Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 30 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Atomism | Logic Texts | Read III 28ff Atomism: the leading thought is that facts are autonomous. The truth of the conjunction is simply the result of the truth of each member of the conjunction. Reduction: each link corresponds to a fact. >Conjunction, >Truth, >Fact, >Reduction. The dream of the logical atomists, Russell and Wittgenstein, was to thus retain the truth of atomic and elementary statements after a great reduction. Wittgenstein later abandoned atomism (as well as realism and correspondence theory). >Realism, >Correspondence theory. VsReductionism: this would have to explain the truth of a negative statement like "Ruby did not kill Kennedy" as the result of the truth of another statement that would be inconsistent with "Ruby killed Kennedy". RussellVsVs: Russell objected to such argumentation that recourse is threatened: "B is incompatible with A" is itself a negative statement. To explain its truth, we would need a third statement C, which would be incompatible with "C is incompatible with A", and so on. Read III 31 ReadVsRussell: this is a strange objection, because it would also apply against any conjunction. And then truth conditions for conjunctive and disjunctive statements must not be conjunctive or disjunctive. >Disjunction, >Conjunction, >Truth condition. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Behaviorism | Nagel | I 108 NagelVsReductionism/NagelVsBehaviorism: the internal perspective of the discourse or thought area which is to be returned, shows us something that does not include the reduction discourse. In the philosophy of the mind behaviorism does not work because the phenomena and intentional features cannot be explained by a purely external perspective. >Phenomena, >Description levels, >Levels/Order, >Perspective, >Interior/exterior. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Causes | Davidson | McDowell I 92 Davidson: VsReduction of terms from the space of reasons to those from the space of the laws of nature. Doubling. Cf. >Reasons, >motives, >space of reasons. Rorty IV 48 Reason/Cause/Davidson: reasons can be causes: any given event can be described by physiological, unintentional terminology just as well as by psychological, intentional terminology. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Ethics | Nozick | II 17 Ethics/Nozick: there is no argument, which Hitler had to bow to. - This means that we cannot regard ethics as absolute, but: E.g. Heimson: does not bring our belief system about personal identity in the same way at risk. >Heimson case/Perry. We have more of a "How's that possible?" Question about ethics than about personal identity. >Identity, >Personal identity, >Temporal identity, >Identification, >Individuation, >Individual, >Person. II 118 Categorical imperative/Kant/Nozick: when the content could be extracted from the form, it would not be a "hard fact" (brute fact) anymore. - It would arise necessarily from the form. >Bare fact, >Categorical imperative, >Ethics/Kant, >Morality/Kant. II 570 Ethics/Nozick: how important is it, anyway? - As long as the meaning of our lives is not shown, ethics and values appear to be meaningless. >Life. II 631 Ethics/moral/reduction/Reductionism/Nozick: VsReductionism: infringes the principle that everything has a value in itself. NozickVsVs: this is not only theoretically wrong but also morally wrong. >Reductionism, >Reduction, >Values. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Explanation | Davidson | Glüer II 99 ff Explaining means re-describing. Thesis: explanations of action can be interpreted as singular causal statements. That is, in contrast to the "logical-connection-thesis" as statements about two distinct events. Caution: It is true that explanations of action do not allow an independent description of the cause, but it is precisely the description of the cause for which this is true, not the cause itself. >Causes, >Reasons, >Reason/Cause, >Motives, >Description/Davidson. Glüer II 112f Explanation of Action/DavidsonVsAristotle: the practical syllogism cannot deal with divergent causal chains (mountaineer-example), and also not with a mere intention (omission, intermittent event), and weakness of will. >Weakness of will. Glüer II 114 Intention/Davidson: Form: Judgment: "x is executable." Weak will/Acrasia/Davidson: irrational judgment - solution: separate action and intention. Glüer II 115 "All things-considered"-judgement: is only possible for omniscient beings. Glüer II 138 Explanation of action/mental/physical/DavidsonVsReductionism: intentionalistic vocabulary is in principle irreducible. There are no strict laws for the prediction of actions. - >Anomalous monism. Horwich I 456 Truth/Explanation/Davidson/Rorty: is not an explanation for something - ((s) A phenomenon is not explained by the fact that a proposition that asserts it is true). - also the existence of truth needs no explanation. Wrong: e.g. "he did not find the house because his beliefs about its location were wrong". Correct: (without truth): "He believed that it was located ---". Explanation: details of what was true or false, not the truth itself - If truth itself was an explanation, it would have to be a cause for something. Explanation: not "he did the right thing", but the circumstances. "Truth" as explanation would be like tertia (e.g. "intended interpretation", "conceptual scheme"). It is an idle wheel. - Putnam ditto. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Knowledge | Chalmers | I 103 Knowledge/Consciousness/color researcher Mary/Jackson/Nagel/Chalmers: (Jackson 1982(1), Nagel 1974(2)). E.g. Color researcher Mary knows everything there is to know about colors - but she has never seen colors. >F.Jackson, >Qualia/Jackson. All neurophysical knowledge cannot explain how it is to see red. The knowledge of how it is (experience) does not follow from physical knowledge alone. >Knowledge how, >Explanation. Bat-Example/Nagel/Chalmers: boils down to the same: it remains an open question: it is compatible with all physical facts that bats or even mice have a consciousness, and it is also compatible with them that they have none. >What is it like to be a bat? I 104 Jackson/Chalmers: Jackson has presented his argument JacksonVsMaterialism, not VsReductionism, not against a reductive explanation of our conscious experience. >Reductionism, >Materialism, >VsReductionism, >VsMaterialism. See also Lewis (1990)(3), and Nemirov (1990)(4). I 141 Knowledge/intension/fact/Chalmers: every time, if one knows a fact under one way of giveness, but not under another, there will be an additional, different fact which one does not know. E.g. Morning star/Evening Star, Superman/Clark Kent, Water/H2O. >Morning Star/Evening Star, >Superman/Clark Kent. I 142 The new fact that one learns (also e.g. color researcher Mary, when she first sees a color) is a fact in relation to the way of giveness. >Way of being given, >Intension. 1. F. Jackson, Ephiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32, 1982: pp. 127-36 2. Th. Nagel What it is like to be a bat? Philosophical Review 4, 1974: pp. 435-50 3. D. Lewis, What experience teaches. In: W. Lycan (Ed) Mind and Cognition. Oxford 1990 4. L. Nemirow, Physicalism and the cognitive role of acquaintance. In: W. Lycan (Ed) Mind and Cognition. Oxford 1990 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Language | Field | Avramides I 113 Belief/Meaning/FieldVsReductionism: (VsReductive Griceans): it is circular, to want to explain the semantic properties by believe. (This also says the reductionism.) >Semantic properties. Field like Grice: one can explain believe without reference to the sentence. Solution: what makes a symbol a symbol for Caesar is the role in my learning. Field: then there can be no inner language without a public language. SchifferVsField: no problem: Grice (intention based semantics, IBS) does not need to assume that propositional attitudes have been acquired before the public language. Both goes hand in hand. Only there is no logical dependence between them (and to competence). >Intention-based semantics. Armstrong: both are logically connected. ((s) This is stronger than Schiffer's thesis.). >Propositions/Schiffer, >David Armstrong, >Stephen Schiffer. --- Soames I 481 Language/Truth-Definition/Field/Soames: when truth is defined non-semantically (i.e., speaker-independent, i.e. non-physical), language becomes an abstract object. It has its characteristics essentially. >Scott Soames. With other properties, it would be a different language - that is, it could not have been shown that the expressions could have denoted anything else. Then it is still contingent on language, which language a person speaks. But the semantic properties (truth, reference, applying) are not contingent. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Legislation | Public Choice Theory | Parisi I 191 Legislature/Public choice theory/Farber: (…) early versions of public choice held that the sole goal of legislators was to be re-elected. As a simplifying assumption, this may have had some merits. After all, legislators who do not take an interest in re-election will be unable to accomplish their other goals for long. But the salary and fringe benefits of being a legislator do not seem great enough to explain why keeping the job would override all other interests. Motivations: A number of other motivations are plausible. To begin with, legislators may want to pursue their own views of public policy, even if they sometimes have to do so at the expense of a higher risk at the next election. It would also seem rational for voters and interest groups to support legislators who have firm policy views since their actions will be more predictable. Legislators may also be interested in their next jobs rather than their current ones. They may seek prominence as a stepping stone to higher office, either elective or appointive. Re-election: The re-election theory of legislator motivation suggests that legislative votes should correlate strongly with local economic interests. This appears to be the case, although it is hardly a counter-intuitive prediction. Vs: No one would expect that legislators from coal states would be on the forefront of climate change legislation. But the re-election thesis ascribes much more influence to re-election motives, holding that legislators are driven solely by re-election. Empirical problems: 1) (…) some notable empirical studies have found that a legislator's ideology also has an impact on her votes, though like most empirical studies they have their imperfections (Farber and Frickey(1), 1991, pp. 29—3 2). 2) VsReductionism: (…) a good deal of legislation seems inconsistent with the reductionist theory. Deregulation is an example, since it provides benefits to diffuse groups of consumers by lifting the limits on competition that benefited concentrated groups of businesses. Environmental law: Another example is environmental law. Federal pollution laws impose heavy costs on industry while benefiting diffuse groups such as large urban populations or communities living near rivers and lakes. Of course, no one believes that special interests are powerless in legislatures, but attributing hegemonic control to them is implausible. >Federalism/Public choice theory. Pork barrel projects: Another version of the re-election theory is that legislators have an incentive to support local pork barrel projects in order to woo local voters. Only a small share of the tax dollars financing the project come from the district, whereas the Parisi I 192 benefits of the projects flow there, so these projects are likely to be inefficient, with national costs exceeding their local benefits. (Note, however, that given limited funds to use for pork barrel projects, legislators will pick the most efficient local projects since they will produce the biggest local benefits given available resources.) >Corruption/Public choice theory. 1. Farber, D. A. and P. P. Fricky (1991). Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Farber, Daniel A. “Public Choice Theory and Legal Institutions”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Mentalese | Schiffer | I 73 Meaning in Mentalese determines meaning in public language, but not vice versa (on the content of thoughts). Fodor: we must see intentional properties of mental states as inherited from the semantic properties of the mental representations, which are implied in their tokening. Neural state: also exists if false. - There is no object, since with truth value. Schiffer: is still no system, not yet like a language. Harman: thesis: inner representations have sentence-like structure. >Mental representation. Lewis: language of the brain of synaptic connections and neuronal fires -> SLT (strong thesis of a language of thought). Other thesis: semantic properties are inherited from intentional properties. - (VsStrong thesis of a language of thought). Strong thesis of a language of thought Vs: short/(s): mental representation determines intentionality. Tthis can be explained without public content. SchifferVs: that cannot be fulfilled. I 76 Mentalese/relation theory/Schiffer: which relation of sentences is there in Mentalese to sentences in English? >Relation theory. Problem: the mental sentence "s" cannot be specified by meaning in English (that would be circular). Also Vs core thesis of the strong thesis of a language of thought (semantic properties of the public language are inherited from intentional properties of mental states). >Mental states. I 282 Mentalese/Schiffer: meaning is here not a question of convention and intention - unlike public language. >Convention, >Intention, >Everyday language. Solution/some authors: conceptual role (c.r.) in Mentalese. >Conceptual role. Public language: here sentences have a conceptual role only if they are also thought, not only spoken. Problem: we need a non-semantic relation between mental representation and public sentences. - Fortunately the inner code needs not to be mentioned here. E.g. "state with the same content". Problem: the speaker could believe a sentence only under additional assumptions. - This only with reference to content. - That does not work in a strong thesis of a language of thought. Conclusion: a neural sentence cannot be accepted without reference to the content as an object of belief. >Objects of belief, >Content. I 78 Mentalese/Schiffer: Relation theory requires complex properties, F which has everything; E.g. "flounders snore". Problem: we must not presuppose anything about the intentional properties of mental states or meaning in public language. I 79 Mentalese/Relation theory/belief/Fodor/Schiffer: for the attribution of truth values from situations to sentences: for this purpose, properties are used at the end of the causal chain. >Relation theory. Problem: quantification via properties as semantic values ultimately goes via propositions. >Propositions, >Quantification. Solution: SLT (strong thesis of a language of thought) can use propositions together with conceptual roles for the individuation of content. - Truth values by M-function to possible situations - additional physical condition C. Problem: this approach needs the theory of representation - (in which mental representation is only a special case). Truth conditions: formula: a is the truth condition for s in x' inner code if under optimal conditions x s believes if and only if a exists. - So we can identify a pattern of neuronal firing with the display of a fly for a frog. Problem: only under optimal conditions. SchifferVsFodor: then everyone is omniscient and infallible. I 87 Mentalese/Charity Principle/Schiffer: the charity principle is not for mentalism - this would have to be explained in terms of propositions. I 83-90 Relation theory/Mentalese/Schiffer: Problem: competing attribution functions for truth conditions ("M functions") - wrong solution: "larger survival value" does not exclude wrong attribution functions - e.g. weight/mass. I 189 SLT/strong thesis of a language of thought/Mentalese/Schiffer: thesis 1. the brain is a computer, we are information-processing systems with an inner neural code. Schiffer: I can agree with that. 2. there is a computational relation R for every belief that one can have, so that one has this belief iff one has R for this formula. Schiffer: that works, but only with substitutional quantification. E.g. "Nodnol si yggof": Mentalese for London is foggy. Then the sentence means that, but is not compositional. N.B.: then the content of belief cannot be reduced. - (SchifferVsReductionism) - ((s) Mental content is irreducible (Schiffer pro Brentano). E.g. knowledge-how cannot be analyzed in other terms - there is no fact that makes that something is this faith - + + >Knowing-how, >Nonfactualism. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Numbers | Field | I 153 Numbers/Frege/Crispin Wright: Frege suggests that the fact that our arithmetical language has these qualities is sufficient to establish natural numbers as a sortal concept whose instances, if they have some, are the objects. WrightVsFrege: but the objects do not have to exist. Problem: Frege thus demands that empirical concerns are irrelevant. - Then there is also no possibility of an error. >Numbers/Frege, >Existence/Frege. II 214 Numbers/BenacerrafVsReduction/Benacerraf/Field: there may be several correlations so that one cannot speak of "the" referent of number words. >Paul Benacerraf. Solution/Field: we have to extend "partially denoted" also to sequences of terms. >Denotation, >Partial denotation, >Generalization/Field. Then "straight", "prim", etc. become base-dependent predicates whose basis is the sequence of the numbers. - Then one can get mathematical truth (> truth preservation, truth transfer). - E.g. "The number two is Caesar" is neither true nor false. (without truth value). >Senseless. II 326 Def Natural numbers/Zermelo/Benacerraf/Field: 0 is the empty set and every natural number > 0 is the set that is the only element which includes the set which is n-1. Def Natural numbers/von Neumann/Benacerraf/Field: Every natural number n is the set that has the sets as elements which are the predecessors of n as elements. Fact/Nonfactualism/Field: it is clear that there is no fact about whether Zermelos or von Neumann's approach "presents" the things "correctly" - there is no fact which decides whether numbers are sets. That is what I call the Definition Structural Insight: it makes no difference what the objects of a mathematical theory are, if they are only in a right relationship with each other. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Pain | McGinn | I 65 McGinnVsSearle: We are not able, to lead back pain to the underlying neural entities. I 71 Pain/McGinn: can only be determined by introspection. We are unable to change the focus, or apply a different meaning. >Introspection. I 226f Brain/Mentalese/language of thought/McGinn: the brain is not subject to the same limitations as the conscious reason. E.g. pain: there may be a subsystem for self-monitoring, which prescribes the pain centers to change the fibers when overloaded. Here, semantically mediated feedback loops would obviously be highly useful, the more clever, the better. The dimensions of this cleverness do not coincide with the consciousness. >Consciousness. --- II 34 Pain/McGinnVsReductionism: pain cannot be reduced to the firing of C fibers, just as water cannot be reduced to H2O. But phenomena are what makes the mind. So mind cannot be reduced to the brain. >Brain, >Mind, >Reductionism. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Quine | Fodor | IV 37 Holism/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Quine represents a meaning holism (MH) but supposedly also a confirmation holism (CH) which equals the >Quine-Duhem Thesis. (>Two Dogmas: phrases do not stand individually before the tribunal). IV 39f PragmatismVsRealism/QuineVsReductionism: verification conditions are not analytically included in statements. Confirmation Holism/Fodor/Lepore: confirmation holism does not have to be a pragmatist, it can also be a realist. This is compatible with the Quine-Duhem thesis (i.e. that sentences are not individually verifiable). Confirmation is not a linguistic matter, but the way the world is (Quine pro realism). Quine: this is a priori equivalent to semantics. Quine pro verificationism: sentence meaning: is a method of verification. Quine-Duhem thesis: is highly consistent with realism. Quine-Duhem thesis: a) any statement can be maintained if appropriate auxiliary hypotheses are provided, b) the requirement that evidence must be a posteriori. Quine-Duhem thesis/Fodor/Lepore: the Quine-Duhem thesis can also be read as: a) QuineVsCarnap: Vs localism of confirmation or b) QuineVsCarnap: Vs localism of meaning. IV 2189 Network/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: the only fixed nodes are the observational concepts. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Reduction | Fodor | I 147 Reduction/type/token/psychology/reductionism/Fodor: of course we can get evidence that neural events that would otherwise constitute a heterogeneous mass, do have a kind of properties in common. Such correspondences can now found the token physicalism with same reasons as the type physicalism. >Type/Token-Identity, >Type/Token, >Physicalism, >Identity theory, >Token-physicalism. FodorVsReductionism: however, if this is true, the arguments that can be concluded from token physicalism to the reductionism must be wrong. >Reductionism. FodorVsUnified Science: it is not about which of the natural kind predicates are coextensive with those of the single science, but which physical mechanism explains the events that the particular science states. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Reduction | Searle | I 133 ff Reduction/Searle: There are different types of reduction: a) property reduction: is nothing but average kinetic energy, b) theoretical reduction: is reduction between theories, e.g. recycling the gas laws to the laws of statistical thermodynamics, c) logical or ontological reduction: concerns laws of numbers on laws of quantities and... I 135 ...d) causal reduction, causal powers of an entity to causal forces of another phenomenon: is the vibration in molecular lattice instead of solid bodies. I 136 Consciousness/Searle: even a perfect science of the brain would not lead to an ontological reduction of the kind that our contemporary science can provide for heat, firmness, color and sound. I 137 SearleVsReductionism: that changes nothing for our scientific world view. >Reductionism. I 139f From the irreducibility of consciousness arises nothing important. >Consciousness/Searle. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Reduction | Vollmer | II 170 Reduction/Vollmer: Def Entropy: the number of microstates that could realize the present macrostate. Def Pressure: average pulse to transfer the moving molecules on a wall. >Reducibility, >Reductionism, >Entropy. Reduction: e.g. the terms of the phenomenological thermodynamics are defined by concepts of molecular mechanics and thus reduced to this. VsReductionism: in simple language contradictions can still be formulated - then why reduction? II 228 Reduction/Vollmer: if system S2 is developed from system S1, then would theory T2, logically imply theory T1 - but if T1 or T2 are still faulty, it is unlikely that there is an entailment relation between them. >Implication, >Consequences, >Theories. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Reductionism | Avramides | I 96 Reductionism/Grice/Avramides: the real bone of contention between reductive and anti-reductive Griceans is the profound epistemic asymmetry - (that thoughts could be known without language). For symmetry/asymmetry: >Terminology/Avramides. Both, reductionism and anti-reductionism are agains superficial epistemic aymmetry: Def Superficial Epistemic Asymmetry/Radical Interpetation/Avramides: Thesis: that we can solve the problem of Radical interpretation by understanding the foreign language through firstly learning the beliefs and intentions ((s) without language, because the psychological concepts are more fundamental). >Avramides on Grice, >Thinking without language. I 96 DavidsonVsReductionism: of the semantic on the mental. - Without knowledge of the language beliefs cannot be verified. The method of radical interpetation (RI) fails: you cannot first establish foreign beliefs and intentions. >Radical interpretation. I 112 Reductionism/Avramides: must accept thinking without language. Antireductionism: must deny just that. I 127f Mind/AvramidesVsReductionism: Thesis: the image of the reductionism of the objective mind is wrong. - It goes back to its distinction between superficial and deep epistemic asymmetry. I 130 Avramides Thesis: deep epistemic symmetry does not include ontological symmetry (despite Davidson). Mind/Avramides:The right (subjective) image of the mind requires the semantic and the psychological to be understood on the same level. >Meaning theory. I 128 Summary/Antireductionism/Avramides: is the right about how we can understand propositional attitudes - Reductionism: is right about what propositional attitudes are. I 166 AvramidesVsReductionism: overlooks the fact that we have to characterize behavior semantically at some point. Normal evidence is the only means to maintain the thesis that semantic and psychological concepts are on the same level. I 168 The dispute over reductionism is about epistemic, not ontological questions. >Epistemic/ontologic. I 166 Grice: Thesis: the psychological is an essential part of the semantic. Reductionism/Avramides: the reductionism denies that! Thinking without language: if we attribute it, the semantic and the psychological may not be very interdependent. Solution/AvramidesVsReductionism: behavior is observable even with speechless creatures. - This forms part of our concept of the psychological. >Animals, cf. >Animal language. I 167 Manifestation/Avramides: it would be wrong to say that it must be more complex if the attributed thoughts are more complex. More complex is rather a linguistic behavior. >Compositionality, >Complexity. The reductive Gricean accepts deep epistemic asymmetry - the antireductionist denies it. >Terminology/Avramides. VsReductionism: with that he has nothing more to do with interpretation and understanding. Graeser I 128 AvramidesVsReductionism/Graeser: reductionism disregards the intimate connection between the psychological and the semantic and ultimately does nothing to contribute to the clarification of the mind and the thoughts. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Reductionism | Churchland | II 464 Reductionism/Churchland: Thesis: I am a reductionist. This does not mean that a pure bottom up strategy should be pursued. I also do not mean that descriptions of higher levels would be dubious in themselves. There are clearly higher-level properties, and so there is a need for corresponding descriptions. >Levels/order, >Description levels Definition Bottom up/Churchland: is the opinion according to which one must first know everything about the molecular basis before the psychological processes can be achieved. But this is not a reductionism either. II 468 VsReductionism/other authors: A) The goal is absurd. Stereotype critique: "I cannot imagine that pain should consist of any activity patterns of neurons" ChurchlandVsVs: that is nothing more than the impotence of the imagination. II 470 Vs Reductionism: if a macro-phenomenon can be the result of more than one mechanism (organization and dynamics of the components), then it cannot be identified with one of these mechanisms. The reduction of the macro-phenomenons on a single micro-phenomenon is then not possible. (>"Multiple realizability"). ChurchlandVsVs. II 471 Reductionism/Churchland: when the mechanism of a biological process has been discovered, it may be possible to invent devices that mimic these processes. The reductive success is not denied. Just as little, perhaps, that there might be DNAs in other parts of the universe. Reductionism/Churchland: It is not easy to argue VsReductionism and not to fall into dualism. (VsSearle). >Dualism, >Monism, >Property dualism. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Reductionism | Damasio | Churchland II 486 KantVsReductionism: The self will never be investigated, it is only to be thought of in the highly abstract conceptualization of "transcendental apperception." >Apperception. DamasioVsKant: we have a much safer foundation in our body with its skin, bones, muscles, joints, internal organs, etc. >Representation, >Body, >Consciousness, >Self-consciousness, >Perception, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Knowing how, >Experiencing, >World/thinking, >Sensation, >Sensory impressions. |
Damasio I Antonio R. Damasio Descartes ’ Irrtum: Fühlen, Denken und das menschliche Gehirn München 2004 Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Reductionism | Logic Texts | Read III 28 Reductionism: was central for Wittgenstein. For Russell it was quite clear that the assumption of an additional fact between two statements was absurd and unnecessary: E.g. "Kennedy is President," and "Oswald killed Kennedy," a third fact, a sort of conjunctural fact that makes the connection absurd and lavish. >Atomism, >Atomic sentences. If you know the two separate facts, you learn nothing new when you connect them. There is no extra fact behind the link, which is added to the separated facts. Similar to disjunctive. What makes "A or B" true is not another strange disjunctive fact, but exactly the same fact that makes one of the two limbs true! >Fact. Otherwise regress. >Regress. III 30 Reductionism: would have to declare the truth of a negative statement like "Ruby did not kill Kennedy" as the result of the truth of another statement that would be incompatible with "Ruby killed Kennedy." III 31 RussellVsReductionism: argues against such argumentation that a regress threatens: "B is incompatible with A" is itself a negative statement. To explain its truth, we would need a third statement C which is incompatible with "C is compatible with A," and so on. ReadVsRussell: this is a strange objection, because it would also be valid against any conjunction. And then truth conditions for conjunctive and disjunctive statements must not be subjunctive or disjunctive. >Disjunction, >Conjunction. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Reductionism | Mayr | I 41 Def Reductionism/Mayr: Reductionism considers the problem of explanation fundamentally as solved as soon as the reduction to the smallest components is completed. >Reduction, >Explanation, >Theories, >VsReductionism, >Analysis. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Reductionism | Nagel | I 9 ff Reductionism/Nagel: (here a subjective or relativistic reinterpretation of the ratio) seems to provide a refuge from skepticism. >Skepticism. Rorty VI 144 NagelVsReductionism: one can not explain the world in purely objective concepts that would deny certain obvious phenomena. >Objectivity, >Objectivity/Nagel, >Subjectivity, >Subjectivity/Nagel. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Reductionism | Putnam | V 193 Metaphysical Realism/subjectivism: metaphysical realism and subjectivism are, generally speaking, related. See e.g. cats/cats*, interpretation I/interpretation J in: Loewenheim/Putnam. >Löwenheim sentence/Putnam. V 194 If the interpretations are not equally correct, just because one is the correct reference, so this fact itself, seen from a physicalist point of view, is an inexplicable fact. This argument is also an argument. VsReductionism: because reference and truth are words that we cannot utter, without falling into contradictions. When I think "a cat is on the mat", I commit myself to the belief that "cat" refers to something (but not according to the metaphysical realism!). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Reductionism | Quine | Quine VII (b) 40 Reductionism/QuineVsCarnap: his space time quadrupel set preuppose a sedentary world - the quadruples still increase the set of the general properties. Refined form of reductionism: any incident either increases the probability (likelihood) of a statement or deminishes it. Schiffer I 2 QuineVsReductionism: the semantic cannot be reduced to more fundamental facts because of the indeterminacy of translation - so he saw the whole semantics skeptical. Quine IV 412 Def Reductionism (radical form): according to him, every single meaningful expression can be translated into an expression of immediate experience. QuineVsReductionism: radical form: erroneous translatability of individual observations into individual expressions. >HolismVs. >Holism. Weaker form: still the idea: each (synthetic) statement is clearly assigned a certain range of sensory irritations. (False). Vs:Reactions to sensory stimuli are not rigid in humans. (>"Super Spartan"/Putnam). Two dogmas: 1. Reductionism 2. Differentiation analytic/synthetic. VII (b) 39 Radical Reductionism/Quine: 1. Example: Carnap's translation into sense data language plus logical notation plus higher set theory. Empiricism/Quine: is often wasteful in its ontology. Carnap: was the first empiricist to consistently reduce. VII (b) 40 But his work is still just a fragment of the whole program. His space-time-point quadruples presuppose a world with little movement ("laziest world"). Principle of least movement, should be the guideline for the construction of a world from experience. QuineVsCarnap: did not appear to notice that his treatment of physical objects lacked reduction! The quadruples maximize and minimize certain general characteristics (over all features) and with increasing experience the truth values are revised in the same sense. But this does not help to see how a statement of the form "property q is at x,y,z,t" could ever be translated into Carnap's original sense data language and logic. Problem: the "is on" remains an undefined connection. The canon shows us how to use it, but not how to eliminate it! Carnap later recognized this and no longer used it. Reductionism/Dogma/Quine: 2. more refined form: each utterance is associated with a uniform range of possible sensations, so that each occurrence increases either the likelihood of the truth of the statement. VII (b) 41 or diminishes it. This is of course included in the verification theory. Quine Thesis: (comes from Carnap's "structure"): our statements stand before the tribunal of experience not individually, but as a whole corpus. >Quine-Duhem thesis. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Reductionism | Searle | I 68 SearleVsReductionism: if one could reduce qualia (e.g. sensation of pain), qualia would be something different in reality. However, they are not different. >Qualia. I 77f Why would you reduce everyday objects to anything? My everyday theory that large farm houses will have probably two stories is hopelessly irrelevant, but that does not question the existence of farm houses. VsReductionism: funny: something was considered as evidence of non-existence, when you could reduce something. >Ontology, >Existence, >Folk psychology. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Reductionism | Strawson | IV 33f Reductionism / Strawson: VsReductionism, instead, a "network" should explain the complex relationships between terms. - (This avoids circles). >Circular reasoning. It is not problematic, that sense perception is not possible without knowledge and sensory perception not without knowledge. >Perception,>Experience, >Concepts, >Recognition, >World/thinking, >Reality. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Reductionism | Vollmer | II 171 VsReduction/VsReductionism/Vollmer: We must realize that we are still able to formulate conflicting statements in the same language. Why then reduction? >Reduction, >Contradictions. II 207/208 VsReduction/biology: organisms are completely structured, while parts of a celestial body could be exchanged. >Structures, >Necessity, >Contingency. II 228 Reduction/Evolution/Vollmer: with the evolution argument the universal evolution serves as evidence that a reduction by deduction could be possible. >Evolution, >Deduction. Problems: VsReduction/Evolution/Vollmer: the evolution argument only applies to right (true) theories. If system S2 resulted from system S1, then theory T2 must logically imply theory T1. However, when T1 or T2 are still flawed, it is unlikely that there is an implication relation between them. >Consequence, >Implication. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Science | Maturana | I 95 Science/Maturana: science is based on subject dependency: this allows to cope with the domain of action. >Domains/Maturana. I 153 Science/Natural Science/ MaturanaVsReductionism: science is not reductionist, but generative (forms statements, ad hoc proposals). - It does not present phenomena of an area by the phenomena of another region. >Description levels, >Explanation/Maturana. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Subjectivity | Nagel | Frank I 132f Subjectivity/Nagel(1): the fact that it is somehow avoids the attribution of a separate aspect such as quality. >Properties, >Qualities, >Qualia, >Attribution, >Aspects. NagelVsReductionism: the way something is cannot be reduced. 1. Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450 Nagel III 116 ff Subjective/Objective/Gradual/Nagel: so the distinction is relative! (Polarity, continuum, respects: space, time, opportunities, scales). - E.g. a universal human perspective is more objective than that of an indidvidual, but less objective than a physical one. >Perspective/Nagel. Subjectivity: not necessarily something private. >Intersubjectivity. Objectivity: you cannot approach it by expansion of the imagination. III 120 Problem: for physical objectivity, the subject depends on those of its own components that it deems most suitable. >Objectivity/Nagel. III 28ff Subjectivity/Completeness/Objectivity/Reality/Nagel: since scrambled eggs taste like something for a cockroach and we will never know how (because we cannot imagine), we must say: either a) that the subjective qualities are not part of reality (absurd) or b) that not everything that is real is part of the objective world. Reality/Nagel: thesis: reality is not only the objective reality. >Reality, >Reality/Nagel. III 30 The world is neither my world nor ours. (This does not even apply to the mental world). |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Terminology | Millikan | I 2 Def Eigenfunction/Millikan: in contrast to 1. the current function 2. a "type of purpose", applicable on different occasions. (Generalization, "average" (see below.) E.g. An organ has a certain function = eigenfunction. Natural language/Millikan: natural language is not invented by someone for a purpose. Eigenfunction/Millikan: analogy: e.g. to organs of the body: we can use our organs for purposes other than their own function, e.g. to row with one's arms. I 3 Speech patterns/language device/terminology/Millikan: I mean words with this as well as, syntactic forms, stress, accents, punctuation, etc. Thesis: such patterns were only handed down because stable open and covert reactions of a cooperation partner are just as much handed down (have asserted themselves). Standardization/Millikan: the (speech-) pattern only performs its eigenfunction with a co-operation partner, but with an arbitrary one. Therefore, it must be standardized. Stabilization/Millikan/(s): (temporal) for recurring tokens a similarity must be given to previous tokens. Stabilization/standardization/Millikan: stabilization and standardization are two sides of a medal. I 5 Eigenfunction/Language/Meaning/MillikanVsGrice: we do not take the speaker meaning as the basic concept. Meaningfulness/Millikan: We do not explain meaningfulness with typical use. Belief/wishes/Intention/Millikan: belief, wishes and attention can be explained without reference to language. I 5 NORMAL/Terminology/Millikan: (spelling: capitalized): is understood here as a biological term, which is biologically normal. Not what average behavior is. I 12 "Real value"/real value/terminology/Millikan: I call the basic partner of sense real value. The difference between real value and a speaker is at least as great as between sense and intension. Terminology/Millikan/(s): "sense" is to be reproduced from now on with "meaning", which is not Fregean sense. Real value/Millikan: the real value is practically the truthmaker of sentences. Part II: this is about Fregean sense. Sense: is quasi intentionality. Thought/sentence/Millikan: are patterns that show intentionality, perhaps they have the form of inner sentences ((s) > Mentalese). Inner Sentences/Mentalese/Millikan: inner sentences and Mentalese are not determined by final rules. Therefore, intentionality is not equal to rationality. Intentionality/Millikan: I describe naturalist, but not reductionist. (MillikanVsReductionism). Intentionality/Millikan: their understanding is something quite different from the understanding of consciousness. I 17f Def direct eigenfunction/Millikan: a thing (device, pattern, instrument) has a direct eigenfunction, if it has it as an element of a particular family of things that I call Definition reproductively established family/reF/Terminology/Millikan: things that are similar are similar here because there was a kind of copying process (> reproduction). I 19 Reproductively established family/reF/Millikan: here there are two different ones: Reproductively established family 1st level: only elements of reproductively established families of 1st level are copies of each other. Reproductively established family of higher level: their elements can only be defined by the concept of the eigenfunction of lower-level families and the concept of "normal explanation" (according to biological normality). I 23 Def reproductively established family 1st stage/reF/Millikan: Any set of entities having the same or reproductively established characters derived from repetitive reproductions of the same character of the same model form a reproductively established family of 1st level. N.B.: i.e. that the elements can be reproduced in the same way, but they do not have to! e.g. Tokens of the written word "dog" can be copied in writing, photocopied, printed, etc. For example, the repetition of a word by a parrot. Reproductively established family of higher level: I 24 (1) Any set of similar units produced by elements of the same reproductively established families if it is a direct eigenfunction of this family to produce these units and if all are produced in accordance with normal explanations, form a higher level reproductively established family. (2) Any set of similar units produced by elements of the same pattern, if one of the eigenfunctions of this pattern is to make later units coincide with earlier ones, and this similarity is in accordance with a normal explanation of this function, form a reproductively established family of higher level. I 27 Def method of difference/Mill/Millikan: trial and error, but with only one trial and one observation. I 109 Substance/Properties/Millikan: Thesis: "Substance" and "properties" are categories that are cut off relative to each other and relative to the operation of the negation. They do not mutually exclude one another. Properties/Millikan: properties are varied elements of facts, receptive to negation. Substances/Millikan: substances are also variable, but relative to other transformations. I 127 Def Hubot/Terminology/Millikan: Hubots are beings that are like us, except that they all think in the same inner language. (This is unlikely for humans). (Other classification, other opposites, other concept pairs > order). In addition, Hubots never develop new concepts. N.B.: the example is to show that Fregean senses and intensions are not the same. I 130 Def Rubots/Rubot/Terminology/Millikan: Rubots are like Hubots, (sensitive to light, odors, temperature, touch) but in a different frequency spectrum than Hubots. Vocabulary: may still be perfectly coordinated with the environment with regard to the meaning (as with the Hubots). I 130 Def Rumans/Ruman/Terminology/Millikan: Rumans apply color concepts like Hubots. And they also live in a similar environment (but initially somewhere else). Color/Color concepts/Perception/Spectrum: unlike the Hubots, the Rumans live under a sun that emits much redder light. Language/Stimulus Meaning/Hubots/Rumans/Millikan: Suppose the mechanisms that produce their sentences are identical. That is, the stimulus meanings of their expressions correspond perfectly! I 151 Def "fully-developed" Intension/Terminology/Millikan: the fully-developed intension is the intensions, which an inner term can have beyond the language-bound intentions. I 277 Complete concept/Millikan: to have a complete concept, one needs time concepts. Accessibility: complete concepts for durable objects are not as accessible as concepts for substances such as e.g. domestic cat or e.g. gold. I 281 Summary/substance/property/identity/self-identity/Millikan: Perfect Secondary Substance: e.g. gold: has an identity that is formally the same as that of an individual in relation to its properties. Imperfect secondary substance: e.g. 69s Plymouth (contradiction to above) e.g. domestic cat: have a kind of identity that is formally analogous to the identity of perfect substances. For example, in accordance with laws in situ, instead of under all natural conditions. I 289 Def Subessence/Terminology/Millikan: e.g. Gold exists over space and time, without being instantiated in the same objects. It is an identity that the material has relative to its own properties. I 332 Veil/Millikan: authors such as Wittgenstein and Quine have once again introduced a veil, like Descartes and Hume earlier. I 325 Def "Meaning-rationalism"/Millikan: Thesis: the knowledge that a proposition has meaning is not empirical, but a priori. Unlike knowledge about judgments, this is empirical. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Vocabulary | Fodor | I 143 Vocabulary/FodorVsReductionism/Fodor: reductionism does not guarantee appropriate vocabulary for all individual cases. >Reduction, >Reductionism. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Avramides, A. | Reductionism Vs Avramides, A. | Avra I 90 Radical Interpretation/RI/Avramides: is quite obviously indeed a gradual approach? Avramides: I do not want to deny that, but that we need assumptions about beliefs and meanings simultaneously in early stages. ReductionismVsAvramides: this is the point where my opponent may step in and see an opportunity for an epistemic asymmetry: what is implausible, is not a gradual approach, but the concomitant thesis that radical interpreter needs a complete evidence basis for beliefs and intentions of the unacquainted speaker before he finds out anything about his language. AvramidesVsVs: this implausible thesis notwithstanding, the gradual approach of radical interpretation is as follows: the interpreter forms hypotheses on simple beliefs... (>see Bennett 1985) and all these hypotheses remain revisable until the end. In later stages, we then simultaneously deal with beliefs and meaning. I 158 ReductionismVsAvramides: Subjective Mind/AvramidesVsReductionism: is incompatible with the fact that the mind is only contingently connected with behavior. I 159 A subject can never be separated from its very own experience. VsAvramides: Important Argument: such a subjective concept can be constructed, without significant reference to the behavior! VsAvramides: neither is it necessary to make any significant reference to the third person perspective! I.e. reductionism (reductive Gricean) does not automatically lead to the objective mind. I.e. that a subjective concept of mind is therefore compatible with the fact that mind is only contingently connected with behavior. AvramidesVs: I admit that I cannot prove that this objection is incorrect, but is important to me that my approach allows to combine the first person and third person perspectives. I 160 Without connection to behavior there is no proper understanding of the first person perspective. And this leads to an objective Cartesian (or incomplete) picture. (55 +). |
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| Functionalism | Nagel Vs Functionalism | Frank I 64 Subject/Body/Nagel: if I am familiar with my mental states necessaryly directly, i.e. not through perception, but it is only possible to address perception findings as mine through the direct familiarity, then I have a reason not to seek the subject of the psyche in the body. In addition, I am also in an arbitrary mental state when I have no idea about its descriptive interpretation. ((s) VsNagel: (with Sellars): access only through language). NagelVsFunctionalism: if he was right, it would necessarily be true of mental states that they would be identical with functional states, but only by chance, that they are mental states, because the latter depends on their causal roles, and not on their inner epistemic nature. Nagel III 21 NagelVsFunctionalism/VsReductionism: the ordinary concept of the mental already contains the beginnings of a very different conception of objective reality. We cannot understand the idea of a different consciousness if we interpret it in a way that becomes incomprehensible when we try to apply the idea to ourselves. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Nagel, Th. | Nominalism Vs Nagel, Th. | Frank I 133 Nominalism/VsNagel: Standard objection: it does not really make sense to raise questions that cannot be answered on grounds of principle. E.g. what it is like to be a bat. I 134 NagelVsNominalism/NagelVsReductionism: its consequences are intuitively unacceptable. Unlike our realism of the world, of which we indeed distance ourselves verbally, but which we cannot really give up. Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450 |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Physicalism | Cresswell Vs Physicalism | II 163 CresswellVsGrice/CresswellVsReductionism: I do not see how principles of semantics could somehow be traced back to principles of physics or psychology - CresswellVsFodor/CresswellVsToken physicalism. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Loar Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Avramides I 37 Propositional Attitude/Physicalism/LoarVsQuine: Variant: allows the propositions of A to be replaced by those of B, but nothing has changed in the way people see things. In particular, we allow the propositions of some physical theory to be replaced by propositions about belief, etc., but that does not change the way we think about each other. That is the "conservative explanation". N.B.: not that the theorist did not change beliefs, but his cognitive situation is as if he did not. How can that be? I cannot explain it, but it happens. And it can serve as a cognitive solution for something that is considered a serious theoretical problem. But: for the substitution to be correct, the truths of B (set of propositions) must give way to those of A (physical theory). ((s) So to become physicalistic propositions about belief). I 38 AvramidesVsLoar/AvramidesVsReductionism: I cannot allow the truths of B to give way to those of A. (see below chapters 3 and 4) I will show that the reasons for forcing us to hold on to propositions about belief are reasons for abandoning the imperialist (physicalist) view. This even corresponds to Loar's line. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Reductionism | Dummett Vs Reductionism | Avramides I 146 DummettVsLocke/VsIdealism/DummettVsReductionism/Avramides: Dummett says above that the idealistic MT is not irreparable, but it is then obliged by an objective (objectivistic) image of the mind. Avramides: because of the reduction the Gricean must assume that linguistic behavior is only contingently related to propositional attitudes. He must therefore separate the theory of propositional attitudes from the behavior. Avramides: any theory that denies that the mind manifests itself in linguistic behavior, refers to an objective image of the mind. Functionalism/propositional attitude/GriceansVsAvramides: It might be objected that I have overlooked one theory all the time, in spite of everything: functionalism! It allows us to refer to behavior with propositional attitude, but not language behavior. This makes it attractive for the Gricean. I 147 Avramides pro functionalism: it gives a subjective (subjectivist) image of the mind. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Reductionism | Field Vs Reductionism | Avramides I 113 FieldVsReductionism/VsReductive Griceans: the reductive Gricean approach says that one can explain what it means to believe that Caesar was selfish, without somehow referring to the semantic properties of the sentence "Caesar was selfish". Because explaining the semantic properties of the sentence with belief would be circular. The question is whether the Gricean presupposition is true that you can explain belief without reference to the sentence. (84). ((s) This is not the argument of Pieter Seuren that one could not explain linguistic meaning linguistically. ((s)> Evans/McDowellVsSeuren)). Field: I believe that the presupposition is correct. In a typical case, that which in my system makes a symbol a symbol that stands for Caesar that this symbol has acquired its role in my representation system as a result of my learning a name. I 114 Which stands for Caesar in the public language. (85). Meaning/Language/Field: if that’s right, then ... Avramides: then there can be no inner language without public language, according to Field. SchifferVsField: there is no incompatibility. Intention-based Semantics (IBS, Grice) does not need to assume that you have propositional attitude before you have acquired public language. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Reductionism | Functionalism Vs Reductionism | Frank I 129 FunctionalismVsReductionism/Lange: N.B.: reductionism (especially physicalism) brings us very close to physiology. Now one day it may turn out that other forms of life are physically structured quite differently from us, but that we do not want to doubt that they have mental states such as pain or opinions. ((s) Functionalism must therefore not be so strongly reductionist that it makes the naturalistic vocabulary absolute. Lange: the conflict arises from the reduction of criteria to observable behaviour. Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450 |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Reductionism | Lewis Vs Reductionism | IV 76 Def Person State/p.s./State/Lewis: is a physical object, just like the person! (If persons had ghostly parts, their conditions would also have some). The state does many of the things a person does: it walks, talks, thinks, has a belief and desires, size and spatial location. The only difference: the state begins and ends abruptly. So it can't do everything a person does, namely things that take more time. 1. it is possible that a person state exists 2. it is possible that two person states follow each other directly, but do not overlap. The properties and location of the second can be exactly the same as those of the first. IV 77 Patchwork principle of possibility: if it is possible for X to occur intrinsically in a space-time region and Y in the same way, then it is also possible for X and Y to occur in two separate but subsequent regions. There are no necessary exclusions. Everything can follow everything. 3. there may be a possible world that is exactly like ours in terms of distribution of intrinsic local qualities in time and space. ((s) > Humean Supervenience; > Humean World). 4. such a possible world could be exactly like ours in terms of causal relations, for causality is determined by nothing but the distribution of local qualities. (But maybe this is too strong). 5. such a world of states would be just like our simpliciter. There are no properties of our real world, except those supervening on the distribution of local qualities. 6. then our actual world is a world of states. In particular, there are person states. 7. but persons also exist and persons are (mostly) not person states. They take too long! Nevertheless, persons and person states, such as tables and table legs, are not present twice in regions. That can only be because they are indistinguishable! They are partly identical. Person states are parts of persons. LewisVsReductionism: my definition of person as maximum R correlated aggregates of person states is no reduction! This saves me from circularity when I say that these in turn consist of even shorter ones. Part/Lewis: by this I simply mean a subdivision, not a well-defined unit that could occur in a causal explanation. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Reductionism | Luhmann Vs Reductionism | AU Kass 11 Autopoiesis/Luhmann: For example one could describe communication solely on the basis of physical or psychological facts. Then autopoiesis was missing as was the case with purely chemical description of a cell. Autopoiesis can only be performed in the living system, not in the description. LuhmannVsReduction/LuhmannVsReductionism: this shows, that emergence is only possible by complete uncoupling of energetic and material conditions which form systems on another level - N.B.: there are no drastic effects - these would be destructive. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Reductionism | Nagel Vs Reductionism | Frank I131 NagelVsReductionism: most fundamental objection: the identifications cannot explain that mental states are attributed not only to other "objects", but that they are consciously experienced by subjects. NagelVsReductionism: Argument structure: (1) A reductionist theory of experience has to explain all essential aspects of mental states (2) It is an essential aspect of (at least some) mental states that they are of subjective nature (3) Reductionist theories of the mind cannot explain the subjective nature of mental states Hence the conclusion: (4) There is no reductionist theory of the mind. Mental States/Nagel: are states "conscious experience". E.g. hunger. Fra I 132 Nagel does not speak here about states like knowledge or intentions! Def Subjective/Nagel: that it is "somehow" to make this experience. ((s) the phrase "it is somehow for" avoids the attribution of an aspect initially regarded as a separate, such as a "quality".) I 134 NagelVsNominalism/NagelVsReductionism: its consequences are intuitively unacceptable. Opposes our realistic view of the world, from which we do verbally distance ourselves, but which we cannot really give up. I 137 NagelVsReductionism: any reductionist program must be based on a complete analysis of what is to be reduced. If the analysis leaves out something (e.g. materialism, the subjective quality) the problem will be put wrongly. |
NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Reductionism | Nozick Vs Reductionism | II 627 Reductionism/Nozick: asymmetrical: II 628 Nobody says that the brushing of horsehair on catgut "is nothing but a violin sonata". Part/Whole: a version of reductionism explains the functioning of the parts without relation to the whole. II 631 Values/Reductionism/Nozick: some authorsVsReductionism: if it evaluates people, reductionism violates the principle that everything must be treated as if it had a value in itself. VsVs: this is not only wrong in theory, but also morally. II 632 Properties/Reductionism/Nozick: to explain why something has a property we can refer to something else with this property. But a fundamental explanation of the property must extend to all instances. Properties/Emergence/N.R.Hanson: atoms and particles II 633 do not have the properties that they are to explain. (Emergence, for example, color). |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Reductionism | Putnam Vs Reductionism | V 193 Metaphysical realism/subjectivism: the two are, generally speaking, related. See E.g. Cats/Cats*, interpretation I/ interpretation J in: Löwenheim/Putnam. --- V 194 If the interpretations are not equally correct, just because one is the correct reference, so this fact itself, seen from a physicalist point of view, is an inexplicable fact. This argument is also an argument. VsReductionism: because reference and truth are words that we cannot utter, without falling into contradictions. When I think "a cat is on the mat," I commit myself to the belief that "cat" refers to something. (But not according to the metaphysical realism!). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Reductionism | Quine Vs Reductionism | Davidson I 89 QuineVsreductionism: Quine appeals to today’s science as the best theory of our world. The irritations of our sense organs are the only evidence of "operations in their environment." Of course, this is not reductionism. Davidson II 130 2nd Dogma: reductionism: the view that every meaningful statement is equivalent to a logical construction of terms which refer to immediate experience. Quine IV 412 Def Reductionism (radical form)/Quine: according to him, every single meaningful expression is translatable into an expression about immediate experience. QuineVsReductionism: radical form: false translatability of individual observations into individual expressions. >HolismVs. weaker form: continued idea: a particular area of sensory irritation is clearly assigned to any (synthetic) statement. (Falsely). Vs: responses to sensory stimuli are not rigid in humans. Rorty I 241 QuineVsReductionism/Rorty: before Quine theorists made a significant contribution to the unification of science. After Quine's attacks on the concept of meaning there is the need to replace functional descriptions of theoretical entities with structural descriptions. (speaking of DNA molecules instead of genes). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. 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Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Reductionism | Rorty Vs Reductionism | VI 210 Intelligibility/RortyVsReductionism: in other natural sciences, for example, theory of evolution or plate tectonics there is no counterpart to the form of intelligibility, which Newton's primitive corpuscular has in common with today's particle physics. What we get here are not sublimations of events, but narrative representations. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 |
| Reductionism | Searle Vs Reductionism | II 325 SearleVsReductionism: there are actually mental processes that cannot be reduced to others. (Similar to Putnam, Quine, etc.) E.g. tickling, itching, pain, hopes, beliefs, fears, desires, experiences of action, thoughts, feelings, etc. All the more astonishing that this is denied by the majority of philosophers! II 326 Pain/Searle: pain is irreducible. Nobody ever came through a thorough phenomenological study to the belief that e.g. his own agonizing pain does not exist. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Reductionism | Strawson Vs Reductionism | IV 33 StrawsonVsReductionism: net instead of reduction. (avoids circle). It is not bad that we cannot explain knowledge without sense perception and sense perception not without knowledge. |
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| Reductionism | Wittgenstein Vs Reductionism | II 188 WittgensteinVsReductionism: tendency to explain a phenomenon with a single cause, and then to try to show that this phenomenon is "actually" something else. This tendency is immensely strong. Example punishment: it must be one of three things: revenge, deterrence or improvement means. E.g. that hitting on the table in anger as a relic from times when you struck to kill. E.g. burning of an image is similar to burning a human. --- II 189 It may be that in fact it is so, but it is by no means necessary. The destruction of an image can be associated by itself with a complex of feelings, without necessarily be related to an old custom or usefulness. (WittgensteinVsFrazer). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Reductionism | Verschiedene Vs Reductionism | Metzinger II 471 VsReductionism: if a macro-phenomenon may be the result of more than one mechanism (organization and dynamics of components), then it cannot be identified with one of these mechanisms, the reduction of macro-phenomenon to a single micro-phenomenon is impossible then. ("multiple realizability"). ChurchlandVsVs: Statement/Churchland: Explanations and thus reductions are area-specific. Simons I 214 Reductionist view of Superposition/Chisholm: Thesis: only the final constituents are real. Everything else is only a logical construction from it. SimonsVs: this contains a considerable revisionary element: it eliminates all terms and predicates that are true of such constructions that are familiar to us. ((s) Example: machines do not exist then.) Pro: emphasizes the importance of the material constitution. Vs: overlooks the fact that parts are not always ontologically superior to their whole! For example, the whole is ontologically subordinate: a heap of pre-existing stones that only remains because it is not destroyed. Example: Whole ontologically predominant: Organism: possesses properties and operates according to laws that are relatively independent of the respective material constituents. I 215 An organism survives many replacements of parts. (>Flux). DoepkeVsReductionism: the existence of the constituted objects, which retain their properties across the flux, makes it superfluous to explain why precisely these successive chemicals assume certain properties. Wright I 202 "Natural Thought"/Realism/Natural Sciences: nothing that constitutes an intuitive scientific realism requires semantic realism. I 203 1. VsReductionism: the theoretical vocabulary of natural science is not a dispensable substitute for a more basic vocabulary. 2. Statements formulated with theoretical vocabulary can be true or false in a meaningful sense, because they have to do with the representation of objective facts. |
Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Reductionism | Poundstone Vs Reductionism | I 393 Brain/Reductionism/PoundstoneVsReductionism: irreducibility of the brain: of nothing that is easier than you yourself can you expect that it behaves just like you. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Reductionism | Avramides Vs Reductionism | Avra I 112 Avramides Reductionism: Reductionism/Avramides: can deny to be committed to attributing thinking without language to a being. Antireductionism/Avramides: might be uncomfortable with the implausible thesis (attribtuted to him) of having to deny thinking without language. Solution/Avramides: ontological asymmetry Vs ontological symmetry: Ontological asymmetry/Avramides: one could argue that my deep epistemic asymmetry (EA) contained ontological implications. If there is to be a deep EA, there would have to be an ontological one. This conditional could be interpreted as follows: Antireductionism: discards the antecedent and thus must reject the consequent. Therefore it is set to ontological symmetry. Reductionism: can assume ontological asymmetry. And with that he seems to be committed to epistemic asymmetry. AvramidesVs: that only seems like that! Because the controversy between ReductionismVsAntireductionism runs above that of ontological SymmetryVsAsymmetry. Reductionism/Avramides: must accept thinking without language. Antireductionism: must deny just that. AvramidesVs: but the flaws in these arguments are obvious. Antireductionism/Avramides: (formal errors aside) how can he accept thinking without language? What exactly is the relationship between epistemic and ontological asymmetry? We will now examine that. I 112 Reductionism/Avramides: must accept thinking without language - Antireductionism: must deny it. I 168 Reductionism/Grice/Epistemic/Ontological/Avramides: the controversy over reductionism or antireductionism is not about ontological but epistemological questions. The reductive follwer of Grice accepts deep epistemic asymmetry, Antireductionist: denies it. AvramidesVsReductionism: so he has nothing to do with interpretation and understanding anymore. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Reductionism | Peacocke Vs Reductionism | Avramidis I 92 Reductionism/Peacocke/Grice/Avramides: Peacocke seems to have equated the failure of superficial epistemic asymmetry (eA) with the failure of the reductive interpretation of Grice's analysis: But he is more cautious than Platts. PeacockeVsReductionism: Grice is more interesting without. "Actual Language Relation"/Peacocke: it is a misleading idea that there is simply a kind of reductionism that can bring the motivation for a search for the "actual language relation", the uses no semantic vocabulary. This is wrong. Suppose we could very precisely attribute certain beliefs and desires before we could translate the language of an individual: even then, simultaneous attribution of propositional attitudes and locutions would be necessary. And to achieve this, it is not necessary that exactly certain propositional attitudes are ascribable before understanding the language. (Peacocke 1976, p. 167). Avramides: Peacocke seems to connect reductive interpretation and oeA here. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Reductionism | Cartwright Vs Reductionism | I 100 Book of Nature/Science/BoN/17th Century/Boyle/Hooke/History/Cartwright: God wrote down the fundamental laws in the BoN. Then the phenomenological ones are a consequence of it. I 101 A lot of these cann still be found even in today’s philosophy of science, especially in the reductionism and the deductive-nomological model (although not by its authors Hempel, Grünbaum and Nagel). Cartwright: I myself have formerly used such stories in the classroom with the students: namely two creation stories: a) Reductionism: E.g. God writes the book of nature, Peter was his assistant. God writes down the fundamental laws and then leaves the hard-working Peter with a bit of a poor imagination to establish the phenomenological laws. b) God takes special care of the regularities in the world, there are no distinctions between different kinds of laws, God himself dictates every single one of them. Now Peter’s task is much more demanding: he must find the possible initial conditions! According to this view, all the laws are true together. I 102 Cartwright: I have searched long for a non-metaphorical analysis of these metaphors. Today I believe that it cannot be found. Laws/Derivative/Important argument/CartwrightVsReductionism: without the story of God and the Book of Nature, there is no sense in assuming that in nature something is derived from something else. I.e. that the fundamental laws are more "fundamental" and that the others apply "by virtue of them". Deductive-nomological model/Cartwright: here is only an apparent help: because here we can look for quasi-causal relation between LoN. If we do not find any, we focus on language. Then we have formal placeholders for relations between laws. CartwrightVsRealism: but the deductive-nomological model itself is not an argument for realism. Truth/Cartwright: without all the metaphysics, the success in the organization of our knowledge is no argument for the truth of the theory. We still need a story about how the connection between fundamental equations and complex laws should be. > Grünbaum (see above I 94). |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Reductionism | Castaneda Vs Reductionism | Frank I 216 CastanedaVsReductionism: constantly has to deal with the reflexivity of consciousness or should have to do with it. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Reductionism | Millikan Vs Reductionism | I 11 Def sentence meaning/sense/Millikan: are the projective functions (informal "rules") in accordance to which one would represent it to the world if one wanted to exert its intrinsic function in accordance with a normal ((s) biological) explanation. Sense/meaning/Millikan: is not "intension": nor Quine'ian "meaning". Also not Frege'ian sense. Intension/Millikan: has to do with a network of rules of inference. Sense: has assumed the role of "intension", but sense is not completely in contrast with "reference". Reference: having a reference will be the same as having "sense". Referees: are another matter. I 12 "Real value"/terminology/Millikan: is what I call the basic partner of sense. The difference between real value and a referee is at least as great as that between sense and intension. ((s) Terminology/Millikan/(s): "sense" from now on is to be reproduced by "sense", by which isn't meant the Frege'ian sense.) Real value/Millikan: practically the truthmaker of sentences. Part II: this is about Frege'ian sense. sense: is basically intentionality. Thought/sentence/Millikan: are patterns that show intentionality, maybe they have the form of internal sentences ((s)> Mentalese). Inner sentences/mentalesian/Millikan: are not determined by rules of inference. Therefore, intentionality is not the same rationality. Intentionality/Millikan: I describe naturalistically, but not in a reductionist way. (MillikanVsReductionism). Intentionality/Millikan: its understanding is quite different from the understanding of consciousness. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Redundancy Theory | Fodor Vs Redundancy Theory | I 138 Reduction/Fodor: since it is asymmetrical, it should turn out that physics is the fundamental science. FodorVsReductionism: so it will turn out that reductionism is too strong a basis for the unified science. Fodor pro token physicalism. I 141 Def Reductionism/Fodor: the assumption that every natural kind is a physical natural kind or coextensive with it. (Every natural kind is a physical natural kind if bridge laws express characteristic identity). I 142 Vs: a) interesting generalizations could be made about events whose physical descriptions have nothing in common. b) often it is irrelevant whether physical descriptions have something in common. c) the individual sciences deal primarily with generalizations of this kind. Reductionism/Fodor: more precarious: he asserts that the coextensions are nomologically necessary. Bridge laws are laws. FodorVs. (Davidson ditto) I 143 FodorVsReductionism: the assumption that every mental event is a physical event does not guarantee that physics can provide a suitable vocabulary for psychological theory. I 147 Psychology/Neuroscience/Fodor: Of course we can provide evidence that neural events, that otherwise form a heterogeneous mass, have a kind of properties in common. Such correspondences can now justify token physicalism as well as type physicalism. FodorVsReductionism: but if this is true, the arguments which infer from token physicalism to reductionism must be wrong. I 154 + Reductionism/Tradition: if x and y differ in the descriptions which make them subject to the actual laws of physics, they must also differ in the descriptions by which they fall under any laws. FodorVs: why would we believe that? Two entities may differ physically and still converge in an infinite number of properties. (> description dependent >Davidson?). Fodor: why should there not be some among these properties whose lawful correlation supports the generalizations of the individual disciplines? |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Redundancy Theory | Hofstadter Vs Redundancy Theory | II 512 Explanation: no explanation of macroscopic reality successfully comes by saying that it is a result of microscopic X-unity (VsReductionism, Emergence). Heisenberg: if atoms are really supposed to explain the origin of color and smell, then they cannot have properties like color and smell. |
Hofstadter I Douglas Hofstadter Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid German Edition: Gödel, Escher, Bach - ein Endloses Geflochtenes Band Stuttgart 2017 Hofstadter II Douglas Hofstadter Metamagical Themas: Questing for the Essence of Mind and Pattern German Edition: Metamagicum München 1994 |
| Redundancy Theory | Kant Vs Redundancy Theory | Metz II 486 KantVsReductionism: The self will never be explored, it can only be thought of in the most abstract concepts of "transcendental apperception". DamasioVsKant: We have a more secure foundation in our body with its skin, its bones, its muscles, the joints, the internal organs, etc. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 |
| Redundancy Theory | McGinn Vs Redundancy Theory | I 89 VsReductionism/McGinn: The concept of a person were not reducible. VsIrreducibility: not informative! VSVS: that's just the joke about the theory of irreducibility. The world is not obliged to appear interestingly. I 119 From not being able to make out a fact does not follow that that fact doesn't exist. Vagueness: it is not as if the meaning meant were objectively undetermined, but that whatever determines it is not part of our knowledge. Vagueness/blurriness/(S): Ex When one takes away the object that one sees blurred, it is not as if the blurriness remains. To mean sth./McGinn: Problem: different levels of description. The levels are clearly in systematic relations with each other, but we are unable to explain this relationship sufficiently. (Similar to consciousness). |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Russell, B. | Read Vs Russell, B. | Read III 31 + VsReductionism: would have to explain the truth of a negative statement like "Ruby didn't kill Kennedy" as the result of the truth of another statement that would be incompatible with "Ruby killed Kennedy". RussellVsVs: objected to such argumentation that recourse is imminent: "B is incompatible with A" is itself a negative statement. To explain its truth, we would need a third statement, C, which would be incompatible with "C is compatible with A", and so on. ReadVsRussell: this is a strange objection, because it would also apply against every conjunction. And then truth conditions for conjunctive and disjunctive statements must not be subjunctive or disjunctive. III 156 VsRussell: his theory cannot be right because it leads to false truth values: it says (wrongly) that any statement about non-existent objects is false. It is, however, an improvement on traditional theory, which says that all such statements are meaningless. |
Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Various Authors | Brandom Vs Various Authors | I 205 The approach advocated here is critical of three views: Vs 1) that the content is construed exclusively in accordance with the model of the representation of facts. 2) that the quality of the inference solely according to the model of formal validity, 3) that rationality is construed only according to the model of reasoning based on means or purposes. I 338 Brandom: VsReductionism, Brandom pro Relativism I 340 Beliefs: make a difference for what we say and do. They can only be understood in a context of social linguistic practice. First-person reflection is the internalization of third-person reflections. (Vs "privileged access"). I 542 BrandomVsFormalism: of course it is not the case, that something would be propositional in content only by virtue of its relation to accuracies in the inferential practice. Formalistic error: equals all accuracies of inference with logical correctness. I 822 VsTradition: so far, a clear distinction could be made between semantics and pragmatics only by largely overlookeding anaphoric phenomena. I 826 BrandomVsTradition: instead of non-perspective facts one must pay attention only to the structural characteristics of score keeping practices. II 13 VsBrandom: characterized as super-rationalist by others. The meaning of it all stems from the role in language use. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Verificationism | Quine Vs Verificationism | NS I 73 Verificationism/QuineVsVerificationism/Two Dogmas/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: (verificationism: the meaning of a sentence is the empirical method of its verification): This leads to reductionism. Reductionism: every synthetic sentence is equivalent to a sentence whose terms refer to the sensory experience. QuineVsReductionism: it isolates the sentences. Instead: Quine pro holism. Verificationism/QuineVsVerificationism/Newen/Schrenk: e.g. if a thermometer is immersed in boiling water and does not show 100 °, we assume (with the holism) that it's broken. Verificationism would have to assume that the sentence was falsified. Solution: the sentence must not be isolated. That again speaks against analyticity as "true solely because of meaning". Quine V 63 QuineVsVerificationism: Problem: for most sentences there are no confirmatory observational data. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reductionism | Versus | Brandom I 338 Brandom: VsReductionism, Brandom per relativism |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Token Physicalism | Pro | Fodor I 137f Fodor per token physicalism - FodorVsReductionism: to strong a restriction for the individual sciences. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Type Identity | Pro | Fodor I 143 Fodor: per type-identity - FodorVsReductionism: (psychology): can not be defended with ontological reasons. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vs Reductionism | Avramides, A. | I 104 AvramidesVsReductionism: Thesis: the semantic is important when it comes to understand the psychological. Therefore, a reduction is not possible. As paradoxical as it seems, I want to show this by allowing the attribution of thoughts to beings without language. |
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| Vs Reductionism | Davidson, D. | Horwich I 452 DavidsonVsReductionism / Rorty: Davidson s physicalism is non-reductive (like that of Dewey and Skinner). Thesis: there are many terms that are used by people who study causality (particle physicists, field linguists) which do not denote causal relations by themselves. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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