is then more fundamental than the identity!
Existence/SharvyVsQuine: instead of no "entity without identity": "quasi-mereology".
Identity/Sharvy: thus becomes the special case of the part-of-relation.
SimonsVsSharvy: this fails because if the partial order which should correspond to a predicate is the identity then there is the = < least upper bound (l.u.b.) a subset of the extension of the predicate only if this subset contains a single (single, "singular") element and then the order is not a quasi-mereology, for which namely the coS for all subsets of the extension of the predicate has to exist.
- - -
I 330
Unity/integrity/whole/complete/Simons: it can occur in variations because of the systematic ambiguity of the predicate "part":
I 331
this can lead to individuals, collections or masses. whole: it is here not clear whether the whole formed of individuals is an individual itself. It could also be a collection because the elements form a division because the element-relation is a special case of the part-relation for collections.
SimonsVsSociology: undifferentiated concept of a "whole" which is composed of individuals: is again incorrectly assumed as an individual (supra-personal).

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Wittgenstein, L. Davidson Vs Wittgenstein, L.
 
Books on Amazon
I 6ff
Many philosophers under the influence of Wittgenstein: recognition of the mind of another person: difference in the way we recognize our own mind and how we recognize the one of another person. In the first case there is no evidence needed, in the second case: the behavior must be observed. (not own behaviour) Davidson: As regards the use of these concepts of the mental, I agree with this distinction. But: DavidsonVsWittgenstein:
 The description of our practice does not constitute a solution to our original problem.
 Our practice has never been in doubt. Two questions: 1) Why should evidence-based knowledge not have greater certainty?
   2) boils down to: we have no reason to believe that we are dealing only with a single concept.
 Why should one believe the other one has the exact same mental states as he himself?
- - -
Rorty I 230
Truth Function/ Wafu / extension / intension / DavidsonVsQuine / Rorty: truth-functional vocabularies are characterized not in a particular way of reproducing the "true and ultimate structure of reality", do not in the intensional vocabularies this. (DavidsonVsTractatus). The distinction extensional / intensional is not more interesting than between nations and people. She’s just apt to evoke emotions reductionist.
- - -
Rorty I 230
Truth function/tr.-fnc./Extension/Intension/DavidsonVsQuine/Rorty: truth-functional vocabularies do not stand out by reproducing the "true and ultimate structure of reality" in a particular way in which intensional vocabularies do not do this. (DavidsonVsTractatus). The distinction extensional/intensional is not more interesting than that between nations and people. It is only apt to evoke reductionist emotions.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Wittgenstein, L. Putnam Vs Wittgenstein, L.
 
Books on Amazon
V 154
Wittgenstein/Quine (old): they have constructed thoeries that levae no room for a rational activity of philosophy. For this reason these conceptions are self-contradictory. (PutnamVsQuine, PutnamVsWittgenstein). Putnam: move: argumentative debate about the nature of rationality is an activity that requires a concept of rational justifications. This goes beyond institutionalized criterial rationality!

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Quine-Duhem- Thesis Versus Fodor/Lepore IV 218
QDT/Fodor/Lepore: DummettVsQuine: DummettVsQuine-Duhem-Thesis.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Indetermination Chomsky, N.
 
Books on Amazon
I 325
Unbestimmtheit der Übersetzung/Quine/Chomsky: nach dieser These sollen "alle Vorschläge für die Übersetzung mit der Totalität der Sprechdisposition verträglich, aber untereinander unverträglich" sein können. (Q+O, 27). Chomsky: das geht wegen der Probleme in Zusammenhang mit der Wahrscheinlichkeit nicht. Die These wenn alle Wahrscheinlichkeiten ununterscheidbar sind, sowohl innerhalb als auch außerhalb einer Sprache.
Quine: umgeht das Problem, indem er nicht von der "Totalität der Dispositionen" sondern von der "Reizbedeutung" ausgeht.
I 337
Übersetzungsunbestimmtheit/ChomskyVsQuine: die These läuft in einem psychologischen Kontext auf eine unplausible und ziemlich gehaltlose empirische Behauptung hinaus, nämlich darüber, welche angeborenen Eigenschaften der Geist zu Spracherwerb beisteuert. In einem erkenntnistheoretischen Kontext ist Quines These lediglich eine Version der bekannten skeptischen Argumente, die genauso gut auf die Physik oder anderes angewendet werden können.
Es ist ganz sicher, daß ernstzunehmende Hypothesen "über das Datenmaterial hinausgehen" .Wäre das nicht so, wären sie als Hypothesen uninteressant!
Gavagai Field, Hartry
 
Books on Amazon
II 201
Gavagai/FieldVsQuine: These ich glaube, daß es in diesem Fall tatsächlich physikalische Tatsachen gibt, werde aber in diesem Text nichts darüber sagen. Statt dessen nehme ich an, daß Quine recht hat und erwäge die Folgen davon für eine Korrespondenztheorie.
II 211
Gavagai/Field: These -žKaninchen-œ, ((s) nicht -žGavagai-œ) -žDinosaurier-œ usw. sind abhängige Prädikate, deren Extension eine Funktion der Extension eines anderen Prädikats ist, nämlich -œidentisch-. (Dieses ist die -žBasis-œ..
Horwich I 409
unabgetrennter Teil/Field: These ist aber auch nicht sprachabhängig. Sie sind genauso sprachunabhängig wie Dinosaurer.

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Reference Field, Hartry
 
Books on Amazon
II 201
FieldVsQuine: thesis: that one cannot ask either in Quine s relativistic sense or in the absolute sense about the reference .
II 279
Reference / Field: Thesis: "reference" itself may be indeterminate.
II 342
Assertiveness / Circle / FieldVsVs: we do not need to first secure the certainty of a concept before we use it in thinking (reasoning), otherwise the thought could never begin!
Identity Geach, P.
 
Books on Amazon
I 238
Identität/GeachVsQuine: These Identität ist relativ. Wennn jemand sagt " x ist identisch mit y" ist das ein unvollständiger Ausdruck. Es ist eine Abkürzung für " x ist dasselbe A wie y" : (DF hinz. Drittes: "dasselbe in Bezug worauf". (>tertium comarationis ï·" >Komparativum). Frege: "x ist eins" ist eine Abkürzung für "x ist ein A, ein einzelnes A". (s) "x ist ein Ding".
Geach: es wundert mich deshalb, daß Frege nicht auch die These der relativen Identität vertreten hat, obwohl es im Deutschen, wie im Englischen heißt "ein und dasselbe".
Relative Clause Geach, P.
 
Books on Amazon
Quine V 129
Relativsatz/GeachVsQuine: (Reference and generality, S. 115ï·"122, außerdem "Quines syntaktische Einsichten"). Relativpronomen/Geach: statt dessen im Sinne von "und er" auffassen: Bsp "Ich kaufte Fido von einem Mann und er hatte ihn gefunden". ((s) > parataktische Analyse).
Oder auch mit "wenn er" oder "da er".
V 130
Das nennt Geach die "Lateinsatz-Theorie" (latin prose theory). Def Lateinsatztheorie/Geach: These es ist falsch, "der ihn gefunden hatte" überhaupt als Terminus oder eigenständige grammatische Entität anzusehen.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Prosentential Theory Grover, D.
 
Books on Amazon
II 46
GroverVsQuine: in Bezug auf propositionale Quantoren. Thesis: propositionale Variablen sind nicht pronominal. These sie haben prosententialen Charakter.
II 130
quantifikatorischer Prosatz/Inhalt/Grover: (> "alles was er sagte"): These der Inhalt eines quantifikatorischen Prosatzes kommt von den möglichen Inhalten der Substituenden (Sätzen, die Substitutions-Instanzen liefern).
II 138
ZimmermanVsProsentential Theory/ZimmermanVsCGB/Grover: (Zimmerman 1978): "thatt" (((s) Abkürzung für "Das ist wahr", atomarer Prosatz) sei nicht zu verstehen, wenn es keine Lesart in der Alltagssprache dafür gäbe. Wenn man -"thatt" nun interpretiert, als "Das ist wahr" dann ist das zirkulär.
Essentialism Lewis, D.
 
Books on Amazon
Staln I 72
Nature / essentialism / essential property / LeibnizVsQuine / Stalnaker: any property of any individual constitutes its essence and only the existence of the thing as a whole is contingent.   Today: David Lewis with his counterpart theory is a modern successor of Leibniz.
  Counterpart / Lewis: things of the actual world have counterparts in other worlds. Things that resemble them more than any other thing. Therefore, no individual has accidental properties, properties which depart him in other worlds.
Justification McDowell, J.
 
Books on Amazon
I 12
These Denken, das auf Urteile gerichtet ist, ist insofern der Art und Weise, wie die Dinge sind (der Welt ) verantwortlich, als es richtig oder falsch ausgeführt sein kann. Es geht um Rechtfertigung vor dem "Tribunal der Erfahrung".
I 162
McDowellVsQuine: Widerspruch: Wenn Erfahrung nicht innerhalb der Ordnung der Rechtfertigung steht, kann sie von Weltsichten nicht überschritten werden. Das verlangt aber die "begriffliche Souveränität". Die ganze These von der Unbestimmtheit der Übersetzung würde gegenstandslos, wenn wir nicht darüber sprechen dürfen, wie jemand zu einer Weltsicht kommt, sondern nur über kausal erworbene Dispositionen.
Andererseits: wenn wir das "Tribunal" aufgäben, verlören wir das Recht, von einer mehr oder weniger angemessenen Weltsicht zu reden.
Generality Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
Tugendhat I 380
general statements / generality / Quine: the basic statements are general statements, and there are no singular statements - StrawsonVsQuine: it is the general statements themselves that point in the indication of their truth-conditions to singular statements - you cannot explain the way of a general term without the assumption of the manner of use of singular senetences.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Mathematics Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
Field I 241
FieldVsQuine: ... this, however, he would have to make a major renovation to his thesis that mathematics is continuous with the rest of the other sciences.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Underdeterminacy Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
Stroud I 235
Unterbestimmtheit/Empirie/Daten/Quine/Stroud: es gibt zwei Bedeutungen dieser These: 1. Wahrheiten über die äußere Welt folgen nicht aus der Tatsache, daß gewisse Reize auftreten.
2. sie folgen nicht aus den -žDaten-œ oder der -žInformation-œ, die durch die Reize geliefert werden.
I 244
...auch Bestätigungen durch -žweniger magere Inputs-œ blieben immer Teil der Projektion. StroudVsQuine: These ich glaube nicht, daß das die normale Situation ist. Im Normalfall ist Bestätigung möglich und ich sehe nichts falsches daran, unsere Verifikation und unsere Methoden so zu beschreiben wie wir es tun.
Indeterminacy Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
VI 51
Unbestimmtheit/VsQuine: die These der Unbestimmtheit der Übersetzung führe geradewegs zum Behaviorismus. Andere: sie führe zu einer reductio ad absurdum von Quines eigenem Behaviorismus.
VI 52
Übersetzungsunbestimmtheit/Quine: sie führt tatsächlich zum Behaviorismus, an dem kein Weg vorbei führt.
Rorty I 217
Übersetzung/Unbestimmtheit/Quine: Unbestimmtheit der Übersetzung: betrachten wir die Gesamtheit aller Wahrheiten über die Natur, auch unbekannte und nicht beobachtbare sowie zukünftige. Meine These besagt, daß die Unbestimmtheit der Übersetzung sich sogar der Gesamtheit dieser Wahrheiten widersetzt, der ganzen Wahrheit über die Natur. Es gibt die Frage der richtigen Wahl nicht wirklich! Es gibt auch innerhalb der zugestandenen Unbestimmtheit jeder Theorie über die Natur hier keinen objektiven Tatbestand. ((s) Keine Tatsache).

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
de dicto Searle, J.R.
 
Books on Amazon
II 261
de dicto/Überzeugung/ SearleVsalle: alle Überzeugungen sind de dicto ï·" de re Überzeugungen sind eine Teilklasse ï·" QuineVs: irrduzible Üb. de re: zwischen dem Glaubenden und den Gegenständen ï·" zusätzlich zu den de dictoï·"Ü ï·" (viel stärkere These) ï·" GIT: nur rein de dicto ï·" SearleVsQuine;: wenn die Welt sich änderte, ändern sich die Überzeugungen, auch wenn im Kopf alles gleich beleibt ï·" II 262 allg Wunsch nach einem Segelboot: de dicto ï·" nach einem speziellen: de re ï·" II 263 SearleVsQuine: dann im allg. Fall angeblich kontextfrei aber: BurgeVsQuine: kontextuell gebundene Ü lassen sich nicht vollständig durch ihren intentionalen Gehalt charakterisieren (als nicht bloß Rel zwischen Begriff u. Ggst) ï·" de dicto/Burge: Bsp rote Mütze im Nebel: " da gibt es einen Mann, der..." ï·"Searle: das reicht aus, um jedes de reï·" Gegenstück zu individuieren ï·" derselbe Mann kann zu den Erfüllungsbedingungen für ganz versch. Wahrnehmungen gehören ï·" II 268 These es gibt Formen der Intentionalität, die nicht begrifflich, aber auch nicht de re sind ï·"
Knowledge Stroud, B.
 
Books on Amazon
I 24
Wissen/Descartes/Skeptizismus/Traum/Stroud: ist Descartes These, daß Wissen, daß man nicht träumt eine notwendige Bedingung für Wissen ist? StroudVs. Stroud: wir können nichts wissen, wenn wir nicht einige Dinge, die mit dem Wissen inkompatibel sind, ausgeschlossen haben. (Inkompatibilitäten)
I 30
Wissen/Stroud: Wissenschaft und Alltag haben dieselben Standards für Wissen! - wahre Überzeugung ist noch kein Wissen - Wissen/Stroud These wir können wissen, wie die Dinge uns erscheinen - (hilft nicht gegen Descartes Skeptizismus) -
I 247
Wissen/Wissenstheorie/StroudVsQuine: These wir nehmen unwissentlich einige Dinge als unzweifelhaft wahr an. Selbst wenn wir in der Weise über Wissen nachdenken wie Quine das tut. Aber wenn wir ganz allgemein annehmen, These daß menschliches Wissen eine Kombination eines objektiven und eines subjektiven Faktors ist, und wir feststellen, daß der objektive Beitrag relativ klein ist.
Concepts Wiggins, D.
 
Books on Amazon
EMD II 286
Term / language / WigginsVsQuine: Quine s attitude is not entirely clear here. Thesis: Only a conscious system of distinctions in favor of substance terms and against random formations could explain the certainty of our culture treated with issues of identity in time or durability.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Essentialism Leibniz, G.W.
 
Books on Amazon
Staln I 72
Wesen/Essentialismus/wesentliche Eigenschaft/LeibnizVsQuine/Stalnaker: These jede Eigenschaft jedes Individuums konstituiert sein Wesen und nur die Existenz des Dings als ganze ist kontingent. heute: David Lewis mit seiner Gegenstück-Theorie ist ein moderner Nachfolger von Leibniz.
Gegenstück/Lewis: Dinge der WiWe haben Gegenstücke in anderen MöWe. Dinge, die ihnen mehr ähneln als jedes andere Ding. Daher kann kein Individuum akzidentelle Eigenschafen haben, Eigenschaften, die ihm in anderen MöWe abgehen.
Staln I 168
Eigenschaften/Essentialismus/Leibniz/Stalnaker: These selbst die am stärksten akzidentiell erscheinenden Eigenschaften sind notwendig.