Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


[german]  

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 86 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Acquaintance Field
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 490
Acquaintance / Russell / M.Williams: meant a direct grasping, no causal relation. FieldVsRussell: so a conceptual scheme is stapled to the outside of the world.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Acquaintance Peacocke
 
Books on Amazon
I 180ff
Acquaintance / Russell: with sense-data, complexes (aRb), immediate memory, universals - objects are found as a component in thought. PeacockeVsRussell: we reinterpret that: the object specifies the type of the way of givennes - objects appearintensionally in thought, not extensionally. - object as a characteristic of a type of a way of givenness in causal antecedents and consequences of thoughts - descriptive explanation of action / possible world: requires no acquaintance Example (s) of the winner has won the prize - demonstrative: requires acquaintance: ((s) the winner has a beard. ) - acquaintance / Peacocke: something quite different from identification between worlds.

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Acquaintance Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
Hintikka I 79 f
Acquaintance/Knowledge/Russell/Hintikka: 1) you need to be familiar with the reference of "a", "R" and "b" - 2) and also with the logical form to distinguish aRb from bRa - 1) concrete objects - 2) logical form - WittgensteinVsRussell: eliminates the logical forms, which can be expressed by general propositions - we do not need experience in logic - Tractatus: thus the logical forms get great weight. ---
Hintikka I 315f
Language/Acquaintance/Russell/Hintikka: Russell has to show how his (phenomenological) language of acquaintance can be applied to physical objects - Wittgenstein: has to show, in turn, how a physical language can speak about our immediate experiences.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Articles Kamp
 
Books on Amazon
Cresswell I 175
Definite descriptions/Cresswell: so far we have only spoken about undefined descriptions! Undefined descriptions/Russell. Thesis: a man means "at least a man".
Certain descriptions/Russell. Thesis: the man means "this particular man".
Anaphora/HintikkaVsRussell: the tradition has no explanation for the anaphoric use of certain descriptions.
Article/Cresswell: recent attempts to integrate the old linguistic idea into the traditional logic that the indefinite article introduces new objects in the speech while the definite article refers to already introduced entities. This corresponds to:
Article/Kempson: (1975, 111): thesis: definite/indefinite article should be distinguished not semantically but only pragmatically.
Article/old/new/file change semantics/Heim/Cresswell: the distinction between old and new entities in connection with the article is also found in Heim (1983).
---
I 176
There it leads to the file change semantics/Kamp/Heim: Thesis: as entities in the world the objects are not new, but only within the speech, therefore "files". (Files, "new in the files"). Definiton file/Heim/Cresswell: a file represents facts about objects for the speaker.

Kamp I
Kamp
From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy)


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Articles Millikan
 
Books on Amazon
I 176
Unbestimmter Artikel/Millikan: bewirkt, dass ein Name plus Modifikation (Kennzeichnung) rein beschreibend funktioniert. Bsp Henry wurde von einer Giftschlange gebissen, nicht von Giftigkeit oder Schlangenheit. Wahrheitswert/Wahrheit: um einen Wahrheitswert zu haben, muss der Satz eine Situation abbilden, die ein bestimmtes Individuum involviert, d.h. er muss einen real value (>Terminologie) haben.
Pointe. es ist aber nicht wichtig, welche Schlange es genau war, damit der Satz richtig funktioniert ((s) D.h. seine Eigenfunktion ausübt).
I 189
Bestimmter Artikel/Kennzeichnung/Millikan: wenn mit notwendig identifizierenden Kennzeichnungen gebraucht, ist er eigentlich überflüssig. Seine Kraft entfaltet er nur bei anderen Kennzeichnungen. eindeutig/Bestimmtheit/MillikanVsRussell: der bestimmte Artikel hat nicht die Funktion, Eindeutigkeit herzustellen.
Ausnahme: notwendig identifizierende Kennzeichnungen, die rein beschreibend sind. Aber selbst dann ist eine Übersetzung in einen inneren Namen immer möglich.
I 189
Zufällig identifizierend/Kennzeichnung/bestimmter Artikel/Millikan: zufällig identifizierende Kennzeichnungen mit „der“ sind indexikalisch. Und relativ zur Identifizierungsfunktion sind dies auch notwendig identifizierende Kennzeichnungen.


Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Atomism Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
II 218
QuineVsRussell: VsLogical atomism (pro Holism) - connection with observation is more complex. ---
II 107
Atomic facts/Russell: sensory data - QuineVsRussell: are not atomic but composed - acquaintance: with sensory data is certain, everything else is fallible (Russell).

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Atomism Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
Hintikka I 25
Atomism/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Thesis: all logical forms can be constructed from the shapes of objects. ---
Hintikka I 175
Logical Independence/Elementary Proposition/Atomism/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: (1931) Wittgenstein eventually abandons the quest for logical independence of elementary propositions. - It was a real failure. - Reason: color attributes (color predicates) are not independent - E.g. red exists in the degree q1r and red exists in the degree q2r, then it follows: if q2>q1, q1r follows from q2r. - Later Vs: does not work with impure and opaque colors either. ---
I 176
Atomism/Middle Period/Wittgenstein/Waismann/Hintikka: new: atomic sentences are no longer individually compared with the world, but as a sentence systems. - ("Holistic"). - WittgensteinVsAtomism: middle period. - New: I apply the whole color scale at once. - That is the reason why a point cannot have more than one color. -> Measuring - If I apply a set system to reality, then it is thereby said that only one fact can exist at a time. ---
II 138
WittgensteinVsAtomism/WittgensteinVsTractatus: 2 errors: 1) assuming the infinite to be a number and assuming that there would be an infinite number of sentences. - 2) that there are statements that express degrees of qualities - atomism; requires, however, that if p and q are contradictory, they may be further analysed until t and ~t result. ---
II 157
Atomism/Atom Sentence/WittgensteinVsRussell: in the analysis of atomic sentences you do not encounter -"particulars", not unlike in chemical analysis. ---
IV 14
Atomism/Substance/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: if the world had no substance, ((s) = unchangeable objects), the atomic sentences would not be independent of each other. ---
apropos IV 36 ~
Tractatus/Atomism/Wittgenstein/(s): Atoms: undefined objects, quasi material things, (sounds), primitive signs - unclear whether thing (object) or immaterial, only components of the sentence are translated. - Thus, they are open to meaning theory which simultaneously derives from complex of objects, facts as well as connection of words, but (4.0312) the logic of the facts cannot be represented - the logical constants (and, or, not) do not represent. - Representative: sign for the object - internal properties: in the sentence different than the relations to the world (external). WittgensteinVsRussell, VsFrege: confusion mention/Use: internal/external.
---
VII 122
Atomism/Atom Sentence/Truth Value/Truth Functions/Tr. fnc./Laws of Nature/LoN//Tractatus/Te Tens: the truth values of the atom sentences determine the truth of all remaining sentences with logical necessity, also those of the Laws of Nature - but then you should not say that something is only possible impossible or necessary by virtue of natural law or causality. - (6.37) - Laws of Nature are the truth functions of elementary propositions. - Therefore, the world as a whole cannot be explained. ---
VII 124
Laws of Nature: are not the ultimum; that is logical space.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Beliefs Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
II 44
Def Belief/Davidson: a sentence plus interpretation considered to be true Belief/Davidson/McDowell: we cannot get out of our beliefs.
Rorty VI 36
Davidson/Rorty: most of our beliefs must be true. But not congruence subject/object, but: the pattern formed by truth is the same as the pattern formed by the justification that justifies it in our opinion.
Rorty VI 166
Brains in the Vessel/Davidson/Rorty: if they have always been in the tank, they have many beliefs about their actual tank-plus-computer environment, no matter what kind of input they receive.
Rorty VI 187
Davidson/Rorty: Most of our beliefs must be true. Beliefs are not more or less accurate representations, but they are states that are attributed to people for the purpose of explaining their behavior.
Rorty VI 205
Davidson/Sellars: avoiding the confusion of justification and cause leads to the thesis: beliefs can only be justified by beliefs. (McDowellVs).
Dav I 25
Belief/Davidson: not language-dependent - DavidsonVsRussell: the objects used for identification of a belief do not need to belong to the realm of ​​knowledge of the believer.
Dav I 68
Belief/Deception/Error/Davidson: for identification each depends on other beliefs being in the background - the concept of chair or mouse cannot remain the same independent of its occurrence in different beliefs - you can have beliefs about guanacos from books and correctly identify them when you see one - but: despite knowing that G. is not a Lama, he could say "guanaco" at every Lama - in both cases, the content is not determined by the sight of guanacos, but by the fact that you have appropriated other concepts such as "animal" "Lama", "camel", "pet", etc.
Dav II 127
Belief/Error/Deception/Davidson: beliefs have no objects that might correspond to reality (representations), but causes - these are publicly accessible (inter-subjective) objects - ((s) the meanings that play a role in beliefs, are individuated through the public objects - (through causes)).
Frank I 649
Beliefs/Davidson: cannot all be wrong: a speaker who wants to be understood, makes sure to be interpretable - the interpreter has no other material than the sounds the speaker emits in conjunction with other events.
Frank I 680
Beliefs/Davidson: cannot all be wrong, because the use of our words (in relation to the objects) regularly gives them meaning - use theory.
Perler/Wild I 107
Belief/Davidson: most must be correct: reason: the beliefs are identified by their place in the system of beliefs - there must be an endless number of true beliefs regarding this subject area - false beliefs tend to undermine the identification of the subject matter - thus they undermine the validity of the description of a belief as one which deals with its subject matter - thus false beliefs in turn undermine the assertion that a linked belief is wrong.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Beliefs Prior
 
Books on Amazon
Cresswell II 146
Belief/Prior/Cresswell: Thesis: Belief should not be considered a predicate of that-sentence - but instead believes-that should be seen as a syntactic unit that is applied directly to a sentence. - - -
Prior I 6f
Belief/Prior: no adequate approach without distinction between mind state of belief and that which is believed (state/content) - in case of false beliefs: instead of non-existing object: attribution: E.g. Othello attributes infidelity to Desdemona - PriorVsRussell: Problem: above it is abstract loyalty. - In case of falsity, the belief relation would then need to have an additional position (to the true fact).
I 11
False Belief/Russell: false facts fail in truth-making. - Montague: points in the wrong direction. - PriorVs: not for a neutral observer.
I 27
Belief/Prior: no relation - E.g. ...that nothing is perfect: no object.
I 53
Belief Function/Prior: E.g. X believes that ... not identical in identical propositions: bachelor/unmarried man - (although one may feel that the propositions are self-identical).
I 81
Belief/Prior: you do not have to believe rightly that you believe something - (>about) - you can also simultaneously believe p and not-p. - You can believe something contradictory - E.g. fear that God will punish you for your disbelief. - You can find out that you did not believe what was thought you believed - If someone believes what he says when he says that he mistakenly believes that it is raining, then this belief is not necessarily mistaken. - No epistemic logic ist necessary, propositional calculus is sufficient.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Causes Cartwright
 
Books on Amazon
I 74
Cause/Causality/Empiricism/VsCauses - Russell: the law of gravity is given in equations - there are no "causes" and "effects" here. - Equations/Cartwright: are today's generalizations. - They are the heart of science.
I 75
Explanations by equations are often redundant. - I.e. there are alternative equations! - Cause: cannot be redundant. - Equation: causes nothing, but includes phenomena in a frame.
I 79
Alternative equations: offer different laws. - (they compete) - E.g. multiple versions of the Schrödinger equation - CartwrightVsRussell: I prefer causes rather than laws.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

Circularity Russell
 
Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
I XII
Def circle fault principle/Russell/Gödel: no totality can contain elements that can be defined only in terms of this totality or elements which include or imply this totality -" -viscious circle principle, VCP -
I XII
Circle fault principle/GödelVsRussell: the principia themselves do not fulfil the principle in their first edition if "definable" means "definable within the system" and no definition methods outside are known, except for those that include even more extensive totalities than those that occur in the system - Gödel: I would rather see this as proof that the circle fault principle is wrong than that classical mathematics is wrong - because one can argue that the reference to a totality necessarily implies a reference to all of its individual elements or, in other words, that "all" means the same as an infinite logical conjunction -" I XIV "all"/solution/Carnap:"All" alludes to analyticity or necessity or provability -" CFP/Gödel: seems to apply only to entities constructed by ourselves -" otherwise totality is nothing absurd -
I 55f
Circle fault principle/Russell: Propositions: only form multiplicities, no entities - (s) entities are formed by terms, i.e. that you cannot set up a sentence about "all of its elements". (> "Everything he said"/(s): "say" does not form a category like "next to", "similar" "son of"; "nothing" does not either nor does it form an entity, only a multiplicity. but "father of" (unambiguous) (Ru: function, not only relation)> Chisholm)
I 57
Circle/PM/Russell: arises when one allows values as possible arguments of a propositional function ​​that require the function -
I 61
Circle fault principle/circle/entitiy/totality/PM/Russell: there must be no propositions about all propositions - E.g. All propositions are false -" therefore two kinds of truth/falsehood: 1st kind: "j a is true" (special value) - 2nd kind "Every value of jx^ has truth of the 1st kind" -

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Content Field
 
Books on Amazon
I 253
Modality/Possibility//Physics/Field: a prefixed modal operator would change the content of a physical law. - ((s) This goes beyond the purely logical case p > Mp).
I 254
Contents/Content/Field/(s): is not preserved, although arbitrary conflicting conclusions may be believed as well. - Requirement: separation into two components, one of which remains fixed. - E.g. physics/mathematics.
II 107
Belief State/Contents/Deflationism/Truth Conditions/Field: if belief can be described as the state of acceptance of the sentence "snow is white", it can be described: - a) as belief state that snow is white and - b) as a state with the truth conditions that snow is white - Point: the connection of that-sentences with truth conditions is loosened. - (VsFrege, VsRussell).

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Content Strawson
 
Books on Amazon
III 434
StrawsonVsRussell: confused what the sentence says, with the utterance conditions

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

de re Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
I 18
Belief de re/Russell: we can only have an opinion if we know about which object it is - (acquaintance) - DavidsonVsRussell: problem with propositional attitudes - e.g. cornbread - I 19 Quine early: belief de re: island of clarity.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Demonstratives Tugendhat
 
Books on Amazon
Wolf II 21
logical proper names / "this" / TugendhatVsRussell: is not assigned to an object, but changing objects in changing situations

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992


K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Denotation Russell
 
Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
Hintikka I 165
On Denoting/Russell/Hintikka: (Russell 1905) Problem: mit Phrasen, die für echte Konstituenten von Propositionen stehen. Problem/Frege: Fehlschlagen der Substitutivität der Identität (SI) in intensionalen Kontexten.
informative Identität/Frege: dass Identität manchmal überhaupt informativ sein kann hängt damit zusammen.
EG/existentielle Generalisierung/Russell: auch sie kann fehlschlagen in intensionalen Kontexten, (Problem der leeren Termini).
HintikkaVsRussell: er erkennt nicht die Tiefe des Problems und umgeht eher die Probleme mit denotierenden Termen.
Der gegenwärtige König/Russell: Problem: wir können nicht durch existentielle Generalisierung beweisen, dass es einen gegenwärtigen König von Frankreich gibt.
HintikkaVsRussell: es gibt aber noch andere Probleme. (s.u. wegen Uneindeutigkeit der Querwelteinidentifikation).
Hintikka I 173
Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: Pointe: ein geniales Merkmal von Russells Theorie der Denotation von 1905 ist, dass es die Quantoren sind, die denotieren! Theorie der Kennzeichnungen/Russell: (Ende von „On Denoting“) These: enthält die Reduktion von Kennzeichnungen auf Objekte der Bekanntschaft.
I 174
Hintikka: dieser Zusammenhang ist erstaunlich, Es scheint auch zirkulär zu sein, nur Objekte der Bekanntschaft zuzulassen. Lösung: wir müssen sehen, was erfolgreich denotierende Ausdrücke (phrases) tatsächlich denotieren: sie denotieren eben Objekte der Bekanntschaft.
Uneindeutigkeit/Eindeutigkeit/Hintikka: es ist eben Uneindeutigkeit, die zum Fehlschlagen der EG führt.
Bsp Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: dass nur Objekte der Bekanntschaft zugelassen sind, zeigt sein eigenes Beispiel: „der Autor von Waverley“ in (1) ist tatsächlich ein primäres Vorkommnis d.h. sein Beispiel (2) .
„ob“/Russell/Hintikka: einziger Unterschied: wollte wissen, ob“ statt „wusste nicht“.
Sekundäre Kennzeichnung/Russell: kann man auch so ausdrücken: dass George von dem Mann, der tatsächlich Waverley schrieb wissen wollte, ob er Scott sei.
I 175
Das wäre der Fall, wenn Georg IV Scott gesehen hätte (in der Distanz) und gefragt hätte „Ist das Scott?“. HintikkaVsRussell: warum wählt Russell ein Beispiel mit einem wahrnehmungsmäßig bekannten Individuum? Haben wir nicht normalerweise mit Individuen aus Fleisch und Blut zu tun, deren Identität uns bekannt ist, statt nur mit Wahrnehmungsobjekten?
Wissen wer/Wissen was/Wahrnehmungsobjekt/Russell/Hintikka: gerade bei Wahrnehmungsobjekten scheint es, als sei die Art von Eindeutigkeit, die wir für ein Wissen-wer brauchen, gerade nicht gegeben ist.

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996


Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Denotation Hintikka
 
Books on Amazon
Hintikka I 173
Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: N.B.: a brilliant feature of Russell's theory of the denotation of 1905 is that it is the quantifiers which denote! Theory of denotation/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") Thesis: the theory of denotation contains the reduction of denotation on objects of acquaintance.
---
I 174
Hintikka: this connection is amazing. It also appears to be circular, only to admit objects of acquaintance. Solution: we must see what successfully denotating phrases actually denote: they denote objects of acquaintance.
Unambiguity/uniqueness/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization.
E.g. Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: that only objects of acquaintance are permitted, shows its own example: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is indeed a primary event, that is, his example (2).
"Whether"/"if"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: Russell and Hintikka wanted to know if "instead of" "did not know".
Secondary Denotation/Russell: one can also say that George wanted to know from the man who actually wrote Waverley if he was Scott.
---
I 175
That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (at a distance) and asked "Is that Scott?". HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell choose an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not normally deal with individuals of flesh and blood, whose identity is known to us, rather than merely with perceptual objects?
Knowledge who/what/perception object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely in the case of perception objects, it seems as if the kind of uniqueness that we need for a to-know-who does not exist.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Description Field
 
Books on Amazon
II 18
Description / acquaintance / Russell / Field: according to Russell: "analytical connection" - problem / FieldVsRussell: circular, because the reference of descriptions is explained by reference to their parts - they will include names. RussellVsTradition: you can only give a lecture on something that can be defined from the logically basic concepts - e.g. "if Cicero existed, then he denounced Catiline" - FieldVsRussell: that makes contingent biographical characteristics become necessary properties.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Description McDowell
 
Books on Amazon
I 132
Theory of Descriptions/SearleVsRussell/McDowell: here it is easy to be on the side of Searle (i.e., to assume intentionality). ---
I 132/33
McDowellVsSearle: it is better to give up Searle's desire and clarify what the non-obvious descriptions are. (With Evans): the conceptual area should not be regarded as a "predicative", but as "belonging to the area of Fregean sense".
---
I 210
McDowell Thesis: Fregean sense is effective in the area of reasons. Because rationality is a condition in the community, we do not distinguish between different senses. But in order to attribute rationality to a subject, we must distinguish between senses (rational and irrational).
VsMcDowell: but then we need some theory of descriptions.
Theory of Descriptions/Russell/McDowell: Indirect relation to the world.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Description Prior
 
Books on Amazon
I 124
Theory of Descriptions/unicorn/Russell/Prior: a) "the so-and-so ft" - b) "X thinks that the so-and-so ft" - in a) and b) the marking has the same meaning whether the object exists or does not exist - in b) the sentence even has the same truth value. ---
I 148
Theory of Descriptions/Russell: singular names: "The only thing that ft" - Geach: this analysis has two parts: a) explicitly predicative use: "x is the only thing that ft" - b) use as apparent subject: can be explained as an explication of an implicit predicative use: "the only thing that ft, yt." - a) as "something that .." b) "If something ..." - Prior: solution for non-existing - Problem: different scope: a) as part of a complex predicate: "Something is both the only-thing- that-ft and not yt ". b) as part of a complex sentence: "It is not the case that .." - markings: useful: "the f-re does not exist" not with logically proper name "this". ---
I 152
Champagne-Example/PriorVsRussell: has overlooked that markings can be used differently : "the man over there," does not speak of something that it is "man" or that it is "over there" - if it is true that he is clever, then even if it is a disguised woman - attribution does not require proper identification - it is only required that it is "the only ...".

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Description Russell
 
Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
Cresswell I 117
Descriptions/Russell: are never names - Other authors VsRussell: Descriptions are names, but not of normal objects but of intensional objects (various objects in different worlds). - CresswellVs intentional objects. ---
Geach I 61
Description/Russell is never a name: E.g. The Duke of Cambridge is also a pub, but the Duke does not sell beer. ---
Newen/Schrenk I 90
Theory of Descriptions/Russell: E.g. 1. There is at least one author of "Waverley" (existence assertion) - 2. There is at most one author of "Waverley" (uniqueness assertion) - 3. Whoever wrote "Waverley", was a Scot (statement content) - E.g. The current King of France/empty names: At least one king of France is bald - 2. At most one - 3. whoever ... is bald - E.g. identity: at least one denounced Catiline - 2. At most one ... - 1* at least one wrote "De Oratore" - 2* at most one ... - 3. Whoever denounced Catiline, wrote ... - E.g. negative existence sentences "It is not the case that 1. At least one .. - 2. At most one ... - RussellVsFrege: thus one avoids to accept Fregean sense as an abstract entity.
Truth-value gaps/RussellVsFrege: they too are thus avoided.
---
I 92
N.B.: sentences that seemed to be about a subject, are now about general propositions about the world. ---
Russell I VIII
E.g. Waverley - all true sentences have the same meaning - e.g. "Author of Waverley." Is no description of Scott - Description (labeling) is not the same as assertion - this does not refer to an object. - StrawsonVs - A sentence with "Waverley" says nothing about Scott, because it does not contain Scott. ---
I 46
Labelling/Russell: always in the singular E.g. "father of" but not "son of" (not clear - always presuppoes quotes without "the": "jx": "x is φ" - instead of (ix)(jx) in short "R'y": the R of y, "the father of y" - characterizing function, not propositional function all mathematical functions are distinctive features ---
I 96
Labelling/Principia Mathematica/Russell: "The author of Waverley" means nothing - we cannot define (ix)(jx) only its use - (> Definition).
---
III 122
Labelling/Russell/Flor: are not names - reason: otherwise it would result in a mere triviality: "a = a" or something wrong. E.g. "The Snow man does not exist" is something different than to say, "Paul does not exist" - Descriptions: incomplete symbols - ((s) If description were names, they could not fail.)

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Description Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
I 43 f
"Topic-neutral" (Austin): is not nomological - SearleVs "topic-neutral" e.g. digestive does not need an additional state which must be described separately. - - -
II 317
Description/Frege: delivers the sense, but not the definition (otherwise Aristotle is analytically Alexander's teacher). ---
II 319
Description/SearleVsKripke: some labels are rigid: when they include the identity condition for the object - e.g. "the object that I perceive" - also: every description can be made rigid by taking the actual world as an index - then "the inventor of bifocal glasses" is clear. ---
V 146
Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Searle: every sentence with reference can be replaced by an existence theorem - Searle: this is the true discovery of the theory of description. ---
V 236ff
Theory of description/Russell: Sentence with description: hidden existence assertion - SearleVsRussell: propositional act (expression of the proposition, certain reference) can never be identical with the illocutionary act of assertion (pA is part of iA) - (s) reference is not existence assertion. ---
V 240
Searle: from the fact that a speech can be carried out only under certain circumstances (conditions) does not follow that the mere execution already claims that the conditions are satisfied - e.g. "bring this to the King of France" is not a claim and contains none.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Description Theory Russell
 
Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
Hintikka I 165
Kennzeichnungen/Russell/Hintikka: Def Primäre Kennzeichnung: für sie gilt die Substitutivität der Identität (SI)
Def Sekundäre Kennzeichnung: für sie schlägt die Substitutivität der Identität (SI) fehl.
I 166
Bsp Russell: zwei Lesarten: (1) George IV wusste nicht, ob Scott der Autor von Waverley war.
Kennzeichnung/logische Form/Russell/Hintikka: „der Autor von Waverley“: (ix)A(x)
primär: hat die Kennzeichnung folgende Kraft:
(2) (Ex)[A(x) & (y) A(y) > y = x) & ~ George IV wusste, dass (Scott = x)].
((s) Schreibweise : Quantor hier immer normaler Existenzquantor, gespiegeltes E).
D.h. der Quantor hat in der primären Kennzeichnung maximale Reichweite (RW).
Wahrscheinlicher ist aber die zweite Lesart:
sekundär:
(3) ~George IV wusste, dass (Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x & (Scott = x)].
((s) enge Reichweite)
Reichweite/HintikkaVsRussell: dieser wusste nicht, dass es für die Reichweite eines Quantors auch eine dritte Möglichkeit gibt ((s) „mittlere Reichweite“ > Kripke, > Wolf).
(4) ~(Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x ) & George IV wusste, dass (Scott = x)].


R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996


Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Domains Kripke
 
Books on Amazon
EMD II 372
Domain/Range/Russell/Kripke: "iff" extensional: Moves domain inside - de dicto: always the smallest range: E.g. Jones believes there is ... - dramatic difference to referential quantification: is referential quantification always the largest domain? E.g. there is something that Jones believes. ---
Wolf II 216f
Domain/KripkeVsRussell: he wanted to explain the difference de re/de dicto by domains: smallest domain: de dicto - largest domain: de re - KripkeVs: there are three areas: narrowest MN(Ex) (There are exactly x planets and x is even), (de dicto) - largest: (E.g.) (There are exactly x planets and MN(x is even)), (de re) - medium domain: M(Ex) (there are exactly x planets and N(x is even)). ((s) it is possible that there are 8 planets and it is necessary that 8 is even (correct)) - ((s) short range: both operators at front - widest: both in the rear - medium: distributed operators - medium ranges are possible, when operators are repeated). ---
Wolf II 217
Domain/Russell/Kripke: E.g. largest domain/de re: "there is a high official, so that Hoover believes that the Barrigans want to kidnap him" - the smallest domain/de-dicto "Hoover believes that the Barrigans ..." - medium domain "Hoover believes that there is a high official, so ...". ---
Wolf II 217 ~
Domain/Kripke: not suitable for illustrating the difference de re/de dicto because of the third domain.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984


EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Element Relation Lesniewski
 
Books on Amazon
Prior I 163
Epsilon/Klassen/Individuum/LesniewskiVsRussell/Prior: "ε" Konstante für Relation zwischen Klassen - Bsp "a ε b": "Das a ist b" oder "Es gibt genau ein a und jedes a ist b" - Bei Russell gibt es natürlich solche Formen, aber die Form "x ε a" hat nicht diese Bedeutung! - L: "a = b" : "Das a ist das b" das entspricht nicht der Def Klassenidentität/Russell: "die a"s koinzidieren mit den b"s". - Aber die Identität bei Lesniewski ist auch nicht ganz dasselbe wie die individuelle Identität bei Russell -
Prior I 165ff
Epsilon/Lesniewski/Prior: auch höherstufiges: "f ε g": z.B. "die Einheitsklasse-von-Klassen-von f ist in der Klasse-von-Klassen g enthalten".


Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Elimination Hintikka
 
Books on Amazon
Hintikka I 180
Elimination/Eliminability/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in order to eliminate seemingly denotative descriptions, one must assume that the quantifiers and bound variables go over individuals that are identified descriptively. ((s) object of the > description). Otherwise the real Bismarck would not be an admissible value of the variables with which we express that there is an individual of a certain kind.
Problem: then these quantifiers must not be constituents of the propositions, for their domains of values consists not merely of objects of acquaintance. So Russell's mistake was a twofold one.
1.
Quantor/Variable/Russell/Hintikka: in 1905 he had already stopped thinking that quantifiers and bound variables are real constituents of propositions. Definition apparent variable/Russell/Hintikka: an apparant variable is a bound variable.
2.
Aquaintance/Russell: Values of the variables should only be objects of the acquaintance. (HintikkaVsRussell).

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Existence Strawson
 
Books on Amazon
Meg I 312
Existence / Strawson / Hungerland: existence does not follow from speech, it is presupposed in the speech. - If there is no reference, a statement is neither true nor false.
Strawson VII 96 ~
Existence / Russell / Strawson: only if a sentence really has subject-predicate form, the existence is guaranteed - therefore only logical proper names such as "the" are real names: existence is guaranteed by acquaintance.
VII 102
StrawsonVsRussell: only complete sentences can be true / false - pointless to say "the present King" was needed "as the expression" to make a false statement - A sentence always remains the same - statement and assertion: change over time.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Existence Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
Chisholm II 181
Existence/Wittgenstein/Simons: we cannot claim of an atom that it exists - atomism/SimonsVsWittgenstein: linguistic analysis cannot show that there are atoms. ---
Hintikka I 71
Name/existence/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: a name cannot occur in the connection "X exists" - if red did not exist, one could not speak of it - subject/existence/general: one cannot say "There are objects" like one can say "There are books "- unity: it is nonsense to talk of the "total number of objects". ---
I 73
Existence/necessary/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: since "possible existence" makes no sense, we need to regard every existing thing as necessary existent. - But this is only transcendental - of course the objects do not really exist necessarily - or the necessity is not expressible. - It follows that one must also interpret the possible facts constructed of the same objects. ---
I 92f
Existence/name/object/description/Russell/Hintikka: pointless: to say "this exists" - also with everything that is designated - against: useful for descriptions. Acquaintance: also provides the reference - so that even complex logical forms are objects of acquaintance - WittgensteinVsRussell: instead actual objects (and their connections).

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Existence Statements Strawson
 
Books on Amazon
VII 112
Existence theorem / StrawsonVsRussell: he blurs the distinction between pure existence sentences and phrases that contain an expression to point to an object or to refer to it - "Inquiry into Meaning and Truth": logically catastrophic theory of names (logical proper names) - depraves the descriptions of the status of logical subjects, but offers no substitute.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Existential Quantification Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
II 37
Name/function/Wittgenstein: (Ex) .fx. - The values of (Ex) are proper names. ---
II 234
Existential quantification/Variable/Domain/Value/Russell/Wittgenstein: (Ex).fx: Russell regards the "x" in brackets so, as if it were a thing - e.g. "I met a thing which is a man" - WittgensteinVsRussell: the "x" stands for men, not for things - (see above I 201 not "this is soz" but "this color is soz").

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Facts Logic Texts
 
Books on Amazon
Re III 26
Russell: Tatsache von der Aussage verschieden. Es gibt falsche Aussagen, aber keine »falschen Tatsachen«. VsRussell: Aber die Kosten dieser Erklärung bestehen darin, dass sie die Unterscheidung von Sprache und Welt untergräbt! Re III 26 Wittgenstein: viel insubstanziellere Auffassung von der Aussage. Tatsachen sind Tatsachen, die sich auf Gegenstände beziehen. Also ist für die Wirklichkeit charakteristisch, was es für Tatsachen gibt. Die Gegenstände müssen allen Möglichkeiten gemeinsam sein. - Zeichen: willkürlich und konventionell.
Re III 242
Tatsachen: Was Aussagen über diese Dinge war oder falsch macht, sind nicht die Dinge selbst, sondern die Tatsachen. Wahrmachen: Es ist nicht der Bär, welcher »der Bär ist schwarz« wahr macht, sondern die Tatsache, dass der Bär schwarz ist.
Re III 242
Es könnte Tarskis Theorie ohne ontologische Bindung an Tatsachen geben.
Logic Texts
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001
Generality Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
II 62
General/Universality/Wittgenstein: cannot be isolated. - It can be understood only by seeing how it is used. - If you interpret a general term, you’re doing the same thing as if you interpret an isolated case. ---
Hintikka I 152
Universality/General/General sentence/WittgensteinVsRussell: his writing presupposes that there are names for each general proposition. - Which could be called an answer to the question "what" (instead of "what kind?"). - That functions of E.g. "Which people live on the island" - but not for E.g. "Which circle is square".

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Idealism McDowell
 
Books on Amazon
I 209
Idealism/VsMcDowell/McDowell: his opponents could speak of a "danger of idealism": idealistic basic mood of the "elimination of the outer boundary". This eludes us a possibility which we should not renounce: the possibility of direct contact between the spiritual and the objects.
We became aware of this possibility in the criticism VsRussell, theory of descriptions.
If one accepts the world as all that is the case, then the world is subordinated to the realm of Fregean sense ("kingdom of the conceivable").
Then there are not episodes and acts of thought but identity. Facts in this sense are thoughts; The conceivable, which is the case.
---
I 209
McDowellVs: However, objects do not belong to the sphere of the conceivable (Fregean sense) but to the realm of the object reference (Fregean meaning).

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Identity Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
I 208ff
Identity/Davidson/Quine: we are unable to pick out the relationship that is constitutive for the knowledge of the identity of an object. The reason is that every property can be considered as relevant. If the mind can only think if it establishes a clear relationship to the object, then thought is impossible. (QuineVsRussell). Identity: does not work without conceptual scheme.
Identity: QuineVsHume, QuineVsLeibniz: Confusion of word and object: there is no relation between different objects but relationship between singular terms - a = b different names.
---
I 211
Copula forms indefinite singular term: no longer Fa but a = b = E.g. Agnes = a lamb - but: Agnes bleats: Fa. ---
I 211
Synonymy and analyticity is graded, identity is absolute. ---
I 365
Identity conditions strong/weak/(s):> E.g. Paul and Elmar. ---
II 23
Identity/absolutely distinguishable: open sentence only fulfilled by an object. - Relatively distinguishable: only fulfilled in the given order. - Identity: Objects that are not relatively distinguishable, not all objects that are not absolutely distinguishable. ---
I 397
Theseus ship: it is not about the term "the same" but the term "ship" - each general term has its own individuation principle. ---
II 156ff
Individuation: in our world moment-to-moment individuation by predicates - for objects at random (everything can be the object), for predicates crucial truth value. - Identification between possible worlds: is dependent on predicates - for body also from space displacement, composition, etc., therefore not cross-worlds- "The same object" is meaningless -> single Term, instead predicate. ---
Geach I 238
Identity/GeachVsQuine: Thesis: identity is relative - if someone says x is identical to y, this is an incomplete expression - it is an abbreviation for "x is the same A as y" - (weird that Frege has not supported this) - Identity/tradition/Geach: can be expressed by a single scheme: (1) l- Fa (x) (Fx ux = a) - in everyday language: whatever is always true of something that is identical to an object y, is true of a and vice versa - from which we derive the law of self-identity from: l- a = a if we take Fx for x unequal to a then scheme (1) provides us with: (2) l- (a unequal a) Vx (x unequal a u x = a) - the results in l a = a. ---
Geach I 240
But Geach pro relative identity. ---
Quine V 86
I/Quine: initially only means for extending the time pointing - then itself relative mass term: E.g. "the same dog as" - used for individuation of absolute general term E.g. "dog" - Geach: this is a reduction to a relative term - Quine. : that does not work when objects overlap. ---
V 89
Identity/Geach: only with respect to general terms, the same thing. ---
V 161
Identity: restricted: in terms of general term: "the same apple" - unrestricted: Learning: 1. anyone who agrees with the sentences [a = b] and [a is a g] also agrees to [b a g] ((s) transitivity) - 2. disposition, to agree on [a = b] , if it is recognized that one can agree [b is a g] due to [a is a g] for any g. - Relative identity: also these I. is relative, because the identity scale depends on words - [a = b] can get wrong when adding new terms. ---
I 162
Definition identity/Set Theory/Quine: x = y as the statement y is element of every class, from which x is element - characterization of the identity by using all relative clauses. ---
V 162
Definition identity/Set Theory/Quine: with quantification over classes is x = y defined as the statement y is a member of each class, from which x is element. - Language learning: here initially still substitutional quantification - then no class, but exhaustion of relative clauses. ---
VII 65 ~
Identity/Quine: important: the demand for processes or temporally extended objects - by assuming identity rather than flow kinship, one speaks of the flow instead of stages. ---
IX 24
Definition identity/Quine: we can now simplify: for y = z - y = z stands for x (x e y x e z) - because we have identified the individuals with their classes. ---
X 90
Definiton identity/Quine: then we define "x = y" as an abbreviation for:. Ax ↔ Ay (z) (bzx ↔ bzy. Bxz ↔ Byz .Czx ↔ Czy .Cxz ↔ Cyz (z') (Dzz'x ↔.... .. Dzz'y .Dzxz'↔ Dzyz' Dxzz '↔ Dyzz')) - i.e. that the objects u x. y are not distinguishable by the four predicates, not even in terms of the relation to other objects z and z'. ---
X 99
Identity/Quine: only defined (in our appearance theory of set theory) between variables, not defined between abstraction expressions or their schema letters. ---
XII 71
Relative identity/Quine: results from ontological relativity, because no entity without identity - only explicable in the frame theory. - E.g. distinguishability of income classes.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Identity Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
Hintikka I 22
Definition sense of the sentence/Tractatus: (4.2:) its agreement and disagreement with the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of facts. Hintikka: it follows that the identity of the meaning of two expressions cannot be said linguistically. (6.2322)
---
I 140 Note
Hintikka: ... for Wittgenstein this is about the dispensability of the identity concept. He could also have said that this term already exists in the other elementary propositions. ---
I 364
Experience/perception/identity/Wittgenstein: the comparison between experiences in terms of their >identity does not belong to the primary but to the secondary language games. In a certain secondary language game, the relationship can partially be influenced by the possible documentary evidence.
---
II 338
Identity/Relation/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell notation triggers confusion, because it gives the impression that the identity is a relationship between two things. We have to differentiate this use of the equal sign from its use in arithmetics, where we may think of it as part of a replacement rule. WittgensteinVsRussell: its spelling gives erroneously the impression that there is a sentence like x = y or x = x. One can remove the identity sign.
---
II 338/339
Identity/logical form/sentence/Wittgenstein: in my writing neither (Ex, y) x = y, nor (Ex) x = x is a set. If there is a thing, then why to express this by a statement about a thing?
What tempts us to believe it is a fundamental truth that a thing is identical with itself? Thus, I did not yet met the sentence of identity.
---
II 416
WittgensteinVsRussell: he was just trying to get next to the list another "entity", so he provided a function that uses the identity to define this entity. ---
II 418
Identity/substitution/equal sign/Wittgenstein: E.g. "a = a": here the equal sign has a special meaning - because one would not say that a can be replaced by a. - Equal sign: its use is limited to cases in which a bound variable exists. ---
IV 103
Identity/meaning/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 the essence of the equation is not that the sides have different sense but the same meaning. - But that this can be already seen at the two sides. ---
VI 179
Identity/Wittgenstein/Schulte: in overlapping silhouettes the question is meaningless, which is A or B after the separation. ---
VI 183
Pain/identity/criteria/Wittgenstein/Schulte: which criterion for identity? Well, simply, the one who is sitting there, or any description. But for my pain? No criterion!

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Idiolect Cresswell
 
Books on Amazon
II 151
Def "extreme Fregeanism" / KripkeVsFrege / KripkeVsRussell / Cresswell (he ascribes this setting to both of them): thesis that names in general belong to idiolects - problem: then the Pierre-Example is not about Pierre, but the reporter of the case, and his idiolect! -

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Infinity Axiom Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
VII 93
Axiom of infinity/QuineVsRussell: Principia Mathematica must be supplemented by the axiom of infinity when certain mathematical principles are to be derived. - Axiom of infinity: ensures the existence of a class with an infinite number of elements - New Foundations/Quine: instead comes with the universal class of ϑ or x^ (x = x).

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Intensions Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
II 343
Intension/classes/quantities/Frege/Russell/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege: both believed they could deal with the classes intensionally because they thought they could turn a list into a property, a function. ---
II 416
Intension/extension/Mathematics/Wittgenstein: in everyday language intension and extension are not interchangeable - E.g. I hate the man in the chair - I hate Mr. Schmitz - on the other hand in mathematics: here, there is no difference between "the roots of the equation x² + 2x + 1 = 0 and "2"- in contrast difference: counting bodies ((s) extension, also writing down) is something different than to determine them with a law ((s) intension) - Wittgenstein: law and extension are completely different - ((s) Physics). ---
III 136-139
Elementary PropositionVsIntension - (protection of formal logic) - intension/meaning/Tractatus/Flor: irrelevant - it is always about extension.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Is Ryle
 
Books on Amazon
Grasses I 30
"Is"/RyleVsAristoteles: "systematically misleading locutions", "is" should suggest the appearance of a thing/property relationship. ---
I 31
Error: the universal "human" is itself not a thing that breathes. Rather, it is to be interpreted as a class subordination - "if existence is a term of 2nd order, God cannot be a subject term" - rather predicate term like 'infinite beings' - RyleVsRussell: E.g. Pegasus: Problem not in the subject term, but in the predicate term.

Ry I
G. Ryle
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969

Knowledge Russell
 
Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
Frank I 654 ~
Proposition / knowledge / Russell: one can know propositions, even if one is not familiar with all components - - - -
Russell IV 116
Knowledge / Wrong Knowledge / Russell: E.g. Someone thinks that the name of the Prime Minister starts with B (Bannerman is correct) - but he thinks Balfour was Prime Minister - no true knowledge. - - -
Hintikka 167
Wissen/wer/was/wo/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell kann nicht explizit Konstruktionen der Form weiß + W-Satz analysieren. Allgemein: (10) a weiß, wer (z.B. x) ist so, dass A(x)
wird zu
(11) (Ex) a weiß, dass A(x).
Hintikka: das geht aber nur, wenn wir Russells Ansatz modifizieren:
Problem: die existenzielle Generalisierung bricht jetzt zusammen auf eine Weise, die nicht auf die Nichtexistenz zurückgeführt werden kann, und die nicht mit Russells Theorie der Kennzeichnungen (ThdK) analysiert werden kann.
Problem: für jede Person gibt es eine Menge Leute, deren Namen sie kennt und von deren Existenz sie weiß, aber von der sie nicht weiß, wer sie sind. ((s) Prominente, Leute, von denen man gehört hat, Hörensagen) nicht Bekanntschaft, sondern durch Beschreibung.
I 168
Bsp Charles Dodgson war für Queen Victoria jemand, von dem sie gehört hatte, den sie aber nicht kannte. Problem: wenn wir annehmen, dass (11) die richtige Analyse von (10) ist, gilt
(12) ~(Ex) Victoria wusste, dass Dodgson = x)
Aber das ist trivial falsch, auch nach Russell.
Denn folgendes ist sicher wahr:
(13) Victoria wusste, dass Dodgson = Dodgson)
existentielle Generalisierung/EG: ergibt dann
(14) (Ex) Victoria wusste, dass Dodgson = x)
Also genau die Negation von (12) Widerspruch.
Kennzeichnungen/Hintikka: sind hier gar nicht involviert. Daher kann Russells Theorie der Kennzeichnungen hier auch nicht helfen.
I 170
Existentielle Generalisierung/EG/Uneindeutigkeit/Eindeutigkeit/Russell/Hintikka. Welche Wege hätten Russell offen gestanden? Wissen-wer/Russell/Hintikka: Russell selbst spricht sehr oft von der Äquivalenz des Wissens, wer etwas tat, mit der Existenz eines Individuums, von dem bekannt ist, dass es das tat.

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Logical Constants Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
II 79
Sheffer stroke/notation/Wittgenstein: makes the internal relation visible. - WittgensteinVsRussell: his writing style does not make clear that p v q follows from p.q. ---
VI 95/96
Logical constants/elementary proposition/WittgensteinVsTractatus/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/Schulte: new: priority of a sentence-system compared to single sentences - formerly VsLogical constants - (do not connect any objects, this is still true for Wittgenstein) - but wrong: that the rules have anything to do with the internal structure of sentences. - New: they form part of a broader syntax.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Logical Proper Names Strawson
 
Books on Amazon
VII 111
Logical proper names / StrawsonVsRussell: "This" is no log pr. name: one must know what the phrase means in order to respond to it
Tugendhat I 387/388
Logical proper names / StrawsonVsRussell: log.pr.n. are merely fictional, no ambiguous name but a deictic expression, it has a uniform meaning and shall refer to different objects (according to the use in different situations) - TugendhatVsRussell: overlooks the fact that the same objects may also be referred to by other terms - TugendhatVsStrawson: overlooked the fact that he himself presupposed Russell’s theory.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981


Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Logical Proper Names Tugendhat
 
Books on Amazon
I 381
This/logical proper names/TugendhatVsRussell: "this" (which of all) will not help us in the specification of objects. It serves no function and could therefore stay away. - Specification/Tugendhat: no relation! - It takes place against the background of all objects. - This works with singular terms, but not with logical proper names.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Meaning Geach
 
Books on Amazon
I 28f
Frege: sense/meaning - GeachVsRussell: false equivalence with "means"/"denotes" (refers to) in Principia Mathematica - seeming parallel: a description contains "meaning" (Sinn) as a component, but not on this sense but about the objects. The description denotes. Signifiying expression/Russell: general term with a prefix, all, some, etc.
Meaning/Principia Mathematica: two phrases mean the same thing when they maintain the same assumption - Signify/Frege: two sentences mean the same when they have both the same truth value.
Incomplete symbol/Russell/late: certain descriptions have no meaning.
GeachVs: this is misleading – rather: we do not need a single entity that corresponds to a specific description – E. g "There is a King…".

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Meaning Russell
 
Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
I Tugendhat 348
meaning/object / Russell: meaning of an expression = object.
I Tugendhat 384
Meaning/Russell makes no distinction between meaning and object (-> Quine: "entity") - Russell: object literally in the sentence- StrawsonVsRussell: then an empty singular term has no significance.

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Mentioning Russell
 
Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
V 38
QuineVsRussell: confusion rampant in Principia Mathematica between use and mention of linguistic expressions: you do not know whether you are talking about the sign or its meaning.
VI 84
Incident/Mention/Use/Russell: "Scott has written Waverley": here, the name "Scott" does not appear in what I say. - What I say is about the person, not the name. - Constituent element of a sentence: E.g. "the unicorn does not exist": "the unicorn" is not a constituent part (part of the reality, unicorn is not a part of a fact).

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Mentioning Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
V 116F
SearleVsRussell: his distinction between mention and use is too strict.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Negation Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
Hintikka I 150
Negation/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the negation is the same picture - the sense of which is, however, reversed - (polarized) - so that the sentence negation is eliminated. ---
I 150
Negation/Frege/Russell/Hintikka: negations of the predicate eliminate them and instead add the sentence negation - ((s) inner/outer negation equated?) ---
II 51
Negation/Wittgenstein: its meaning can only be expressed through rules of use. ---
II 51
Denial/negation/Wittgenstein: there must be an agreement: E.g. the red light is on its own not the instruction to stop. It must be explained with the help of language. The meaning of "no" can only be expressed in rules that apply to its manner of use.
---
II 72
Negation/explanation/Russell: explained ~ p by saying that ~ p is true when p is false, and vice versa. ---
II 73
Negation/WittgensteinVsRussell: but that is no explanation of negation, because it could also apply to other than the negative sentences. (> Truth table/> truth panel). ---
II 74
Negation/fact/Wittgenstein: what corresponds to the sentence "the door is not open" if it is open? But here a mistaken analogy comes into play, because it is nothing that corresponds to p. And that, what corresponds to ~ p , is not being the case of p. ---
II 75
Denial/negation/understanding/Wittgenstein: the understanding of "no" is like understanding a chess move. ---
II 113
Fact/negation/Wittgenstein: there are no positive or negative facts. "Positive" and "negative" refer to the form of the sentences and not to the facts. ---
II 114
A negative statement has not meaning in the same way as a positive statement; it cannot be described by positive terms and maintain its negative meaning. ---
II 221
Internal negation/Wittgenstein: the statement "this table is green" does not form part of the statement "this table is not green"? - ((s) claim, not sentence) - Wittgenstein: we rather draw a picture. ---
II 234
Generality/general things/general/negation/Wittgenstein: the grammars of the generality and the negation are ambiguous in incredible ways. E.g. "This square is white" I could translate it as: "all the points of this square are white". Then we cannot say: "a point is not white" without introducing new conventions.
Negation/"all"/Wittgenstein: both have different grammars. One has raised the question whether the negation of sentences implies the same as a disjunction of sentences. In certain cases, it is actually so:
E.g. disjunction: "this is one of the primary colors, but not red", which means: "this is white or yellow or green or blue or black." However, there is no disjunction which corresponds to "Schmitz is not in this room".
Double Negation/Wittgenstein: is frequently used in the sense of a simple negation.
E.g. "I like it and I do not like it".
---
II 239
Who says we do not mean them in that sense, is saying that there are different types of double negation. Some say: "the application will be different." But how can one speak of a system of signs, without talking of the application.
E.g. I can lay my hands together so that they are covering each other. But one can ask: How would you like to explain "cover" with or without reference to something that is brought to cover?
---
II 276
Double negation/Wittgenstein: double negation equals affirmation: it is not a determination about our habits, because then it would be a statement of natural history and not even a true one. It may be that the double negation means the negation in a symbol system. ---
II 282
Negation/disjunction/Repertoire/Wittgenstein: if one has a distinct repertoire one can equate negation "not-p" with a disjunction e.g. "q v r v s" - that does not work, with e.g. "not this red here". - Delimited repertoire: E.g. permutations. Philosophy/Wittgenstein: the words "true" and "false" are two words, of which the philosophy was so far dependent.
The philosophy is always based on questions without sense. We can completely abolish true and false. Instead, "sentence" and "negation". ((s)> referential quantification > semantic ascent).
---
II 288
Shadow/negation/world/reality/figure/Wittgenstein: we believe the sentences must correspond at least with something like a shadow. But nothing is thus obtained. After all, why in the world should there be a shadow of that reality? The confusing of the negation is in the thought, a symbol must correspond to something. How can you know what is meant when no equivalent is there? Nevertheless, you must know what you mean.
---
II 289
Negation/Wittgenstein: E.g. "here is not a chair" corresponds to that here is the place and somewhere in the world are chairs. E.g. "I wish Schmitz may come" erroneous idea: that the sentence must consist of somehow jointed portions, like a box has a bottom and a lid.
---
II 290
Negation/understanding/Wittgenstein: if one has understood "~ p", one must also have understood "p". But if p is false, there is nothing that corresponds to it. What does it mean to understand a command, if you do not follow him? By forming an image one does not get closer to the execution. ---
IV 79
Negation/denial/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 5,513 one could say, two sentences are opposed to one another if they have nothing in common - and: every sentence has only one negative - ((s)> completeness,> maximum).

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Non-Existence Frege
 
Books on Amazon
I 47
Nonexistence/Unicorn-Example/Truth-value gap/Frege: E.g. Unicorn: sentence without truth value - predicates can not be switched on or denied - the thought is the same whether the name refers ("meaning", reference) or not.
V 102
Name/Non-existence/Frege/Husted: that the name has a reference is not a condition that it belongs to the language - but vice versa.
I 107
Nonexistence/Meaning/Meaning/FregeVsMeinong/FregeVsRussell: there are quite a lot contradictory terms - only no contradictory objects - the logic may determine only the limitation of terms - that is, for each object, whether it falls within the definition, or not - a contradictory term is used to prove that there is no corresponding object.
IV 110
Nonexistence/Frege: proper names: a name that refers to nothing, is logically meaningless - but not a concept under which nothing falls - for a name to be entitled it is necessary that the appropriate term is sharp.
VI 111
Therefore the term should precede the scope.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Non-Existence Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 136
Reference/Nonexistence/Non-existent/Rorty: "talk about anything" in the sense of reference to non-existent is justified.
VI 217/218
Reference/Non-existence/Singular term/Davidson/Sellars/BrandomVsRussell: each singular term, which has a use is as good as any other - E.g. unicorn.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Numbers Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
II 32
Number/Wittgenstein: not a concept, but a logical form. ---
II 283
Numbers/cardinal/Wittgenstein: that there are infinitely many cardinals, is a rule that one sets up. ---
II 343
Number/Frege/WittgensteinVsFrege: a number is a property of a property. - Problem: E.g. for blue-eyed men in the room. - Then the five would be a property of a property - to be a blue-eyed man in the room - e.g. to express that Hans and Paul are two, they would then have a property in common, which not exactly belongs to the other. - ((s) each would have the property to be different from the other.) - Solution/Frege: the property of being Hans or Paul. ---
II 344
Number/Wittgenstein: are not merely signs. - One can have two items of the form three, but only one number. - ((s) WittgensteinVsFormalism). ---
II 360
Number/Definition/WittgensteinVsRussell: numerical equality is a prerequisite for a clear correspondence. - Therefore, Russell's definition of the number is useless. - ((s) because circular, if you want to define number via illustration). ---
II 361
Definition/Wittgenstein: instead of a definition of "number" we must figure out the rules of usage. ---
II 415
Number/Russell/Wittgenstein: has claimed, 3 is a property that is common to all triads. - ((s) Frege: classes of classes - does Frege not mean objects with classes (instead of properties)?). ---
II 416
Definition number/WittgensteinVsRussell: the number is an attribute of a function which defines a class, not a property of the extension. - E.g. Extension: it would be a tautology to say, ABC is three. - In contrast, meaingful: to say, in this room are three people. ---
IV 93
Definition number/numbers/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 6,021 - the number is the exponent of an operation. - - -
Waismann I 66
Def natürlichen Zahlen/Wittgenstein: diejenigen, auf die man die Induktion bei Beweisen anwenden kann.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Wa I
F. Waismann
Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996

Wa II
F. Waismann
Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976
Objects (Material Things) Russell
 
Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
Geach I 314
Def object / Def person / Russell: (logical atomism): an object is a set of classes of particulars, and therefore a logical fiction - "Real things only last a very short" - GeachVsRussell: he tried to apply two theories of classes at once: 1 . the "no-classes theory" that classes are only fictions - 2 the "composition theory": that classes are composed of their elements.

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996


Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Particulars Strawson
 
Books on Amazon
Graeser I 163
Particulars/Strawson: Particulars have priority in our conceptual system - ability to attribute consciousness to predicates necessary. Condition for them for physical predicates. ---
Graeser I 224
Strawson: These particulars take precedence of processes or events that we could not identify without them. ---
Newen/Schrenk I 150
VsStrawson/Newen/Schrenk: why should just particulars be the most fundamental reference objects of subject terms and not events? - Strawson: because objects are recognizable after some time - his arguments are transcendental. ---
Strawson I 35 ~
Particular/Strawson: as long as it is isolated from the rest of the knowledge, we can learn nothing new about it. ---
I 51
Particular/Strawson: is there a class of particular on which all others depend? - Maybe dependent "private particular" - Elementary: Class of People - Tradition: private particular: "Emotions" fundamental. ---
I 52
Principium indivduationis/Strawson: is based on identity of persons. ---
I 70
Particular/Strawson: material bodies: fundamental for the identification - not for process - StrawsonVsRussell: not biography instead of the names. ---
I 72
Description of particular does not force to mention the process - but identification dependency of processes of the particulars in which they take place - because things require space, processes not always. ---
I 175
Particular/properties/Strawson: one cannot only refer identifying to particulars - VsTradition: therefore object character is not a criterion for particulars. ---
I 176 RamseyVs
Particular/properties/RamseyVsTradition: from the fact that two things are linked, it does not follow that they must have different characters - Strawson:> 1. grammatical criterion for distinguishing between things and activities - 2. categorical criterion.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981


Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002
Parts Russell
 
Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
I XVI
Part / whole / mereology / GödelVsRussell: a part may be identical with the whole: - e.g. the structure of the series of integers contains itself as a special part.

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Possibility Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
IV 81
Possibility/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5,525, it is incorrect, the translate sentence "(Ex) fx." As "fx is possible" - possibility: is expressed by the fact that a sentence is meaningful - impossibility: the fact that the sentence is a contradiction.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Predicates Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
II 306f
Predicate/WittgensteinVsRussell: e.g. "man" should not be used as a predicate - otherwise it would become a subject for its name - "man" as a predicate: at best for a disguised woman. ---
II 307
"Man" as a predicate cannot be denied its bearer.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Proper Names Frege
 
Books on Amazon
I 54
Proper Name/Frege: the extension is presumed. - Otherwise, the negation would be: "Kepler did not die in misery or not the name is meaningless".
II 69
The "meaning" of a name is never a concept (predicate), but always only an object.
II 72f
Proper name (saturated) can never be a predicate (but part of a predicate). Names/Understanding/Frege: understanding a name means to know what object it denotes. Problem: names without a carriers (E.g. unicorn). - Problem: E.g. Different names with the same carrier.
V 99/100
The fact that a name stands for an object is a consequence rather than part of the fact that it has a certain sense.
Chisholm II 144f
Names/Frege: "mixed proper name": contains linguistic and non-linguistic parts: the circumstances. -Circumstances: part of the meaning of an expression. - ChisholmVsFrege: he neglects ostension.
Dum III 68f
Names/FregeVsRussell: may well have the same sense as a specific description - what is actually considered to be a representation of an object: Valencia from the air, from the ground, within a specific buildin,g on the map? - Recognition: necessary: ​​the awareness that the object falls under the concept that determines the proper identity criterion (here: "city"). - Ability for recognition instead method of picking out. - ("red": recognition, not method for red).
Frege II 69
Name/Frege: can never be a predicate - but certainly part of a predicate.
Stalnaker I 183
Names/Proper Names/Frege/Stalnaker: for him there is a mental representation, i.e. we only have ideas about something that presents itself to us in a certain way. - ((s) This can be reconciled with Donnellan’s attributive use).

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Proper Names Geach
 
Books on Amazon
I 46f
Name/Aristotle/Geach: direct reference, no parts (Aristotle: syntactically simple) (Geach ditto) - description: indirect reference, mediation of other characters. ---
I 143
Calculus of Natural Deduction/Gentzen/Geach: here there are "possible names" (> "introduction of existence"). - But not quantification over it. - GeachVsQuine: so he can no longer regard names as "hidden descriptions". ---
I 155
Names/Geach: not knowing the causal chain is important, but its existence. - The right to use a name can exist, even if one does not know that. - Russell: a proper name must name something (Geach dito). - GeachVsRussell: but then he makes a wrong conclusion: "only a name that has to name something is a name". - Just as wrong: fallacy of "what one knows, must be" to "only what must be like this, can be known". ---
I 162
Quasi-names/Geach: in encyclopedias, for foreign gods - (Geach pro) - Quasi-names appear only in object position after intentional verbs. - No "second order existence". - There is no identy criterion to decide whether different peoples worship the same God. ---
I 208
Names/Geach: whether something is a proper name does not depend on who it is given to. - Quasi quotation: is not a name.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Proper Names Prior
 
Books on Amazon
I 119 ~
Names/Hobbes: are names of our ideas - MillVs: convey to the others, what we think of someone (something), not only about our idea - the idea of fire does not cause the heat, even though I must have terms to think. ---
I 158 ~
Name/existence/Prior: Vs thesis "Name is all what intends to identify a real object: Problem: indirect speech: E.g. the spokesperson believes Holmes exist, but the listener does not: then the speaker is in a position to identify Holmes the listener is not but then the listener cannot tell what the speaker has said (absurd). ---
I 168
Names/KennyVsRussell: covert markings in "B exists" - PriorVsKenny: when names must name something then no name can be used in indirect speech with a known non-existence. ---
I 168ff
Theory/PriorVsKenny: cannot set up his own theory. - Kenny Thesis: names must intend reference - then the theorist himself cannot even intend to use the name if he talks in his example sentences of non-existent persons.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Proper Names Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
II 288
Names/Searle: presuppose any other representation - have no explicit intentional content. ---
II 291 ff
Names: SearleVsKripke: VsCausal Theory: exaggerates analogy between reference and perception - overweights parasitic cases - presupposes omniscient observer - Meteorology baptizes future events. ---
II 291 ff
Names: Mill: no connotation, only denotation - Frege: meaning of a name is detected by description. ---
II 292
Names/SearleVsKripke: causal chain can only be detected intentionally: by speaker's intention - causal chain not pure, self-descriptive - baptism itself cannot be causal, otherwise successful reference explained by successful reference (circular). ---
II 311
Names/meaning/reference/Searle: E.g. Goedel/Schmidt: intentional content determines reference: "discoverer, no matter what his name is" - we speak of the person who has been recognized by his contemporaries - E.g. swapped spots: Identification: "the spot that causes the experience" - Variant: forgotten: "the one I was formerly able to identify as A." ---
Wolf II 168
Names/Searle: meaning stays ambigious, half of the descriptions could be true - we cannot determine in advance what characteristics apply to Aristotle - (Strawson ditto) - Zink: but then we would say that we do not know the name - solution/Zink: Localisation. ---
Searle V 145
Names/SearleVsMill: it is wrong, that proper names would be "meaningless characters" that they were "denotative" but not "connotative". ---
V 145
There can be no facts about an independently identified object by facts - otherwise one is approaching traditional substance - Identification/SearleVsTractatus: objects cannot be identified, regardless of facts. ---
V 245
Names/SearleVsRussell: if they should not contain any description (description), we must unfortunately assume substances. - From the supposed distinction between names and descriptions the metaphysical distinction is derived between object and properties - Tractatus: the name means the object, the object is its meaning - SearleVsWittgenstein. ---
V 247
Names/Mill: have no sense - FregeVsMill: E.g. then Mt. Everest would be = Gaurisankar, not more informative than Everest = Everest - FregeVs, SearleVs - Searle: names do not describe properties of objects - identity Everest = Tschomolungma provided no other information. ---
V 256
Names/SearleVsFrege: not entirely clear - E.g. morning star/evening star are actually on the border to description.- SearleVsKripke: names not rigid, otherwise like logical equivalents - Searle: names are there, because it is necessary, to seperate the indicative from the predicative function.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Proper Names Strawson
 
Books on Amazon
VII 16
Names/Strawson: proper names have no meaning. Ignorance of the name is not linguistic ignorance. ---
I 222
Names/adjective/Strawson: also names can be adjectival: E.g. Napoleonic, Russian, even with auxiliary verb is a Hitler. ---
I 224
But: Napoleonic gesture is not connecting gesture with Napoleon but between gesture and similarity principle of the summary which is made possible by Napoleon - but: Ramsey we probably say wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates, but not: wisdom sokratizes (wrong) - particular cannot be predicted - Solution: Language has a pseudo-universal: be feature of. ---
I 226
Only pseudo-universal. otherwise regress: characterized through being characterized by... ---
VI 386 ~
Names/general term/Strawson: cannot be derived syntactically. ---
VII 113
Names/Strawson: Meaning not object - (confusion of utterance and use) - Reference: Expressions plus context - referencing does not mean to say that you refer - (steps). ---
VII 122
StrawsonVsRussell/VsQuine: Summit of circularity: names to treat as camouflaged descriptions - names are chosen arbitrarily or conventionally - otherwise names would be descriptive. ---
VII 122
Quasi names/Strawson: Glorious Revolution, Blue Grotto, Patriotic War.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Properties Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Rorty VI 151
Major property/holism/Quine/Rorty: at best: "property, which is necessary for the use of a certain description" - but not: "property, which is necessary for the identity of an object with itself." ---
Quine I 43
Features: independent existence is pointless. ---
I 218
Mass Terminus/Quine: is archaic(> Cassirer) -> Properties a) commonality b) Scattered clumps? ---
I 217
Features: usually merely convenient abbreviations for long cross-references - Quine/Cassirer: features of archaic remains. ---
I 219
Not all abstract objects are properties: numbers, classes, functions, geometric figures, ideas, possibilities - give up or trace back abstract objects - faithfully distinguished of concrete objects by use of "-ness". ---
I 322
Property abstraction (elimination) instead of "a = x(..x..)" - new: irreducible two-digit operator "0": "a0x(..x..)" - variables remain as the only ones - primacy of the pronoun. ---
I 344/45
Properties/Quine: no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal logic) - only more or less important properties. ---
I 344
Properties/relations: meaning of timeless open sentences - is unidentifiable (How-propositions). ---
I 361
Elimination of relations and properties in favor of classes of ordered pairs, open sentences, general terms - even scattered objects (in the case of color) (46). ---
I 412
QuineVsProperties: fallacy of subtraction: to derive existence from "about" and "deals with" - "round" and "dog" are terms for physical objects - but no additional features. "Round" and "dog" general terms for objects not singular terms for properties or classes. The same argument would be for classes instead of properties: general term symbolizes its extension as well as its intension.
---
I 412
Properties: not every general term is necessarily about properties or classes - properties and classes are acceptable as values of variables. ---
I 464
QuineVsRussell/Whitehead: theory of incomplete symbols: eliminated classes only in favor of properties. ---
II 129f
Properties: hard to individuate - not to define like classes by the same elements - various properties can get to the same things. properties: "Zettsky" (like Russell): properties identical when they were members of the same classes - QuineVs - solution: property identical if two sentences ↔ (follow seperately) - unsatisfactory, less analyticity and necessity-operator.
Properties/Quine: identical when coextensive-classes: are not specified by elements, but by condition of containment (open sentence).
Property is not the same as predicate - property: open sentences - propositions: completed sentences.
Properties not the same as classes: since no individuation principle for properties - solution "last classes" (do not belong to any other class, only have elements themselves) - like Russell: statement function only comes through their values - properties = last classes or properties = statement function.
Properties as last classes every element of the zero class, therefore all identical? - Vs: this identity definition only applies to theories that allow no objects who belong to no class (Unicorn).
Properties/identity: (here) interchangeability in all contexts - Prerequisite: exhaustion of a finite lexicon by interchangeability of atomic contexts - RyleVs: Category confusion.
Properties: QuineVsCarnap/Russell: minimize grammatical categories, expand scope - if all can be attributed to "has", then all properties are extensional - rest could be listed by list.
Properties: contexts with "has" unproblematic - "contained in" prohibited (less classes) - "is" leads to circular definition of properties - properties do not count. "Nap had all properties but one": prohibited. - however: "all properties" allowed.
---
II 144 f
De re: E.g. spy should be an essential property (wrong) - no belief de re (essential property). Modal logic/Quine: entire modal logic is context-dependent - what role does someone or something play? - Same level as essential properties.
Necessity/Quine: the whole concept is only meaningful in context.
Property Einstein/Quine: are preserved. - But not de re.
---
X 95
Properties/Quine: do not exist for lack of distinctness (only amounts) - "synonymy unclear" - open sentences that apply to the same objects never determine different amounts, but differnt properties could underlie.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Propositional Functions Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
IX 178
Propositional function/Principia Mathematica/Theoretical Terms/Russell: name for attributes and relations - "f", "y"... as variables - i.e. that x has the attribute f, that x is to y in the relation y, etc. "fx",y(x,y)", etc. - ^x: to abstract propositional function from statements he just inserted variables with an accent circonflexe into the argument positions - E.g. the attribute to love: "^x loves y" E.g. to be loved: "x loves ^y" (active/passive, without classes!) (>lambda notation/(s) Third Way between Russell and Quinean classes) - Analog in class abstraction: "{x: x loves y}", "{y: x loves y}" - E.g. relation of loving: "{: x loves y}" or "{: x loves}". Abstraction: Problem: in wider contexts sometimes you have no clues as to whether a variable ^x should be understood as if it caused an abstraction of a short or a longer clause - Solution/Russell: Context Definition - statement function must not occur as a value of bound variables that are used to describe it - it must always have too high an order to be a value for such variables - characteristic back and forth between sign and object: the propositional function receives its order from the abstracting expression, and the order of the variables is the order of the values. ---
IX 185
Propositional function/Attribute/Predicate/Theoretical Terms/QuineVsRussell: overlooked the following difference and its analogues: a) "propositional functions": as attributes (or intensional relations) and
b) proposition functions": as expressions, i.e. predicates (and open statements: E.g. "x is mortal") - accordingly:
a) attributes
b) open statements - solution/Quine: allow an expression of higher order to refer straight away to an attribute or a relation of lower order.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Propositions Russell
 
Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
I 54
Proposition/Russell: is a complex entity with components: E.g. Smith is taller than Brown: Smith, Brown, the relation taller than - E.g. Brown is smaller than Smith: is therefore equivalent, but is different in all three components! - Letter to Frege: the mountain literally appears in the proposition - Cartwright: thoughts/Frege: unequal Russell’s propositions - they do not contain their objects - ((s) anywhere. ...but their sense).
I 56
Proposition/Russell/Cartwright: how can a proposition be wrong if it consists of the components and the nature of their connection? - Solution/Russell: another quality - CartwrightVs: which had already been rejected.
I 59
Proposition/Principia Mathematica/Russell: φ x (requires function) - Propositional function: φ x^ - not ambiguous - the values ​​are all propositions of the form j x.
I 60
I.e. the symbol φ (φx^) must not express a proposition as does indeed, if a is a value for φ x^ - indeed j(jx^) must be a symbol that expresses nothing, it’s pointless - (neither true nor false) - E.g. -the function- is a human is a human.
I 60f
Proposition/propositional function/Principia Mathematica/Russell: The symbol (x).j x shall always express the proposition φ x, i.e. the proposition that claims all values ​​for φ x^.
I 61
This proposition presupposes the function j x^, not just an ambiguous value of the function - the assertion of φ x, where x is not specified, is different from that which claims all values for φ x^, because the former is an ambiguous assertion, and the latter is not ambiguous in any sense.
I125
Proposition/Function/Extensional/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: functions of propositions are always truth functions - a function can only occur in a proposition by means of its values. (see above ​​extensional) - consequence: all functions of functions are extensional. E.g. A believes p is not a function of p - (Tractatus 19-20) - ((s) VsRussell: (see above)> Waverley, functions equivalent, but not identical, because George IV did not want to know if Scott = Scott - ((s) being believed is not a function of the believed object) - ((s)> extrinsic properties, extrinsic) - ((s)> Function of a function of higher level).

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Qualities Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
I 202
Quality/experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the base of the "logical" structure: rows of temporary total experiences out of which qualities are formed - unlike sense data. - CarnapVsRussell: individual experience must be added: "sensation". - Hintikka: these are similar to the objects of Wittgenstein. - Difference: Carnap: ephemeral, psychologically - Wittgenstein: not temporal, substance of the world - sensation/Carnap: belongs to psychology, quality: to the phenomenology and theory of objects. - phenomenology/Carnap: holistic analysis of the experience.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Quantification Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
I 283
Indefinite singular term: quantification disappears in "something is an x such that", "everything is an x ..". ---
I 316
Paraphrases by quantification uncover false existence assumptions. ---
VI 41
Quantification/Quine/(s) is a postulation of objects. ---
X 94
Quantification/variable/Quine: in the open sentence after the quantifier "x" stands at a point where a name could be - E.g. also names of numbers - the sentences do not say that names or numbers are walking- "EF" does not say, "is a predicate such and such", but an object that is called by the predicate is so and so" - this object could be a property (pro Frege ) - VsRussell : but not a predicate - mixing up of representation (schema) and quantification (talking about). ---
X 104
Apparent Quantification/Quine : Apparent values ​​of the new quantifiable variables " p", " q ", etc.: truth values - then sentences are exceptionally names of these apparent objects - we can quantify over apparent objects - apparent objects arise from context definition. ---
XI 38
Quantification/Lauener/(s): truth values can only be attributed to quantified sentences.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quantifiers Russell
 
Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
Hintikka I 173
Quantifikation/Quantor/Bekanntschaft/Beschreibung/Russell/Hintikka: bei Russell gehen die Quantoren (bzw. der Bereich der gebunden Variablen) nur über Objekte der Bekanntschaft. ((s) Körperlich präsente Dinge). Kennzeichnung/ThdK/Russell: Kennzeichnungen werden eliminiert im Kontext zugunsten von Quantoren. Es gibt nur noch Quantoren und gebundene Variablen.
Russell/Hintikka: man könnte ihn so paraphrasieren: „der Begriff „ist immer wahr“ kommt als einziges in den Propositionen vor, die ursprünglich bestimmte Kennzeichnungen enthielten.
Kraft/Russell/Hintikka: die Kraft ((s) semantische Kraft) der reduzierten Propositionen hängt vom Individuenbereich der Variablen ab.
Pointe/Hintikka: nun ist es nur ein Teil der Geschichte, dass Russell erfolgreich nicht-existente Objekte eliminiert hat (Bsp Der gegenwärtige König von Frankreich ist kahl). Seine Reduktion geht weiter:
Quantor/Russell/Hintikka: die Quantoren gehen nur über Objekte der Bekanntschaft. ((s) Objekte, von denen wir nur durch Beschreibung wissen, sind nicht zugelassen, über sie darf bei Russell nicht quantifiziert werden. Das ist mehr als die Elimination von nichtexistenten Objekten, denn es gibt auch existierende Objekte, die wir nur durch Beschreibung kennen).
Hintikka I 173
Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: Pointe: ein geniales Merkmal von Russells Theorie der Denotation von 1905 ist, dass es die Quantoren sind, die denotieren! Theorie der Kennzeichnungen/Russell: (Ende von „On Denoting“) These: enthält die Reduktion von Kennzeichnungen auf Objekte der Bekanntschaft.
I 174
Hintikka: dieser Zusammenhang ist erstaunlich, Es scheint auch zirkulär zu sein, nur Objekte der Bekanntschaft zuzulassen. Lösung: wir müssen sehen, was erfolgreich denotierende Ausdrücke (phrases) tatsächlich denotieren: sie denotieren eben Objekte der Bekanntschaft.
Uneindeutigkeit/Eindeutigkeit/Hintikka: es ist eben Uneindeutigkeit, die zum Fehlschlagen der EG führt.
Bsp Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: dass nur Objekte der Bekanntschaft zugelassen sind, zeigt sein eigenes Beispiel: „der Autor von Waverley“ in (1) ist tatsächlich ein primäres Vorkommnis d.h. sein Beispiel (2) .
„ob“/Russell/Hintikka: einziger Unterschied: wollte wissen, ob“ statt „wusste nicht“.
Sekundäre Kennzeichnung/Russell: kann man auch so ausdrücken: dass George von dem Mann, der tatsächlich Waverley schrieb wissen wollte, ob er Scott sei.
I 175
Das wäre der Fall, wenn Georg IV Scott gesehen hätte (in der Distanz) und gefragt hätte „Ist das Scott?“. HintikkaVsRussell: warum wählt Russell ein Beispiel mit einem wahrnehmungsmäßig bekannten Individuum? Haben wir nicht normalerweise mit Individuen aus Fleisch und Blut zu tun, deren Identität uns bekannt ist, statt nur mit Wahrnehmungsobjekten?
Wissen wer/Wissen was/Wahrnehmungsobjekt/Russell/Hintikka: gerade bei Wahrnehmungsobjekten scheint es, als sei die Art von Eindeutigkeit, die wir für ein Wissen-wer brauchen, gerade nicht gegeben ist.
Hintikka I 178
Quantor/Quantifikation/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell verwechselt systematisch zwei Arten von Quantoren. (a) der Bekanntschaft, b) der Beschreibung). Problem: Russell hat nicht erkannt, dass der Unterschied nicht allein in Bezug auf die aktuale Welt definiert werden kann!
Lösung/Hintikka: wir brauchen eine Relativierung auf Mengen von möglichen Welten, die mit den verschiedenen propositionalen Einstellungen wechseln.
Hintikka I 180
Elimination/Eliminierbarkeit/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: um bloß scheinbar denotierende Kennzeichnungen zu eliminieren, muss man annehmen, dass die Quantoren und gebundenen Variablen über Individuen gehen, die beschreibungsmäßig identifiziert sind. ((s) Objekt der > Beschreibung). Sonst wäre der reale Bismarck kein zulässiger Wert der Variablen, mit denen wir ausdrücken, dass es ein Individuum einer bestimmten Art gibt.
Problem: dann dürfen diese Quantoren aber keine Konstituenten der Propositionen sein, denn ihre Wertebereiche bestehen eben nicht bloß aus Objekten der Bekanntschaft. Daher war Russells Fehler ein zweifacher.
1.
Quantor/Variable/Russell/Hintikka, 1905 hatte er schon aufgehört zu denken, dass Quantoren und gebundene Variablen echte Konstituenten von Propositionen sind. Def Scheinveränderliche/Russell/Hintikka: = gebundene Variable.
2.
Bekanntschaft/Russell: Werte der Variablen sollten nur noch Objekte der Bekanntschaft sein. (HintikkaVsRussell).
Hintikka I 180
Quantoren/HintikkaVsRussell: jetzt können wir sehen, warum Russell nicht zwischen verschiedenen Quantoren unterschied (Bekanntschaft/Beschreibung): Für ihn waren Quantoren nur notationale Muster, und für sie braucht man den Bereich der möglichen Interpretation nicht festzulegen, daher macht es auch keinen Unterschied, wenn sich der Bereich ändert! Quantifikation/Russell: für ihn war sie implizit objektional (referentiell) jedenfalls nicht substitutional.


R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996


Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Reductionism Logic Texts
 
Books on Amazon
Re III 28
Reduktionismus: der für Wittgenstein zentral war. Für Russell war es ganz klar, dass die Annahme einer zusätzlichen Tatsache zwischen zwei Aussagen absurd und unnötig war: Bsp »Kennedy ist Präsident« und »Oswald tötete Kennedy« noch eine dritte Tatsache, eine Art Konjunktionstatsache, die die Verbindung wahr mache, absurd und verschwenderisch.
Re III 28
Wenn man die beiden getrennten Tatsachen kennt, lernt man nichts Neues, wenn man sie in Verbindung setzt. Es gibt hinter der Verbindung keine Extratatsache, die zu den getrennten Tatsachen hinzukommt. Ähnlich bei disjunktiven. Was »A oder B« wahr macht, ist keine weitere seltsame disjunktive Tatsache, sondern genau dieselbe Tatsache, die eines der beiden Glieder wahr macht! Sonst Regress.
Re III 30
Reduktionismus: müsste die Wahrheit einer negativen Aussage wie »Ruby hat Kennedy nicht getötet« als Ergebnis der Wahrheit einer anderen Aussage erklären, die mit »Ruby tötete Kennedy« unvereinbar wäre.
Re III 31
RussellVsReduktionismus: wendete gegen solche Argumentation ein, dass ein Regress droht: »B ist unvereinbar mit A« ist selbst eine negative Aussage. Um ihre Wahrheit zu erklären, bräuchten wir eine dritte Aussage C, die unvereinbar wäre mit »C ist vereinbar mit A« usw ReadVsRussell: das ist ein seltsamer Einwand, denn er würde auch gegen jede Konjunktion gelten. Und dann dürfen Wahrheitsbedingungen für konjunktive und disjunktiv Aussagen nicht konjunktiv bzw. disjunktiv sein.
Logic Texts
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001
Reference Chisholm
 
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I 51
Each kind of reference can be understood with the help of self-attribution. - 1. the one who means must be able to make himself an object; 2. He must understand propositions and facts; - direct attribution (self-attribution) original form of all attribution. ---
I 133
But not yet self-consciousness: in addition, knowledge that it is the subject itself, to which the property is attributed. ---
Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

II 112/113
Reference/Brandl: other way of reference, depending on whether description or acquaintance - the latter allows reference without information, or even to ignore information - BrandlVsRussell: different motivation of the distinction. Between the appearance of the object and our knowledge of how the object is the cause of the phenomenon. Description allows us to exceed the limits of our experience.
II 24
really / Rutte: 1 this way of appearing, - 2 arranged in the way it appears - 3rd the right causation - reality must be distinguished from the outside world.
II 105f
Reference/Reference/Brandl: by sign or speaker? by speaker - Strawson: dito, so use of the sign refers, not the sign - problem: intentionality would have to explain sign - BrandlVsChisholm: thesis: it is no use to decide whether the linguistic or psychological (intentionality) should have primacy - directedness is incomprehensible if the designation of the words has not yet been introduced. - A separation of the areas would either lead to total behaviorism or psychologism. ---
II 107
"Unity" would also not explain anything. - Also here question about primacy: either "thinking of" or talking about objects. - Solution: differentiate different kinds of singular term for different types of reference - but only a kind of intentionality. ---
II 108
Domain/Russell: non-singular propositions are always related to a domain of objects, not unambiguous - singular propositions: contain the object as a genuine component" (by acquaintance) - QuineVsRussell: confusion of mention and use.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Russell’s Paradox Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
IV 29
Russell's paradox/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: instead of "F(F(u))" we write "(Eφ):F(φu).ψu = Fu". - (Solution).

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Scheme/Content Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
~ I 133ff
Scheme/content/3rd Dogma/world/Rorty: we cannot specify which "joints" of nature belong to the content and which to the scheme.
I 285
Truth/world/Russell/Rorty: thesis: every true statement contains both our own contribution and a contribution from the world - 1) DavidsonVsRussell: Vsthird Dogma: separation of scheme and content. There is no content that is waiting to be organized - 2) PutnamVsRussell -
I 338
However, we have found no intelligible basis from which could be said that schemes are different. But with that we do not reveal the idea of an objective truth, quite the opposite! Without the dogma (scheme/content) this kind of relativity goes overboard. We do not reveal the world, but restore the direct contact with the familiar objects.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Scope Russell
 
Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
Hintikka I 166
Reichweite/HintikkaVsRussell : dieser wusste nicht, dass es für die Reichweite eines Quantors auch eine dritte Möglichkeit gibt ((s) „mittlere Reichweite“ > Kripke, > Wolf).
(4) ~(Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x ) & George IV wusste, dass (Scott = x)].


R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996


Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Scope Hintikka
 
Books on Amazon
Hintikka I 166
Scope/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not know that there is a third possibility for the scope of a quantifier ((s) "medium scope"> Kripke,> wolf).
(4) ~ (Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x) & George IV knew that (Scott = x)].

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Sense Data Theory Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
I 19
QuineVsSense-Data Theory: immediate experience is not coherent, autonomous region. ---
I 404
VsSensory Data: intermediate instances do not explain anything. - Not necessary for the description of illusions - not a substitute for physical objects - double standards: linking to objects/utility - Complete knowledge of sense data guaranteed no translation. ---
II 107
Atomic Facts/Russell: sense data QuineVsRussell: are not atomic but composed - acquaintance: certain with sense-data, all other are fallible (Russell). ---
VII 40
Sense-Data/Quine: is ambivalent: a) event - b) quality.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Sense Data Theory Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
Hintikka I 78
Sense data/Russell/Hintikka: a) given by the senses, therefore deception possible - b) at the same time they do not belong to the psychic process of perception - but they are their objects, their content. ---
I 107
Sense data/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: no physical objects. - Much broader: he needs them for semantic purposes: as the building blocks of all logical forms - as well as the substance of all possible situations. - Subject: is itself not an object. ---
I 109
Whether an object is simple or complex, is empirically not question the logic. ---
I 114
Sense data/Moore/Hintikka: makes a difference between spot and its color. Only the spot belongs to the sense data. WittgensteinVsRussell: they are logical constructions - they simplify laws but are not necessary for them. - Later: (note § 498): "private object before my soul." ---
I 180
Sense data/Russell/Hintikka: fails to uphold a strict distinction between a sense datum as a naked individual thing and a sense datum as a complex object. ---
I 322
Sense data/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: middle and late period: the world in which we live is the world of sense data. ---
II 87
Sense data/Wittgenstein: the sentence is a judgement on the sense data, a reading of one's own sense-data, for example, this is red. Here, there is no need for further verification, that is a priori. ---
II 92
Sense data/physical event/Wittgenstein: the physical sound has a duration, the corresponding sense datum not - Listening and remembering are quite different. - Pointless: to say that one hears something and also recalls it - as e.g. one is seeing while one uses the thermometer at the same time. ---
II 100
Sense data/WittgensteinVsRealism: sense data and physical objects are not in a causal relationship with each other. ---
II 101
The relationship between objects and sensations is linguistically - and therefore necessary. ---
II 101
Sense data/term/Wittgenstein: sense data is the source of our terms. ---
II 102
The world in which we live, is the one of sense data - but the one of which we speak is that one of physical objects. ---
II 129
Sense data/Wittgenstein: it is nonsense to speak of the relationship between object and sense datum. ---
II 134
Senseless: to speak of the causes of my sense data.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Sentences Frege
 
Books on Amazon
II 48
Truth Value/Frege: A truth value cannot be part of a thought any more than the sun, because it is not a sense but an object. (truth value = object).
II 51
Sentence/Frege/(s): consists of sense components, not of objects. (>FregeVsRussell) Subordinate clauses that begin with "that" (that-sentence, >opaque context, >propositional attitudes) have as meaning a thought, not a truth value.
II 74
Sentence: The idea itself does not yet determine what is to be regarded as the subject. (>Ramsey) We must never forget that different sentences can express the same idea. Neither is it impossible that the same thought appears in a decomposition as a singular one, in another one as a particular one, and in a third one as general one.
II 77
Sentence: The three proper names: "the number 2", "the concept prime number", "the relation of the falling of an object under a concept" behave as brittle to each other as the first two alone: ​​no matter how we group them together, we get no sentence.
I 7
Sentence/Frege: does not represent a proposition (only a that-sentence does that, a subset) - but for a truth value. - There is a sentence for each proposition that expresses it and that states the truth conditions. - Vs: problem with sentences without truth value (neither true nor false, not an object, etc.).
Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 68
Sentence/Frege: except the idea (what can be t/f) there are two other aspects: a) "content" - b) "imagination".
Tugendhat II 243
Oblique Meaning//German Original: "odd"/Frege: name of a sentence. - Complex sentences: truth functions of their subsets - where that is not the case, subsets appear as names (oblique ("odd") meaning, Quote) - Nominalized Subset/Frege: only part of a thought - TugendhatVsFrege: such a subset cannot be replaced, so the truth-value potential cannot consist in its truth value.
Tugendhat II 245
Sentence/Frege/Tugendhat: since all sentences are derived from the subject-predicate form, subsets must sometimes be nominalized. - Exception: causal and conditional clauses.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


F III
R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz
Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Skepticism Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
II 100
Skepticism/Russell: E.g. we could have only existed 5 minutes - WittgensteinVsRussell: then he uses the words with a new meaning. ---
VII 152
Skepticism/philosophy/Wittgenstein/late: the words "error", "doubt", etc., were also learned by the philosophers from the everyday language, they have not been invented for the purpose of philosophizing.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Substance Millikan
 
Books on Amazon
I 109
Substanz/Eigenschaften/Millikan: These: „Substanz“ und „Eigenschaften“ sind Kategorien, die relativ zueinander ausgeschnitten sind und relativ zur Operation der Negation. Sie schließen einander nicht gegenseitig aus. Eigenschaften/Millikan: sind variante Elemente von Tatsachen, empfänglich für Negation.
Substanzen/Millikan: sind ebenfalls variabel, aber relativ auf andere Transformationen.
I 254
Substanzen/Eigenschaft/Millikan: sind bestimmt in Relation zueinander. Def Substanz/Millikan: ist was sie ist und dasselbe wie sie selbst relativ zu einer Menge von Eigenschaftsbereichen aus denen sie mit Notwendigkeit eine Eigenschaft hat, während andere Eigenschaften in dem Eigenschaftsbereich ausgeschlossen sind.
Bsp Substanzkategorie/Millikan: korrespondiert einer Menge von Substanzen. Die Identitäten sind Relation zu denselben Gegenteil-Prädikat-Bereichen. Bsp Gold, wie andere Elemente der Kategorie Chemisches Element, hat eine Atomzahl, eine Valenz, einen Schmelzpunkt, eine Farbe. Aber es hat nicht Größe, Form, Mutter, Geburtstag, Gebärde.
Def Eigenschaft/Millikan: (entsprechend zu Substanz) ist was sie ist und dasselbe wie sie selbst relativ zu einem Bereich von Gegenteilen und zu einer Menge von Elementen von Substanzkategorien, deren Elemente notwendig eine Eigenschaft aus diesem Bereich haben, und alle anderen Eigenschaften ausgeschlossen sind.
Erfassen/Eigenschaft//Millikan: eine Eigenschaft zu erfassen heißt dann, sie von anderen zu unterscheiden, bzw. die Gegenteilsbereiche zu erfassen, relativ zu denen die Eigenschaft dieselbe ist wie die, die sie ist.
I 255
Sinnlos/Millikan: damit können wir Ausdrücke als sinnlos erkennen, wie Bsp „Gold ist groß“.
I 274
Eigenschaft/Gegenstand/Prädikat/Substanz/Individuum/Ontologie/Millikan: Strawsons Unterscheidung zwischen „monogamen“ und „nichtmonogamen“ Entitäten ist nicht absolut, sondern relativ: Gegenstand/Ding: Bsp wenn mein Ring aus Gold ist, kann er nicht gleichzeitig aus Silber sein.
Polygam: ist Gold relativ zu meinem Ring ((s) er hätte auch aus Silber sein können – das Gold hätte zu einem anderen Gegenstand gehören können.). Dann ist Gold eine Eigenschaft (im Gegensatz zu einer anderen) und mein Ring eine Substanz.
Aber relativ zu anderen Substanzen scheint die Identität von Gold wie die Identität eines Individuums zu sein.
Ontologie/MillikanVsFrege/MillikanVsRussell: die starre Unterscheidung zwischen Begriff und Gegenstand bzw. Einzelding und Eigenschaft müssen wir fallenlassen.
I 275
Variante: nicht nur Prädikate sind Varianten in Weltzuständen, sondern auch Substanzen bzw. Individuen (sie können ausgetauscht werden). Substanz: wenn wir Gold als eine Eigenschaft auffassen, hindert das nicht, es auch als eine Substanz aufzufassen. Wie Aristoteles meinte:
Individuen/Aristoteles/Millikan: sind bloß primäre Substanzen, nicht die einzigen Substanzen, die es gibt, D.h. Substanzen, die nicht Eigenschaften von etwas anderem sind.
Substanz/ Millikan. ist eigentlich eine epistemische Kategorie.
Substanz/Millikan: Bsp Gold, Bsp Hauskatze, Bsp 69er Plymouth Valiant 100.
Substanz/Kategorie/Millikan: Substanzen fallen in Kategorien, definiert durch die Ausschließlichkeitsklassen, in Hinblick auf die sie bestimmt sind.
Bsp Gold und Silber fallen in dieselbe Kategorie, weil sie zu denselben Ausschließlichkeitsklassen gehören: einen Schmelzpunkt haben, Atomgewicht, usw.
I 276
Unperfekte Substanzen/Millikan: haben nur ungefähre Eigenschaften. Bsp Hauskatze hat ein Gewicht zwischen 7 und 14 Pfund. Perfekte Substanz/Millikan: kann auch zeit-gebundene Eigenschaften haben:
Bsp Johnny sitzt zu t1, aber nicht zu t2
Bsp Wasser hat einen Schmelzpunkt bei 0 Grad, bei einer Atmosphäre Druck, aber nicht bei 10 Atmosphären!
Bsp Johnny hat dann aber ein für alle Mal die Eigenschaft, zu t1 zu sitzen.
I 277
Vollständiger Begriff/Millikan: um einen vollständigen Begriff zu haben, braucht man Zeitbegriffe. Zugänglichkeit: vollständige Begriffe für dauerhafte Gegenstände sind nicht so zugänglich wie Begriffe für Substanzen wie Bsp Hauskatze oder Bsp Gold.
I 281
Zusammenfassung/Substanz/Eigenschaft/Identität/Selbstidentität/Millikan: Perfekte sekundäre Substanz: Bsp Gold: hat eine Identität, die formal dieselbe ist wie die eines Individuum in Relation zu seinen Eigenschaften.
Unperfekte sekundäre Substanz: Bsp 69er Plymouth (Widerspruch zu oben) Bsp Hauskatze: haben eine Art Identität, die formal analog zur Identität perfekter Substanzen ist. Bsp in Übereinstimmung mit Gesetzen in situ, statt unter allen natürlich möglichen Bedingungen.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Thoughts Evans
 
Books on Amazon:
Gareth Evans
Frank I 487
Thoughts / EvansVsRussell / EvansVsHume: (with Davidson): it may be that you simply think you have a thought - even about yourself

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Thoughts Russell
 
Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
Frank I 487
Russell / Evans: Cartesians: Thought : we only have a thought if the object really exists - I 487 ~ Thoughts / EvansVsRussell / EvansVsHume: (with Davidson): it may be that you simply think you have a thought - even about yourself

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Truth Russell
 
Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
Horwich I 4
Truth/Russell: There are objective truths as objects of judgments, but not objective falsehoods - a) false: Judgment as relation to a simple object: E.g. that Charles I died on the scaffold - does not work in the case of false judgments - b) for a complex: (Russell pro):
I 9
Truth: exists if the objects have the relation to each other which is claimed in the judgment.
I 11
The fact that a judgment is made does not alter the objects - this is how falsehood becomes possible.
Russell VII 64
Truth/Russell: can only exist if there are also opinions - but it does not depend on the opinions.
IV 127
RussellVsHegel: a truth about a thing is not part of the thing itself, although it has to belong to his "essence". - If the nature of a thing should be all truths, then we cannot recognize the "essence" before we know all its relations with all other things in the universe - but if we use the word "essence" in this sense, we have to assert that a thing can be recognized, even if its "essence" is unknown - or incompletely known - contradiction: this confuses knowledge of things and knowledge of truth -" acquaintance does not imply knowledge of the essence - (> naturalistic fallacy) - therefore we cannot prove that the universe is a harmonious whole.
Tugendhat III 214
Truth/Russell: early: a matter of belief and this one reaction dispo to react near B with "B" - (Quine, stimulus meaning) - TugendhatVsRussell: neither reaction nor triggering signs are w/f - because there is no assumption that something is this way or that - therefore no mistake possible.

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Truth Tugendhat
 
Books on Amazon
I 263
Truth/Tugendhat: an assertion is once and for all true or false, it does not depend on the circumstances or on a situation (> timeless sentence). ---
I 267
Truth/Tugendhat: One must not have reasons for truth, but know them - difference using reasons/truth reason - otherwise lie and deception would be excluded. ---
I 285
Truth/Tugendhat: only made possible by reference to spatiotemporal objects - but reference only possible in controlled language use - VsRussell: not by pseudo-concept idea. ---
III 190
Truth/Tarski/Tugendhat: his definition is not related to verification - TugendhatVsTarski: Scheme to narrow - Reality and subjectivity must be taken into the truth-conception - Tugendhat VsMeta Language - Judgments point beyond themselves, therefore criteria necessary. ---
III 196
Tugendhat: we need to know how we can verify a judgment, otherwise meaningless. ---
III 208
The "dual relationship" (sentence-sense-given), evaporates with Tarski to a simple ratio.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Truth Tables Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
II 73
Truth panel/Truth Table/Truth-panel/Truth-Table/WittgensteinVsRussell: no explanation, since it could also apply to other sentences. ---
II 322
Truth table/truth value table/WittgensteinVsFrege: he did not recognize that this table can be seen again as a symbol for the function, although it looks as if it would say something about the function. - ((s) As a symbol it is arbitrary and thus no explanation but only set next to it). ---
II 327
True/false/truth value/Truth Table/truth panel/Wittgenstein: the calculus with true/false (truth value) is boring and useless. - Just as the calculus by Russell. - Only justification: the true/false-calculus provides a translation of Russell's calculus. - Calculus: has only then value when it brings clarity over another.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Type Theory Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
VII 91ff
QuineVsType theory: 1) universal class: because the type theory only allows uniform types as elements of a class, the universal class V leads to an infinite series of quasi-universal classes, each for one type - 2) negation: ~x stops including all non-elements of x and only includes those non-elements that belong to the next lower level - 3) Zero class: even this accordingly leads to an infinite number of zero classes - 4) Boolean class algebra: is no longer applicable to classes in general, but is reproduced at each level - 5) Relational calculus: accordingly to be established new at every level - 6) arithmetic: the numbers cease to be uniform. At each level (type) there is a new 0, new 1, new 2, etc. ---
IX 186
Definition branched type theory/Russell/Quine: distinction of orders for statement functions whose arguments are of one single order - in order for two attributes with the same extension to be able to differ in terms of their orders, attributes with the same extension must be distinguished and be called attributes and not classes - new: this becomes superfluous when we drop the branching - Solution: context definition/Russell: we define class abstraction through context, thus "e" remains the only basic concept apart from quantifiers, variables and statement-logical links - context definition for class abstraction: "yn e {xn: Fxn}" stands for "Ez n + 1["xn(xn e z n+1 Fxn) u yn e z n + 1]". ---
IX 191~
Cumulative types/Set Theory/Quine: Type 0: Only L is of type 0 - type 1: L and {L} and nothing else - Type n: should generally include only this and the 2n sets that belong to type n-1 - in this way, every quantification only interprets a finite number of cases. Each closed expression can be mechanically tested on being true - that no longer works when the axiom of infinity is added. ---
IX 198
Cumulative types/Quine: advantages: if we equate the zero classes of all class types, (~T0x u ~T0y u "w(w e x w e y) u x e z) > y ez is a single axiom, no longer an axiom scheme - in int "~T0x u ~T0y" avoids that the individuals L are identified with one another - we need individuals, but we identify them with their classes of one (see above) - but one exception: if x is an individual, "x e x" shall be considered as true, (Above, "x e y" became false if both were not objects of sequential types). ---
IX 201
Cumulative Type Theory/Quine: individuals: identified with their classes of one - no longer elementless, have themselves as elements - therefore definite identity: a = b if a < b < a - zero classes of all types can now be identified (formerly: "No individuals" , "no classes", etc.) ---
IX 204
Natural numbers/QuineVsRussell: his type theory even has problems with Frege’s numbers: perhaps the successor relation does not bring something new always: Example 5 is then the class of all classes from five individuals, assuming that there are only five individuals in that universe. So 5 in type 2 equals {J1} ,then 6, or S"5, in type 5 equals {z1: Ey0(y0 e z1 u z1 n _{y0} = J1)}: this equals L², because "y e z u z n _{y} = J" is contradictory - but then 7, or S"6, equals S"L², which is reduced to L² - i.e. S"x = x when x equals 6 in type 2, provided that there are no more than five individuals - otherwise the theory of numbers would collapse.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Type Theory Russell
 
Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
Prior I 164
Type Theory / Russell: Variable lowest level: not part of logic- ((s) existence empirical).
Russell I XXIII Type theory / GödelVsRussell: mixed types (individuals with predications about individuals, etc.)obviously do not contradict the circle fault principle

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996


Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Universals Russell
 
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Bertrand Russell
IV 44/45
Universals/Knowledge/Russell: all knowledge of truths requires an acquaintance with "things" which are significantly different from the sensory data: universals. - E.g. "blackness", "diversity", "brotherhood" - each sentence must contain at least one universal. - Because the meaning of all verbs is general.
IV 82
Universals/Russell: everything that is not denoted by proper names: what nouns, adjectives, prepositions and verbs stand for. - Therefore, there must be a universal in each sentence. - Most authors VsRussell.
IV 88
Russell: universals have to be objects, because we can think of them repeatedly.

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996


The author or concept searched is found in the following 91 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Atomism Wittgenstein Vs Atomism
 
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II 138
WittgensteinVsAtomism/self-criticism/WittgensteinVsTractatus: it was a mistake, that there are elementary propositions, into which all sentences can be dismantled. This error has two roots: 1. that one conceives infinity as a number, and assumes there is an infinite number of sentences.
2. statements that express degrees of qualities. ((s) They must not exclude any other sentence. Therefore, they cannot be independent).
---
II 157
Particular/Atom/Wittgenstein: Russell and I, we both expected to get to the basic elements by logical analysis ("individuals"). Russell believed, in the end subject-predicate sentences and binary relations would arise. WittgensteinVsRussell: this is a mistaken notion of logical analysis: like a chemical analysis. WittgensteinVsAtomism.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Atomism Newen Vs Atomism
 
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New I 76
Sense Data/Russell/Newen: are material entities! Otherwise Russell's position would be an idealistic one. But RussellVsIdealism. Intersubjectivity/Russell/Newen: is thus created to a certain degree.
NewenVsRussell: but not the materiality of sense data.
I 77
VsAtomism: the materiality of sense data are the weakest point of logical atomism.

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005
Blanshard, B. Armstrong Vs Blanshard, B.
 
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Particular/ArmstrongVsRussell/ArmstrongVsBlanshard: particulars are not bundles of universals, however, they cannot exist without properties. The interdependence of universals is better formulated as follows:
III 84
neither individual things nor universals can exist independent of situations (states of affairs).

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Brandom, R. Russell Vs Brandom, R.
 
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Bertrand Russell
Read III 26
Russell a fact is different from the statement. There are false statements, but no "wrong facts". ((s) Brandom: speaks only of true statements as facts). VsRussell: But the cost of this statement is that it undermines the distinction between language and the world.

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996
Bundle Theory Newen Vs Bundle Theory
 
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New I 233
Def Reference/Newen: Relation between the occurrence of a singular term and the object thus designated. ((s) i.e. general terms do not refer?).
Names/Proper Names/Newen: two problems:
1) Reference definition: how is the reference determined
2) Meaning: what is the meaning of a name.
Names/Description Theory/Newen: E.g. "Aristotle": the meaning would then be "student of Plato".
Vs: Problem: it could be that someone does not know that Aristotle was a student of Plato, but otherwise uses the name correctly.
Bundle Theory/Solution/Searle/Newen/(s): it should not happen that a single failure refutes the entire theory, therefore, a bundle of descriptions should be decisive, not a single description.
I 234
Bundle Theory/Reference Definition/Searle/Newen: Searle's bundle theory simultaneously regards itself as a theory of reference definition. Names/Proper Names/KripkeVsBundle Theory/KripkeVsDescription Theory/KripkeVsSearle/Kripke/Newen: (modal argument): there is a necessary condition for Def meaning equality/Kripke:

(meaning equality) if two expressions a1 and a2 have the same meaning, they are mutually replaceable in sentences that are introduced by the modal operator "It is necessary that", without changing the truth value.
I 235
E.g. It is necessary that Aristotle is K. Here, "student of Plato" is not usable. Hence the name "Aristotle" (quotation marks by Newen) cannot have the same meaning as "student of Plato".
Description Theory/Meta-Linguistic/Names/Newen: special case description theory of proper names: the so-called meta-linguistic description theory:
E.g. the meaning of the name Aristotle can be specified with the description "The bearer of the name "Aristotle"."
Point: this description captures the context-independent knowledge of a speaker with respect to the name.
KripkeVs/Newen: if the modal argument is also true for the meta-linguistic theory, it cannot be right: it is indeed necessary that Aristotle is Aristotle, but not necessary that Aristotle is
I 236
the bearer of the name "Aristotle". He could have been given a different name. Object Theory/Meaning/Names/Proper Names/Newen: Thesis: The meaning of a name is the designated object.
A variation of this theory is Russell's theory of the meaning of logical proper names. ("dis", etc.)
Epistemology/VsRussell/Newen: Russell's epistemology proved untenable.
Solution/Newen: Reference definition by a description: "The only object that satisfies the description associated with the concept "E" (quotation marks by Newen)".
Frege: was the first to specify this (in his theory of sense and meaning)
Names/Frege/Newen: the Fregean meaning of a name is the designated object.
Reference Definition/Frege/Newen: through description. This is Frege's theory of sense.
Sense/Frege/Newen: through description (= reference definition for proper names).
Names/Frege/Newen: Frege combines an object theory of meaning with a description theory of reference definition.
I 237
((s) KripkeVsFrege/KripkeVsDescription Theory/Newen/(s): Kripke also criticized the description theory of reference definition: E.g. Schmidt was the discoverer of the incompleteness theorem, not Gödel. Nevertheless, we refer with "Gödel" to Gödel, and not to an object which is the singled out with a description that can be true or not.) Solution/Kripke: causal theory of proper names.

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005
Carnap, R. Ryle Vs Carnap, R.
 
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Read III 32> RyleVsRussell
Ryle: (review of Carnap s Meaning and Necessity): Error: "Fido"-Fido principle: because the name "Fido" receives its meaning from referring to a single individual, we are tempted to assume that other words function in the same way.

Ry I
G. Ryle
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969
Compositionality Cartwright Vs Compositionality
 
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Horwich I 57
Relations theory/Belief object/Truth/Easy/Russell/Moore/Cartwright: one question remains: should the doctrine that truth is a simple unanalysable property go together with a relation theory of belief? ((s) Adopted relation to internal objects).
I 58
Solution/Cartwright: (ultimately not entirely satisfactory): E.g. the complicated proposition: (12) Brown is taller than Smith and Robinson is taller than Smith.
... + ...
CartwrightVsCompositionality: but this is not a case of compositionality in the strict sense. And that applies equally to the above case with propositions. Triadic relation: standing in the K (8) and (9) is a function whose arguments are ordered triples and have a value O(p,q). CartwrightVsRussell: but the fact that (12) is such a function of K, p, and q, does not justify to regard these entities as "components". Russell/Moore/Cartwright: would probably have replied that a proposition is in a certain way an entity or a unit that has parts in an indefinable sense. (Principles Ch. 16) They would have said that it’s one thing for (12) to be a function of K, (8) and (9), but another for these entities to be part of (12). Cartwright: with that they would have been right. But we do not need more than functionality. I 60 You might think functionality is too cheap, there is always some function, and that K, (8) and (9) are linked more intimately in (12) than in a function. But the alternative to strong compositionality is not mere functionality, it is rather the determination of what is required to assert the proposition (12)! Thus, a comparison of (12) is prepared with other propositions.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Constructivism Russell Vs Constructivism
 
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Bertrand Russell
Quine IX 184
VsConstructivism/Construction/QuineVsRussell: we have seen how Russell's constructivist access to the real numbers failed (least upper bound (Kos), see above). He gave up the constructivism and took refuge in the reducibility axiom (RA). ---
IX 184/185
The way he gave it up, had something perverse in it: Reducibility axiom/QuineVsRussell: the reducibility axiom implies that all the distinctions that gave rise to its creation, are superfluous.
When Russell's system is consistent with reducibility axioms, then no contradictions will arise if we ignore all orders except the predicative.
We can determine that the order of each attribute is always the next highest in comparison to the order of things that have this attribute, according to intensional relations.
If somehow an attribute of the order n + k is referred to, which is an attribute of objects of the order n, so we need this name only as such, which is based on a systematic reinterpretation that refers to an attribute of the order n + 1 with the same extension. According to intensional relations.
Reducibility Axiom: tells us that an equal-extensional attribute or equal-extensional intensional relation of the desired order, and namely in predicative execution, always exists.
Is the axiom planned from the outset, so you should avoid its necessity in that we speak in the beginning only of types of attributes instead of orders of any distinctive sense.
Orders are only excusable if one wants to maintain a weak constructive theory without reducibility axiom.
((s)Axiom/Quine/(s): should not be taken as necessary)

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Correspondence Theory Moore Vs Correspondence Theory
 
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Hacking I 179
MooreVs correspondence theory: an essential condition of the theory is that a true statement of the reality that in relation to which will include its truth, always deviates in a specific way when the reality again is not itself a sentence.   It is the inability to detect such a specific difference between a true statement and the supposedly matching reality which refutes the theory.

- - -
Horwich I 45
Korrespondenztheorie/CartwrightVsMoore: Problem: dann gibt es auch eine Eigenschaft des Übereinstimmens (Korrespondenz) die die falsche Proposition nicht hat. Und das scheint unleugbar von der Welt abzuhängen! Von einer Tatsache. Tatsache: die Proposition ist wahr, wenn es eine Tatsache ist, dass es U Bahnen in Boston gibt, sonst falsch.
CartwrightVsMoore/CartwrightVsRussell: es ist genau dies, was die Theorie der Wahrheit als einfacher, unanalysierbarer Eigenschaft ignoriert.
Aber dessen waren sich die beiden bewusst. („Meinongs Theory“ , S 75).
Sie hielten daran fest wegen:
RussellVsKorrespondenztheorie, MooreVsKorrespondenztheorie.
I 46
Wahrheit/Moore: ( Baldwin Dictionary, früh)): manche glauben, sie bestehe in einer Relation einer Proposition zur Realität. („Korrespondenz“). MooreVsKorrespondenztheorie: setzt voraus, dass sich die Wahrheit von der Realität unterscheidet (um überhaupt eine Relation eingehen zu können). Aber eine solche Differenz ist überhaupt nicht zu finden!
Lösung/Moore:
Proposition/Moore/früh: These: ist nicht identisch mit dem Glauben, sondern das Glaubensobjekt. ((s) >Relationstheorie).
Wahrheit/Moore/früh: These: ist identisch mit der Realität. Sie unterscheidet sich nicht von ihr….+…

Hack I
I. Hacking
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Field, H. Leeds Vs Field, H.
 
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Field II 304
Indeterminacy/Set Theory/ST/Leeds/Field: e.g. somebody considers the term "set" to be undetermined, so he could say instead: The term can be made "as large as possible". (Leeds 1997,24) (s) "everything that is included in the term"). As such the term can have a wider or narrower definition. Cardinality of the continuum/Indeterminacy/Field: This indeterminacy should at least contain the term set membership.
LeedsVsField: It is not coherent to accept set theory and to qualify its terms as indetermined at the same time. And it is not coherent to then apply classical logic in set theory.
Field: It could also look like this: the philosophical comments should be separated from mathematics. But we do not need to separate theory from practice, e.g. if the belief in indeterminacy is expressed in whether the degree of the mathematician's belief in the continuum hypothesis and his "doubt degree" adds up to 1 ((s) So that there is no space left for a third possibility).
Problem: A mathematician for whom it adds up to 1 could ask himself "Is the continuum hypothesis correct?" and would look for mathematical proof. A second mathematician, however, whose degree of certainty adds up to 0 ((s) since he believes in neither the continuum hypothesis nor its negation) will find it erroneous to look for proof. Each possibility deserves to be analyzed.
The idea behind indeterminacy however is that only little needs to be defined beyond the accepted axioms. ((s) no facts.)
Continuum Hypothesis/Field: Practical considerations may prefer a concept over one another in a particular context and a different one in another context.
Solution/Field: This is not a problem as long as those contexts are hold separate. But is has been shown that its usefulness is independent from the truth.
II 305
Williamsons/Riddle/Indeterminacy/Leeds/Field: (LeedsVsField): (e.g. it must be determined whether Joe is rich or not): Solution/Leeds: i) we exclude the terms in question, e.g. rich (in this example) from the markup language which we accept as "first class"
and
ii) the primary (disquotional) use of "referred" or "is true of" is only used for this markup language.
Indeterminacy/Leeds: Is because there is no uniform best way to apply the disquotional scheme in order to translate into the markup language.
Field: This is genius: To reduce all indeterminacy on the indeterminacy of the translation.
FieldVsLeeds: I doubt that a meaning can be found.
Problem: To differentiate between undetermined termini and those which are only different regarding the extension of the markup language. Especially if we have a number of translations which all have different extensions in our markup language.
Solution/Disquotationalism: It would integrate the foreign terms in its own language. We would then be allowed to cite.(Quine, 1953 b, 135. see above chap. IV II 129-30).
Problem: If we integrate "/" and "", the solution which we obtained above may disappear.
FieldVsLeeds: I fear that our objective - to exclude the indeterminacy in our own language- will not be reached.It even seems to be impossible for our scientific terms!
e.g. the root –1/√-1/Brandom/Field: The indeterminacy is still there; We can simply use the "first class" markup language to say that -1 has two roots without introducing a name like "i" which shall stand for "one of the two".
FieldVsLeeds: We can accept set theory without accepting its language as "first class". ((s) But the objective was to eliminate terms of set theory from the first class markup language and to limit "true of" and "refer" to the markup language.)
Field: We are even able to do this if we accept Platonism (FieldVsPlatonism) :
II 306
e.g. we take a fundamental theory T which has no vocabulary of set theory and only says that there is an infinite number of non-physical eternally existing objects and postulates the consistency of fundamental set theory. Consistency is then the basic term which is regulated by its own axioms and not defined by terms of set theory. (Field 1991). We then translate the language of set theory in T by accepting "set" as true of certain or all non-physical eternally existing objects and interpret "element of" in such a way that the normal axioms remain true.
Then there are different ways to do this and they render different sentences true regarding the cardinality of the continuum. Then the continuum hypothesis has no particular truth value. (C.H. without truth value).
Problem: If we apply mathematical applications to non-mathemtical fields, we do not only need consistency in mathematics but in other fields as well. And we should then assume that the corresponding theories outside mathematics can have a Platonic reformulation.
1. This would be possible if they are substituted by a nominal (!) theory.
2. The Platonic theorie could be substituted by the demand that all nominal consequences of T-plus-set theory are true.
FieldVs: The latter looks like a cheap trick, but the selected set theory does not need to be the one deciding the cardinality of the continuum.
The selected set theory for a physical or psychological theory need not to be compatible with the set theory of another domain. This shows that the truth of the ML is not accepted in a parent frame of reference. It's all about instrumental usefulness.
FieldVsLeeds: We cannot exclude indeterminacy - which surpasses vagueness- in our own language even if we concede its solution. But we do not even need to do this; I believe my solution is better.
- - -
Horwich I 378
Truth/T-Theory/T-concept/Leeds: We now need to differentiate between a) Truth Theory (T-Theory) ((s) in the object language) and
b) theories on the definition of truth ((s) metalinguistic, ML) .
Field: (1972): Thesis: We need a SI theory of truth and reference (that a Standard Interpretation is always available), and this truth is also obtainable.
(LeedsVsStandard Interpretation/VsSI//LeedsVsField).
Field/Leeds: His argument is based on an analogy between truth and (chemical)valence. (..+....)
Field: Thesis: If it would have looked as if the analogy cannot be reduced, it would have been a reason to abandon the theory of valences, despite the theory's usefulness!
Truth/Field: Thesis: (analogous to valence ): Despite all we know about the extension of the term, the term also needs a physicalistic acceptable form of reduction!
Leeds: What Field would call a physicalistic acceptable reduction is what we would call the SI theory of truth: There always is a Standard Interpretation for "true" in a language.
Field/Leeds: Field suggests that it is possible to discover the above-mentioned in the end.
LeedsVsField: Let us take a closer look at the analogy: Question: Would a mere list of elements and numbers (instead of valences) not be acceptable?
I 379
This would not be a reduction since the chemists have formulated the law of valences. Physikalism/Natural law/Leeds: Does not demand that all terms can be easily or naturally explained but that the fundamental laws are formulated in a simple way.
Reduction/Leeds: Only because the word "valence" appears in a strict law there are strict limitations imposed on the reduction.
Truth/Tarski/LeedsVsTarski: Tarski's Definitions of T and R do not tell us all the story behind reference and truth in English.
Reference/Truth/Leeds: These relations have a naturalness and importance that cannot be captured in a mere list.
Field/Reduction/Leeds: If we want a reduction à la Field, we must find an analogy to the law of valences in the case of truth, i.e. we need to find a law or a regularity of truth in English.
Analogy/Field: (and numerous others) See in the utility of the truth definition an analogy to the law.
LeedsVsField: However, the utility can be fully explained without a SI theory. It is not astonishing that we have use for a predicate P with the characteristic that"’__’ is P" and "__"are always interchangeable. ((s)>Redundancy theory).
And this is because we often would like to express every sentence in a certain infinite set z (e.g. when all elements have the form in common.) ((s) "All sentences of the form "a = a" are true"), > Generalization.
Generalization/T-Predicate/Leeds: Logical form: (x)(x e z > P(x)).
Semantic ascent/Descent/Leeds: On the other hand truth is then a convenient term, same as infinite conjunction and disjunction.
I 386
Important argument: In theory then, the term of truth would not be necessary! I believe it is possible that a language with infinite conjunctions and disjunctions can be learned. Namely, if conjunctions and disjunctions if they are treated as such in inferences. They could be finally be noted.
I 380
Truth/Leeds: It is useful for what Quine calls "disquotation" but it is still not a theory of truth (T-Theory). Use/Explanation/T-Theory/Leeds: In order to explain the usefulness of the T-term, we do not need to say anything about the relations between language and the world. Reference is then not important.
Solution/Leeds: We have here no T-Theory but a theory of the term of truth, e.g. a theory why the term is seen as useful in every language. This statement appears to be based solely on the formal characteristics of our language. And that is quite independent of any relations of "figure" or reference to the world.

Reference/Truth/Truth term/Leeds: it shows how little the usefulness of the truth term is dependent on a efficient reference relation!
The usefulness of a truth term is independent of English "depicts the world".
I 381
We can verify it: Suppose we have a large fragment of our language, for which we accept instrumentalism, namely that some words do not refer. This is true for sociology, psychology, ethics, etc. Then we will find semantic ascent useful if we are speaking about psychology for example. E.g. "Some of Freud's theories are true, others false" (instead of using "superego"!) Standard Interpretation/Leeds: And this should shake our belief that T is natural or a standard.
Tarski/Leeds: This in turn should not be an obstacle for us to define "T" à la Tarski. And then it is reasonable to assume that "x is true in English iff T (x)" is analytic.
LeedsVsSI: We have then two possibilities to manage without a SI:
a) we can express facts about truth in English referring to the T-definition (if the word "true" is used) or
b) referring to the disquotional role of the T-term. And this, if the explanandum comprises the word "true" in quotation marks (in obliqua, (s) mentioned).
- - -
Acquaintance/Russell/M. Williams: Meant a direct mental understanding, not a causal relation!
This is an elder form of the correspondence theory.
I 491
He was referring to RussellVsSkepticism: A foundation of knowledge and meaning FieldVsRussell/M. WilliamsVsRussell: das ist genau das Antackern des Begriffsschemas von außen an die Welt.
Field/M. Williams: His project, in comparison, is more metaphysical than epistemic. He wants a comprehensive physicalistic overview. He needs to show how semantic characteristics fit in a physical world.
If Field were right, we would have a reason to follow a strong correspondence theory, but without dubious epistemic projects which are normally linked to it.
LeedsVsField/M. Williams: But his argument is not successful. It does not give an answer to the question VsDeflationism. Suppose truth cannot be explained in a physicalitic way, then it contradicts the demand that there is an unmistakable causal order.
Solution: Truth cannot explain (see above) because we would again deal with epistemology (theory of knowledge).(>justification, acceptancy).

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Frege, G. Kripke Vs Frege, G.
 
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Cresswell II 151
Pierre-E.g../Kripke/Cresswell: (Kripke 1979) Cresswell: if de re interpreted, is the belief about London. Description Theory/Cresswell: For this, the example is not a problem ((s) Londres and London are different for Pierre because of different descriptions).
((s) causal theory/(s): the case is a problem for them because they have to assume that the meaning of the name is the carrier and must therefore be the same carrier and therefore contradictory predicates are attributed.)
Description Theory/Cresswell: Here the description is relative to Pierre, but it is not his private matter!
Def "Extreme Fregeanism"/KripkeVsFrege/KripkeVsRussell/Cresswell: (he attributes this disposition to these two): Thesis: that name in general belong to idiolects.
Problem: Then the Pierre-E.g. is not about Pierre but about the speaker, who is reporting this case, and his idiolect.
Cresswell: Unfortunately it is not so simple: e.g. an ancient Greek could have been arrived from the ancient to us. He is initially going to use "" (special characters) instead of "Phosphorus". His disposition towards it will as different from ours, as the Pierre-example demonstrates the different dispositions of "London" and "Londres".
Ambiguity/Cresswell: is caused here because a name can stand for numerous descriptions. The latter allow in most cases that "London" can be translated as "Londres". The only case in which it does not work is the example of Pierre.
- - -
Stalnaker I 172
Name/reference/meaning/sense/Stalnaker: 1. Mill/KripkeVsFrege: Thesis: Names are directly addressing the referent without the mediation of an intermediary meaning
Frege/Dummett/Searle: Thesis: The meaning of the name must be adopted in-between the name and his referent.
a) otherwise the object cannot be identified or we cannot explain how it is identified,
b) (DummettVsKripke)since we cannot learn the language.
I 174
Reference/meaning/Searle/Stalnaker: When a statement does not possess a descriptive content, it cannot be linked to an object. Reference/Dummett/Stalnaker: .. the object must be singled out somehow. Stalnaker: in both cases, it comes to skills, use, habits, practices or mental states.
Searle/Dummett/Stalnaker: So both seem to be of the opinion that a satisfactory fundamental semantics (see above that as a fact an expression has its semantic value)cannot be given.
StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: Both, however, do not state this since they do not separate those two issues.
a) what is the semantics, e.g. for names
b) what circumstances lead to those semantics.
Stalnaker: if we separate them, we can no longer rule out the possibility that each language could be a language spoken by us. Then the community could very well speak a Mill’s language.
Frege’s language/Meaning/Reference/Denotation/Stalnaker: We would need them if these questions were not separate, e.g. if we needed to explain those at the same time.
a) why a name has these referents and
b) what the speaker communicates with his statement (which information, content).
Meaning/ KripkeVsFrege: (1972:59) The latter should be criticized for using "meaning" in two different ways.
a) as meaning
b) as the way how the reference is determined.
By identifying the two, he assumes that both are created by specific descriptions.that both are given by specific markings.
I 192
Causal chain/Historic chain/Semantics/Metasemantics/Presemantics/Kaplan/Stalnaker: (Kaplan 1989a, 574 ("pre-semantics")
Question: Are causal chains a part of semantics or a part of metasemantics?
Semantics: states, which semantic values hold the expressions of a language.
Metasemantics: what circumstances determine the semantic values.
Presemantics/Kaplan: concerns those who believe that a name signifies something laying at the other end of a historical chain.
Semantics/Kaplan: gives us rather the meaning than explaining how to find it.
Similar to Kripke:
Reference/Meaning/Kripke/Stalnaker: Kripke distinguishes between what the reference fixes (the causal chain) and it signifies.
KripkeVsFrege: he has mixed up those two things.
Name/Kaplan/Stalnaker: he asks whether names are like index words.
I/Kaplan/Stalnaker: Is a rigid designator: The truth conditions (WB) of what is said (propositional content) depend on the actual referent. Contrary to:
Meaning/I/Stalnaker: One indicates the significance by stating how the referent is determined in the context. That would belong to a theory of e.g. the English language.
E.g. "I refer to the speaker" . Who knows this will be taken for someone who knwos the significance of"I", even if
Important Argument: he does not know who was the speaker at a particular occasion.((s) Difference between significance/reference > "whoever was the speaker")
Def Character/Kaplan: = significance. Function of possible contexts of use for referents.
- - -
Tugendhat I 440
KripkeVsFrege: Primacy of descriptions not anymore(TugendhatVs). Kripke/Tugendhat: Actually, he is not particularly interested in the definition of the proper name but in the rigid designator.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Frege, G. Russell Vs Frege, G.
 
Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
Dummett I 59
RussellVs distinction sense / reference (meaning / reference) (RussellVsFrege) ---
Stepanians I 44
Proof/Frege/Stepanians: Frege requests with the demand for completeness and rigor much stronger requirements for evidence than his mathematical contemporaries. Mathematics/VsFrege: mathematicians were more interested in truth than in the epistemological status. Intuitively plausible transitions were sufficient.
---
Stepanians I 87
Explicit definition/Frege/Stepanians: must satisfy two conditions 1. Frege's adequacy criterion: Hume's principle must follow from it. The justification for this principle is that the basic laws of arithmetic have to be provable on the principle's basis.
2. the explicit definition must master the problem with recourse to concept scope, where the context definition fails: it must solve the Caesar-problem (see above).
---
I 88
VsFrege: his explicit definition of the number concept does not solve the Caesar problem, but shifts it only to concept scope. Solution: would it only be if the concept scope excluded from the outset that Caesar is such a one.
Solution/Frege: requires here simply that the knowledge of the concept scope excludes this.
Value-over-time/terminology: = concept scope.
---
I 88
Concept scope/Frege/StepaniansVsFrege/VsFrege/Stepanians: Frege's own view of concept scopes will prove to be contradictory (see Russell's paradox). ---
I 91
Concept scope/Frege/Stepanians: was a newly introduced logical object by Frege for solving the Caesar-problem. They were not present yet in the concept script. Frege must justify them. Additional axiom: "Basic Law V":
The scope of F = is the scope of G
bik
All Fs are G and vice versa.
Russell's paradox/antinomy/RussellVsFrege/Stepanians: Basic Law V allows the transition from a general statement via terms to a statement about objects that fall under F - the scope of F.
It is assumed that each term has a scope, even if it might be empty.
---
I 92
RussellVsFrege/Stepanians: shows that not all definable terms in Frege's theory have a scope: Concept scope/Frege/RussellVsFrege: since concept scopes are objects the question has to be allowed whether a concept scope falls under the concept whose extent/scope it is.
If so, it includes itself, otherwise not.
Example: the scope of the term cat is itself not a cat.
On the other hand:
Example: the scope of the term non-cat contains very well itself, since it is not a cat.
Contradiction: a concept scope which includes all concept scopes that do not contain themselves. If it contained itself, it should not to contain itself by definition, if it did not contain itself, it must include itself by definition.
---
I 96
Object/concept/Frege/Stepanians: we discover (in a purely logical way) objects on concepts as their scopes. ---
I 97
VsFrege/VsConcept scope/Stepanians: the idea of the concept scope is based on a linguistic deception (See Chapter 6 § 2). That was Frege's own diagnosis. ---
I 114
Sentence/declarative sentence/statement/designating/VsFrege/Stepanians: one has often accused Frege that a declarative sentence does not want to denote anything but wants to claim (a truth value as an object) something. FregeVsVs/Stepanians: sentences as names for truth values are actually about subsets, whereas these subsets make a contribution to the truth value of the sentence structure (complete sentence).
Sentence/assertion/declarative sentence/Frege: (later, function and concept, 22, footnote): the total sentence means F nothing.
Basic Laws/terminology/Frege: (later): in the basic laws he differentiates terminologically and graphically between sentential "truth value names" that contribute towards the determination of the truth value and "concept type sets" that mean F nothing, but claim something.
---
Horwich I 57
RussellVsFrege/Cartwright: Russell's analysis differs from Frege, by not using unsaturation. ---
Newen I 61
Meaning determination/meaning/Russell/Newen: Two modes are possible: a) syncategorematic: according to the occurrence in a sentence.
b) categorematic; independent from the occurrence in a sentence.
Relational principle of meaning: applies to categorematic expressions: the meaning is the object (or the property). They are defined by acquaintance.
---
I 62
RussellVsFrege: Thesis: simple expressions mean what they signify. Syncategorematic/meaning/Russell. E.g. "and", "or": indicating their meaning means indicating the meaning of sentences in which they occur. ((s)> Context, contextually).
Contextually/Russell/Newen: syncategorematic expressions: their meaning is indicated by their meaning in schemes (sentence scheme).
---
Quine II 103
Russell: classes, if there are any, must exist, properties at best must be in place (weaker). Quine: I think this is arbitrary. In Russell's analysis of the concept of meaning, its relative indifference reappears opposite the existence-term (subsistence): Frege: threefold distinction
a) expression,
b) what it means,
c) that to what it (if at all) refers to.
This is not natural for Russell.
RussellVsFrege: ~ the whole distinction between mean and designate is wrong. The relationship between "C" and C remains completely mysterious, and where should we find the designating complex that supposedly refers to C?
QuineVsRussell: Russell's position seems sometimes to come from a confusion of terms with their meanings, sometimes from a confusion of the expression with its mention.

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Step I
Markus Stepanians
Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Frege, G. Wittgenstein Vs Frege, G.
 
Books on Amazon
Brandom I 919
TractatusVsFrege: nothing can be considered an assertion, if not previously logical vocabulary is available, already the simplest assertion assumes the entire logic. ---
Dummett I 32
Frege capturing of thought: psychic act - thought not the content of consciousness - consciousness subjective - thought objective - WittgensteinVs ---
I 35
WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, unknowable for the subject itself. WittgensteinVsFrege: Understanding no psychic process, - real mental process: pain, melody (like Frege).
---
Dummett I 62
Wittgenstein's criticism of the thought of a private ostensive definition states implicitly that color words can have no, corresponding with the Fregean assumption, subjective, incommunicable sense. (WittgensteinVsFrege, color words). But Frege represents anyway an objective sense of color words, provided that it is about understanding. ---
Dummett I 158
WittgensteinVsDummett/WittgensteinVsFrege: rejects the view that the meaning of a statement must be indicated by description of their truth conditions. Wittgenstein: Understanding not abruptly, no inner experience, not the same consequences. ---
Wolf II 344
Names/meaning/existence/WittgensteinVsFrege: E.g. "Nothung has a sharp blade" also has sense if Nothung is smashed. ---
II 345
Name not referent: if Mr N.N. dies, the name is not dead. Otherwise it would make no sense to say "Mr. N.N. died". ---
Simons I 342
Sentence/context/copula/tradition/Simons: the context of the sentence provided the copula according to the traditional view: Copula/VsTradition: only accours as a normal word like the others in the sentence, so it cannot explain the context.
Solution/Frege: unsaturated phrases.
Sentence/WittgensteinVsFrege/Simons: context only simply common standing-next-to-each-other of words (names). That is, there is not one part of the sentence, which establishes the connection.
Unsaturation/Simons: this perfectly matches the ontological dependence (oA): a phrase cannot exist without certain others!
---
Wittgenstein I 16
Semantics/Wittgenstein/Frege/Hintikka: 1. main thesis of this chapter: Wittgenstein's attitude to inexpressibility of semantics is very similar to that of Frege. Wittgenstein represents in his early work as well as in the late work a clear and sweeping view of the nature of the relationship between language and the world. As Frege he believes they cannot be expressed verbally. Earlier WittgensteinVsFrege: by indirect use this view could be communicated.
According to the thesis of language as a universal medium (SUM) it cannot be expressed in particular, what would be the case if the semantic relationships between language and the world would be different from the given ones?
---
Wittgenstein I 45
Term/Frege/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: that a concept is essentially predicative, cannot be expressed by Frege linguistically, because he claims that the expression 'the term X' does not refer to a concept, but to an object. ---
I 46
Term/Frege/RussellVsFrege/Hintikka: that is enough to show that the Fregean theory cannot be true: The theory consists of sentences, which, according to their own theory cannot be sentences, and if they cannot be sentences, they also cannot be true ". (RussellVsFrege) WittgensteinVsFrege/late: return to Russell's stricter standards unlike Frege and early Wittgenstein himself.
Wittgenstein late: greatly emphasizes the purely descriptive. In Tractatus he had not hesitated to go beyond the vernacular.
---
Wittgenstein I 65ff
Saturated/unsaturated/Frege/Tractatus/WittgensteinVsFrege: in Frege's distinction lurks a hidden contradiction. Both recognize the context principle. (Always full sentence critical for meaning). ---
I 66
Frege: unsaturated entities (functions) need supplementing. The context principle states, however, neither saturated nor unsaturated symbols have independent meaning outside of sentences. So both need to be supplemented, so the difference is idle. The usual equation of the objects of Tractatus with individuals (i.e. saturated entities) is not only missed, but diametrically wrong. It is less misleading, to regard them all as functions.
---
Wittgenstein I 222
Example number/number attribution/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: Figures do not require that the counted entities belong to a general area of all quantifiers. "Not even a certain universality is essential to the specified number. E.g. 'three equally big circles at equal distances' It will certainly not be: (Ex, y, z)xe circular and red, ye circular and red, etc ..." The objects Wittgenstein observes here, are apparently phenomenological objects. His arguments tend to show here that they are not only unable to be reproduced in the logical notation, but also that they are not real objects of knowledge in reality. ((s) that is not VsFrege here).
Wittgenstein: Of course, you could write like this: There are three circles, which have the property of being red.
---
I 223
But here the difference comes to light between inauthentic objects: color spots in the visual field, tones, etc., and the
actual objects: elements of knowledge.
(> Improper/actual >sense data, >phenomenology)
---
II 73
Negation/WittgensteinVsFrege: his explanation only works if his symbols can be substituted by the words. The negation is more complicated than that negation character.
---
Wittgenstein VI 119
WittgensteinVsFrege/Schulte: he has not seen what is authorized on formalism that the symbols of mathematics are not the characters, but have no meaning. Frege: alternative: either mere ink strokes or characters of something. Then what they represent, is their meaning.
WittgensteinVsFrege: that this alternative is not correct, shows chess: here we are not dealing with the wooden figures, and yet the figures represent nothing, they have no Fregean meaning (reference).
There is simply a third one: the characters can be used as in the game.
---
Wittgenstein VI 172
Name/Wittgenstein/Schulte: meaning is not the referent. (VsFrege). ---
Sentence/character/Tractatus 3.14 .. the punctuation is a fact,.
3.141 The sentence is not a mixture of words.
3.143 ... that the punctuation is a fact is concealed by the ordinary form of expression of writing.
(WittgensteinVsFrege: so it was possible that Frege called the sentence a compound name).
3.1432 Not: "The complex character 'aRb' says that a stands in the relation R to b, but: that "a" is in a certain relation to "b", says aRb ((s) So conversely.: reality leads to the use of characters). (quotes sic).
---
IV 28
Mention/use/character/symbol/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: their Begriffsschrift does not yet exclude such errors. 3.326 In order to recognize the symbol through the character, you have to pay attention to the meaningful use.
---
Wittgenstein IV 40
Sentence/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: the verb of the sentence is not "is true" or "is wrong", but the verb has already to include that, what is true. 4.064 The sentence must have a meaning. The affirmation does not give the sentence its meaning.
---
IV 47
Formal concepts/Tractatus: (4.1272) E.g. "complex", "fact", "function", "number". WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: they are presented in the Begriffsschrift by variables, not represented by functions or classes.
E.g. Expressions like "1 is a number" or "there is only one zero" or E.g. "2 + 2 = 4 at three o'clock" are nonsensical.
4.12721 the formal concept is already given with an object, which falls under it.
---
IV 47/48
So you cannot introduce objects of a formal concept and the formal concept itself, as basic concepts. WittgensteinVsRussell: you cannot introduce the concept of function and special functions as basic ideas, or e.g. the concept of number and definite numbers.
Successor/Begriffsschrift/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 4.1273 E.g. b is successor of a: aRb, (Ex): aRx.xRb, (Ex,y): aRx.xRy.yRb ...
General/something general/general public/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: the general term of a form-series can only be expressed by a variable, because the term "term of this form-series" is a formal term. Both have overlooked: the way, how they want to express general sentences, is circular.
---
IV 49
Elementary proposition/atomism/Tractatus: 4.211 a character of an elementary proposition is that no elementary proposition can contradict it. The elementary proposition consists of names, it is a concatenation of names.
WittgensteinVsFrege: it itself is not a name.
---
IV 53
Truth conditions/truth/sentence/phrase/Tractatus: 4.431 of the sentence is an expression of its truth-conditions. (pro Frege). WittgensteinVsFrege: false explanation of the concept of truth: would "the truth" and "the false" really be objects and the arguments in ~p etc., then according to Frege the meaning of "~ p" is not at all determined.
Punctuation/Tractatus: 4.44 the character that is created by the assignment of each mark "W" and the truth possibilities.
Object/sentence/Tractatus: 4.441 it is clear that the complex of characters
---
IV 54
"F" and "W" does not correspond to an object. There are no "logical objects". Judgment line/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 4.442 the judgment line is logically quite meaningless. It indicates only that the authors in question consider the sentence to be true.
Wittgenstein pro redundancy theory/Tractatus: (4.442), a sentence cannot say of itself that it is true. (VsFrege: VsJudgment line).
---
IV 59
Meaning/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: (5.02) the confusion of argument and index is based on Frege's theory of meaning ---
IV 60
of the sentences and functions. For Frege the sentences of logic were names, whose arguments the indices of these names. ---
IV 62
Concluding/conclusion/result relation/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 5.132 the "Final Acts" that should justify the conclusions for the two, are senseless and would be superfluous. 5.133 All concluding happens a priori.
5.134 one cannot conclude an elementary proposition from another.
((s) Concluding: from sentences, not situations.)
5.135 In no way can be concluded from the existence of any situation to the existence of,
---
IV 63
an entirely different situation. Causality: 5.136 a causal nexus which justifies such a conclusion, does not exist.
5.1361 The events of the future, cannot be concluded from the current.
---
IV 70
Primitive signs/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.42 The possibility of crosswise definition of the logical "primitive signs" of Frege and Russell (e.g. >, v) already shows that these are no primitive signs, let alone that they signify any relations. ---
Wittgenstein IV 101
Evidence/criterion/logic/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.1271 strange that such an exact thinker like Frege appealed to the obviousness as a criterion of the logical sentence. ---
IV 102
Identity/meaning/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 the essential of the equation is not that the sides have a different sense but the same meaning, but the essential is that the equation is not necessary to show that the two expressions, that are connected by the equal sign, have the same meaning, since this can be seen from the two expressions themselves. ---
Wittgenstein II 343
Intension/classes/quantities/Frege/Russell/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege: both believed they could deal with the classes intensionally because they thought they could turn a list into a property, a function. (WittgensteinVs). Why wanted both so much to define the number?

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Frege, G. Verificationism Vs Frege, G.
 
Books on Amazon
Field II 104
Verifikationstheorie/VsFrege/VsRussell/VsTractatus/VsRamsey/Bedeutung/Field: hier ist der Hauptbegriff nicht Wahrheitsbedingungen (WB) sondern Verifikations-Bedingungen (VB). (Vielleicht über Reize). Diese werden ohne daß-Sätze gegeben. WB/Rege/Russell/Field: einige Vertreter dieser Linie werden sagen, was beim Verifikationismus ausgelassen ist, sind nicht die WB, sondern propositionaler Inhalt.
Proposition/Verifikationismus/Field: kann der Verifikationist dann einfach als Klasse von VB bezeichnen. Für eine Äußerung drückt die entsprechende Proposition dann die Menge der VB aus, die sie hat. So mußten Propositionen im verifikationistischen Sinn nicht mit daß-Sätzen beschrieben werden.
Proposition/Inflationismus/Frege/Russell/Field: würde sagen, daß das keine richtigen Propositionen sind, weil diese WB einschließen müssen. InflationismusVsVerifikationismus.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Frege, G. Millikan Vs Frege, G.
 
Books on Amazon
I 102
Relation of projection/language/Millikan: We begin by saying that at least a few words are coordinated with objects. Accordingly, true propositions correspond with facts in the world.
Problem: Incorrect sentences do not correspond to any facts. How can individual words that correspond very well to objects, be composed in a way that in the end the whole sentence does not correspond?
Ex "Theaetetus flies": "Theaetetus" corresponds to Theaitetus, "flies" corresponds to flying.
wrong solution: to say that it was up to the relation between the Theaetetus and the flying. Because the relation corresponds somewhat, this may be instantiated (Ex between Theaitetos and walking) or uninstantiiert. Everything corresponds to something - just not the whole sentence "Theaetetus flies".
Solution/Frege: he joined the singular term with "values" that were the objects in the world.
I 103
Sentence/Frege/Millikan: he interpreted thus similarly to names, as complex characters that marked truth or falsity in the end. (Millikan pro Frege: "elegant") Solution/Wittgenstein/WittgensteinVsFrege/Millikan (Millikan: better than Frege): complex aRb, whereas in the case of false sentences the correspondence with the world lacks.
Correspondence/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but that is another meaning of "corresponding"! Words should correspond with different things than sentences with the world. ((S) double difference: 1. aRb unlike 2. SLW!. It would have already made a difference, if aRb and SRW were opposed.).
((S) Sense/Wittgenstein/(S): corresponds to the possibility of derogations.)
- - -
I 190
real value/indexical adaptor/denotation/Millikan: Ex "the ___ N of ....". indexical adaptor: has to be a real value of "N" to be in the embedded clause "N ..." and a real value of "the" in the embedded sentence "the ...".
focused eigenfunction/eigenfunction: to be translated into an internal name, which identifies the individual N. This has the entire denotation if it is properly adapted.
intentional Icon: Ex "the ___m of..." thus includes two intentional icons or projections on facts. But these are different from the purpose of the sentence as a whole or a subset.
embedded sentence: does not only want to introduce the listener to a fact, but o show to which complex category belongs what corresponds to the subject in the independent sentence containing the embedded sentence.
Reference: that's how the reference of a designation is determined.
Sense / Millikan: now it is clear why I have called sense the rules. Because the various markings differ in terms of the rules, even if they have the same references.
Sense according to Frege/Millikan: this difference of rules is the difference in meaning.
Meaning/reference/MillikanVsFrege: but a reference has to take on only a meaning of a certain kind. Thus, there is something that has been previously discriminated before the meaning of the remainder of the sentence has been identified.
I 191
Reference/meaning/Millikan: but the having of meaning or of references are very similar types of "having". - - -
I 274
Property/object/predicate/substance/individual/ontology/Millikan: Strawson'S distinction between "monogamous" and "non-monogamous" entities is not absolute but relative: Object/thing: Ex if my ring is made of gold, it can not be made of silver at the same time.
polygamous: Gold is relative to my ring. ((S) it could have been made of silver - the gold could have belonged to another subject.). Then gold is a property (as opposed to another) and my ring a substance.
But in relation to other substances the identity of gold seems to be like the identity of an individual.
Ontology/MillikanVsFrege/MillikanVsRussell: we must drop the rigid distinction between concept and object or individual thing and property.
I 275
Description: not only predicates are variations in world states, but also substances or individuals (they can be exchanged). Substance: if we consider gold as a property that does not prevent interpreting it also as a substance. As Aristotle said:
Individuals/Aristotle/Millikan: are merely primary substances, not the only substances that exist, that is, substances which are not properties of something else.
Substance/Millikan: is actually an epistemic category.
Substance/Millikan: Ex Gold, Ex Domestic Cat, Ex '69 Plymouth Valiant 100th.
Substance/category/Millikan: substances fall into categories defined by exclusive classes, in regard to which they are determined.
Ex gold and silver fall into the same category because they belong to the same exclusive classes: have a melting point, atomic weight, etc.
I 308
Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: For Quine a criterion for correct thinking seems to be that the relation to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction?
Correspondence/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what conformity in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If one does not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree.
Solution/Millikan: correspondence is to say the same about the same.
Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted.
One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow the sentence "Ouch!" He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer.
Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by a lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra).
Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree on a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in the nature (natural necessity).
I 309
Thesis: lack of contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987
Hintikka, J. Russell Vs Hintikka, J.
 
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Bertrand Russell
Hintikka I 179
RussellVsHintikka: he would not have accepted my representation of his position like this. HintikkaVsRussell: but the reason for this lies merely in a further error by Russell: I have not attributed to him what he believed, but what he should have believed.
Quantification/Russell/Hintikka: he should have reduced this to objects of acquaintance. But Russell believed that it was sufficient to eliminate expressions that apparently denote objects, which are not those of acquaintance.
N.B.: with this, his quantifiers do not enter an ontological commitment. Only denoting expressions do so.
Variable/Russell/Hintikka: with Russell only notational patterns.
Ontological commitment/Quine/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell did not recognize the ontological commitment, which languages of 1st order bring with them.
Being/ontology/Quine: "Being means, being a value of a bound variable."
HintikkaVsRussell: that, he did not recognize.

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Hintikka, J. Peacocke Vs Hintikka, J.
 
Books on Amazon
I 189
Possible Worlds/Acquaintance/Identification/Hintikka/Peacocke: then we must interpret Hintikka so that he assumes that only demonstrative methods are indispensable for the ability to distinguish between possible worlds.
I 189/190
PeacockeVsHintikka: E.g., it is quite natural that someone who sees a table in front of him also has a "descriptive" condition for the identification between possible worlds (cross-world identity). Whether one is in the right relations in the real world to be familiar with a thing (acquaintance), is one question, the conditions of cross-world identity is quite another!
This can be extended to the semantics of propositional attitudes in terms of possible worlds. It can be seen as a sufficient condition to quantify into belief contexts (!) that there is something in every possible world that is compatible with the belief of the subject that is in a certain relation to him, without asserting that the things that are in relation to him in another possible world are in any sense identical!
Then it is only necessary, but not sufficient for the subject to believe something that this belief must remain true with respect to any possible world compatible with this belief.
But this is something that every theory of possible worlds must assume in relation to propositional attitudes. Especially if these propositional attitudes cannot be formulated in terms of the subject.
Possible World/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: R. is unable to explain the cases where we quantify into belief contexts (!) where (according to Hintikka) the quantifier goes beyond "public descriptively identified" particulars.
Hintikka: compares this with a "roman à clef".
Peacocke: it is not clear that (if) this could not be explained by Russell as cases of general thoughts so that the person with such and such properties is so and so.

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983
Kripke, S. A. Donnellan Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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I 27
Names/DonnellanVsRussell: logical proper names ("this") are no meaningful construction: according to the natural conception, it is precisely proper names that stand for an object without describing it. DonnellanVsKripke: for him it looks as if the name would somehow stand directly for the language-independent given object, I 27 Donnellan: but the name is only a means, which could also be replaced by another one.
Donnellan. I 205
Causal Chain/Donnellan: must be historically correct. In the case of negative existential propositions it breaks off or is blocked. Names/BurgeVsKripke/BurgeVsDonnellan: not singular terms, but predicates (like Russell). E.g. "There is a time t for the speaker S a reference action x to an object y, so that: y is a Socrates and y is bald". The part sentence "y is a Socrates" thus has a truth condition itself. Reference is not eliminated. Dual reference: To the reference action and to naming.
Leibniz, G.W. Strawson Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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Hacking I 162
Monads / StrawsonVsLeibniz: the idea of a complete description is at all useless! ---
VII 116
StrawsonVsLeibniz/StrawsonVsRussell: both assume that the conventions that apply to existence, must also apply to statements of facts.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Lesniewski, St. Prior Vs Lesniewski, St.
 
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I 43
Abstracts/Prior: Ontological Commitment/Quine: quantification of non-nominal variables nominalises them and thus forces us to believe in the corresponding abstract objects.
Here is a more technical argument which seems to point into Quine's direction at first:
Properties/Abstraction Operator/Lambda Notation/Church/Prior: logicians who believe in the real existence of properties sometimes introduce names for them.
Abstraction Operator: should form names from corresponding predicates. Or from open sentences. (Special character)
Lambda: λ followed by a variable, followed by the open sentence in question.
E.g. if φx is read as "x is red",
I 44
then the property of redness is: λxφx. E.g. if Aφxψx: "x is red or x is green" (A: Here adjunction)
"Property of being red or green": λx∀φxψx.
To say that such a property characterizes an object, we just put the name of the property in front of the name of the object.
Lambda Calculus/Prior: usually has a rule that says that an object y has the property of φ-ness iff. y φt. I.e. we can equate:
(λy∀φxψx)y = ∀φyψy. ((s) y/x: because "for y applies: something (x) is...")
One might think that someone who does not believe in the real existence of properties does not need such a notation.
But perhaps we do need it if we want to be free for all types of quantification.
E.g. all-quantification of higher order:
a) C∏φCφy∑φyCAψyXy∑xAψxXx,
i.e. If (1) for all φ, if y φt, then φt is something
then (2) if y is either ψt or Xt, then
something results in either ψ or X.
That's alright.
Problem: if we want to formulate the more general principle of which a) is a special case: first:
b) C∏φΘφΘ()
Where we want to insert in the brackets that which symbolizes the alternation of a pair of verbs "ψ" and "X".
AψX does not work, because A must not be followed by two verbs, but only by two sentences.
We could introduce a new symbol A', which allows:
(A’ φψ)x = Aψxψx
this turns the whole thing into:
c) C∏φΘφΘA’ψX
From this we obtain by instantiation: of Θ
d) C∏φCφy∑xφxCA’ψXy∑xA’ψXx.
And this, Lesniewski's definition of "A", results in a).
This is also Lesniewski's solution to the problem.
I 45
PriorVsLesniewski: nevertheless, this is somewhat ad hoc. Lambda Notation: gives us a procedure that can be generalized:
For c) gives us
e) C∏φΘφΘ(λzAψzXz)
which can be instatiated to:
f) C∏φCφy∑xφx(λzAψzXz)y∑x(λzAψzXz)y.
From this, λ-conversion takes us back to a).
Point: λ-conversion does not take us back from e) to a), because in e) the λ-abstraction is not bound to an individual variable.
So of some contexts, "abstractions" cannot be eliminated.
- - -
I 161
Principia Mathematica/PM/Russell/Prior: Theorem 24.52: the universe is not empty The universal class is not empty, the all-class is not empty.
Russell himself found this problematic.
LesniewskiVsRussell: (Introduction to Principia Mathematica): violation of logical purity: that the universal class is believed to be not empty.
Ontology/Model Theory/LesniewskiVsRussell: for him, ontology is compatible with an empty universe.
PriorVsLesniewski: his explanation for this is mysterious:
Lesniewski: types at the lowest level stand for name (as in Russell).
But for him not only for singular names, but equally for general names and empty names!
Existence/LesniewskiVsRussell: is then something that can be significantly predicted with an ontological "name" as the subject. E.g. "a exists" is then always a well-formed expression (Russell: pointless!), albeit not always true.
Epsilon/LesniewskiVsRussell: does not only connect types of different levels for him, but also the same level! (Same logical types) E.g. "a ε a" is well-formed in Lesniewski, but not in Russell.
I 162
Set Theory/Classes/Lesniewski/Prior: what are we to make of it? I suggest that we conceive this ontology generally as Russell's set theory that simply has no variables for the lowest logical types. Names: so-called "names" of ontology are then not individual names like in Russell, but class names.
This solves the first of our two problems: while it is pointless to split individual names, it is not so with class names.
So we split them into those that are applied to exactly one individual, to several, or to none at all.
Ontology/Lesniewski/Russell/Prior: the fact that there should be no empty class still requires an explanation.
Names/Lesniewski/Prior: Lesniewski's names may therefore be logically complex! I.e. we can, for example, use to form their logical sum or their logical product!
And we can construct a name that is logically empty.
E.g. the composite name "a and not-a".
Variables/Russell: for him, on the other hand, individual variables are logically structureless.
Set Theory/Lesniewski/Prior: the development of Russell's set theory but without variables at the lowest level (individuals) causes problems, because these are not simply dispensable for Russell. On the contrary; for Russell, classes are constructed of individuals.
Thus he has, as it were, a primary (for individuals, functors) and a secondary language (for higher-order functors, etc.)
Basic sentences are something like "x ε a".
I 163
Def Logical Product/Russell: e.g. of the αs and βs: the class of xs is such that x is an α, and x is a β.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Meinong, A. Frege Vs Meinong, A.
 
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III 107
FregeVsMeinong FregeVsRussell: there are contradictory terms, there are only no contradictory objects - the logic may determine only the limitation of terms, ie for each object, whether it falls within the definition, or not - a contradictory term is used to prove that there is no corresponding object.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993
Meinong, A. Meixner Vs Meinong, A.
 
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I 62
rundes Quadrat/Kennzeichnung/Meinong/Meixner: der Meinongianer sagt ja nicht, dass das runde Quadrat existiert, er geht sogar noch weiter und sagt, es könne gar nicht existieren, er insistiert nur darauf, dass es eine Entität ist.
I 63
MeinongVsRussell: wenn die Kennzeichnung "der goldene Berg" ein unvollständiges Individual bezeichnet, dann doch wohl auch die folgende Kennzeichnung genauso: "der existierende goldene Berg".
MeixnerVsMeinong: wenig überzeugend. Allerdings:
"schwacher Sinn"/Existenz: wie bei Holmes kann man im schwachen Sinn sagen, "er hat die Eigenschaft F, zu existieren".
Aber das ist nicht der starke Sinn.
Possibilia/Meixner: individuenähnliche Entitäten, denen es zumindest im Prinzip möglich ist, zu existieren. ((s) Also nicht ein rundes Quadrat).
Frage: gibt es so etwas?
Das wäre genau die ee maximalkonsistenten Individuale und Individuen.
Die unmöglichen sind nicht ee maximalkonsistent.
maximalkonsistente Individuale: Bsp meixner, bush, (Mengen von Eigenschaften).
reine Posssibilia: bloß mögliche Individuen oder Individuale. Gibt es solche?
Sprache: hat interessanterweise für reine Possibilia keine Namen!
I 64
Dennoch gibt es gewisse ontologische Hinweise auf das Vorhandensein reiner Possibilia: Es steht fest, dass manche Individuen zwar aktual sind, aber dennoch hätten nicht aktual sein können (Bsp Menschen).
Meixner: These: die umgekehrte Annahme, dass manche zwar nicht aktual sind aber dennoch hätten aktual sein können, tritt natürlicherweise neben diese Tatsache.
Meixner: gewisse aktuale Individuen verweisen auf nichtaktuale: Eizellen und Samenzellen, aus denen nie eine Mensch hervorgeht. Soll man hier nun sagen, dass es bloss so scheine, als würde auf einen möglichen Menschen verweisen, und dass am anderen Ende der Verweisungsbeziehung (Referenz) nicht ist.
unverwirklichte Möglichkeiten/Meixner: gewisse Eigenschaften hat der bloß mögliche Mensch nicht, z. B. ein genaues Geburtsdatum, (d.h. er hat sie nicht in der WiWe, der wirklichen (aktualen) Welt, aber dennoch hat er die Negation dieser Eigenschaften.
unverwirklichte Möglichkeiten/Meixner: die Anlage für blaue Augen (der Ei und Samenzellen) lassen an positiver Bestimmtheit sogar nichts zu wünschen übrig!
Def maximalkonsistent/Meixner: von jeder Individueneigenschaft enthält das Individual entweder diese selbst oder seine Negation. ((s) > durchgängige Bestimmung/Kant).
reine Possibilia/Meixner: das gilt auf für bloß mögliche. Das Individual ist gewissermaßen nichts anderes als diese Menge von Eigenschaften (s.o.).

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004
Metalanguage Wittgenstein Vs Metalanguage
 
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VI 78
Figure/sentence/Wittgenstein/Schulte: In the sentence must be distinguished just as much as to the situation that it represents. (4:04). (Mathematical, logic manifold). ---
VI 79
This mathematical multiplicity cannot be reproduced again. One cannot escape it during reproduction. (4041). (WittgensteinVsRussell, WittgensteinVsType theory, WittgensteinVsMetalanguage).       The logical element - which gives the image the multiplicity - cannot be the subject itself of an image.

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Mill, J. St. Kripke Vs Mill, J. St.
 
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Kripke I 36
FregeVsMill/RussellVsMill:Fallacy: in reality, a proper name which is used correctly is only an abbreviated or disguised description.
I 81
KripkeVsMill: Ordinary proper names of people are not characters that have no sense. We could otherwise understand any sentence in which "Socrates" is used if we do not know that "Socrates" means "the individual who is called ’Socrates’".
I 145
Mill: "singular names": connotative: Description. Non-connotative: proper name.
I 145
But Mill: All names for general types are connotative. E.g. "human being" is defined as a conjunction of certain properties which specify the necessary and sufficient conditions to be a human being: rationality, animality and certain physical properties. RussellVsMill: Wrong by common names, right by singular names.
KripkeVsRussell: Mill: Right by singular names, wrong for general names. Maybe some general names ("foolish" ,"fat", "yellow ") express properties. General names like "cow"and "tiger"do not, unless being a cow banally counts as a property. (> Properties).
Kripke’s general names such as "cat" do not express any property.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984
Mill, J. St. Russell Vs Mill, J. St.
 
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Bertrand Russell
FregeVsMill/RussellVsMill: error: in reality, a proper name that is used correctly, is only an abbreviated or disguised designation.
---
Kripke I 36
Mill: "singular names": connotative: characteristic. Non-connotative: proper names.
---
I 145
But Mill: all names for general types connotative. E.g. "human being" is defined as a conjunction of certain properties, which specify necessary and sufficient conditions for the being-a-human: rationality, animality and certain physical properties. RussellVsMill: wrong with general names, correct with singular names.
KripkeVsRussell: Mill: correct with singular names, wrong in general names. Maybe some general names express ("foolish", "fat", "yellow") properties. General names like "cow" and "tiger" do not, unless being a cow, counts in a trivial way as a property . (> properties).
---
I 145
Strand: Kripke general names such as "cat" express no property.

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996
Moore, G.E. Ayer Vs Moore, G.E.
 
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Horwich I 52
RussellVsPropositionsRussellVsRussell: (later, Logic and Knowledge, 1956, p. 223): I used to think there were some. But that would only be shadowy additional things to facts. CartwrightVsRussell: we still do not know what the objection against them is!".
I 53
Fact/AyerVsMoore: expresses himself unclearly when he says, "the fact does not exist". Properly, it should be: "There is no fact". ("There is"/Existing/"Being"). (Ayer, Russell and Moore, p. 210). CartwrightVsMoore: it still remains a poor argument: it cannot be concluded that because a false belief has no fact as an object it has no object at all.
What Moore meant becomes more clear in "Some Main Problems": the proposition "that lions exist" is definitely in the universe, if someone believes that, regardless of whether it is true or false. Because the expressions "that lions exist" and "the existence of lions" are names for that which is believed. (p. 260).
Cartwright: at first this looks like a mistake, but it’s not: because he seems to have accepted (together with Russell) that what is believed can be named with a verb ("verbal noun").
I 54
Then we seem to have a demonstration that there is no such thing as the proposition that E.g. there is no subway in Boston. Because if there were one, there would also have to be such a thing as the non-existence of a subway in Boston. And this cannot exist, because there is a subway in Boston. Cartwright: what is the basis of this argument, the assumption that what is believed may be referred to by a verb (verbal noun)?.
CartwrightVsMoore: the argument is not very convincing: Maybe the sentence E.g. "Brown believes that God exists" is synonymous with "Brown believes in the existence of God." But it does not follow that what Brown believes is the existence of God. ((s) The "object" (object of the belief) is on the one hand a sentence with "that", and on the other hand the actual existence). (FN 19).
The reason for this lies in Russell’s access to propositions:
(8) Brown is taller than Smith.
I 56
Fact/proposition/CartwrightVsMoore/CartwrightVsRussell: Problem: now it is just hard to see how a proposition can be anything but true! (FN 23). If in (8) Brown is linked to Smith the way it is said above, how can Brown be anything but taller than Smith?. Russell: E.g. the proposition "A is different from B". The components seem to be only A, B and difference. Nevertheless, they do not constitute the proposition when they are next to each other. The Proposition combines the parts in more ways than a mere list. (FN 24).
Cartwright: nevertheless, if the proposition links the parts like this, it cannot be wrong!.
Cartwright: if a proposition like (8) exists, then Brown is taller than Smith.
Russell: in "Principles" he was also aware that there is a difficulty, but as a solution he could only propose:
Russell: if a proposition is true, it has another quality apart from that which it shares with other propositions. (p. 49).
Cartwright: this additional quality should of course be the simple, unanalysable truth. But this appeal comes too late! Either the components are linked properly, then the proposition is invariably true, or they are not, then we have no proposition at all.
A.J.Ayer
I Ayer Wahrheit, aus "Wahrheitstheorien" Hrsg. Skirbekk Frankfurt/M 1996
II Hügli ()Hrsg.) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Moore, G.E. Cartwright Vs Moore, G.E.
 
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Horwich I 45
Correspondence theory/CartwrightVsmoore: Problem: there is also a property of coincidence (correspondence) which does not have the false proposition. And that seems to depend undeniably on the world! On a fact. Fact: the proposition is true if it is a fact that there are subways in Boston, otherwise it is false. CartwrightVsMoore/CartwrightVsRussell: it is precisely this which the theory of truth ignores as a simple, unanalysable property. But both were aware of this. ("Meinong Theory", p 75). They stuck to it, because: RussellVsCorrespondence theory, MooreVsCorrespondence theory.
I 47
Fact/True proposition/Moore/Cartwright: (Moore: Some Main P, pp 262): seems to have explained his former theory wrongly there: Tact/MooreVsMoore: (late): does not consist in a proposition having a simple property while remaining the same, regardless of whether it is true or false. Even if we concede the existence of propositions. The relation of the proposition to the fact is not simply that the proposition is a constituent of the fact, one of the elements of which it is composed. Moore/Cartwright: otherwise, one would have to say that E.g. the fact that lions exist was a fact about the proposition that lions exist. But how is this relevant for Moore’s earlier theory? Because that was not what it was about, but rather that the fact that lions exist simply is the proposition. (Moore, early: fact = true proposition, not part of it) The simple property (truth) is possessed by the proposition itself.
I 48
Anyone who believes that the proposition that lions exist is true, believes the corresponding proposition. The fact here is that the proposition is true. Fact/Moore: (early): consists in that the proposition possesses the simple property of truth. Fact/Moore/late: (Some Main P, misrepresenting his earlier theory): now consists in the possession of the truth (simple property) by the proposition. Important argument: then there is no identity fact = true proposition: because identity does not consist in itself having a property. ((s) A does not consist of the fact that A has the property F,> consist in, consist of, identity). Moore/Cartwright: the time of "Some Main .." he had come to the view that the relation theory of beliefs (acceptance of belief objects) is inconsistent with the identification of facts with true propositions. Now a relation was searched rather than the identity and his solution was the relation of "consisting in": Def Fact/Moore: (Some Main Problems): consists in the possession of truth by the proposition. (still simple property). CartwrightVsMoore: he saw himself that this was not very successful: there are facts that do not consist in a proposition having a certain simple property.
CartwrightVsMoore: worse: once facts and propositions are distinguished, no simple property (truth) is needed anymore. Instead, we now have facts as the corresponding ones! It was precisely this inability to distinguish propositions and facts that had led Moore and Russell to the theory of truth as a simple unanalysable property!.
Fact/Proposition/Moore/Cartwright: what had led Moore to start believing that propositions and facts cannot be identified?.
I 49
E.g. Suppose Brown believes that there are subways in Boston. Moore/Russell/early: then there is a corresponding proposition that Brown believes.
Problem: even if the belief had been wrong, Brown would have needed a faith object. Because what someone believes cannot depend on its truth!.
So the believed proposition is definitely in the universe. But if the proposition is false, there is no corresponding fact in the universe. So propositions cannot be identical with facts. Ayer: this is a compelling argument. Cartwright: but for me it does not refute the early theory!. Russell/Moore/Early/Cartwright: sure, if something is true of a proposition, and it is not true of the corresponding fact, then proposition and fact are not the identical. But is this case given here? According to the early theory, the proposition would be in the universe anyway, even if it were wrong. Question: Is Moore right to say that the same does not apply to the fact? CartwrightVsMoore: it is not obvious that if the belief, e.g. that there are underground trains in Boston, was wrong, it would be necessary that something that actually exists in the universe, (namely that there are underground trains in Boston) would then be missing in the universe. Surely it would not be fact, but that does not mean that an entity would be missing if the belief had been wrong.
I 50
Analogy: e.g. there is someone in the universe who can be correctly described as the author of Word and Object (namely Quine). Now, it could easily have been the case that Quine had not written the book. But that would not require Quine (= author of W + O) to not exist in the universe! E.g. Someone else might also have written the book. Furthermore, all persons who actually are in the universe, would not have had to be in the universe. Moore/Early/Cartwright: According to Moore’s earlier theory one might have thought that by analogy, something could also be in the universe that is "correctly described" with that there are underground trains in Boston, which, in the case that there were no underground trains in Boston, would not be a fact. That is wrong because of the false analogy between people and abstract belief objects). CartwrightVsMoore: (early): a follower of the early theory would have expressed the true same proposition with the following two sentences: (3) The fact that there are underground trains in Boston would not have had to be the fact that there are underground trains in Boston. and
(4) The author of Word and Object would not have had to be the author of Word and Object. CartwrightVsMoore: (early): With that he would have assumed that "the fact that" would have been a rigid designator.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Possibilia Lewis Vs Possibilia
 
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Schwarz I 87
Possibilia/MöWe/mögliche Welten/possibilistischer Strukturalismus/Lewis/Schwarz: (1991,1993d) hier ging Lewis davon aus, These: dass es deutlich weniger Bewohner von MöWe (Possibilia) gibt als Mengen. ML: für sie mussten also zusätzliche Entitäten neben den Possibilia angenommen werden. Diese zusätzlichen Entitäten sollten dann gerade die Mengen (und Klassen), wie die 5. Bedingung (s.o.) verlangt.
Lewis später: akzeptiert, dass es mindestens so viele Possibilia wie Mengen (s.o. Abschnitt 3.2). Dann könnte man auf die zusätzlichen mathematischen Entitäten verzichten (Lewis pro). Dann streichen wir die 5. Bedingung. Dann müssen „viele“ Bewohner von MöWe Mengen sein.
Schw I 88
Denn Lewis setzt voraus, dass es mehr Mengen als Individuen gibt. Denn wenn es „viele“ Individuen gibt, dann auch „viele“ individuelle Atome, Atome von Individuen. Es gibt aber mehr Summen individueller Atome als individuelle Atome. Dann gibt es auch mehr Individuen als Atome überhaupt und dann nach Bedingung (1) und (3) auch mehr Einermengen als Atome, im Widerspruch zu (2). Possibilia/Lewis/Schwarz: wenn sie keine Kardinalität haben, können nicht alle Possibilia Individuen sein.
Def possibilistischer Strukturalismus/Lewis/Schwarz: mathematische Aussagen handeln ohnehin nicht nur von mathematischen Entitäten, sondern teilweise auch von Possibilia. Warum dann nicht nur von diesen?
Pro: er kommt nicht nur ganz ohne primitives mathematisches Vokabular, sondern auch ohne primitive mathematische Ontologie aus. Damit erledigen sich Fragen nach deren Herkunft und unserem epistemischen Zugang. Handeln mathematische Aussagen von Possibilia, ergibt sich ihr
modaler Status aus der Logik unbeschränkter Modalität: Für unbeschränkt
modale Aussagen fallen Wahrheit, Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit zusammen
(s.o. Abschnitt 3.6).
Lewis: kann aber die mathematische Entitäten nicht einfach streichen. (LewisVsField): Problem: gemischte Summen. Bsp wenn einige Atome in Cäsars Gehirn als Einermengen und andere als Individuen eingestuft werden, dann ist Cäsar eine gemischte Summe.
Gemischte Summe/Mereologie/Lewis: ist aber selbst weder Individuum noch Klasse.
Klasse: Summe von Einermengen.
Schw I 89
gemischte Summen: sind in Lewis’ Originalsystem auch keine Elemente von Mengen. Schwarz: das ist mengentheoretisch unmotiviert: nach der iterativen Auffassung hat absolut alles eine Einermenge. Lewis ignoriert gemischte Summen sowieso meist.
Problem: nicht unter jeder Einermengenbeziehung gibt es eine Einermenge von Cäsar.
Lösung: a) auch gemischten Summe eine Einermenge zugestehe. Vs: es gibt mehr gemischte Summen als Einermengen, das funktioniert also nicht.
b) Forderung: dass alle „kleinen“ gemischten Summen eine Einermenge haben.
c) eleganter: gemischte Summe dadurch erledigen, dass man Individuen verbietet. Wenn man Klassen mit gewöhnlichen Possibilia identifiziert, könnte man jedes Atom als Einermenge behandeln. Bsp Cäsar ist dann immer eine Klasse, seine Einermenge Gegenstand der reinen Mengenlehre.
LewisVs: das funktioniert in seiner ML (anders als bei ZFC) nicht. Denn wir brauchen mindestens ein Individuum als leere Menge.
Einermenge/Lewis/Schwarz: da ein einziges individuelles Atom dazu aber ausreicht, könnte man an Stelle von (1) (3) Einermengenbeziehungen auch als beliebige eineindeutige Abbildungen von kleinen Dingen in alle Atome außer einem bestimmen. Dieses eine Atom ist dann die leere Menge relativ zur jeweiligen Einermengen Beziehung. (> QuineVsRussell: mehrere leere Mengen, dort je nach Typ).
Lösung/Daniel Nolan: (2001, Kaß 7, 2004): VsLewis, VsZermelo: leere Menge als echter Teil von Einermengen:
Def „Esingleton“ von A /Nolan: {A} besteht aus 0 und einem Ding {A} – 0 . (Terminologie: „Singleton“: einzige Karte einer Farbe).
Esingleton/Nolan: für sie gelten ähnliche Annahmen wie bei Lewis für Einermengen.
Gemischte Summe/Nolan: dieses Problem wird zu dem von Summen aus 0 und Atomen, die keine Esingletons sind. Diese sind bei Nolan nie Elemente von Mengen.
Gegenstand/Nolan: (2004.§4):nur gewisse „große“ Dinge kommen als 0 in Frage. Also werden alle „kleinen“ Dinge als Elemente von Klassen erlaubt.
Individuum/Nolan: viele „kleine“ Dinge sind bei ihm unter allen Esingleton Beziehungen Individuen.
Leere Menge/Schwarz: alle diese Ansätze sind nicht makellos. Die Behandlung der leeren Menge ist immer etwas künstlich.
Schw I 90
leere Menge/Lewis/Schwarz: Menge aller Individuen (s.o.): Das hat einen guten Grund! ((s) Also gibt es keine Individuen und die leere Menge wird gebraucht, um das auszudrücken.). Teilmenge/Lewis/Schwarz: ist dann disjunktiv definiert: einmal für Klassen und einmal für die leere Menge.
possibilistischer Strukturalismus/Schwarz: ist elegant. Vs: er verhindert mengentheoretische Konstruktionen von MöWe (etwa als Satzmengen).
Wenn man Wahrheiten über Mengen auf solche über Possibilia reduziert, kann man Possibilia nicht mehr auf Mengen reduzieren.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Principia Mathematica Gödel Vs Principia Mathematica
 
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Russell I XIV
Zirkelfehlerprinzip/VsPrincipia Mathematica/PM/Russell/Gödel: scheint also nur zu gelten unter konstruktivistischen Annahmen: wenn man unter einem Begriff ein Symbol versteht, zusammen mit einer Regel, um Sätze, die das Symbol enthalten zu übersetzen in Sätze, die es nicht enthalten. Klassen/Begriffe/Gödel: können dagegen auch als reale Objekte aufgefasst werden, nämlich als "Vielheiten von Dingen" und Begriffe als Eigenschaften oder Relationen von Dingen, die unabhängig von unseren Definitionen und Konstruktionen existieren!
Das ist genauso legitim wie die Annahme physikalischer Körper. Sie sind auch für Mathematik notwendig, so wie sie es für die Physik sind. Konzept/Terminologie/Gödel: ich werde „Konzept“ von jetzt an ausschließlich in diesem objektiven Sinne gebrauchen.
Ein formaler Unterschied zwischen diesen zwei Konzeptionen von Begriffen wäre: dass von zwei verschiedenen Definitionen der Form α(x) = φ(x) angenommen werden kann, dass sie zwei verschiedenen Begriffe α im konstruktivistischen Sinn definieren. (Nominalistisch: da zwei solche Definitionen unterschiedliche Übersetzungen geben für Propositionen, die α enthalten.)
Für Konzepte (Begriffe) ist das dagegen keineswegs der Fall, da dasselbe Ding in verschiedener Weise beschrieben werden kann.
Bsp "Zwei ist der Begriff, unter den alle Paare fallen und nichts sonst." Es gibt gewiss mehr als einen Begriff im konstruktivistischen Sinne, der dieser Bedingung genügt, aber es könnte eine gemeinsame "Form" oder "Natur" aller Paare geben.
Alle/Carnap: Vorschlag, "alle" als Notwendigkeit zu verstehen, würde nichts helfen, wenn "Beweisbarkeit" konstruktivistisch eingeführt würde (..+..).
Def Intensionalitätsaxiom/Russell/Gödel: zu verschiedenen Definitionen gehören verschiedene Begriffe.
Dieses Axiom hält für Begriffe im Zirkelfehlerprinzip: konstruktivistischer Sinn.
Konzepte/Russell/Gödel: (ungleich Begriffe!) sollen objektiv existieren. (Also nicht konstruiert). (Realistischer Standpunkt).
Ist nur die Rede von Konzepten, bekommt die Frage einen völlig anderen Sinn: dann scheint es keinen Einwand dagegen zu geben, von ihnen allen zu sprechen, noch dagegen, einige von ihnen unter Bezug auf alle zu beschreiben.
Eigenschaften/GödelVsRussell: man könnte sicher von der Totalität aller Eigenschaften (oder aller eines bestimmten Typs) sprechen, ohne dass das zu einer "Absurdität" führen würde! ((s) > Bsp „Alle Eigenschaften eines großen Feldherrn“.
Gödel: das macht es lediglich unmöglich, ihren Sinn zu konstruieren (d.h. als eine Behauptung über Sinneswahrnehmung oder irgendwelche anderen nichtkonzeptuellen Entitäten zu erklären), was kein Einwand für jemand ist, der den realistischen Standpunkt einnimmt.
Teil/Ganzes/Mereologie/GödelVsRussell:: ebenso wenig ist es widersprüchlich, dass ein Teil identisch (nicht bloß gleich) sein soll mit dem Ganzen, wie im Falle von Strukturen im abstrakten Sinne zu sehen ist. Bsp Die Struktur der Reihe der ganzen Zahlen enthält sich selbst als einen besonderen Teil.
I XVI/XVII
Sogar innerhalb des Bereichs der konstruktivistischen Logik gibt es gewisse Annäherungen an diese Selbstreflektivität (Selbstreflexivität/Heutzutage: Selbstähnlichkeit) imprädikativer Eigenschaften, nämlich Bsp Propositionen, die als Teile ihres Sinns nicht sich selbst enthalten, sondern ihre eigene formale Beweisbarkeit. Es existieren auch Sätze, die sich auf eine Totalität von Sätzen beziehen, zu der sie selbst gehören: Bsp "Jeder Satz einer (gegebenen) Sprache enthält mindestens ein Beziehungswort."
Das macht es nötig, nach anderen Lösungen für die Paradoxien zu suchen, denen zufolge der Trugschluss nicht in der Annahme gewisser Selbstreflektivitäten der Grundterme besteht, sondern in anderen Annahmen über dieselben!
Die Lösung mag vorläufig in der einfachen Typentheorie gefunden worden sein. Natürlich bezieht sich all das nur auf Konzepte.
Klassen: man sollte meinen, dass sie ebenfalls nur durch ihre Definitionen nicht geschaffen, sondern nur beschrieben werden! Dann gilt das Zirkelfehler Prinzip wieder nicht.
Zermelo spaltet Klassen in "Ebenen" auf, so dass nur Mengen niedrigerer Ebenen Elementen von Mengen höherer Ebenen sein können.
Reducibility axiom/Russell/Gödel. (später fallengelassen) wird nun vom Klassenaxiom (Zermelos "axiom of choice") eingenommen: dass für jede Ebene für eine beliebige Propositionalfunktion
φ(x)
die Menge jener x von dieser Ebene existiert, für die φ(x) wahr ist.
Das scheint impliziert zu sein durch das Konzept von Klassen als Vielheiten.
I XVIII
Extensionality/Klassen: Russell: zwei Gründe gegen die extensionale Sicht von Klassen: 1. Die Existenz der Nullklasse, die nicht gut eine Kollektion sein kann, 2. Die Einerklassen, die identisch sein müssten mit ihren einzigen Elementen. GödelVsRussell: das könnte nur beweisen, dass die Nullklassen und die Einerklassen (als unterschieden von ihrem einzigen Element) Fiktionen sind zur Vereinfachung des Kalküls, und nicht beweisen, dass alle Klassen Fiktionen sind!
Russell: versucht, soweit wie möglich ohne die Annahme der objektiven Existenz von Klassen auszukommen. Danach sind Klassen nur eine facon de parler.
Gödel: aber auch "idealistische" Propositionen, die Universalien enthalten, könnten zu denselben Paradoxien führen.
Russell: schafft Regeln der Übersetzungen, nach denen Sätze, die Klassennamen oder den Term "Klasse" enthalten, übersetzt werden in solche, die sie nicht enthalten.
Klassennamen/Russell: eliminieren durch Übersetzungsregeln.
Klassen/PM/Russell/Gödel: Principia kommen so ohne Klassen aus, aber nur wenn man die Existenz eines Konzepts annimmt, wann immer man eine Klasse konstruieren möchte.
Zunächst müssen einige von ihnen, die Grundprädikate und Relationen wie "rot", "kälter" augenscheinlich als reale Objekte angesehen werden. Die höheren Begriffe erscheinen dann als etwas Konstruiertes (d.h. etwas, das nicht zum "Inventar der Welt" gehört).
I XIX
Ramsey: meinte, dass man Propositionen unendlicher Länge bilden könne und hält den Unterschied endlich /unendlich für nicht so entscheidend. Gödel: Logik und Mathematik sind wie Physik auf einem realen Inhalt aufgebaut und können nicht "wegerklärt" werden.
Existenz/Ontologie/Gödel: es verhält sich nicht so, als sei das Universum der Dinge in Ordnungen eingeteilt und wäre es einem verboten, von allen Ordnungen zu sprechen, sondern im Gegenteil: es ist möglich, von allen existierenden Dingen zu sprechen. Klassen und Konzepte sind allerdings nicht darunter.
Wenn sie aber als facon de parler eingeführt werden, stellt sich heraus, dass die Erweiterung des Symbolismus die Möglichkeit eröffnet, sie auf umfassendere Weise einzuführen, und so weiter, bis ins Unendliche.
Um dieses Schema durchzuhalten, muss man allerdings die Arithmetik (oder etwas gleichwertiges) voraussetzen, was nur beweist, dass nicht einmal diese beschränkte Logik auf nichts aufgebaut werden kann.
I XX
Konstruktivistische Haltung/constructivism/Russell/Gödel: wurde in der ersten Auflage aufgegeben, da das reducibility axiom für höhere Typen es notwendig macht, dass Grundprädikate von beliebig hohem Typ existieren. Vom Konstruktivismus bleibt lediglich
1. Klassen als facon de parler
2. Die Definition von ~, v,. usw. als geltend für Propositionen, die Quantoren enthalten,
3. Stufenweise Konstruktion von Funktionen von Ordnungen höher als 1 (freilich wegen des R-Axioms überflüssig)
4. Interpretation von Definitionen als bloßen typographischen Abkürzungen (alles unvollständige Symbole, nicht solche, die ein durch die Definition beschriebenes Objekt benennt!).
Reducibility axiom/GödelVsRussell: dieser letzte Punkt ist eine Illusion, weil wegen des reducibility axiom stets reale Objekte in Form von Grundprädikaten oder Kombinationen von solchen entsprechend jedem definierten Symbol existieren.
Konstruktivistische Haltung/Konstruktivismus/PM/Gödel: wird in der zweiten Auflage wieder eingenommen und das Reducibility axiom fallengelassen. Es wird festgestellt, dass alle Grundprädikate zum niedrigsten Typ gehören.
Variablen/Russell/Gödel: ihr Zweck ist es, die Behauptungen komplizierterer Wahrheitsfunktionen von atomistischen Propositionen zu ermöglichen. (d.h. dass die höheren Typen nur eine facon de parler sind.).
Die Basis der Theorie soll also aus Wahrheitsfunktionen von atomistischen Propositionen bestehen.
Das ist kein Problem, wenn die Zahl der Individuen und Grundprädikate endlich ist.
Ramsey: Problem der Unfähigkeit, unendliche Propositionen zu bilden ist "bloße Nebensache"
I XXI
endlich/unendlich/Gödel: mit dieser Umgehung des Problems durch Missachtung des Unterschieds von endlich und unendlich dann existiert eine einfachere und zugleich weiterreichende Interpretation der Mengenlehre: Dann wird nämlich Russells Apercu, dass Propositionen über Klassen als Propositionen über ihre Elemente interpretiert werden können, buchstäblich wahr, vorausgesetzt, n ist die Zahl der (endlichen) Individuen der Welt und vorausgesetzt, wir vernachlässigen die Nullklasse. (..) + I XXI
- - -
Theorie der Ganzen Zahlen: die zweite Auflage behauptet, dass sie zu erreichen sei. Problem: dass in der Definition "jene Kardinalzahlen, die zu jeder Klasse gehören, die 0 enthält und x + 1 enthält, wenn sie x enthält" die Wendung "jede Klasse" sich auf eine gegebene Ordnung beziehen muss.
I XXII
So erhält man ganze Zahlen verschiedener Ordnungen, und vollständige Induktion kann auf ganze Zahlen von Ordnung n nur für Eigenschaften von n angewandt werden! (...) Die Frage der Theorie der ganzen Zahlen auf Basis der verzweigten Typentheorie ist zurzeit noch ungelöst.
I XXIII
Theorie der Ordnung/Gödel: fruchtbarer, wenn sie von einem mathematischen Standpunkt, nicht einem philosophischen betrachtet wird, also unabhängig von der Frage, ob imprädikative Definitionen zulässig sind. (...) imprädikative Totalitäten werden von einer Funktion der Ordnung α und ω vorausgesetzt.
Menge/Klasse/PM/Russell/Type theory/Gödel: die Existenz einer wohlgeordneten Menge vom Ordnungstyp ω1 reicht hin für die Theorie der reellen Zahlen.
Def Kontinuumshypothese/Gödel: (verallgemeinert): keine Kardinalzahl existiert zwischen der Potenz irgendeiner beliebigen Menge und der Potenz der Menge ihrer Untermengen.
Type Theory/VsType theory/GödelVsRussell: gemischte Typen (Individuen zusammen mit Prädikationen über Individuen usw.) widersprechen dem Zirkelfehlerprinzip offensichtlich gar nicht!
I XXIV
Russell stützte seine Theorie auf ganz andere Gründe, die denen ähneln, die Frege bereits für die Theorie einfacherer Typen für Funktionen angenommen hatte. Propositionalfunktionen/Aussagenfunktion/AF/Russell/Gödel: haben immer etwas mehrdeutiges, wegen der Variablen. (Frege: etwas ungesättigtes).
Propositionalfunktion/p.f./Russell/Gödel: sozusagen ein Fragment einer Proposition. Sie zu kombinieren, ist nur möglich, wenn sie "zusammenpassen" d.h. von geeignetem Typ sind.
GödelVsRussell: Konzepte (Begriffe) als reale Objekte: dann ist die Theorie der einfachen Typen nicht plausibel, denn wovon man erwarten würde dass es (wie z.B. "Transitivität" oder die Zahl zwei) ein Konzept wäre, schiene dann etwas zu sein, was hinter all seinen unterschiedlichen "Realisationen" auf den verschiedenen Ebenen steht und das demnach zufolge der Typentheorie nicht existiert.
I XXV
Paradoxien in der intensionalen Form/Gödel: hier bringt die Typentheorie eine neue Idee: nämlich die Paradoxien nicht auf dem Axiom zu tadeln, dass jede Propositionalfunktion ein Konzept oder eine Klasse definiert, sondern auf der Annahme, dass jedes Konzept eine sinnvolle Proposition ergibt, wenn es behauptet wird für ein beliebiges Objekt als Argument. Der Einwand, dass jedes Konzept ausgedehnt werden kann auf alle Argumente, indem ein anderes definiert wird, das eine falsche Proposition ergibt, wann immer das ursprüngliche sinnlos war, kann leicht entkräftet werden durch den Hinweis, dass das Konzept "sinnvoll anwendbar" nicht selbst immer sinnvoll anwendbar sein muss.
Principia Mathematica Wittgenstein Vs Principia Mathematica
 
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II 338
Identity/Relation/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell's notation triggers confusion, because it gives the impression that the identity is a relationship between two things. This use of the equal sign, we have to differentiate from its use in arithmetics, where we may think of it as part of a replacement rule. WittgensteinVsRussell: its spelling gives erroneously the impression that there is a sentence like x = y or x = x. But one can abolish the signs of identity.
---
II 352
Definition number/Russell/Wittgenstein: Russell's definition of number as a property of a class is not unnecessary, because it states a method on how to find out if a set of objects had the same number as the paradigm. Now Russell has said, however, that they are associated with the paradigm, not that they can be assigned.
---
II 353
The finding that two classes are associated with one another, means, that it makes sense to say so. WittgensteinVsRussell: But how do you know that they are associated with one another? One cannot know and hence, one cannot know, if they are assigned to the same number, unless you carry out the assignment, that is, to write it down.
---
II 402
Acquaintance/description/WittgensteinVsRussell: misleading claim that, although we have no direct acquaintance with an infinite series, but knowledge by description. ---
II 415
Number/definition/WittgensteinVsRussell: the definition of the number as the predicate of a predicate: there are all sorts of predicates, and two is not an attribute of a physical complex, but a predicate. What Russell says about the number, is inadequate because no criteria of identity are named in Principia and because the spelling of generality is confusing.
The "x" in "(Ex)fx" stands for a thing, a substrate.
Number/Russell/Wittgenstein: has claimed, 3 is the property that is common to all triads.
WittgensteinVsRussell: what is meant by the claim that the number is a property of a class?
---
II 416
It makes no sense to say that ABC was three; this is a tautology and says nothing when the class is given extensionally. By contrast, it makes sense to claim that in this room there are three people. Definition number/WittgensteinVsRussell: the number is an attribute of a function which defines a class, not a property of the extension.
WittgensteinVsRussell: he wanted to get ,next to the list, another "entity", so he provided a function that uses the identity to define this entity.
---
II 418
Definition number/WittgensteinVsRussell: a difficulty in Russell's definition is the concept of the clear correspondence. Equal sign/Russell/Wittgenstein: in Principia Mathematica, there are two meanings of identity. 1. by definition as 1 + 1 = 2 Df. ("Primary equations")
2. the formula "a = a" uses the "=" in a special way, because one would not say that a can be replaced by a.
The use of "=" is limited to cases in which a bound variable occurs.
WittgensteinVsRussell: instead of (Ex):fx . (y).fy > (x=y), one writes (Ex)fx: ~ (Ex,y).fx.fy, (sic) which states that there are no two things, but only one.
---
IV 47/48
So you cannot introduce objects of a formal concept and the formal concept itself, as primitive concepts. WittgensteinVsRussell: one cannot introduce the concept of function and special functions as primitive concepts, or e.g. the concept of number and definite numbers.
---
IV 73
WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.452 in Principia Mathematica (PM) definitions and basic laws occur in words. Why suddenly words here? There is no justification, and it is also forbidden. Logic/Tractatus: 5.453 All numbers in logic must be capable of justification. Or rather, it must prove that there are no numbers in logic.
5.454 In logic there is no side by side and there can be no classification. There can be nothing more universal and more special here.
5.4541 The solutions of logical problems must be simple, because they set the standard of simplicity.
People have always guessed that there must be a field of questions whose answers are - a priori - symmetrical, and
---
IV 74
lie combined in a closed, regular structure. In an area in which the following applies: simplex sigillum veri. ((s) Simplicity is the mark (seal) of the truth).
Primitive signs/Tractatus: 5:46 the real primitive signs are not "pvq" or "(Ex).fx", etc. but the most general form of their combinations.
---
IV 84
Axiom of infinity/Russell/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 5.534 would be expressed in the language by the fact that there are infinitely many names with different meanings. Apparant sentences/Tractatus: 5.5351 There are certain cases where there is a temptation to use expressions of the form
"a = a" or "p > p": this happens when one wants to talk of archetype, sentence, or thing.
WittgensteinVsRussell: (Principia Mathematica, PM) nonsense "p is a sentence" is to be reproduced in symbols by "p > p"
and to put as a hypothesis before certain sentences, so that their places for arguments could only be occupied by sentences.
That alone is enough nonsense, because it does not get wrong for a non-sentence as an argument, but nonsensical.
5.5352 identity/WittgensteinVsRussell: likewise, one wanted to express "there are no things" by "~ (Ex).x = x" But even if this was a sentence, it would not be true if there
IV 85
would be things but these were not identical with themselves? ---
IV 85/86
Judgment/sense/Tractatus: 5.5422 the correct explanation of the sentence "A judges p" must show that it is impossible to judge a nonsense. (WittgensteinVsRussell: his theory does not exclude this). ---
IV 87
Relations/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.553 he said there were simple relations between different numbers of particulars (ED, individuals). But between what numbers? How should this be decided? Through the experience? There is no marked number.
---
IV 98
Type theory/principle of contradiction/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 6.123 there is not for every "type" a special law of contradiction, but one is enough, since it is applied to itself. ---
IV 99
Reducibility axiom/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: (61232) no logical sentence, if true, then only accidentally true. 6.1233 One can think of a possible world in which it does not apply. But the logic has nothing to do with that. (It is a condition of the world).

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Quine, W.V.O. Burge Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
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Wol I 260
Names/Christening/Burge: Thesis: (as Kripke): a name is true when the object has been named in an appropriate manner. The name itself goes into the conditions of its applicability. In this, names differ from many predicates. E.g. the predicate "is a dog": an object could also be a dog, if the word "dog" was never used as a symbol.
But an object could not be a Jones, unless someone used "Jones" as a name.
E.g.
(2) Jones is necessarily a Jones
(3) This entity named "Jones" is necessarily an entity named "Jones"
Both turn out to be wrong! Names behave like ordinary predicates: they do not necessarily apply to objects.
I 261
BurgeVsQuine/BurgeVsRussell: we avoid the artificiality by we not assuming that names abbreviate any predicates, nor produce artificial predicates. Our theory also seems to counter the accusation that proper names do not convey information on the subject and do not attribute properties.
Burge: you give at least the information that E.g. someone was called Aristotle.

Burge I
T. Burge
Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010
Quine, W.V.O. Kripke Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
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EMD II 368
Branched Type Theory/vTT/QuineVsRussell/Kripke: Is intended for propositions. QuineVsRussell: Does not give significant ontological improvement vis-à-vis normal set theory.
KripkeVsQuine: Our ability to apply the substitutional quantification at higher levels (in strong resemblance to vTT) shows that it is not irrelevant to semantic paradoxes. The failure of not branching brought in problems for the pseudo substitutional language.
II 411
KripkeVsQuine: Uses criteria to reduce and others to revalue his favored things, and does not discuss why he uses these criteria.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Ramsey, F. P. Wittgenstein Vs Ramsey, F. P.
 
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II 332
Russell/Ramsey/Wittgenstein: the two believed one could prepare in any sense, the logic for the possible existence of certain entities, one could construct a system to welcome the results of the analysis. WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsRamsey: the construction of a relation does not depend on that one finds a phenomenon. The discovery of a word game is something else than the discovery of a fact.

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Reductionism Read Vs Reductionism
 
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Read III 131
VsReduktionismus: müsste die Wahrheit einer negativen Aussage wie »Ruby hat Kennedy nicht getötet« als Ergebnis der Wahrheit einer anderen Aussage erklären, die mit »Ruby tötete Kennedy« unvereinbar wäre. RussellVsVs: wendete gegen solche Argumentation ein, dass ein Regress droht: »B ist unvereinbar mit A« ist selbst eine negative Aussage. Um ihre Wahrheit zu erklären, bräuchten wir eine dritte Aussage C, die unvereinbar wäre mit »C ist vereinbar mit A« usw. - ReadVsRussell: das ist ein seltsamer Einwand, denn er würde auch gegen jede Konjunktion gelten. Und dann dürfen Wahrheitsbedingungen für konjunktive und disjunktiv Aussagen nicht konjunktiv bzw. disjunktiv sein.
III 132
VsReduktionismus: seine Mängel können an zwei Spielarten betrachtet werden: 1. Mengentheoretische Kombinationen, Raum-Zeit-Punkte, Atome oder dergleichen. Problem: die Beschränkung, die es auferlegt. Es bedeutet, dass die grundlegenden Bestandteile aller Welten dieselben sind, und das gerät mit unserer Intuition in Konflikt, dass nämlich die Welt im mindesten Fall geringfügig andere, wenn nicht sogar tatsächlich gänzlich andere Bestandteile hätte haben können.(Wittgenstein hat das allerdings bestritten, für ihn waren die Gegenstände allen Welten gemeinsam.) 2. eine Parallele zu einem ähnlichen Problemen im Reduktionismus hinsichtlich Zahlen: Bsp die so genannten
Def Neumann-Zahlen haben einen strukturellen Isomorphismus zur Menge natürlicher Zahlen. Wir verstehen jede Zahl als die Menge, die aus allen ihren Vorgängern besteht.
Philosophisch sind die Neumann-Zahlen unannehmbar.

Re III
St. Read
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997

Re IV
St. Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic 1st Edition Oxford 1995
Rorty, R. Quine Vs Rorty, R.
 
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Did you mean: Acquaintance/QuineVsRussell: there is not only a problem with proper names, but in general. If the mind can only think if it establishes an unambiguous relationship to the object, then thought is impossible! Davidson I21 Quine: we are unable to single out "the" relationship that is constitutive of the knowledge of the identity of an object. The reason is that any property can be considered as relevant.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Rousseau, J. J. Cartwright Vs Rousseau, J. J.
 
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I 21
Laws of Nature/Cartwright: There are at least two kinds: a) Laws of association/Association/Hume/Cartwright: they are the ones with which philosophy deals normally. They tell us how many times two qualities or quantities are co-associated. ((s) occur together?). This may be probabilistic or deterministic.
This includes the equations of physics: E.g.: whenever the force on an object with the mass m is f, the acceleration is f/m. The laws of association may have a time index. E.g. the probabilistic Mendelian laws.
Causality: does not matter here, instead: co-occurrence.
b) Causal laws/Cartwright: E.g. Smoking causes cancer, e.g. force causes a change in movement. ((s) different from above!).
Russell: Thesis: 1) there are only laws of association.
2) Causal principles cannot be derived from causally symmetric laws of association.
Cartwright: Vs 1) pro 2)
Causal principles/CartwrightVsRussell: Although they cannot be derived from laws of association, we cannot do without them. This has to do with our strategies.
I 74
CartwrightVsRussell: I prefer causes rather than laws in science and explanation.
I 111
Law/Cause/Effect/Analogy/Russell: (On the Notion of Cause, NY 1953 p 392): the principle of "same cause, same effect" is pointless. Once the antecedent (which represents the circumstances) is determined accurately enough to allow calculating the consequences, it becomes so complex that it is unlikely that the case ever occurs again! This would make science sterile. Fundamental laws/RussellVsCartwright: with that Russell pleads for fundamental laws.
Fundamental laws/CartwrightVsRussell: the fundamental laws represent more the relations between properties than between individuals. But in practice the engineer wants functional laws, albeit only "with a certain accuracy".

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983
Russell, B. Austin Vs Russell, B.
 
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I 226
Russell: Truth is primarily a property of beliefs (early work). AustinVsRussell: then belief is essentially an image substantially. It can not be true, but for example, exact.
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
Russell, B. Carnap Vs Russell, B.
 
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VI 164
Def visual objects/Russell: classes of their possible aspects. CarnapVsRussell: That’s possible, but we begin our constitution much further down! For the "unseen aspects" this is difficult, therefore we constitute the entire visual world at once, not any "experiences for unseen things."
VI 247
CarnapVsRussell: realistic conception that manifests itself by him raising questions regarding whether an object still exists even when it is not observed. Thing in itself/Schlick: real, not given objects. Carnap: that makes them part of the recognizable objects.
- - -
Wittgenstein I 202 ff
Qualität/Erlebnis/Carnap/Hintikka: die Basis von Carnaps "Aufbau" ist eine Reihe von momentanen Gesamterlebnissen, aus denen Qualitäten gebildet werden.
I 203
Aber nicht einmal Qualitäten gleichen den Sinnesdaten, der Russellschen Konzeption. CarnapVsRussell. CarnapVsSinnesdaten/Carnap: individuelles Erlebnis muss hinzukommen.
Carnap: "Wollen wir die beiden gleichartigen Bestandteile der beiden Elementarerlebnisse unterscheiden, so müssen wir sie nicht nur ihrer Qualität nach bezeichnen, sondern die Angabe des Elementarerlebnisses, zu dem sie gehören, hinzufügen.
Erst ein so bezeichneter Bestandteil ist im eigentlichen Sinn ein individueller, wir wollen ihn im Unterschied zum nur der Qualität nach bestimmten Bestandteil, wie er in der Qualitätsklasse repräsentiert wird, "Empfindung" nennen."
Diese "Empfindungen" ähneln demnach den Gegenständen Wittgensteins. Doch nach Carnap sind sie ephemer, subjektiv und zeitgebunden,
während die Tractatus-Gegenstände die nichtzeitliche "objektive" Substanz der Welt bilden.
Dementsprechend Carnap: "Die Empfindungen gehören zum Bereich der Psychologie, die Qualitäten zur Phänomenologie oder Gegenstandstheorie."
Phänomenologie/Carnap/Hintikka: bei Carnap auf eine holistische Analyse der Erfahrung beschränkt.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Russell, B. Davidson Vs Russell, B.
 
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I 24
Ontology / knowledge: DavidsonVsRussell: from the fact that the thinking subject knows what he thinks, it does not follow that it must be acquainted with the subject, or even know anything about it! It does not even follow that he knows anything at all about any object.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
Russell, B. Dewey Vs Russell, B.
 
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I 47
DeweyVssense data theory: subjectivism. Things disappear and are replaced by qualities in the senses. DeweyVsRussell.

Dew II
J. Dewey
Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004
Russell, B. Field Vs Russell, B.
 
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II 19
Description/Reference/FieldVsRussell: VsClassical Theory: asserts that you can only refer to something that is "definable from "logically proper" primitives". Problem: this requires the existence of certain sentences, E.g. "If Cicero existed, then Cicero denounced Catiline." ((s) Necessary biographical characteristics instead of contingent ones). Solution/Names/Kripke/Field: causal theory of denotation. Causal network between E.g. Cicero ((s) without quotes, the person, not the name) and users. Or between E.g. Myon and the speakers. (> Causal chain).
II 20
Problem: (4) No common English name denotes something that does not exist (s) assumed here merely as an example) would become
(4') For each name N that is currently in use, N is "France", then France exists, and ... and N is "Germany", then Germany exists. ((s) 4’: only here follows existence from the use of the word). E.g.
(5) For any elements A and B, when an atom of A is combined with two of B, then the valency of A - 2 times that of B.
(5’) For arbitrary elements A and B, when an atom of A is combined with two of B, then A is either sodium and B is sodium and +1 = -2 (+1), or ... or A is sulfur and B is sodium and +2 = +2 (+1), or ... Field: if you want to eliminate "denotes" or "valence", then these definitions are what you need.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Russell, B. Fodor Vs Russell, B.
 
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Fodor/Lepore IV 54
Meaning Holism/MH/Fodor/Lepore: Quine suggests a curious additional argument, derived from Incomplete Symbol/Russell: is defined in use - that would imply a
"Statement Holism": because the unit of meaning is the statement and not the term (phrase, word >Frege).
Fodor/LeporeVs: this is a modal thesis and therefore the last thing Quine would appreciate.
That is, not only that expressions are not defined in use, but that they must be defined like this.
IV 55
VsRussell: mildly speaking, it is unclear whether Russell’s remarks about certain descriptions guarantee that. It is not clear whether definition in use guarantees anything about meaning!.
E.g. Suppose some words were defined in terms of their context, as Russell believed: then it remains to be seen in relation to which aspects!.
In particular, it depends on whether words that are defined in use are ipso facto defined relative to the semantic properties of their contexts!.
Fodor/Lepore: maybe, maybe not: Vs: this suggests: that a sentence is a syntactic unit. (Dennett pro).
Semantic Properties/Fodor/Lepore: it is not at all clear that the semantic properties are something that words have by virtue of their relationship to the sentences in which they occur!.
Nor is it clear that the units of the semantic and syntactic analysis should be the same.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Russell, B. Frege Vs Russell, B.
 
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Read III 149
FregeVsMeinong FregeVsRussell: there are quite contradictory concepts, just no contradictory objects - logic can only determine the limitation of concepts, i.e. for each object, whether it falls under the concept, or not - a contradictory concept is needed to prove that there is no corresponding object. Russell/Read: statements, meanings of sentences, and objects of belief: have individual things and universals as constituents. "Socrates is wise" literally has Socrates and wisdom as constituent elements. The meaning of "Socrates" for him was the philosopher himself. (>Meaning). Russell: (naive realist: meaning = extension or reference, FregeVs).

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993
Russell, B. Gödel Vs Russell, B.
 
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Russell I VI
GödelVsRussell: Die Syntax des Formalismus ist nicht ausgeführt! Es mangelt an formaler Genauigkeit (Reihenfolge der Eliminierung von Symbolen). Relationenkalkül: wurde zuvor von Schrödinger und Peirce ausgeführt.
I VII
Russell/Gödel: ausgesprochen realistische Haltung. Die besprochenen Dinge existieren vielleicht, wir haben nur keine direkte Wahrnehmung von ihnen! Er vergleicht die Axiome der Logik und Mathematik mit den Naturgesetzen.
I VIII
Bedeutung/Russell/Gödel: Das Bsp "Autor von Waverley" führt überraschend dazu, dass alle wahren Sätze dieselbe Bedeutung haben. Autor v. Waverley: ist keine Beschreibung von Scott. Beschreibung (Kennzeichnung) nicht gleich Behauptung. Sie bezeichnet kein Objekt.
StrawsonVs. Ein Satz mit Waverley sagt nichts über Scott, da er ihn nicht enthält
Beschreibung: bezeichnet außerhalb eines Kontextes überhaupt nichts! "Der Autor von Waverley" behauptet (streng genommen) nichts über Scott, (Da er keine Konstituenten enthält, der Scott bezeichnet). Beschreibung (Kennzeichnung) nicht gleich Behauptung.
I XIII
GödelVsRussel: das Zirkelfehler Prinzip in seiner ersten Form genügt nicht, da die Axiome die Existenz von reellen Zahlen implizieren, die in diesem Formalismus nur unter Bezug auf alle reellen Zahlen definierbar sind. Zirkelfehlerprinzip/GödelVsRussell: die Principia selbst genügen in ihrer ersten Auflage dem Prinzip nicht, wenn "definierbar" heißt, "definierbar innerhalb des Systems", und keine Definitionsmethoden außerhalb bekannt sind, außer solchen, die noch umfangreichere Totalitäten umfassen als die, die im System vorkommen.
Gödel: ich würde das eher als Beweis ansehen, dass das Zirkelfehlerprinzip falsch ist, als dass die klassische Mathematik falsch ist.
Denn man kann mit guten Gründen bestreiten, dass der Bezug auf eine Totalität notwendig einen Bezug auf alle ihre einzelnen Elemente impliziert, oder mit anderen Worten, dass "alle" dasselbe meint wie eine unendliche logische Konjunktion.
I XII/XIV
"alle" /Lösung/Carnap: "alle" meint Analytizität oder Notwendigkeit, oder Beweisbarkeit. Gödel: außerdem scheint das Zirkelfehler-Prinzip (PT) nur zu gelten, wenn die betreffenden Entitäten von uns selbst konstruiert sind. In diesem Fall muss klarerweise eine Definition existieren, nämlich die Beschreibung der Konstruktion.
Wenn es jedoch um unabhängige Objekte handelt, ist nichts absurdes in der Existenz von Totalitäten, die Glieder enthalten, welche nur unter Bezug auf die Totalität beschrieben (d.h. eindeutig charakterisiert) werden können.
Def Beschreibung/Russell/Gödel: ein Objekt heißt Def beschrieben durch eine Propositionalfunktion φ(x) wenn φ(x) wahr ist für x = a und für kein anderes Objekt.
Zweite Form: "umfassen": man kann gar nicht sagen, dass ein unter Bezug auf eine Totalität beschriebenes Objekt diese Totalität "umfasst", obgleich die Beschreibung selbst es tut.
Dritte Form: "voraussetzen": genauso wenig würde sie der dritten Form widersprechen, wenn "vorausgesetzt" meint: "vorausgesetzt für die Existenz", nicht "für die Erkennbarkeit".
Russell, B. James Vs Russell, B.
 
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I 105
Belief/Russell: differentiates whether we believe in something that exists or in something that does not exist. PragmatismVsRussell: but particularly the effect of a content of imagination has a specific effect. ((s) but he does not go as far as to describe this effect as "true making").
Russell, B. Kripke Vs Russell, B.
 
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I 36
FregeVsMill/RussellVsMill: Error: In reality, a proper name which is used correctly is only a shortened or disguised description.
I 87
Description: Kneale and partly Russell as well say that it is not an insignificant message that Socrates was the greatest philosopher in Ancient Greece. It is, however, an insignificant message that we called Socrates "Socrates". KripkeVs: it is not an insignificant message: If it is some sort of fact, it can be wrong! sie ist keineswegs eine unbedeutende: wenn das irgendeine Art von Tatsache ist, kann es falsch sein! A wrong message is indeed that Jesajah was called "Jesaja". The prophet would never have recognized this name! And naturally the Greeks have not given their country the name "Greece" nor a similar one. It is, however, insignificant that we call Socrates that way. I do not believe that it is analytic or necessary.
Sentences as "Socrates is called ’Socrates’" are very interesting indeed, and their analysis can be discussed for hours.
I 145
Mill: "singular names": connotative: description. non-connotative: proper names.
I 145
But Mill: all names are connotative for general types, e.g. "human being". It is defined as a conjunction of specific characteristics which are sufficient and necessary to be human: rationality, animality and specific physical characteristics. RussellVsMill: Wrong by common names, right by singular names.
KripkeVsRussell: Mill: Right by singular names, wrong for general names. Maybe some general names ("foolish" ,"fat", "yellow ") express properties. General names like "cow"and "tiger"do not, unless being a cow banally counts as a property. (> Properties).
Kripke’s general names such as "cat" do not express any property.
- - -
Wolf II 209
KripkeVsRussell: Artificial descriptions are not always elliptic.
II 216
Domain/KripkeVsRussell: It does not work: No two-tier distinction can take on this task because it requires a tripartite. Ex: (2) The number of planets could necessarily have been a straight number.
(The number could have been eight, for example, and that would have been a straight number.)
II 217
Kripke: If(2) is interpreted as true, it is neither de re nor de dicto, i.e. the description has neither the smallest nor the biggest domain (according to Russell). (M= möglich= possible, N= notwendig= necessary)
(2a) MN(Ex)(There are exactly x planets and x is a straight number). (Smallest domain, de dicto)
(2b) (Ex)(There are exactly x planets and MN(x is a straight number)).(Biggest domain, de re)
(2c) M(Ex)(there are exactly x planets and N (x is a straight number)). (Middle domain,).
Middle domains are possible if operators are repeated.
(2c) renders (2) true.
(2a) states, probably erroneously, that it might have been necessary that there is a straight number of planets.
(2b) erroneously states that the real number could necessarily have been a straight one.
e.g. The newspapers wrote: "FBI Chef Hoover leveled an accusation that the Barrigan were planning to kidnap an American senior civil servant". (It was Kissinger)
a) there is a senior civil servant, so that Hoover believes...(biggest domain, de re)
b) Hoover believes that the Barrigan were planning...(smallest domain, de dicto)
c) Hoover believes that there was a senior civil servant. (middle domain)
The more intentional constructions (or others)are repeated, the more possible domains exist.
II 218
Kartunnen showed that no n-partite differentiation suffices for each specific n.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Russell, B. Lewis Vs Russell, B.
 
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Schwarz I 211
Theorie der Kennzeichnungen/Tradition/Russell: hier sollte die mit einem Namen assoziierte Beschreibung dem Träger notwendig zukommen! Namen/Kennzeichnung/LewisVsRussell: in modalen Kontexten kommt die Kennzeichnung dem Träger nicht notwendig zu, das regeln sekundäre Wahrheitsbedingungen.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Russell, B. Moore Vs Russell, B.
 
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Stroud I 116
Externes Wissen/Philosophie/Bio/Russell/Stroud: Russell erzählt, dass er zur Philosophie kam, weil er Gründe dafür haben wollte, die Wahrheit der Mathematik zu glauben. D.h. er suchte sie innerhalb (sic) des Gebiets. Intern/MooreVsRussell: sicher ist es der Job des Mathematikers zu entscheiden, ob etwas in seinem Gebiet wahr oder falsch ist.
I 117
Was soll der Philosoph da tun? Er kann keine besseren Gründe als der Mathematiker geben. Stroud: das gilt dann auch für alle anderen Wissenschaften. Man kann nicht leugnen, dass Moore in gewisser Weise Recht hat. ((s) >Quine: dito).
Russell, B. Pragmatism Vs Russell, B.
 
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James I 105
Belief / Russell: R. distinguishes, whether we believe in something that exists, or believe in something that does not exist. PragmatismVsRussell: but just the effect of the content of an idea has a specific effect. ((s) But he does not go so far as to call this effect a "truth maker").
Russell, B. Prior Vs Russell, B.
 
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PriorVsRussell
I 7
Belief/Theory of Multiple Relation/Meinong/Russell/Prior: (also realistic): Proposition/Meinong: he calls "objects" and facts a subclass: the true propositions. Thus, only two instead of three types of abstract objects remain. But for some this is still too much.
Russell/Moore: they eliminated "falsity", but kept facts as abstract objects.
Russell: represented two variants:
a) major difference: between belief and knowledge. (Theory of multiple relations)
b) between true and false beliefs.
ad a): Knowledge is always of facts and is a double-digit relation between two real objects, the knower and the known fact.
Belief, however, is not a double-digit relation,
I 8
but a multi-digit one between the believer and various elements, which (if they existed) would be the believed proposition. E.g. Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio, or believes in Desdemona's infidelity. Problem: There is no object that is Desdemona's infidelity.
Solution: Attribution! He attributed infidelity!
I.e. the story is about two real objects, Desdemona and infidelity, and Othello is in the complex relation of attribution.
I 9
 Russell: in this sense, propositions are logical constructions. PriorVsRussell: propositions are logical constructions, but not for this reason.
1) Although Russell's theory does not require us to believe that there is an object such as Desdemona's infidelity, it nevertheless requires us to believe that about Desdemona herself there is an object as her fidelity!
2) Russell's construction is a four-term relation instead of a three-term relation.
Russell: revised (1) (following Wittgenstein), but not (2).
Belief/Russell: (late): sentences that describe beliefs have two verbs and none is swallowed by an abstract noun. (?).
Prior: neverthelss, precisely in the attribution of infidelity, this abstract object infidelity requires an explanation.
And also a kind of "universal infidelity".
- - -
I 31
PriorVsRussell: multiple relations: With his solution, Russell burdens himself with new abstract entities. And the same might be said about Ramsey's solution.
Abstract Entities/Verb/Predicate/Prior: but we cannot get rid of all of them, anyway!
Verb: I can dissolve it: instead of "Jones smokes" I can say "I predict the smoking of Jones".
But then I have another verb again: "I predict"!
Verbs and nouns are always needed.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Russell, B. Putnam Vs Russell, B.
 
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I 135
Name/reference/PutnamVsRussell: Vs synonymy of general term and necessary and sufficient conditions for a belonging in the corresponding class: E.g. Multiple Sclerosis: the underlying status is caused by a virus. The interesting question is not the "extension" of the expression, but what (if anything) is in correspondence with our concept of multiple sclerosis.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Russell, B. Quine Vs Russell, B.
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
Chisholm II 75
Predicates/Denote/Russell: denoting expressions: proper names stand for individual things and general expressions for universals. (Probleme d. Phil. p. 82f). In every sentence, at least one word refers to a universal. QuineVsRussell: confusion!
II 108
Theory of Descriptions/VsRussell/Brandl: thus the whole theory is suspected of neglecting the fact that material objects can never be part of propositions. QuineVsRussell: confusion of mention and use. - - -
Quine II 97
Pricipia mathematica, 1903: Here, Russell's ontology is rampant: every word refers to something. If a word is a proper name, then its object is a thing, otherwise it is a concept. He limits the term "existence" to things, but has a liberal conception of things which even includes times and points in empty space! Then there are, beyond the existent things, other entities: "numbers, the gods of Homer, relationships, fantasies, and four-dimensional space". The word "concept", used by Russell in this manner, has the connotation of "merely a concept". Caution: Gods and fantasies are as real as numbers for Russell!
QuineVsRussell: this is an intolerably indiscriminate ontology. Example: Take impossible numbers, e.g. prime numbers that are divisible by 6. It must be wrong in a certain sense that they exist, and that is in a sense in which it is right that there are prime numbers! Do fantasies exist in this sense?
- - -
II 101
Russell has a preference for the term "propositional function" against "class concept". In P.M. both expressions appear. Here: Def "Propositional Function": especially based on forms of notation, e.g. open sentences, while concepts are decidedly independent of notation. However, according to Meinong Russell's confidence is in concepts was diminished, and he prefers the more nominalistic sound of the expression "propositional function" which is now carries twice the load (later as Principia Mathematica.)
Use/Mention/Quine: if we now tried to deal with the difference between use and mention as carelessly as Russell has managed to do sixty years ago, we can see how he might have felt that his theory of propositional functions was notation based, while a theory of types of real classes would be ontological.
Quine: we who pay attention to use and mention can specify when Russell's so-called propositional functions as terms (more specific than properties and relations) must be construed as concepts, and when they may be construed as a mere open sentences or predicates: a) when he quantifies about them, he (unknowingly) reifies them as concepts.
For this reason, nothing more be presumed for his elimination of classes than I have stated above: a derivation of the classes from properties or concepts by means of a context definition that is formulated such that it provides the missing extensionality.
QuineVsRussell: thinks wrongly that his theory has eliminated classes more thoroughly from the world than in terms of a reduction to properties.
II 102
RussellVsFrege: "~ the entire distinction between meaning and designating is wrong. The relationship between "C" and C remains completely mysterious, and where are we to find the designating complex which supposedly designates C?" QuineVsRussell: Russell's position sometimes seems to stem from a confusion of the expression with its meaning, sometimes from the confusion of the expression with its mention.
II 103/104
In other papers Russel used meaning usually in the sense of "referencing" (would correspond to Frege): "Napoleon" particular individual, "human" whole class of such individual things that have proper names.
Russell rarely seems to look for an existing entity under any heading that would be such that we could call it the meaning that goes beyond the existing referent.
Russell tends to let this entity melt into the expression itself, a tendency he has in general when it comes to existing entities.
QuineVsRussell: for my taste, Russell is too wasteful with existing entities. Precisely because he does not differentiate enough, he lets insignificance and missed reference commingle.
Theory of Descriptions: He cannot get rid of the "King of France" without first inventing the description theory: being meaningful would mean: have a meaning and the meaning is the reference. I.e. "King of France" without meaning, and "The King of France is bald" only had a meaning, because it is the short form of a sentence that does not contain the expression "King of France".
Quine: actually unnecessary, but enlightening.
Russell tends commingle existing entities and expressions. Also on the occasion of his remarks on
Propositions: (P.M.): propositions are always expressions, but then he speaks in a manner that does not match this attitude of the "unity of the propositions" (p.50) and of the impossibility of infinite propositions (p.145)
II 105
Russell: The proposition is nothing more than a symbol, even later, instead: Apparently, propositions are nothing..." the assumption that there are a huge number of false propositions running around in the real, natural world is outrageous." Quine: this revocation is astounding. What is now being offered to us instead of existence is nothingness. Basically Russell has ceased to speak of existence.
What had once been regarded as existing is now accommodated in one of three ways
a) equated with the expression,
b) utterly rejected
c) elevated to the status of proper existence.
- - -
II 107
Russell/later: "All there is in the world I call a fact." QuineVsRussell: Russell's preference for an ontology of facts depends on his confusion of meaning with reference. Otherwise he would probably have finished the facts off quickly.
What the reader of "Philosophy of logical atomism" notices would have deterred Russell himself, namely how much the analysis of facts is based on the analysis of language.
Russell does not recognize the facts as fundamental in any case. Atomic facts are as atomic as facts can be.
Atomic Facts/Quine: but they are composite objects! Russell's atoms are not atomic facts, but sense data!
- - -
II 183 ff
Russell: Pure mathematics is the class of all sentences of the form "p implies q" where p and q are sentences with one or more variables, and in both sets the same. "We never know what is being discussed, nor if what we say is true."
II 184
This misinterpretation of mathematics was a response to non-Euclidean geometry. Numbers: how about elementary arithmetic? Pure numbers, etc. should be regarded as uninterpreted. Then the application to apples is an accumulation.
Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I find this attitude completely wrong. The words "five" and "twelve" are nowhere uninterpreted, they are as much essential components of our interpreted language as apples. >Numbers. They denote two intangible objects, numbers that are the sizes of quantities of apples and the like. The "plus" in addition is also interpreted from start to finish, but it has nothing to do with the accumulation of things. Five plus twelve is: how many apples there are in two separate piles. However, without pouring them together. The numbers "five" and "twelve" differ from apples in that they do not denote a body, that has nothing to do with misinterpretation. The same could be said of "nation" or "species". The ordinary interpreted scientific speech is determined to abstract objects as it is determined to apples and bodies. All these things appear in our world system as values ​​of variables.
II 185
It even has nothing to do with purity (e.g. of the set theory). Purity is something other than uninterpretedness.
XII 60
Expression/Numbers/Knowledge/Explication/Explanation/Quine: our knowledge of expressions is alone in their laws of interlinking. Therefore, every structure that fulfills these laws can be an explication.
XII 61
Knowledge of numbers: consists alone in the laws of arithmetic. Then any lawful construction is an explication of the numbers. RussellVs: (early): Thesis: arithmetic laws are not sufficient for understanding numbers. We also need to know applications (use) or their embedding in the talk about other things.
Number/Russell: is the key concept here: "there are n such and suches".
Number/Definition/QuineVsRussell: we can define "there are n such and suches" without ever deciding what numbers are beyond their fulfillment of arithmetic addition.
Application/Use/QuineVsRussell: wherever there is structure, the applications set in. E.g. expressions and Gödel numbers: even the mention of an inscription was no definitive proof that we are talking about expressions and not about Gödel numbers. We can always say that our ostension was shifted.
VII 80
Principia Mathematica/PM/Russell/Whitehead/Quine: shows that the whole of mathematics can be translated into logic. Only three concepts need to be clarified: Mathematics, translation and logic.
VII 81
QuineVsRussell: the concept of the propositional function is unclear and obscures the entire PM.
VII 93
QuineVsRussell: PM must be complemented by the axiom of infinity if certain mathematical principles are to be derived.
VII 93/94
Axiom of infinity: ensures the existence of a class with infinitely many elements. Quine: New Foundations instead makes do with the universal class: θ or x^ (x = x).
- - -
VII 122
Propositional Functions/QuineVsRussell: ambiguous: a) open sentences
b) properties.
Russell no classes theory uses propositional functions as properties as value-bound variables.
- - -
IX 15
QuineVsRussell: inexact terminology. "Propositional function", he used this expression both when referring to attributes (real properties) and when referring to statements or predicates. In truth, he only reduced the theory of classes to an unreduced theory of attributes.
IX 93
Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I differ in one point: for me, rational numbers are themselves real numbers, not so for Russell and Whitehead. Russell: rational numbers are pairwise disjoint for them like those of Peano. (See Chapter 17), while their real numbers are nested. ((s) pairwise disjoint, contrast: nested)
Natural Numbers/Quine: for me as for most authors: no rational integers.
Rational Numbers/Russell: accordingly, no rational real numbers. They are only "imitated" by the rational real numbers.
Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: for me, however, the rational numbers are real numbers. This is because I have constructed the real numbers according to Russell's version b) without using the name and the designation of rational numbers.
Therefore, I was able to retain name and designation for the rational real numbers
- - -
IX 181
Type Theory/TT/QuineVsRussell: in the present form our theory is too weak to prove some sentences of classical mathematics. E.g. proof that every limited class of real numbers has a least upper boundary (LUB).
IX 182
Suppose the real numbers were developed in Russell's theory similar to Section VI, however, attributes were now to take the place of classes and the alocation to attributes replaces the element relation to classes. LUB: (Capters 18, 19) of a limited class of real numbers: the class Uz or {x:Ey(x ε y ε z)}.
Attribute: in parallel, we might thus expect that the LUB of a limited attribute φ of real numbers in Russell's system is equal to the
Attribute Eψ(φψ u ψ^x).
Problem: under Russell's order doctrine is this LUB ψ is of a higher order than that of the real numbers ψ which fall under the attribute φ whose LUB is sought.
Boundary/LUB/QuineVsRussell: You need LUB for the entire classic technique of calculus, which is based on continuity. However, LUB have no value for these purposes if they are not available as values ​​of the same variables whose value range already includes those numbers whose upper boundary is wanted.
An upper boundary (i.e. LUB) of higher order cannot be the value of such variables, and thus misses its purpose.
Solution/Russell: Axiom of Reducibility:
Def Axiom of Reducibility/RA/Russell/Quine: every propositional function has the same extension as a certain predicative one. I.e.
Ey∀x(ψ!x φx), Eψ∀x∀y[ψ!(x,y) φ(x,y)], etc.
IX 184
VsConstruktivism/Construction/QuineVsRussell: we have seen Russell's constructivist approach to the real numbers fail (LUB, see above). He gave up on constructivism and took refuge in the RA.
IX 184/185
The way he gave it up had something perverse to it: Axiom of Reducibility/QuineVsRussell: the RA implies that all the distinctions that gave rise to its creation are superfluous! (... + ...)
- - -
IX 185
Propositional Function/PF/Attribute/Predicate/TT/QuineVsRussell: overlooked the following difference and its analogs: a) "propositional functions": as attributes (or intentional relations) and
b) proposition functions: as expressions, i.e. predicates (and open statements: e.g. "x is mortal") Accordingly:
a) attributes
b) open statements
As expressions they differ visibly in the order if the order is to be assessed on the basis of the indices of bound variables within the expression. For Russell everything is "AF".
Since Russell failed to distinguish between formula and object (word/object, mention/use), he did not remember the trick of allowing that an expression of higher order refers straight to an attribute or a relation of lower order.
- - -
X 95
Context Definition/Properties/Stage 2 Logic/Quine: if you prefer properties as sets, you can introduce quantification over properties, and then introduce quantification over sets through a schematic context definition. Russell: has taken this path.
Quine: but the definition has to ensure that the principle of extensionality applies to sets, but not to properties. That is precisely the difference.
Russell/QuineVsRussell: why did he want properties?
X 96
He did not notice at which point the unproblematic talk of predicates capsized to speaking about properties. ((s) object language/meta language/mention/use). Propositional Function/PF: Russell took it over from Frege.
QuineVsRussell: he sometimes used PF to refer to predicates, sometimes to properties.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Russell, B. Read Vs Russell, B.
 
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Read III 31 +
VsReduktionismus: müsste die Wahrheit einer negativen Aussage wie »Ruby hat Kennedy nicht getötet« als Ergebnis der Wahrheit einer anderen Aussage erklären, die mit »Ruby tötete Kennedy« unvereinbar wäre. RussellVsVs: wendete gegen solche Argumentation ein, dass ein Regress droht: »B ist unvereinbar mit A« ist selbst eine negative Aussage. Um ihre Wahrheit zu erklären, bräuchten wir eine dritte Aussage C, die unvereinbar wäre mit »C ist vereinbar mit A« usw.
ReadVsRussell: das ist ein seltsamer Einwand, denn er würde auch gegen jede Konjunktion gelten. Und dann dürfen Wahrheitsbedingungen für konjunktive und disjunktiv Aussagen nicht konjunktiv bzw. disjunktiv sein.
III 156
VsRussell: seine Theorie kann nicht richtig sein, denn sie führt zu falschen Wahrheitswerten: sie sagt (fälschlich), daß jede Aussage über nicht existierende Objekt falsch ist. Sie ist allerdings eine Verbesserung gegenüber der traditionellen theorie, die sagt, dass alls solchen Aussagen sinnlos seien.

Re III
St. Read
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997

Re IV
St. Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic 1st Edition Oxford 1995
Russell, B. Rorty Vs Russell, B.
 
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Richard Rorty
I 187
RortyVsRussell: confuses the specific semantic doctrines of Frege and Wittgenstein, which had indeed emerged from the new logic, with epistemological teachings. - - -
Rorty I 189
Russell/Rorty: distinguishes "truth by virtue of meaning" and "truth by virtue of experience". QuineVsRussell/Rorty: (Two Dogmas): VsTradition: Vs the conventional belief that philosophy relates to the empirical sciences like the study of structures to the study of contents.
I 190
Quine: (like Wittgenstein): we can hardly distinguish when we respond to the pressure of experience and when to the pressure of language. Quine/Rorty: Thesis: "every statement can be revised".
Sellars/Rorty: "It may turn out that there are no colored objects."

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Russell, B. Ryle Vs Russell, B.
 
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Logik III 33 (>RyleVsCarnap)
Russell fell into the trap in his account of universals: according to his opinion, atomic statements consists of a number of individuals and a universal.
E.g. "Fido is a dog." What does "dog" refer to? According to the "Fido"-Fido-theory of the Fido, it must get its meaning through the fact that it is assigned to a single thing, to "being-a-dog" or the universal, dog.
Statement/Russell's statements were designed by him to make the meaning of sentences. Consequently, he said, they must contain these generic entities, universals.
This is an unjustified step.
---
III 296
"Fido"-Fido principle: RyleVs: reference equals meaning. ---
Logik III 34
> VariousVsRussell, statements, facts Russell: believed that predicate expressions, verbs, and adjectives related to universals, "is president" refers to presidency, "runs" to what is common to all things that are going. But many philosophers deny that the concept of the object reference can be applied to such parts of speech.
Meaning: Russell and others simply identify meaning and object reference (reference).

Ry I
G. Ryle
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969
Russell, B. Searle Vs Russell, B.
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
V 122
Theory of descriptions/Russell/Searle: Russell went as far as to negate that a specific description could ever be used as reference! ((s) This is about fictions) Description/fiction/SearleVsRussell: of course you can refer to literary figures. Condition: they must exist (in the literature). You cannot refer to the wife of Sherlock Holmes, because he was not married.
V 129
Theory of descriptions/Russell/problem: E.g. "The man insulted me" means that one might assume that only one man exists in the universe. SearleVsRussell: actually asserted something like this in the theory of descriptions.
- - -
V 245
Names/descriptions/SearleVsRussell: from the supposed distinction between proper names and certain descriptions the metaphysical distinction between objects and properties is derived. - - -
V 131
definite article/reference/SearleVsRussell: there is absolutely no use of the definite article, which implies in itself that only one object can be meant.
V 132/133
definite article: its function is rather to indicate that the speaker intends a singular reference.
V 144
Proposition/Searle: only the expression in a particular context (circumstances) ensures the transmitting of a proposition! SearleVsRussell: no class of logically proper names can exist at all (this, now, there). If their expressions gave no descriptive content (Russell), there is no way to establish a relation between the expression and the object. How could one explain that this term refers to that object?
- - -
V 238
Searle: a propositional act can never be identical to the illocutionary act of the assertion, since a propositional act can never occur independently but only as part of an illocutionary act. SearleVsRussell: the attempt to equate the specific reference (propositional act) with the setting up of assertions (illocutionary act) was bound to fail.
V 239
Because Russell used the formal notation, complete statements must be prepared for him, even if there is no object.
V 240
But from the fact that a certain type of acts can be carried out only under certain conditions, does not simply follow that implementation of such an act in itself already represents the assertion that these conditions were met. Searle: The command "Bring this to the King of France" is neither a statement nor does it contain such. (> Ex "The King of France is bald.")
- - -
IV 113
Sense/Russell: E.g. pointless: "Four-pageness drinking postponement": SearleVsRussell: is read by many authors as a metaphorical statement about the Quadripartite Agreement after WW2. But none of the words occurs here literally!

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Russell, B. Strawson Vs Russell, B.
 
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Wolf II 17
StrawsonVsRussell: Vs Russell's resolution of singular sentences like "the F, which is G, is H" are general sentences such as "There is exactly one F, which is G, and this F is H" : this is inappropriate. Thus it is not included, that we refer with the singular term to individual things.
---
NS I 92
Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: ("On Referring") in 1950, 45 years after Russell's "On Denoting" (1905)). Strawson: 5 theses
(i) one must distinguish between a) the sentence, b) the use, c) the expression (on one occasion)
(ii) there is a difference between (logical) implying and presupposition
(iii) truth value gaps are allowed
(iv) The meaning of an expression is not its referent, but the conventions and rules. In various uses the term can therefore refer to different objects.
(v) expressions can be used referential and predicative (attributing properties).
Sentence/truth value/tr.v./Strawson: Thesis: sentences themselves cannot be true or false, only their use.
Presupposition/implication/Strawson: difference:
Definition implication/Strawson: A implies B iff it cannot be that A is true but B is false. On the other hand:
Definition presupposition/Strawson: A presupposes B iff B must be true so that A can take a truth value.
Existence assertion/uniqueness assertion/Strawson: are only presupposed by a sentence with description, but not implied.
E.g. King of France/presupposition/Strawson: the sentence presupposes the existence, however, does not imply it. And also does not claim the existence and uniqueness.
Newen/Schrenk VsStrawson: Strawson provides no philosophical-logical arguments for his thesis.
---
NS I 94
He rather refers to our everyday practice. Truth-value gaps/StrawsonVsRussell: accepted by him.
Negative existential statements/existence/existence theorem/Strawson/VsStrawson/Newen/Schrenk: his approach lets the problem of empty existence theorems look even trickier.
Referential/predicative/singular term/designation/name/Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: Thesis:
Proper names/demonstratives: are largely used referential.
Description: have a maximum predicative, so descriptive meaning (but can also simultaneously refer).
Identity/informative identity sentences/referential/predicative/Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: here the description has (or two occurring descriptions) such an extreme predicative use that E.g. "Napoleon is identical to the man who ordered the execution of the Duke" is as good as synonymous with the phrase "Napoleon ordered the ...".
In principle, both sentences are used for a predication. Thus, the first sentence is informative when it is read predicative and not purely referential.
---
Quine I 447
StrawsonVsRussell: has called Russell's theory of descriptions false because of their treatment of the truth value gaps. ---
Strawson III 433
StrawsonVsRussell/Theory of descriptions: Strawson brings a series of basic distinctions between types and levels of use of linguistic expressions into play. Fundamental difference between the logical subject and logical predicate. Pleads for stronger focus on everyday language.
"The common language has no exact logic".
---
III 434
King-E.g.: "The present king of France is bald". Russell: here the description must not be considered a logical subject. Russell: Such sentences are simply wrong in the case of non-existence. Then we also not need to make any dubious ontological conditions. We analyze (according to Russell) the sentence as follows: it is in reality a conjunction of three sentences:
1. There is a king of France.
2. There are no more than a king of France.
3. There is nothing that is King of France and is not bald.
Since at least one member in the conjunction is false, it is wrong in total.
StrawsonVsRussell: 1. he speaks too careless of sentences and their meanings. But one has to consider the use of linguistic expressions, which shows that there must be a much finer distinction.
2. Russell confused what a sentence says with the terms of the meaningful use of this sentence.
3. The everyday language and not the formal logic determines the meaning.
---
III 435
Reference/Strawson: an expression does not refer to anything by itself. King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: with the sentence "The present king of France is bald" no existence assertion is pronounced. Rather, it is "implied".
Therefore, the sentence does not need to be true or false. The term does not refer to anything.
Definition truth value gap (Strawson): E.g. King-Example: refers to nothing. Wittgenstein: a failed move in the language game.
---
VII 95
Description/Strawson: sure I use in E.g. "Napoleon was the greatest French soldier", the word "Napoleon", to name the person, not the predicate. StrawsonVsRussell: but I can use the description very well to name a person.
There can also be more than one description in one sentence.
---
VII 98
StrawsonVsRussell: seems to imply that there are such logical subject predicate sentences. Russell solution: only logical proper names - for example, "This" - are real subjects in logical sentences. The meaning is exactly the individual thing.
This leads him to the fact that he can no longer regard sentences with descriptions as logical propositions.
Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: Solution: in "clear referring use" also dscriptions can be used. But these are not "descriptions" in Russell's sense.
---
VII 99
King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: claims three statements, one of which in any case would be wrong. The conjunction of three statements, one of which is wrong and the others are true, is false, but meaningful.
---
VII 100
Reference/description/StrawsonVsRussell: distinction: terminology:
"Unique reference": expression. (Clearly referring description).
Sentence begins with clear referring description.
Sentences that can start with a description:
(A1) sentence
(A2) use of a sentence (A3) uttering of a sentence
accordingly:
(B1) expression
(B2) use of an expression (B3) utterance of an expression.
King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: the utterance (assertion (>utterance) "The present king of France is wise" can be true or false at different times, but the sentence is the same.
---
VII 101
Various uses: according to whether at the time of Louis XIV. or Louis XV. Sentence/statement/statement/assertion/proposition/Strawson:
Assertion (assertion): can be true or false at different times.
Statement (proposition): ditto
Sentence is always the same. (Difference sentence/Proposition).
---
VII 102
StrawsonVsRussell: he overlooks the distinction between use and meaning. ---
VII 104
Sense/StrawsonVsRussell: the question of whether a sentence makes sense, has nothing to do with whether it is needed at a particular opportunity to say something true or false or to refer to something existent or non-existent. ---
VII 105
Meaning/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. "The table is covered with books": Everyone understands this sentence, it is absurd to ask "what object" the sentence is about (about many!). It is also absurd to ask whether it is true or false.
---
VII 106
Sense/StrawsonVsRussell: that the sentence makes sense, has to do with the fact that it is used correctly (or can be), not that it can be negated. Sense cannot be determined with respect to a specific (individual) use.
It is about conventions, habits and rules.
---
VII 106/107
King-Example/Russell/Strawson: Russell says two true things about it: 1. The sentence E.g. "The present king of France is wise" makes sense.
2. whoever expresses the sentence now, would make a true statement, if there is now one,
StrawsonVsRussell: 1. wrong to say who uttered the sentence now, would either make a true or a false claim.
2. false, that a part of this claim states that the king exists.
Strawson: the question wrong/false does not arise because of the non-existence. E.g. It is not like grasping after a raincoat suggests that one believes that it is raining. (> Presupposition).
Implication/Imply/StrawsonVsRussell: the predication does not assert an existence of the object.
---
VII 110
Existence/StrawsonVsRussell: the use of "the" is not synonymous with the assertion that the object exists. Principia Mathematica: (p.30) "strict use" of the definite article: "only applies if object exists".
StrawsonVsRussell: the sentence "The table is covered with books" does not only apply if there is exactly one table ...
---
VII 111
This is not claimed with the sentence, but (commonplace) implied that there is exactly one thing that belongs to the type of table and that it is also one to which the speaker refers. Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: referring is not to say that one refers.
Saying that there is one or the other table, which is referred to, is not the same as to designate a certain table.
Referencing is not the same as claiming.
Logical proper names/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. I could form my empty hand and say "This is a beautiful red!" The other notes that there is nothing.
Therefore, "this" no "camouflaged description" in Russell's sense. Also no logical proper name.
You have to know what the sentence means to be able to respond to the statement.
---
VII 112
StrawsonVsRussell: this blurs the distinction between pure existence theorems and sentences that contain an expression to point to an object or to refer to it. Russell's "Inquiry into meaning and truth" contains a logical catastrophic name theory. (Logical proper names).
He takes away the status of logical subjects from the descriptions, but offers no substitute.
---
VII 113
Reference/Name/referent/StrawsonVsRussell: not even names are enough for this ambitious standard. Strawson: The meaning of the name is not the object. (Confusion of utterance and use).
They are the expressions together with the context that one needs to clearly refer to something.
When we refer we do not achieve completeness anyway. This also allows the fiction. (Footnote: later: does not seem very durable to me because of the implicit restrictive use of "refer to".)
---
VII 122
StrawsonVsRussell: Summit of circulatory: to treat names as camouflaged descriptions. Names are choosen arbitrary or conventional. Otherwise names would be descriptive.
---
VII 123
Vague reference/"Somebody"/implication/Strawson: E.g. "A man told me ..." Russell: existence assertion: "There is a man who ..."
StrawsonVsRussell: ridiculous to say here that "class of men was not empty ..."
Here uniqueness is also implicated as in "the table".
---
VII 124
Tautology/StrawsonVsRussell: one does not need to believe in the triviality. That only believe those who believe that the meaning of an expression is the object. (E.g. Scott is Scott). ---
VII 126
Presupposition/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. "My children sleep" Here, everyone will assume that the speaker has children. Everyday language has no exact logic. This is misjudged by Aristotle and Russell.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Russell, B. Tugendhat Vs Russell, B.
 
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Wolf II 22
Identifikation/Individuierung/Tugendhat: die subjektive und die objektive Lokalisierung sind gleichursprünglich. TugendhatVsStrawson: Raumzeit nicht nur besonders wichtig, sondern die einzige Möglichkeit der Identifizierung.
Wie Strawson: sortale Prädikate müssen hinzukommen. (Herausgreifen aus der Situation, Wiedererkennen, Zählbarkeit).
Alle sing Term verweisen auf die unterste Ebene der Identifizierung. "Dies F ist G", verifizierbar. (KantVs).
TugendhatVsRussell: Zwar ist hier noch die Existenzaussage "es gibt hier und jetzt genau ein F" impliziert, aber nicht mehr als allgemeine (generelle) Aussage wie bei Russell: "unter allen Gegenständen gibt es einen..." sondern Lokalisation.
Erst bei lokalisierenden Ausdrücken haben wir sing Term, deren Referenz nicht mehr fehlschlagen kann. Daher implizieren sie keine Existenzaussagen mehr!
Damit gleichen sie Russell’s logischen Eigennamen. Unterschied: sie stehen nicht mehr in einer isolierten Zuordnung zum Gegenstand, sondern in einer Raum-Zeit-Ordnung.
- - -
Tugendhat I 378
Existenzaussagen/Tugendhat: entgegen dem Anschein nicht Aussagen über Einzelnes sondern stets generelle Aussagen. Die Rede von Existenz nimmt im Prinzip immer schon an, dass man von allen Gegenständen spricht, und daher könnte man (VsRussell) von einem einzelnen Gegenstand gar nicht sagen, dass er existiert.
I 383
TugendhatVsRussell: aber hier geht es überhaupt nicht um eine Relation, Spezifikation findet statt vor dem Hintergrund aller Gegenstände. Das hat Russell in Bezug auf sing Term schon richtig gesehen, aber mit seinen logischen Eigennamen lag er trotzdem falsch, gerade weil er ihnen den Bezug auf jenen Hintergrund einer eigentümlichen Generalität absprach.
- - -
III 214
TugendhatVsRussell: weder die Reaktion eines Lebewesens noch das auslösende Anzeichen kann wahr oder falsch sein, weil hier keine Annahme vorliegt, dass etwas so oder so sei, folglich ist auch kein Irrtum möglich.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Russell, B. Turing Vs Russell, B.
 
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Turing: bearbeitete die Frage, ob solche unentscheidbaren Behauptungen zu isolieren seien, oderob die die gesamte Mathematik "durchwachsen", (DB).
Er fand heraus, daß man keine Maschine bauen kann, die unfehlbar unentscheidbare Sätze erkennen kann. (Grund: Gödel).
Universale Turingmaschine: könnte ununterscheidbar von anderen Maschinen agieren.
TuringVsHilbert,VsRussell: AG es gäbe eine solche universale Turingmaschine, dann führt sie zu einem Widerspruch mit sich selbst.
Diese universelle Maschine könnte die symbolische Nummer jeder anderen Maschine akzeptieren und sie simulieren. Problem: was macht sie mit ihrer eigenen Nummer? Widerspruch.
Das ist der Grund, warum sich unentscheidbare Probleme durch die ganze Mathematik ziehen, und nicht isolierbar sind.
Kann auch auf Menschen angewendet werden: Bsp "Werden Sie auf diese Frage mit "Nein" antworten?". Das zeigt: ganz gleich, wie bewußt man sich seines eigenen Geistes ist, seine eigene Komplexität kann man nicht völlig einkalkulieren, wenn man sich gegenseitig zu verstehen versucht.
So können auch Maschinen ihr eigenes Verhalten nicht vorhersagen (In solchen Fällen). II 522/523
Russell, B. Wittgenstein Vs Russell, B.
 
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Carnap VI 58
Intensional logic/Russell: is not bound to certain statement forms. All of their statements are not translatable into statements about extensions. WittgensteinVsRussell. Later Russell, Carnap pro Wittgenstein.
(Russell, PM 72ff, e.g. for seemingly intensional statements).
E.g. (Carnap) "x is human" and "x mortal":
both can be converted into an extensional statement (class statement).
"The class of humans is included in the class of mortals".
---
Tugendhat I 453
Definition sortal: something demarcated that does not permit any arbitrary distribution . E.g. Cat. Contrast: mass terminus. E.g. water. ---
I 470
Sortal: in some way a rediscovery of the Aristotelian concept of the substance predicate. Aristotle: Hierarchy: low: material predicates: water, higher: countability.
Locke: had forgotten the Aristotelian insight and therefore introduced a term for the substrate that, itself not perceivable, should be based on a bunch of perceptible qualities.
Hume: this allowed Hume to reject the whole.
Russell and others: bunch of properties. (KripkeVsRussell, WittgensteinVsRussell, led to the rediscovery of Sortals).
E.g. sortal: already Aristotle: we call something a chair or a cat, not because it has a certain shape, but because it fulfills a specific function.
---
Wittgenstein I 80
Acquaintance/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: eliminates Russell's second class (logical forms), in particular Russell's free-floating forms, which can be expressed by entirely general propositions. So Wittgenstein can say now that we do not need any experience in the logic.
This means that the task that was previously done by Russell's second class, now has to be done by the regular objects of the first class.
This is an explanation of the most fundamental and strangest theses of the Tractatus: the logical forms are not only accepted, but there are considered very important. Furthermore, the objects are not only substance of the world but also constitutive for the shape of the world.
---
I 81
1. the complex logical propositions are all determined by the logical forms of the atomic sentences, and 2. The shapes of the atomic sentences by the shapes of the objects.
N.B.: Wittgenstein refuses in the Tractatus to recognize the complex logical forms as independent objects. Their task must be fulfilled by something else:
---
I 82
The shapes of simple objects (type 1): they determine the way in which the objects can be linked together. The shape of the object is what is considered a priori of it. The position moves towards Wittgenstein, it has a fixed base in Frege's famous principle of composite character (the principle of functionality, called Frege principle by Davidson (s)> compositionality).
---
I 86
Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: thinks, we should be familiar with the logical form of each to understand sentence. WittgensteinVsRussell: disputes this. To capture all logical forms nothing more is needed than to capture the objects. With these, however, we still have to be familiar with. This experience, however, becomes improper that it relates to the existence of objects.
---
I 94ff
This/logical proper name/Russell: "This" is a (logical) proper name. WittgensteinVsRussell/PU: The ostensive "This" can never be without referent, but that does not turn it into a name "(§ 45).
---
I 95
According to Russell's earlier theory, there are only two logical proper names in our language for particularistic objects other than the I, namely "this" and "that". One introduces them by pointing to it. Hintikka: of these concrete Russellian objects applies in the true sense of the word, that they are not pronounced, but can only be called. (> Mention/use/tell/show).
---
Wittgenstein I 107
Meaning data/Russell: (Mysticism and Logic): sense data are something "Physical". Thus, "the existence of the sense datum is not logically dependent on the existence of the subject." WittgensteinVsRussell: of course this cannot be accepted by Wittgenstein. Not because he had serious doubts, but because he needs the objects for semantic purposes that go far beyond Russell's building blocks of our real world.
They need to be building blocks of all logical forms and the substance of all possible situations. Therefore, he cannot be satisfied with Russell's construction of our own and single outside world of sensory data.
---
I 108
For the same reason he refused the commitment to a particular view about the metaphysical status of his objects. Also:
Subject/WittgensteinVsRussell: "The subject does not belong to the objects of the world".
---
I 114
Language/sense data/Wittgenstein/contemporary/Waismann: "The purpose of Wittgenstein's language is, contrary to our ordinary language, to reflect the logical structure of the phenomena." ---
I 115
Experience/existence/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: "Wittgenstein says it is nonsense to believe something that is not given by the experience, because belonging to me, to be given in experience, is the formal characteristics of a real entity." Sense data/WittgensteinVsRussell/Ramsey: are logical constructions. Because nothing of what we know involves it. They simplify the general laws, but they are as less necessary for them as material objects."
Later Wittgenstein: (note § 498) equates sense date with "private object that stands before my soul".
---
I 143
Logical form/Russell/Hintikka: both forms of atomic sentences and complex sentences. Linguistically defined there through characters (connectives, quantifiers, etc.). WittgensteinVsRussell: only simple forms. "If I know an object, I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in facts. Every such possibility must lie in the nature of the object."
---
I 144
Logical constants/Wittgenstein: disappear from the last and final logical representation of each meaningful sentence. ---
I 286
Comparison/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: comparing is what is not found in Russell's theory. ---
I 287
And comparing is not to experience a phenomenon in the confrontation. Here you can see: from a certain point of time Wittgenstein sees sentences no more as finished pictures, but as rules for the production of images.
---
Wittgenstein II 35
Application/use/WittgensteinVsRussell: he overlooked that logical types say nothing about the use of the language. E.g. Johnson says red differed in a way from green, in which red does not differ from chalk. But how do you know that? Johnson: It is verified formally, not experimentally.
WittgensteinVsJohnson: but that is nonsense: it is as if you would only look at the portrait, to judge whether it corresponds to the original.
---
Wittgenstein II 74
Implication/WittgensteinVsRussell: Paradox for two reasons: 1. we confuse the implication with drawing the conclusions.
2. in everyday life we never use "if ... then" in this sense. There are always hypotheses in which we use that expression. Most of the things of which we speak in everyday life, are in reality always hypotheses. E.g.: "all humans are mortal."
Just as Russell uses it, it remains true even if there is nothing that corresponds to the description f(x).
---
II 75
But we do not mean that all huamns are mortal even if there are no humans. ---
II 79
Logic/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: his notation does not make the internal relationships clear. From his notation does not follow that pvq follows from p.q while the Sheffer-stroke makes the internal relationship clear.
---
II 80
WittgensteinVsRussell: "assertion sign": it is misleading and suggests a kind of mental process. However, we mean only one sentence. ((s) also WittgensteinVsFrege). > Assertion sign. ---
II 100
Skepticism/Russell: E.g. we could only exist, for five minutes, including our memories. WittgensteinVsRussell: then he uses the words in a new meaning.
---
II 123
Calculus/WittgensteinVsRussell: jealousy as an example of a calculus with three binary relations does not add an additional substance to the thing. He applied a calculus on jealousy. ---
II 137
Implication/paradox/material/existence/WittgensteinVsRussell: II 137 + applicable in Russell's notation, too: "All S are P" and "No S is P", is true when there is no S. Because the implications are also verified by ~ fx. In reality this fx is both times independent.
All S are P: (x) gx > .fx
No S is P: (x) gx > ~ fx
This independent fx is irrelevant, it is an idle wheel. Example: If there are unicorns, then they bite, but there are no unicorns = there are no unicorns.
---
II 152
WittgensteinVsRussell: his writing presupposes that there are names for every general sentence, which can be given for the answer to the question "what?" (in contrast to "what kind?"). E.g. "what people live on this island?" one may ask, but not: "which circle is in the square?". We have no names "a", "b", and so on for circles.
WittgensteinVsRussell: in his notation it says "there is one thing which is a circle in the square."
Wittgenstein: what is this thing? The spot, to which I point? But how should we write then "there are three spots"?
---
II 157
Particular/ED/atom/atoms/Wittgenstein: Russell and I, we both expected to get through to the basic elements ("individuals") by logical analysis. Russell believed, in the end there would be subject predicate sentences and binary relations. WittgensteinVsRussell: this is a mistaken notion of logical analysis: like a chemical analysis. WittgensteinVsAtomismus.
---
Wittgenstein II 306
Logic/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell notes: "I met a man": there is an x such that I met x. x is a man. Who would say: "Socrates is a man"? I criticize this not because it does not matter in practical life; I criticize that the logicians do not make these examples alive.
Russell uses "man" as a predicate, even though we almost never use it as such.
---
II 307
We could use "man" as a predicate, if we would look at the difference, if someone who is dressed as a woman, is a man or a woman. Thus, we have invented an environment for this word, a game, in which its use represents a move. If "man" is used as a predicate, the subject is a proper noun, the proper name of a man.
Properties/predicate/Wittgenstein: if the term "man" is used as a predicate, it can be attributed or denied meaningfully to/of certain things.
This is an "external" property, and in this respect the predicate "red" behaves like this as well. However, note the distinction between red and man as properties.
A table could be the owner of the property red, but in the case of "man" the matter is different. (A man could not take this property).
---
II 308
WittgensteinVsRussell: E.g. "in this room is no man". Russell's notation: "~ (Ex)x is a man in this room." This notation suggests that one has gone through the things in the room, and has determined that no men were among them.
That is, the notation is constructed according to the model by which x is a word like "Box" or else a common name. The word "thing", however, is not a common name.
---
II 309
What would it mean, then, that there is an x, which is not a spot in the square? ((s)> Geach: Huntington-Example). ---
II 311
Arithmetics/mathematics/WittgensteinVsRussell: the arithmetic is not taught in the Russellean way, and this is not an inaccuracy. We do not go into the arithmetic, as we learn about sentences and functions, nor do we start with the definition of the number.

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Russell, B. Verschiedene Vs Russell, B. Me I 55
Hugo BergmannVsRussell: the claim of the logician to have explained the concept of existence completely through the use in mathematical logic, is an unwarranted exaggeration. MenneVsRussell: a logical analysis of the concept of existence, which is not fixed from the outset on the existence operator, provides a satisfactory result, and also a response to the question of universals.

EMD II 255
Veränderung/Existenz/Wechsel/Phasen Sortal/Michael Woods: Bsp es war wahr von etwas, das es ein Samenkorn in meinem Garten war. es ist aber nicht wahr, daß der Keimling aufgehört hat zu existieren, bloß weil er kein Keimling mehr ist. Statt dessen. es ist der Fall, daß es wahr von etwas war, daß es ein Keimling war und daß es jetzt nicht mehr wahr von etwas ist.
Kennzeichnungen/Michael WoodsVsRussell: können wir in Nicht Russellscher Weise den Namen angeleichen.
"(Ex)(x ist das F)": das variiert im WW mit der Zeit, vorausgesetzt, daß "das F" ein Objekt nur zur Zeit der Äußerung bezeichnet.
Vs: wie oben in Bezug auf Existenz (Verbindung zum Existenzquantor).
Problem: Bsp "das F existiert nicht mehr": wie kann das dann jemals eine Wahrheit ausdrücken, wenn es die Vergangenheitszeit involvieren soll?

Berka I 292
BernaysVsRussell: (1926) das 4. Axiom von PM ist nicht unabhängig.





EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Brk I
K. Berka/L. Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Russell, B. Peacocke Vs Russell, B.
 
Books on Amazon
I 131
Acquaintance/Russell: objects of acquaintance: E.g. sense data. They are obvious to the subject. Sense Data/Russell: correspond to the positions of singular terms in a sentence.
They are at the same time real constituents of the sentence.
And without givenness at that! (Without intension). Purely extensional occurrence of objects in the sentence.
PeacockeVsRussell: 1) that may mollify FregeVsRussell's criticism of his concept of proposition.
But it does not justify Russell: because he did not refer to obviousness for the thinker.
2) physical objects that, according to Russell, "cause the sense data" are therefore demonstrative and descriptive in a mix.
PeacockeVs: our approach, on the other hand, assumes that demonstrative ways of givenness are not descriptive.
But Russell's mixed approach is not entirely irrelevant: if we replace "sense data" by "experience":
PeacockeVsRussell: he confused a plausible determination of the the constitutive role with "content".
- - -
I 180
Acquaintance/Russell: (Problems of Philosophy, 1973, p. 32) "Each understandable sentence must be composed of constituents with which we are familiar." PeacockeVs: that got bad press. Problem: Excessive proximity to Humean empiricism.
SainsburyVs: Russells ideas should be defended without the principle of acquaintance if possible.
Peacocke: but if you free the principle of non-essential epistemological attachments, it is a correct and fundamental condition for the attribution of contents.
Acquaintance/Russell: we are familiar with the sense data, some objects of immediate memory and with universals and complexes.
Earlier: the thinker is also familiar with himself.
Later: Vs.
Complex/Russell: aRb. Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: he had a correct basic notion of acquaintance, but a false one of its extension (from the things that fall under it).
The salient feature is the idea of ​​relation. One is dealing with the object itself and not its deputy.
 I 182
Def Principle of Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: Thesis: Reconstruction, reformulated principle of acquaintance: The thinker is familiar with an object if there is a way of givenness (within its repertoire of concepts) that is ruled by the principle of sensitivity and he is in an appropriate current mental state, which he needs to think of the object under this way of givenness.
For this, we need a three-digit relation between subject, object and type of the way of givenness
The type of the way of givenness (as visual or aural perception) singles out the object.
"Singling out" here is neutral in terms of whether the object is to be a "constituent of thoughts" or not.
This preserves two features of Russell's concept:
1) acquaintance enables the subject to think about the object in a certain way because of the relationship that it has with it.
2) The concept of the mental state may preserve what Russell meant when he spoke of acquaintance as a relation of presentation.
Constituent/Thoughts/Russell: he thought that objects occurred downright as parts of the thought!
PeacockeVsRussell: we will interpret this as an object that indicates a type of a way of givenness (indexing).
We do not allow an object to occur as part of a thought, just because it is the only component of the thought that corresponds to a singular term position in a sentence that expresses a thought!
I 183
This is a Neo-Fregean theory, because an object can only exist as part of the thought by the particular way of its givenness (intension). (VsRussell: not literally part of the thought or sentence).
- - -
I 195
Colors/Explanation/Peacocke: to avoid circularity, colors themselves are not included in the explanation of a response action, but only their physical bases. Different: E.g. 'John's favorite color': which objects have it, depends on what concepts φ are such that φ judges the subject, 'John's favorite color is φ' together with thoughts of the form 't is φ'. (Special character)
Analog: defined description: E.g. the 'richest man'. He is identified by the relational way of givenness in context with additional information:
Complex/Acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: E.g. a subject has an experience token with two properties:
1) It may have been mentioned in the context with sensitivity for a specific demonstrative way of givenness of an object (e.g. audible tone).
2) At the same time it may be an experience token of a certain type. Then, to be recognized the two must coincide in the context
I 196
with a sensitivity for a specific concept φ in the repertoire of the subject. VsAcquaintance/VsRussell/Peacocke: one can argue:
E.g. Cicero died long ago
E.g. arthritis is painful.
We can attribute such beliefs when the subject understands the meanings of the concepts.
Nevertheless, the readiness to judge that Cicero died long ago depends on a mental state, with regard to which there must be an evidence.
What kind of a mental state should that be?
It need not remember the occasion when it first heard the name 'Cicero'.
But neither: 'F died long ago', where 'F' is a defined description.
Name/Peacocke: semantic function: simply singling out a particular object.
Understanding: if you can identify the reference of the name in one way or another.
There is no specific way in which you have to think of the Roman orator to understand the name.
VsAcquaintance/VsPeacocke: that may even endanger the reformulated principle: if the name only singles out the object, then the subject must have a relation to a thought which contains the object as a constituent.
PeacockeVs: I dispute the last conditional.
We must distinguish sharply between
a) beliefs, where the that-sentence contains a name, and
b) the presence of the reference of a name as constituent of a Neo-Fregean thought. The latter corresponds to the relation 'Bel'.
I 196/197
Def Relation 'Bel'/Terminology/Belief/Propositional Attitudes/Peacocke: a belief which contains the reference of a name as constituent of a Neo-Fregean thought: E.g. not only 'NN died a long time ago', but propositional attitude.
((s) not only belief about someone or something, but about a particular object.)
Relation Bel/Belief/Peacocke: three reasons for distinguishing beliefs:
a) we want to exclude that someone can acquire a new belief simply by introducing a new name. (Only a description could do that).
E.g. if we wanted to call the inventor of the wheel 'Helle':
Trivialization: 1) it would be trivial that such a stipulation should be enough for the reference in a community.
2) Nor is it a question of us being able to give outsiders a theoretical description of the community language.
You cannot bring about a relation Bel by linguistic stipulation.
I 198
b) Pierre Example/Kripke/Peacocke: this type of problem arises in cases where the language is too poor for a theory of beliefs in this sense: if someone understands a sentence, it is not clear what thoughts he expresses with it! (>proposition, understanding). Because the semantics only singles out the object, not the way of thinking about the object (intension). This is different with pure index words and certain descriptions.
E.g. a person who says 'I'm hot now' expresses the thought:
^[self x]^[now t].
But that involves nothing that would be 'thinking of something under a name'!
Pierre Example/Kripke/Solution: a complete description of Pierre's situation is possible (for outsiders) without embedding 'London' in belief contexts.
Peacocke: at the level of 'Bel' (where the speaker himself is part of the belief) beliefs can be formulated so that proper names are used: 'He believes that NN is so and so'.
c) Perception/Demonstratives/Way of Givenness/Peacocke: here, the way of givenness seems to have a wealth that does not need to be grasped completely, if someone uses demonstratives.
The wealth of experience is covered by the relation Bel, however.
But this way we are not making certain commitments: E.g. we do not need to regarded 'Cicero died long ago' as metalinguistic, but rather as meant quite literally.
- - -
I 201
Logical Operators/Quantification/Logic/Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: our reconstructed principle of acquaintance implicitly includes the obligation to recognize entities that can only be preserved inferentially: E.g. uniqueness operators, other quantifiers, connections, also derived ones.
This can even apply to logical constants and some truth functions and not only for ways of givenness of these functions.
RussellVs: the principle of acquaintance is not applicable to logical constituents of thoughts.

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983
Russell, B. Hintikka Vs Russell, B.
 
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I 165
On Denoting/Russell/Hintikka: (Russell 1905) Problem: with phrases that stand for genuine constituents of propositions. Problem/Frege: failure of substitutivity of identity (SI) in intensional contexts.
Informative Identity/Frege: the fact that identity can even sometimes be informative is connected to this.
EG/Existential Generalization/Russell: it, too, may fail in in intensional contexts, (problem of empty terms).
HintikkaVsRussell: he does not recognize the depth of the problem and rather circumvents the problems of denoting terms.
E.g. The bald king of France/Russell: Problem: we cannot prove by existential generalization that there is a present king of France.
HintikkaVsRussell: But there are also other problems. (see below for ambiguity of cross world identificaiton).
Description/Russell/Hintikka:
Def Primary Description: the substitutivity of identity applies to them (SI)
Def secondary description: for them, substitutivity of identity (SI) fails.
I 166
Existential Generalization/Russell: two readings: (1) George IV did not know whether Scott was the author of Waverley.
Description/Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: "the author of Waverley": (ix)A(x)
primarily: the description has the following power:
(2) (Ex)[A(x) & (y) A(y) > y = x) & ~ George IV knew that (Scott = x)].
((s) notation: quantifier here always normal existential quantifier, mirrored E).
I.e. the quantifier has the maximum range in the primary identification.
The second reading is more likely, however: Secondary:
(3) ~George IV knew that (Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x & (Scott = x)].
((s) narrow range).
Range/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not know that there is also a third option for the range of a quantifier ((s) "medium range" >Kripke in Wolf, proper names.)
(4) ~(Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x ) & George IV knew that (Scott = x)].
I 166
Existential Generalization/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not see that there was a reason for the failure of the existential generalization, which is not caused by the non-existence of the object. E.g.
(5) George IV knew that the author of Waverley is the author of Waverley.
a) trivial interpretation:
I 167
(6) George IV knew that (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x)) everyday language translation: he knew that one and only one person wrote Waverley.
I 166
b) non-trivial interpretation: (7) (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x) & George IV knew that (A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x))).
((s) no quantifier after "knew that"
everyday language translation: George knew of the only person who actually wrote Waverley, that they did.
Because knowledge implies truth, (7) is equivalent to
(8) (Ex) George IV knew that (Ez)(A(z) & (y)(A(y) > y = z) & x = z).
this is equivalent to.
(9) (Ex) George IV knew that (the author of Waverley = x)
Here, the description has secondary (narrow) range.
Everyday language translation: George knew who the author of Waverley is.
I 167
Knowledge/Who/What/Where/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell cannot explicitly analyze structures of the form knows + W-sentence. General: (10) a knows, who (Ex x) is so that A(x)
becomes
(11) (Ex) a knows that A(x).
Hintikka: this is only possible if we modify Russell’s approach:
Problem: the existential generalization now collapses in a way that cannot be attributed to non-existence, and which cannot be analyzed by Russell’s Theory of Descriptions (ThoD).
Problem: for every person, there are a lot of people whose names they know and of whose existence they know, but of who they do not know who they are.
I 168
E.g. Charles Dodgson was for Queen Victoria someone of whom she had heard, but whom she did not know. Problem: if we assume that (11) is the correct analysis of (10), the following applies.
(12) ~(Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x)
But that’s trivially false, even according to Russell.
Because the following is certainly true:
(13) Victoria knew that Dodgson = Dodgson)
Existential Generalization/EG: then yields
(14) (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x)
So exactly the negation of (12) contradiction.
I 168
Descriptions/Hintikka: are not involved here. Therefore, Russell’s description theory cannot help here, either. E.g. we can also assume that Victoria knew of the existence of Dodgson.
Empty Terms/Empty Names: are therefore not the problem, either.
Ontology/Hintikka: so our problem gets an ontological aspect.
Existential Generalization/EG/Being/Quine/Ontology/Hintikka: the question of whether existential generalization may be applied on a singular term "b", E.g. in a context "F(b)", is the same as whether b may be value of a bound variable.
Existential Generalization/Hintikka: does not fail here because of non-existence.
I 169
We are dealing with the following problems here: Manifestation used by
a) no SI Frege, Russell
b) no EG
(i) due to non-existence Russell
(ii) because of ambiguity Hintikka
Ambiguity/Solution/Hintikka: possible worlds semantics.
E.g. (12) - (14) the problem is not that Dodgson did not exist in the actual world or not in one of Victoria’s worlds of knowledge, but that the name Dodgson singles out different individuals in different possible worlds.
Hence (14) does not follow from (13).
I 170
Existential Generalization/EG/Ambiguity/Clarity/Russell/Hintikka: Which way would have been open to Russell?. Knowing-Who/Russell/Hintikka: Russell himself very often speaks of the equivalence of knowledge, who did something with the existence of another individual, which is known to have done... + ...
I 173
Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: Important argument: an ingenious feature of Russell’s theory of denotation from 1905 is that it is the quantifiers that denote! Theory of Denotation/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") includes the reduction of descriptions to objects of acquaintance.
I 174
Hintikka: this relation is amazing, it also seems to be circular to allow only objects of acquaintance. Solution: We need to see what successfully denoting expressions (phrases) actually denote: they precisely denote objects of acquaintance.
Ambiguity/Clarity/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization.
Existential Generalization/Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: his own example shows that only objects of acquaintance are allowed: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is in fact a primary incident i.e. his example (2).
"Whether"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: wanted to know "if" instead of "did not know". (secondary?).
Secondary Description/Russell: can also be expressed like this: that George wanted to know of the man who actually wrote Waverley whether he was Scott.
I 175
That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (in the distance) and had asked "Is that Scott?". HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell select an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not usually deal with beings of flesh and blood whose identity is known to us, instead of only with objects of perception?.
Knowing Who/Knowing What/Perception Object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely with perception objects it seems as if the kind of clarity that we need for a knowing-who, is not just given.
Identifcation/Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in my approach Dodgson is a bona fide individual iff. he is one and the same individual in all worlds of knowledge of Victoria. I.e. identifiable iff.
(15) (E.g.) in all relevant possible worlds it is true that (Dodgson = x).
Problem: What are the relevant possible worlds?.
I 178
Quantifier/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell systematically confuses two types of quantifiers. (a) of acquaintance, b) of description). Problem: Russell has not realized that the difference cannot be defined solely in terms of the actual world!.
Solution/Hintikka: we need a relativization to sets of possible worlds that change with the different propositional attitudes.
I 179
RussellVsHintikka: he would not have accepted my representation of his position like this. HintikkaVsRussell: but the reason for this merely lies in a further error of Russell’s: I have not attributed to him what he believed, but what he should have believed.
Quantification/Russell/Hintikka: he should have reduced to objects of acquaintance. Russell believed, however, it was sufficient to eliminate expressions that seemingly denote objects that are not such of acquaintance.
Important argument: in that his quantifiers do not enter any ontological commitment. Only denoting expressions do that.
Variable/Russell/Hintikka: are only notational patterns in Russell.
Ontological Commitment/Quine/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell did not recognize the ontological commitment that ​​1st order languages bring with them.
Being/Ontology/Quine: "Being means being value of a bound variable".
HintikkaVsRussell: he has realized that.
I 180
Elimination/Eliminability/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in order to eliminate merely seemingly denoting descriptions one must assume that the quantifiers and bound variables go over individuals that are identified by way of description. ((s) Object of the >Description). Otherwise, the real Bismarck would not be a permissible value of the variables with which we express that there is an individual of a certain species.
Problem: then these quantifiers may not be constituents of propositions, because their value ranges do not only consist of objects of acquaintance. Therefore, Russell’s mistake was twofold.
Quantifier/Variable/Russell/Hintikka, 1905, he had already stopped thinking that quantifiers and bound variables are real constituents of propositions.
Def Pseudo Variable/Russell/Hintikka: = bound variable.
Acquaintance/Russell: values of the variable ​​should only be objects of acquaintance. (HintikkaVsRussell).
Quantifiers/HintikkaVsRussell: now we can see why Russell did not differentiate between different quantifiers (acquaintance/description): For him quantifiers were only notational patterns, and for them the range of possible interpretations need not be determined, therefore it makes no difference if the rage changes!.
Quantification/Russell: for him, it was implicitly objectional (referential), and in any event not substitutional.
Peacocke I 190
Possible Worlds/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: R. is unable to explain the cases in which we quantify in belief contexts (!) where (according to Hintikka) the quantifier over "publicly descriptively identified" particulars is sufficient. Hintikka: compares with a "roman à clef".
Peacocke: it is not clear that (whether) this could not be explained by Russell as cases of general ideas, so that the person with such and such characteristics is so and so.
Universals/Acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: we are familiar with universals and they are constituents of our thoughts.
HintikkaVsRussell: this is a desperate remedy to save the principle of acquaintance.
PeacockeVsRussell: his arguments are also very weak.
Russell: E.g. we cannot understand the transitivity of "before" if we are not acquainted with "before", and even less what it means that one thing is before another. While the judgment depends on a consciousness of a complex, whose analysis we do not understand if we do not understand the terms used.
I 191
PeacockeVsRussell: what kind of relationship should exist between subject and universal?. Solution: the reformulated PB: Here we can see to which conditions a term is subject, similar to the principle of sensitivity in relational givenness.
I 192
HintikkaVsRussell: ("On denoting what?", 1981, p.167 ff): the elimination of objects with which the subject is not familiar from the singular term position is not sufficient for the irreducibility of acquaintance that Russell had in mind. Quantification/Hintikka: the quantifiers will still reach over objects with which the subject is not familiar.
But such quantifiers cannot be constituents of propositions, if that is to be compatible with the PB. Because they would certainly occur through their value range Occur and these do not consist of particulars with which one is familiar.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983
Russell, B. Berka Vs Russell, B.
 
Books on Amazon
Berka I 388
Proposition/Terminologie/Russell: identifiziert den Begriff der Aussage mit ihrem Sinn, ("proposition") während "sentence", und "statement" rein sprachliche Gebilde sind. VsRussell: hielt diese Unterscheidung aber nicht konsequent durch. Er behandelt auch sein "proposition" manchmal als sprachliches Gebilde.

Brk I
K. Berka/L. Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Russell, B. Gentzen Vs Russell, B.
 
Books on Amazon
Berka I 213
Logizismus/logistisch/GentzenVsRussell: wesentlicher Unterschied: bei Russell, Hilbert und Heyting ("logistischer" Ansatz) werden die richtigen Formeln aus einer Reihe von "logischen Grundformeln" ((s) Axiomen) hergeleitet. natürliches Schließen/nS/Gentzen: geht nicht von logischen Grundsätzen ((s) Axiomen) aus, sondern von Annahmen.
Schluß/Unabhängigkeit/Gentzen: durch einen späteren Schluß wird dann das Ergebnis wieder von der Annahme unabhängig gemacht.

Brk I
K. Berka/L. Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Russell, B. Hempel. Vs Russell, B.
 
Books on Amazon
II 108
Verifiability/Hempel: must show the logical possibility of evidence through observation. But not the technical one, and even less the possibility of finding a corresponding object. Verifiability/Russell: real existence of a set of events.
HempelVsRussell: has never been so represented by an empiricist.
Absurd:
1) the sense could not be justified without empirical facts.
2) allows no conclusive evidence the statements.
HempelVsRussell: the decision of whether a class of observation statements exists, i.e. whether they can be formulated, is a matter of logic and requires no factual information at all.
Verifiability/Hempel: error: to assume true = "principally verifiable". (has also never been represented by a positivist. Is logically absurd:
E.g. we can easily describe the conditions which, if they are given,would verify the statement "The Chrysler Building is painted yellow".
II 109
Problem: according to this principle, the statement and its negation would then both have to be considered to be true.
Russell, B. Chisholm Vs Russell, B.
 
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Chisholm II 113
Knowing/Knowledge/BrandlVsRussell: We can know much more about an object, without knowing him, than we often know about those people and things with which we are well familiar. For us the distinction of knowledge has been transformed by acquaintance or description: II 114 1) There is a way in which the objects of the external world appear to us and 2) our knowledge about how these objects are designed as the cause of these experiences. The border has now shifted to the effect that our own experience are separated from what we can know at second hand. Brandl: although Russell must come to completely different results, we can agree with his justification of the distinction: Russell: insight by description is so important because it allows us to go beyond the limits of our experience. BrandlVsRussell: We do not equate "personal experience" with "immediate experience".
II 118
Identification/Chisholm/Brandl: introduces a more sophisticated concept of third-party attribution (briefly: de-re attribution): II 119 1) I need to have at least two relations R and R’ with this and only this object 2) I have to own independent evidence for both relationships 3) I need to know that I am in these relationshipy with the object. Identification/Chisholm: this goes further than Russell, who requested that in order to pass judgment on an object I would have to know which one it is. Russell: If I do not know which object so and so is, I cannot know or believe anything about it. ChisholmVsRussell: if I can only not identify the object, on the other hand, it is not impossible that I will make it the object of an indirect attribution. I can then even relate "to" it.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Russell, B. Castaneda Vs Russell, B.
 
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Hector-Neri Castaneda
Frank I 382
CastanedaVsRussell: his reduction has devastating effects on ethical contexts. (Theory of Descriptions).

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Russell, B. Donnellan Vs Russell, B.
 
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I 18/19
DonnellanVsRussell: has not grasped the referential use, but placed it in a strange construct of "logically proper names". DonnellanVsStrawson: does not see the difference ref/att correctly and mixes the two.
Referential/Attributive/Donnellan: varies even when it comes to the importance of the distinction: 1) Text: only pragmatic distinction, 2) later: "semantic significance". KripkeVsDonnellan: denies semantic ambiguity of the use of descriptions. Both can be grasped with the Russell’s analysis: sentences of the form "The F which is G is H" have the same truth conditions, they are true, if the only F that fulfils G is actually H.
I 193
DonnellanVsRussell: his strict implication works at most with attributive use. (But he does note make the distinction).
I 194
Def Description/Russell: affects an entity which only it fulfills. Donnellan: that is certainly applicable to both uses(!). Ref/Att/Donnellan: if both are not distinguished, the danger is that it must be assumed that the speaker would have to refer to something without knowing it. E.g. "Presidential candidate": we had no idea that it would be Goldwater. Nevertheless, "presidential candidate" would absurdly refer to Goldwater. Solution: DonnellanVsRussell: attributive use.
I 205
Logical Proper Names/"This"/Russell: refer to something without attributing properties! (Donnellan pro) Donnellan: It could eb said that they refer to the thing itself, not to the thing under the condition that it has any special properties. DonnellanVsRussell: he believed that this is something that a description cannot do. But it does work with referential use.
II 275
Theory of Descriptions/Reference/Existence/Russell/Donnellan: Attributed to himself as a merit to explain the reference to non-existent things without the need to bring the idea of ​​non-existent references of singular terms into play. His fully developed theory of singular terms extended this to the of proper names. Philosophy of logical atomism: names as covert descriptions.
IV 275/276
Here, the theory "proper names in the strict logical sense" was introduced, which is rarely found in everyday speech. ((s) logical proper names: "this", etc.) DonnellanVsRussell: we want to try to make Russell’s attempt at a solution (which has not failed) redundant with the "historic explanation". (> like ZinK).
II 281
Logical Proper Names/DonellanVsRussell: have no place in a correct theory of reference. Proper Names/Historical Explanation/DonnellanVsRussell: Russell’s view is incorrect in terms of common singular terms: it is not true that common proper names always have a descriptive content. Question: does this mean that ordinary singular terms might be able to fulfill the function which according to Russell only logical proper names can have?.
II 283
Descriptions/DonellanVsRussell: it seems absurd to deny that in E.g. Waverley that what is described by the description, i.e. Scott, is not "part" of the expressed proposition. Russell: was of the opinion that such statements are not really statements about the described or the reference of the name, that they do not really name the described thing! Only logical proper names could accomplish the feat of actually mentioning a certain particular. "About"/Reference/DonnellanVsRussell: Putting great emphasis on concepts such as "about" would lead us into marshy terrain. We should require no definition of "about"!.
It would be a delicate task to show that such a statement is either not a statement in any sense of "about" about the described thing or that there is a clear sense of "about" by it being not.
II 285/286
DonnellanVsRussell: For his theory he paid the price of giving up the natural use of singular terms. RussellVsVs: but with the "natural conception" we end up at the Meinong population explosion. Proper Names/Historical Explanation/DonnellanVsRussell: according to my theory names are no hidden descriptions. E.g. "Homer" is not an abbreviation for "The author of the Homeric poems".
Wolf II 209
DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Question: Does he refute Russell? No, in itself not! For methodological considerations, Russell’s theory is better than many thought. Nevertheless, it will probably fail in the end.
II 222
Statement/Donnellan/VsRussell/Kripke: It’s not so clear that Donnellan refutes Russell. E.g. "Her husband is kind to her": had Donnellan flatly asserted that this is true iff. the lover is nice, without regard to the niceness of the husband (is perhaps also nice), he would have started a dispute with Russell. But he does not assert this! If we now asked "Is the statement is true?", Donnellan would elude us. Because if description is used referentially, it is unclear what is meant by "statement". If the statement is to be that the husband is nice, the problem is: to decide whether ref. or att. Referential: in this case, we would repeat the speech act wrongly, Attributive: we ourselves would be referring to someone, and we can only do that if we ourselves believe that it is the husband.
Wolf II 232
DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Are the two really conflicting? I propose a test: Test: if you consider whether a particular linguistic phenomenon in English is a counterexample to an analysis, you should consider a hypothetical language that is similar to English, except that here the analysis is assumed to be correct. If the phenomenon in question also appears in the corresponding (hypothetical) community, the fact that it occurs in English cannot refute the hypothesis that the analysis for English is correct!. DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Test: would the phenomenon ref/att occur in different languages?.
Wolf II 234
E.g. Sparkling Wine: speakers of the weaker and middle languages think (albeit erroneously) that the truth conditions are fulfilled. Weak: here, the apparatus seems to be entirely adequate. The semantic reference is the only object. Our intuitions are fully explained. Strong: Here, the phenomenon may occur as well. Even ironic use may be clear if the affected person drinks soda.
Wolf II 235
These uses would become more common in the strong language (which is not English, of course), because the definite article is prohibited. This leads to an expansion of the speaker reference: If the speaker thinks an item to be fulfilling (Ex)(φ x u ψx), it is the speaker reference, then it may indeed be fulfilling or not. Middle: if speaker reference is applicable in the strong one, it is just as easily transferred to the middle one, because the speaker reference of "ψ(ixφ(x)" is then the thing that the speaker has in mind, which is the only one to fulfill φ(x) and about which he wants to announce that it ψ-s. Conclusion: because the phenomenon occurs in all languages, the fact that it occurs in English can be no argument that English is not a Russell language.
NS I 95
Def Attributive/Donnellan/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. "The murderer of Schmidt is insane" in the view of the body of Schmidt ((s) In the absence of the person in question, no matter whether it is them or not, "Whoever ...".). Def referential/Donnellan/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. "The murderer of Schmidt is insane" in the face of a wild rampaging man at court - while Schmidt comes through the door - ((s) in view of the man in question, no matter whether it’s him or not. "This one, whatever he did...").

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Russell, B. Hilbert Vs Russell, B.
 
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Klaus von Heusinger, Eselssätze und ihre Pferdefüsse
Uni Konstanz Fachgruppe Sprachwissenschaft Arbeitspapier 64; 1994
Heusinger I 1
Epsilon/Heusinger: bringt eine neue Repräsentation von bestimmten und unbestimmten NP: diese werden wie Pronomina als kontextabhängige Terme aufgefaßt, die mit einem modifizierten Epsilonoperator repräsentiert werden. Dieser wird als Auswahlfunktion gedeutet. VsRussell/VsIotaoperator: dieser ist weniger flexibel, weil er der Einzigkeitsbedingung unterliegt.
Kontextabhängigkeit: ist außerdem dynamisch, indem der Kontext den fortschreitenden Informationsstand spiegelt.
I 30
EO/Hilbert/Bernays/Heusinger: termbildender Operator, der aus einer Formel F und einer Variablen x den Term x Fx macht. Er kann als verallgemeinerter Iotaoperator verstanden werden, für den weder die Einzigkeits- noch die Existenzbedingung gilt. Iotaoperator/HilbertVsRussell: hat bei Hilbert keine kontextuelle, sondern eine explizite Definition. D.h. ix Fx darf eingeführt werden, wenn die in (48i) ausgedrückte Einzigkeits- und Existenzbedingung für die Formel F ableitbar ist.
Problem: das ist unpraktisch, weil man nicht immer sieht, ob die Formel die Bedingungen erfüllt.
Etaoperator/Lösung/Hilbert: darf wie in (48ii) eingeführt werden, wenn es mindestens ein Element gibt, das F wahr macht,. Er wird inhaltlich als Auswahlfunktion gedeutet.
Einzigkeitsbedingung: ist also durch das Auswahlprinzip ersetzt worden.
Problem: auch diese Existenzbedingung läßt sich der Formel nicht ansehen.
Lösung/Hilbert:
Epsilonoperator/EO: ist nach (48iii) auch dann definiert, wenn F leer ist, so daß ein Epsilonterm immer wohldefiniert ist.
I 38
Bestimmtheit/VsRussell/Heusinger: damit wird Bestimmtheit nicht auf Einzigkeit zurückgeführt (>Iotaoperator) sondern auf den allgemeineren Begriff der Salienz (nach Lewis). Allgemeinheit/(s): ob Salienz (die letztlich selber kontextabhängig ist) allgemeiner als Einzigkeit ist, ist fraglich).
Bestimmtheit/Heusinger: ist entweder
a) eine globale Eigenschaft, wie das für Unikate und funktionale Konzepte zutrifft (deiktischer Gebrauch) oder
b) lokal: durch den Kontext festgelegt. (anaphorischer Gebrauch)
Beide haben ein dynamisches Element.
- - -
Rucker I 263
HilbertVsRussell: verbesserte kurz nach Erscheinen der Principia Mathematica die Techniken, um mit ihrer Hilfe seine Idee des "formalen Systems" auszuarbeiten. Mathematik/Logik/Hilbert: Idee, alle Relationen wie x = y, x = 0, und z = x + y als spezielle Prädikate in der Prädikatenlogik aufzufassen:
G(x,y), N(x), und S(x,y,z).
Dann können die Axiome der Mathematik als Formeln der Prädikatenlogik betrachtet werden und der Beweisvorgang wird zur einfachen Anwendung der Regeln der Logik auf die Axiome.
I 264
Das erlaubt mechanische Lösungsverfahren.
Russell, B. Holz Vs Russell, B.
 
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Leibniz I 64f
Facts of Truth/FoT/Leibniz: sind kontingent - ernunftwahrheiten: notwendig. HolzVsRussell: der Unterschied liegt in der Beweisführung sonst hätte Russell recht: Wahrheit/notwendig/kontingent/ Russell: es ist unsinnig, von einem wahren Satz zu sagen, dass er im Sinne eines anderen, apodiktisch wahren Satzes nicht wahr sei. ((s) d.h. dass eine Vernunftwahrheit einer Tatsachenwahrheit widerspräche).
Holz: für den Beweis einer FoT müssen wir die davorliegende Kette der Verknüpfungen und (wegen der unendlichen Teilbarkeit der Körper) eine unendliche Anzahl von Sätzen.

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Russell, B. Lewis, C.I. Vs Russell, B.
 
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HC I 190
strikte Implikation /C.l.LewisVsRussell/LewisVsPrincipia Mathematica/PM: (1912) eine Reihe von Systemen, VsParadoxien der (materialen Implikation). Paradoxien der Implikation /Hughes/Cresswell: normalerweise aus PM: .
a) eine wahre Aussage wird von jeder beliebigen Aussage impliziert:
(1) p > (q > p)
b) eine falsche Aussage impliziert jede beliebige Aussage: (2) ~p > (p > q)
Beides zusammen nennt man die Paradoxie der (materialen) Implikation.
Da bei jeder Aussage p entweder das Antezedens von (1) oder das Antezedens von (2) wahr sein muss, läßt sich außerdem aus (1) und (2) leicht (3) ableiten:
(3) (p > q) v ( q > p).
I 191
d.h. von zwei Aussagen impliziert immer die erste die zweite oder umgekehrt.
I 191
Paradoxie der materialen Implikation: zusammengefasst: von zwei Aussagen impliziert immer die erste die zweite oder umgekehrt Cl.Lewis: hatte nicht die Absicht, diese These zu verwerfen, im Gegenteil, (1) und (2) sei "weder mysteriöse Weisheiten, noch große Entdeckungen, noch große Absurditäten", sondern sie spiegeln den wahrheitsfunktionalen Sinn wieder, mit dem "implizieren" in PM gebraucht wird.
strikte Implikation/Cl.Lewis: es gibt einen stärkeren Sinn von "implizieren", demzufolge "p impliziert q" besagt, dass q aus p folgt.
Hier ist es nicht der Fall, dass eine wahre von jeder Aussage impliziert wird, bzw. dass aus einer falschen jede beliebige folgt.
Diese stärkere Form führt zu Paaren von Aussagen, von denen keine die andere impliziert.
strikte Implikation: notwendige Implikation . Schreibweise/(s): "strimp".
strikte Disjunktion/Cl.Lewis: analog zur strikten Implikation: notwendige Disjunktion. analog:
strikte Äquivalenz/Cl.Lewis: notwendige Äquivalenz.

I 191
strikte Implikation/Cl.Lewis: p strimp q: "p folgt aus q" vermeidet Paradoxie der (materialen) Implikation führt zu Paaren von Aussagen, von denen keine die andere impliziert
CL.Lewis: führt eine ganze Reihe von Systemen ein, z.B. im Buch "A Survey of Logic": das "Survey System". Grundoperator hier: logische Unmöglichkeit, und Konjunktion/Negation).
strikte Implikation: erst in "Symbolic Logic" Lewis und Langford, (1932) umfassend behandelt. (Systeme S1 und S2). (Auch erste umfassende Behandlung von modallogischen Systemen überhaupt).
Grundoperator hier: Möglichkeit.
Russell, B. Sciama Vs Russell, B.
 
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Kanitscheider I 375
Naturgesetze/VsMach’s Principle: dürfen die Bewegungsgleichungen der Mechanik von der zufälligen Materieverteilung im Universum abhängen? Dann sind sie nicht in allen möglichen Welten gleich. (>Lewis).
I 376
Russell: wenn die Naturgesetze der ganzen dynamischen Welt ohne Berücksichtigung auf die Existenz formuliert werden können (und sie können es) dann kann es kein Bestandteil ihrer Bedeutung sein, dass Materie existiert. SciamaVsRussell: der Inhalt hat genauso Bedeutung wie seine Gesetze.

Sciam I
D. Sciama
The Physical Foundations of General Relativity 1969

Kan I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kan II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Russell, B. Burkhardt Vs Russell, B.
 
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II 364
Namen/Bedeutung/Träger/Burkhardt: auch wenn man den Träger als die Bedeutung des Namens annimmt, heißt dass noch nicht, dass eine Existenzpräsupposition impliziert wäre. Strawson: Sätze können nur in aktuellen Verwendungssituationen wahr oder falsch sein.
Nichtexistenz/Namen/BurkhardtVsRussell: hat sich durch die logische Form des Satzes täuschen lassen. "Scott existiert nicht" heißt nicht, analog zu f(x)" Es gibt Scott und dieser existiert nicht" sondern: eine Person, die den Kriterien genügt, di wir verlangen, um jemand als diejenige Person zu identifizieren, die als Scott konventionalisiert ist, existiert nicht".
Searle: "Aristoteles hat nie existiert": besagt, dass eine hinreichende aber bisher unspezifizierte Anzahl der deskriptiven Stützen von "Aristoteles" falsch sind. (Speachacts, 171).

Burk I
A. Burkhardt
Politik, Sprache und Glaubwürdigkeit. Linguistik des politischen Skandals Göttingen 2003
Russell, B. Burks Vs Russell, B.
 
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Wolf II 144
logische Eigennamen/BurksVsRussell: sind auch auf hinweisende Gesten angewiesen (funktioniert wie Beschreibung) und daher unvollständig.

Burks I
A. W. Burks
Chance, Cause, Reason 1977

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Russell, B. Meixner Vs Russell, B.
 
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I 162
Proposition/MeixnerVsRussell: Identifikation von Satzsinn mit Proposition falsch. Die P ist nicht eine Zusammensetzung aus einem gewissen Begriff und einer gewissen B-Singularisierung, sondern, das, worauf der Name "der Abendstern" referiert, als der AS geht ebenfalls in die Konstitution ein.

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004
Russell, B. Millikan Vs Russell, B.
 
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I 189
Definite article/denotation/Millikan: when used with necessarily identifying denotation it is actually superfluous. Develops its strength only in other denotations. unambiguous/determinateness/MillikanVsRussell: the definite article does not have the function of establishing unambiguity.
Exception: necessarily identifying deotations which are purely descriptive. But even then a translation into an internal name is always possible.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987
Russell, B. Newen Vs Russell, B.
 
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New I 74
Description/Russell/Newen: descriptions are only possible with whole sentences. Therefore atom sentences must be added to the minimum vocabulary.
I 75
Ontology/State of Affairs/Russell/Newen: Point: therefore, the ontology of facts is added to the ontology of objects. NewenVsRussell: this connection between epistemology and ontology has implausible consequences, however.

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005
Russell, B. Lesniewski Vs Russell, B.
 
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Quine VII 81
Klassen/Element/Quine: auf den ersten Blick sieht es so aus, als ob "x ε y" verlangt, dass y eine Klasse ist.
VII 82
Wir können aber auch den Fall zulassen, dass es heißt: "x ist das Einzelding y". Das geht mit dem Postulat P1 (Principa Mathematica): die Verbindung jedes Einzeldings mit seiner Einheitsklasse. Das ist harmlos. ((s) >Prior zeigt, dass das bei LesniewskiVsRussell möglich ist). - - -
VII 87
logische Summe/Abstraktion/Quine: (x U y) ist z^ ((z ε x) v (z ε y)). (s) Vereinigung entspricht "oder" ). Allklasse: ϑ ist x^(x = x)
((s) Dann kann die Allklasse nicht leer sein. Aber >Prior. - LesniewskiVsRussell: sie sollte leer sein können).

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Russell, B. Wessel Vs Russell, B.
 
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I 14
Ontologie/Logik/Psychologie/RussellVsDenkgesetze: es kommt nicht darauf an, dass wir in Übereinstimmung mit Denkgesetzen denken, sondern dass das Verhalten der Dinge ihnen entspricht. Russell: was wir glauben, wenn wir an den Satz vom Widerspruch glauben, ist nicht, dass unsere Bewusstsein so konstruiert ist Wir glauben z.B. nicht, dass wir nicht gleichzeitig denken können, ein Baum wäre eine Buche und auch keine Buche. Wir glauben, dass wenn der Baum eine Buche ist, dass er nicht gleichzeitig keine Buche sein kann.
I 15
Und auch wenn der Glaube an den Satz vom Widerspruch ein Gedanke ist, so ist doch der Satz vom Widerspruch selbst keine Gedanke, sondern ein Faktum, das die Dinge der Außenwelt betrifft. Wenn das, was wir glauben nicht auf die Dinge der Außenwelt zuträfe, dann würde der Umstand, dass wir gezwungen sind, so zu denken, nicht garantieren, dass der Satz vom Widerspruch nicht falsch sein kann (das zeigt, dass es kein Denkgesetz sein kann.)
WesselVsRussell: logische Gesetze betreffen nicht die Außenwelt! Sie geben uns gar keine Information über die Außenwelt.
Die Gültigkeit ergibt sich allein aus der Festlegung der Verwendung der Zeichen!
Natürlich können solche Wendungen auch ontologisch formuliert werden, aber sie sind keine ontologischen Feststellungen. Woher sollten wir sonst die Gewissheit haben, dass sie uneingeschränkt gültig sind? Die Welt können wir ja nicht unendlich absuchen.
- - -
I 123
Subjunktion/materiale Implikation/Frege/Wessel: Frege nennt sie "Bedingtheit".
I 123/124
Unterschied: zwischen der Subjunktion A > B und einem logischen Schluss, bei dem nach der einzigen bei Frege akzeptierten Schlussregel von A > B und A auf B geschlossen wird. ((s) modus ponens).
Russell/Whitehead/Principia Mathematica: übernahmen das von Frege.
"Wesentliche Eigenschaft" der Implikation: was von einer wahren Aussage impliziert wird, ist wahr. Durch diese Eigenschaft liefert eine Implikation Beweise.
Def Implikation/Russell/Principia Mathematica: p > q = def ~p v q.(Materiale Implikation).
WesselVsRussell: das ist gerade unpassend und irreführend! Es ist ja rein formal!.
Implikation/Folgerung/Wessel: die Implikation besitzt eine ganz andere logische Struktur als die Folgerung:
Subjunktion: > ist ein zweistelliger aussagenbildender Operator und p > q ist gleichbedeutend mit ~p v q.
Folgerung(Implikation): "q folgt logisch p" oder "P impliziert q" ist eine Aussage über Aussagen: "Aus der Aussage p folgt logisch die Aussage q". "Folgt aus" ist ein zweistelliges Prädikat - Kein Operator .
Folgerung (auch Implikation genannt) bezieht sich auf sprachl. Gebilde. Schreibweise l-.
Subjunktion: > bezieht sich auf Sachverhalte.

We I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999
Searle, J.R. McDowell Vs Searle, J.R.
 
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I 132/133
Theory of Designations/SearleVsRussell: McDowell: here it is easy to be on the side of Searle. (Intentionality). McDowellVsSearle: it is better to give up this wish and to relaize what non-obvious descriptions are about.
(With Evans): the conceptual area should not be construed as "predicative" but as "belonging to the area of the Fregean sense."

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
Searle, J.R. Donnellan Vs Searle, J.R.
 
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II 287
Names/Searle: are correlated with a set of descriptions (descriptions). The one that best meets the description, because it has the properties that are designated by the predicate, is thus the object. ((s) E.g. "Hans comes": is coming a property then?). Donnellan: Searle’s view is weaker than that of Russell. (Theory of "identifying descriptions": the answer you get if you ask: what are you refering to"?.
II 288
DonnnellanVsRussell, DonnellanVsSearle: now it is possible that the properties do not apply to a substantial degreeto the object to which I refer or to another one. Names/KaplanVsRussell: the idea that the reference of a proper name is to be associated with it by the descriptions that are currently connected to it is not plausible! > historical explanation.
Sense Data Carnap Vs Sense Data
 
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Wittgenstein I 202 ff
Qualität/Erlebnis/Carnap/Hintikka: die Basis von Carnaps "Aufbau" ist eine Reihe von momentanen Gesamterlebnissen, aus denen Qualitäten gebildet werden.
I 203
Aber nicht einmal Qualitäten gleichen den Sinnesdaten, der Russellschen Konzeption. CarnapVsRussell/CarnapVsSense data/Carnap: individuelles Erlebnis muss hinzukommen.
Carnap: "Wollen wir die beiden gleichartigen Bestandteile der beiden Elementarerlebnisse unterscheiden, so müssen wir sie nicht nur ihrer Qualität nach bezeichnen, sondern die Angabe des Elementarerlebnisses, zu dem sie gehören, hinzufügen.
Erst ein so bezeichneter Bestandteil ist im eigentlichen Sinn ein individueller, wir wollen ihn im Unterschied zum nur der Qualität nach bestimmten Bestandteil, wie er in der Qualitätsklasse repräsentiert wird, "Empfindung" nennen."
Diese "Empfindungen" ähneln demnach den Gegenständen Wittgensteins. Doch nach Carnap sind sie ephemer, subjektiv und zeitgebunden,
während die Tractatus-Gegenstände die nichtzeitliche "objektive" Substanz der Welt bilden.
Dementsprechend Carnap: "Die Empfindungen gehören zum Bereich der Psychologie, die Qualitäten zur Phänomenologie oder Gegenstandstheorie."
Phenomenology/Carnap/Hintikka: bei Carnap auf eine holistische Analyse der Erfahrung beschränkt.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Sense Data Dewey Vs Sense Data
 
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I 47
DeweyVssense-data theory: subjectivism. Things disappear and are replaced by qualities in the senses. DeweyVsRussell.

Dew II
J. Dewey
Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004
Sense Data Putnam Vs Sense Data
 
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Putnam I 133
RussellVsRussell: self-criticism: later Vs the idea that all meaningful statements could be reduced to sense data. Putnam: but most philosophers still hold onto it today.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Strawson, P. F. Searle Vs Strawson, P. F.
 
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John R. Searle
Searle V 160
Referential/attributive/Donnellan: E.g. we come across the mangled corpse of Smith without knowing who committed the murder. We might then say: "The murderer of Smith is crazy" without meaning someone specific.
V 161
E.g.' The man who is (falsely) accused, rioted in the courtroom. In this case, we do not mean: "The killer, whoever he was" but a certain man. referential: should it turn out that Smith committed suicide, our statement about the man in the courtroom would at least in a certain sense still be true.
attributiv: in the attributive meaning it cannot be true if the description doe not apply to anything.
(DonnellanVsRussell, DonnellanVsStrawson: both do not account for the distinction).
referential: S has talked about e, regardless of whether e is actually φ.
He said something true or false about it independent of whether e is actually φ. But he implied it.
One can report correctly about his speech act that he talked about e, because one can report also with other expressions than with "the φ".
If the identification was used attributively, there were no such entity e. (And the speaker would not even have had in mind that it exists).
- - -
V 176
Term theory/object/universals/SearleVsStrawson: in what sense is the is by "is red identified term a non-linguistic form? Is the universal in a similar sense a non-linguistic form like the material object? Can the existence of a non-linguistic entity follow from the existence of a linguistic entity?
V 177
Universals/Searle: they do not persist in the world, but in the language of our representation of the world. They are however not linguistic in the way as words are (as phonemes), but linguistic in the way in which the meanings of words are linguistic! SearleVsStrawson: considering the usual criteria for distinguishing between linguistic and non-linguistic entities his finding that universals are not linguistic is therefore wrong.
V 178/179
Universals/Searle: so are not identified with the help of facts, but with the help of meanings! Universals/predicate/SearleVsStrawson: shows that "to identify" has both times completely different meanings in the model of the term theory.
V 179/180
According to Strawson we would be forced to assume that also subject expressions identify universals. E.g. "The rose is red". If "is red" identified redness, then "rose" would identify the property of being a rose, something like "roseness". Or e.g.
The thing that is a rose is red.
By this proposition no more and no less universals are identified than by:
The thing that is red is a rose.
I cannot imagine any argument with which it could be shown that hereby "is red" a universal is identified without necessarily showing at the same time, that "is a rose" identifies a universal.
The term theory is not consistent enough. If predicate expressions identify universals (what the theory claims) then subject expressions necessary do this as well!
V 181
Universals/SearleVsStrawson: no non-linguistic entities!

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Strawson, P. F. Tugendhat Vs Strawson, P. F.
 
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Wolf II 20
Identifikation/TugendhatVsStrawson: dieser unterschätzt die Bedeutung des Raum-Zeit-Systems für die Identifizierung. Grundlegendste Aussagen: solche mit Wahrnehmungsprädikaten.
- - -
I 387/388
StrawsonVsRussell: logische Eigennamen sind bloß fiktiv. "Dies" ist auch kein mehrdeutiger Eigenname sondern hat als deiktischer Ausdruck eine einheitliche Bedeutung und bezeichnet je nach Verwendungssituation einen anderen Gegenstand. TugendhatVsStrawson: aber man kann Russell nicht darauf verpflichten, dieses Wort so zu verwenden, wie wir es in unserer natürlichen Sprache verwenden.)
Russell scheitert, weil er eine andere Eigentümlichkeit nicht berücksichtigt: derselbe Gegenstand, für den in der Wahrnehmungssituation ein deiktischer Ausdruck verwendet wird, kann außerhalb dieser Situation auch mittels anderer Ausdrücke bezeichnet werden. (Substituierbarkeit).
I 389
TugendhatVsStrawson: was StrawsonVsRussell vorbringt, steht eigentlich gar nicht im Widerspruch zu dessen Theorie, sondern scheint sie sogar vorauszusetzen.
I 433
Lernen/Tugendhat: das Kind lernt nicht Etiketten auf Gegenstände zu heften, sondern es sind gerade die Demonstrativausdrücke, die über die Situation hinausweisen! Die Demonstrativausdrücke sind keine Namen, man weiß, dass er durch andere deiktische Ausdrücke zu ersetzen ist, wenn man aus anderen Situationen auf dasselbe Bezug nimmt. (TugendhatVsRussell und StrawsonVsRussell). - - -
I 384
StrawsonVsRussell: Bsp "Der gegenwärtige König von Frankreich ist kahl" (König-Bsp) es kommt darauf an, zu welcher Zeit eine solche Behauptung geäußert wird. So ist sie manchmal wahr.
I 385
Bsp "Der gegenwärtige König von Frankreich ist kahl" hat eine Bedeutung, aber an und für sich keinen Wahrheitswert. (>Äußerung, utterance): RussellVsStrawson: das hätte mit dem Problem überhaupt nichts zu tun, man hätte ja noch eine Jahreszahl hinzufügen können.
StrawsonVsRussell: wenn jemand der Meinung ist, dass die Existenzvoraussetzung irrig ist, wird er nicht von Wahrheit oder Falschheit sprechen.
RussellVsStrawson: es komme nicht darauf an, ob man in der Umgangssprache eher das eine oder das andere sage, außerdem gebe es genug Beispiele dass eher von Falschheit in der Umgangssprache gesprochen wird.
I 386
TugendhatVsStrawson: er hat nicht gemerkt, dass er selbst Russells Theorie schon akzeptiert hat. Es geht gar nicht um den Unterschied zwischen Idealsprache und Umgangssprache. Das führt zur Oxforder Schule mit der ordinary language philosophy. Dabei ist nicht um Nuancen der Umgangssprache als Faktisches geht, sondern, wie bei Philosophie überhaupt, um Möglichkeit.
I 387/388
StrawsonVsRussell: logische Eigennamen sind bloß fiktiv. »Dies« ist auch kein mehrdeutiger Eigenname sondern hat als deiktischer Ausdruck eine einheitliche Bedeutung und bezeichnet je nach Verwendungssituation einen anderen Gegenstand. TugendhatVsStrawson: aber man kann Russell nicht darauf verpflichten, dieses Wort so zu verwenden, wie wir es in unserer natürlichen Sprache verwenden.)
Russell scheitert, weil er eine andere Eigentümlichkeit nicht berücksichtigt: derselbe Gegenstand, für den in der Wahrnehmungssituation ein deiktischer Ausdruck verwendet wird, kann außerhalb dieser Situation auch mittels anderer Ausdrücke bezeichnet werden. (Substituierbarkeit).
I 389
TugendhatVsStrawson: was StrawsonVsRussell vorbringt, steht eigentlich gar nicht im Widerspruch zu dessen Theorie, sondern scheint sie sogar vorauszusetzen.
I 395
Identifizierung/TugendhatVsStrawson: verwendet Identifizierung im engeren Sinn. Tugendhat: mein eigener Begriff "Spezifizierung" oder "Spezifikation" (welcher von allen Gegenständen ist gemeint) ist diesem Begriff überlegen.
"Herausgreifen" (to pick put) ist Strawsons Ausdruck. (Von Searle übernommen). (Quine: "to specify").
I 397/398
TugendhatVsStrawson: Bsp "Der höchste Berg" ist überhaupt keine Identifizierung: welcher ist denn der höchste? Es muss noch etwas hinzukommen, eine Ostension, oder einen Name, oder eine Ortsangabe. Bsp jemand kann mit verbundenen Augen vor den höchsten Berg geführt werden. Er wird auch nicht mehr wissen.
I 399
Identifikation/Strawson: unterscheidet zwei Arten der Identifizierung a) Direktes Zeigen
b) Beschreibung durch Kennzeichnung. Raum-Zeit-Stellen. Relative Position zu allen anderen möglichen Standorten und allen möglichen Gegenständen (in der Welt).
I 400
TugendhatVsStrawson: er hat übersehen, dass die demonstrative Identifizierung ihrerseits die nicht demonstrative, raum-zeitliche Identifizierung voraussetzt. Daher gibt es gar keine zwei Stufen. Strawson hatte Russells Theorie von der direkten Relation soweit akzeptiert, dass er das nicht sehen konnte. ((s) > Brandom: Deixis setzt Anapher voraus.)
I 415
TugendhatVsStrawson: er hat übersehen, dass das System raum-zeitlicher Relationen nicht nur demonstrativ perzeptiv verankert ist, sondern ein System möglicher Wahrnehmungspositionen ist, und damit ein System von demonstrativen Spezifizierungen.
I 419
TugendhatVsStrawson: er hat nicht gefragt, wie die Bedeutung der singulären Termini erklärt bzw. wie festgestellt wird, welchen Gegenstand ein singulärer Term spezifiziert. Das wird bei verschiedenen Gegenständen auf ganz verschiedene Weisen festgestellt, manchmal durch Durchlaufen aller möglichen Fälle.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Type Theory Gödel Vs Type Theory
 
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Russell I XXV
Typentheorie/Gödel: in der realistischen (intensionalen) Interpretation: zusätzliche Annahme: "Wann immer ein Objekt x ein anderes Objekt y in einer sinnvollen Proposition ersetzen kann, kann es dies in jeder sinnvollen Proposition". Das hat zur Konsequenz, dass die Objekte in einander ausschließende Bedeutungsbereiche eingeteilt werden.
GödelVsRussell: suspekt, dass seine Annahme selbst seine Formulierung als sinnvolles Prinzip unmöglich macht: weil x und y dann auf definite Bedeutungsbereiche eingegrenzt werden müssen, die entweder dieselben sind, oder verschieden und in beiden Fällen drückt die Feststellung nicht das Prinzip oder auch nur einen Teil von ihm aus.
Andere Konsequenz: die Tatsache, dass ein Objekt x von einem gegebenen Typ ist (oder nicht ) kann ebenfalls nicht durch eine sinnvolle Proposition ausgedrückt werden.
I XXVI
Eine Lösung ist nicht unmöglich. Es könnte sich herausstellen, dass jedes Konzept überall bedeutsam ist, außer für gewisse "singuläre Punkte" oder "Grenzpunkte" so dass die Paradoxien als etwas wie die "Teilung durch Null" erschienen.
I XXVI
Axiome/Russell/Gödel: Frage: sind sie analytisch (wie von Russell hier behauptet?). Analytizität/Gödel: kann zweierlei heißen: 1. rein formal, eliminierbar. In diesem Sinne ist sogar die Theorie der ganzen Zahlen nichtanalytisch, vorausgesetzt, man verlangt, die Eliminierung in einer endlichen Zahl von Schritten auszuführen. ((s) Sonst z.B. für jede Zahl einzeln).
Aber das Ganze der Mathematik als angewandt auf Sätze von unendlicher Länge muss vorausgesetzt werden, um diese Analytizität zu beweisen, z.B. kann von dem Auswahlaxiom nur bewiesen werden, dass es analytisch ist, wenn angenommen wird, dass es wahr ist!.
I XXXIV
Analytizität im 2. Sinne: "Aufgrund des Sinnes der in ihr vorkommenden Begriffe". Dabei ist dieser "Sinn" vielleicht undefinierbar (d.h. irreduzibel auf etwas Grundlegenderes). Bsp Wenn man "Klasse" und "" definierte als "die Konzepte (Begriffe) welche den Axiomen genügen" wäre man nicht imstande, ihre Existenz zu beweisen. "Konzept " könnte man vielleicht in Termini von "Proposition" definieren, aber dann werden gewisse Axiome über Propositionen nötig, die sich nur unter Bezug auf den undefinierten Sinn dieses Terms rechtfertigen lassen.
Diese Sicht von Analytizität macht es wiederum möglich, dass vielleicht jede mathematische Proposition auf einen Spezialfall von a = a reduziert werden könnte.
I XXVII
Russell: ging den Weg, sowohl Klassen als auch Konzepte (mit Ausnahme der logisch uninteressanten Grundprädikate) als nichtexistent anzusehen und sie durch unsere eigenen Konstruktionen zu ersetzen. Russell/Gödel/(s): konstruktivistisch.
Reduzibilitätsaxiom: ist im Fall von unendlich vielen Individuen beweisbar falsch, außer man nimmt die Existenz von Klassen oder unendlich vielen "qualitates occultae" an.
Die tatsächliche Entwicklung der mathematischen Logik ist den Weg der Existenz von Klassen und Begriffen gegangen, und Russell war später selbst genötigt, diesen Weg zu gehen.
Type Theory Wittgenstein Vs Type Theory
 
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II 439
Type Theory/TT/WittgensteinVsRussell: f(a) = U's coat is red
F(a) = U's coat has one of the colors of the rainbow
φ(f) = Red is a color of the rainbow
Question: Now, φ (F) has a meaning? ((s) This is not mentioned in this combination above).
Russell: would say that "a color of the rainbow has the property to be a rainbow color" has no meaning, so that "f(f)" generally has no meaning.
But if we now create a rule of grammar in order to exclude a replacement option (and exactly this does the theory of types, in order to avoid contradictions), then we must make the replacement rule dependendet exclusively on the characteristics of symbols.
Replacement rule: if we introduce "f(x)" we must not give "f (f)" a meaning.
E.g. Consider ~ f(f) = F(f) and the expression that is obtained by replacing "f" through "F": the property to not have oneself as a property that has itself in turn as a property. The root of the contradiction is that one considers a function to function of itself. ((s)> heterology).
From ~ f(f) = F(f) results the contradiction F(F) = ~ F(F).
Problem: arises when one declares a function to its function of itself.
---
II 440
"f" in "f(x)" cannot be used as an argument itself. But why should this not occur as that which one presupposes, is not a sentence? It is not true to say that here the principle of contradiction has been violated, because that could only be the case if one was talking about sentences.
Hardy said it would be unbearable to have real numbers of different orders.
See his discussion, after which a sequence of real numbers belongs to another order, because it is defined by reference to a entirety whose barrier it is itself.
An analog example is the maximum of a curve, which is defined as the highest points of all on this curve.
---
IV 68
Operation/Form Series/Type theory/TT/Tractatus: 5.252 only like this the progression from member to member in a form series (from type to type in Russell) is possible. WittgensteinVsRussell: in Principia Mathematica (PM), they have not given the possibility of this progression, but have made use of it repeatedly.
5.2521 The repeated application of an operation to its own result ((s)> recursion) I call its successive application ("O'O '=' a" is the result of a triple application of "O'ζ" to "a").
5.2522 the general term of a form series a, O 'a, O'O'a ... I write:
---
IV 69
"[a,x,O'x]". This expression in brackets is a variable.
1. member: beginning of the form series
2. member: The form of any member x of the series
3. member: Form of the immediate successor this x. (Successor: O').
---
IV 70
WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.4 "Logical objects" or "logical constants" in the sense of Russell do not exist. Primitive signs/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.42 The possibility of crosswise definition of the logical "primitive signs" of Frege and Russell (e.g. >, v) already shows that these are not primitive signs, let alone that they do not signify any relations.

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Various Authors Prior Vs Various Authors
 
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I 123
Intentionality/Findlay: relational property with only one side. ((s) Vs: absurd.) Of course, "thinking about T" is a property of the thinker.
I 124
Touchstone for Intentionality: is the "built-in reference to what is not part of it and what does not need to exist anywhere". There is absolutely no intrinsic difference between thinking and speaking about what does and what does not exist. (>Anscombe pro).
That would only be a Pickwickian distinction (>distinction without difference).
FindlayVsRussell: VsTheory of Descriptions.
PriorVsFindlay: that's not fair, because he just offered the solution.
- - -
I 127
PriorVsReid/VsAnscombe/VsFindlay: it is not easy to hold the following two sentences together: (1) What X thinks of Y, plans to do with him, appreciates about him, always involves Y as much as X.
(2) There are cases in which X thinks of Y (appreciates, etc.), and there is no Y at all.
At least it's difficult in this case to dismiss the following three considerations that merely seem to make them consistent:
a) Thinking about an unreal object is a different kind of thinking than that about a real object.
b) our thinking would not put us in relation to an object, but only to an "idea" of it.
c) there would be strong and weak types of reality. (>Subsistence).
I 128
Thinking/Anscombe/Prior: could "think" not be replaced with any other (at least intentional) verb? Object/Tradition/Anscombe: something cannot just be an object without being object of something. I.e. "relational property" of being an object.
- - -
Simons I 119
Identity/Simons: is transitive. Prior: this is questionable (the only one). (PriorVsTransitivity of identity).

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Wittgenstein, L. Russell Vs Wittgenstein, L.
 
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Bertrand Russell
Proposal by Wittgenstein: a long conjunction for "each F is G": "This is G and that is G and that is any further G ...
  RussellVs: these two statements are not equivalent because the long conjunction needs a final clause "and these are all F". ReadVsRussell: error: if a conjunction is exhausted, then the two statements are equivalent. If not, the extra clause has no effect because it is wrong. It does not provide extra work. Read, Logic III 65

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Description Th./nat.Kind Versus Cresswell II 98
Names / descriptions CresswellVsRussell: names are no descriptions, but nominal (noun phrases, NP).

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Causal Th./Names Pro Donnellan II 286
DonnellanVsRussell: names are no hidden descriptions - Homer is no shortcut for "the author of the Homeric poems."
Mentalism Versus Quine2 XI 66
Mentalism: Russell QuineVsMentalism/QuineVsRussell

The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Description Cresswell, M.J.
 
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I 175
bestimmte Kennzeichnungen/Cresswell: bisher haben wir nur über unbestimmte gesprochen! unbestimmte Kennzeichnung/Russell. These ein Mann bedeutet -žwenigstens ein Mann-œ.
bestimmte Kennzeichnung/Russell. These der Mann bedeutet -ždieser bestimmte Mann-œ.
Anapher/HintikkaVsRussell: die Tradition hat keine Erklärung für den anaphorischen Gebrauch bestimmter Kennzeichnungen.
Artikel/Cresswell: neuere Versuche: die alte linguistische Idee in die traditionelle Logik einzubauen, daß der unbestimmte Artikel neue Gegenstände in die Rede einführt, während der bestimmte Artikel auf schon eingeführte Entitäten referiert. Das entspricht:
Artikel/Kempson: (1975, 111): These bestimmter/unbestimmter Artikel sollten nicht semantisch, sondern nur pragmatisch unterschieden werden.
alt/neu/Artikel/file change semantics/Heim/Cresswell: die Unterscheidung von alten und neuen Entitäten im Zusammenhang mit dem Artikel findet sich auch bei Heim (1983).
I 176
Dort führt sie zur file change Semantik/Kamp/Heim: These als Entitäten in der Welt sind die Gegenstände nicht neu, sondern nur innerhalb der Rede, daher -žfiles-œ. (-žAkten-œ, -žneu in den Akten-œ). Def file/Heim/Cresswell: repräsentiert Tatsachen über Gegenstände für den Sprecher.
Names Frege, G.
 
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Wolf I 13
Namen/FregeVsRussell: sing Term.
Newen/Schrenk I 101
Sinn/Namen/Frege: These der Sinn eines Namens wird durch die Kennzeichnung ausgedrückt. Das ist die sogenannte Kennzeichnungstheorie, eine einfache Variante der Beschreibungstheorie.
Staln I 172
Namen/Referenz/Sinn/sense/Stalnaker: 1. Mill/KripkeVsFrege: These: Namen haben ihre Referenten direkt, ohne Vermittlung eines zwischengeschalteten Sinns
Frege/Dummett/Searle: These zwischen dem Namen und seinem Referenten muß man den Sinn des Namens annehmen
a) weil der Gegenstand sonst gar nicht identifiziert werden kann, bzw. wir nicht erklären können, wie er identifiziert wird,
b) (DummettVsKripke) weil wir dann die Sprache nicht lernen können.

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Idiolect Kripke, S.A.
 
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Cresswell II 151
Def "extreme Fregeanism" / KripkeVsFrege / KripkeVsRussell / Cresswell: the thesis that names in general belong to idiolects.   Problem: then the Pierre-Example is not about Pierre, but about the speaker who reports the case, and about his idiolect.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Acquaintance Peacocke, Chr.
 
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I 182
Def principle of acquaintance / PeacockeVsRussell: Reconstruction, reformulated p.o.ac.:   The thinker is acquainted with an object when there is (within his term repertoire) a way of givenness, which is dominated by the principle of sensitivity and it is in a suitable current psychological state, which he takes to the object under this way of givennes.
  For this we need a three-place relation between subject, object and type of givennes.
Acquaintance Russell, B.
 
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Hintikka(Wittg I 93
Bekanntschaft/Russell/Hintikka: These die Bekanntschaft liefert nicht bloß die Bausteine unseres Wissens - sondern, wichtiger, auch die Bedeutungen (Bezüge ((s) Referenz)) unserer Basisausdrücke. Russell postuliert komplexe logische Formen als tatsächlich existierende Gegenstände der Bekanntschaft.
WittgensteinVsRussell: ersetzt diese durch Kombinationen von Gegenständen.

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Fido-Fido-Principle Russell, B.
 
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Read I 32
Russell made ​​the same mistake: he assumed atomic propositions consist of a number of individuals and a Universal - E.g. "Fido is a dog." To what does "dog" refer? According to the "Fido"-Fido theory it needs to get its meaning from the fact that it is associated with a single thing, the dog, or an universal, dog - RyleVsRussell: reference is not the same as meaning.
Proposition Russell, B.
 
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Horwich I 45
Proposition/Tatsache/VsRussell: (früh): gegen die These, daß Wahrheit eine einfache Eigenschaft ist könnte man einwenden: wahre Propositionen drücken Tatsachen aus ((s) statt mit ihnen identisch zu sein, DF) falsche drücken keine Tatsachen aus.
I 46
RussellVsVs: dann wäre - wenn Tatsachen mit wahren Propositionen gleichgesetzt werden - jede bedeutsame Behauptung einfach eine Tautologie. (Meinongs Th. 75).
Horwich I 62
Proposition/Identität/Ã"quivalenz/Kennzeichnung/Name/Cartwright: Frage: wenn eine Kennzeichnung für einen Namen eingesetzt wird, sind die zwei Propositionen identisch oder nicht? -" das ist mehrdeutig! -" Problem: gegeben eine Objekt x, welches ist die Proposition, daß x größer ist als Smith? -" wenn x Brown ist, dann wahrscheinlich nicht -žSmith-™ Angestellter...-œ (obwohl = Brown) -" wenn wir nicht wissen, welche Kennzeichnung di richtige ist, wissen wir auch nicht, welche Proposition -" PM/Russell: (früh) These die Propositionen sind identisch, wenn Green ein Pseudonym für Brown ist -

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
referential /attrib. Russell, B.
 
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Newen / Schrenk I 96
DonnellanVsRussell: he has clearly overlooked the referential use. He considers only the attributive. This is because Descriptions / Russell: Thesis: d. are syncategorematic for him. Expressions that can not refer themselves.
Language/World Russell, B.
 
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Rorty I 285
Truth / World / Russell / Rorty: Thesis: every true statement contains both our own contribution and a contribution of the world. This has spawned two attacks 1 DavidsonVsRussell: VsDrittes dogma: separation of scheme and content. There is no content that is waiting to be organized.
2 PutnamVsRussell.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Kausality Russell, B.
 
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Cartwright I 21
Russell: These 1. es gibt nur Assoziations-Gesetze. 2. Kausalprinzipien können nicht von kausal symmetrischen Gesetzen der Assoziation abgeleitet werden.
Cartwright: Vs 1. pro 2.
Kausalprinzipien/CartwrightVsRussell: können zwar nicht aus Assoziationsgesetzen abgeleitet werden, wir können aber auch nicht auf sie verzichten. Das hat mit unseren Strategien zu tun.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983