Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 39 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Artificial Intelligence Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 185
Artificial Intelligence/Chalmers: Suppose we had an artificial system that rationally reflects what it perceives. Would this system have a concept of consciousness? It would certainly have a concept of the self, it could differ from the rest of the world, and have a more direct access to its own cognitive contents than to that of others. So it would have a certain kind of self-awareness. This system will not say about itself, that it would have no idea how it is to see a red triangle. Nor does it need access to its elements on a deeper level (Hofstadter 1979, Winograd 1972). N.B.: such a system would have a similar attitude to its inner life as we do to ours.
---
I 186
Behavioral explanation/Chalmers: to explain the behavior of such systems, we never need to attribute consciousness. Perhaps such systems have consciousness, or not, but the explanation of their behavior is independent of this. ---
I 313
Artificial Intelligence/VsArtificial Intelligence/Chalmers: DreyfusVsArtificial Intelligence: (Dreyfus 1972): Machines cannot achieve the flexible and creative behavior of humans. LucasVsArtificial Intelligence/PenroseVsArtificial Intelligence/Chalmers: (Lucas 1961, 1963, Penrose, 1989): Computers can never reach the mathematical understanding of humans because they are limited by Goedel's Theorem in a way in which humans are not. Chalmers: these are external objections. The internal objections are more interesting:
VsArtificial intelligence: internal argument: conscious machines cannot develop a mind. SearleVsArtificial Intelligence: > Chinese Room Argument. (Searle 1980). According to that, a computer is at best a simulation of consciousness, a zombie.
Artificial Intelligence/ChalmersVsSearle/ChalmersVsPenrose/ChalmersVsDreyfus: it is not obvious that certain physical structures in the computer lead to consciousness, the same applies to the structures in the brain.
---
I 314
Definition Strong Artificial Intelligence/Searle/Chalmers: Thesis: There is a non-empty class of computations so that the implementation of each operation from this class is sufficient for a mind and especially for conscious experiences. This is only true with natural necessity, because it is logically possible that any compuation can do without consciousness, but this also applies to brains. ---
I 315
Implementation/Chalmers: this term is needed as a bridge for the connection between abstract computations and concrete physical systems in the world. We also sometimes say that our brain implements calculations. Implementation/Searle: (Searle 1990b): Thesis is an observational-relativistic term. If you want, you can consider every system as implementing, for example: a wall.
ChalmersVsSearle: one has to specify the implementation, then this problem is avoided.
---
I 318
For example, a combinatorial state machine has quite different implementation conditions than a finite state machine. The causal interaction between the elements is differently fine-grained. In addition, combinatorial automats can reflect various other automats, like... ---
I 319
...Turing machines and cellular automats, as opposed to finite or infinite state automats. ChalmersVsSearle: each system implements one or the other computation. Only not every type (e.g., a combinational state machine) is implemented by each system. Observational relativity remains, but it does not threaten the possibility of artificial intelligence.
---
I 320
This does not say much about the nature of the causal relations.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Causality Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
I 287/88 (Note)
Causality/Identity/PlaceVsSearle: causal dependency requires separate entities (>Armstrong) - SearleVsPlace: E.g. liquid state may be causally dependent on the behavior of molecules while being a feature of the system. ---
II 93
Causality/Searle: is no external instance, only more experiences. ---
II 101f
Causality: pressure cooker: inference from steam to pressure - Seeing: no inference on physical objects. - SearleVsHume: causality may well be experienced directly, but not independently, but causality is part of the experience. ---
II 152ff
Causality/SearleVsHume: is real and directly observable. ---
I 157
Logical causality: is not inference, but intentional content and experience condition - not two experiences, but causation = intentional content. ---
II 179
Causality: part of the experience, causation is part of the experience. ---
Danto I 299
Causality/Searle: causality only through interpretation.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Chinese Room Danto
 
Books on Amazon:
Arthur Danto
I 271 ff
Searle: denies that in terms of linguistic skills no distinction should be possible. Chinese room: the occupant does not speak the language, but acts according to established rules. The output is indistinguishable from language skills. DantoVsSearle: but perhaps the brain does not do anything else, but answer to an electrical pulse with a electrical reaction.

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Chinese Room Pinker
 
Books on Amazon
I 121f
Chinese Room/Searle: Understanding is not symbol processing - ChurchlandVsSearle. then you can refute Maxwell’s electromagnetism: a man swung a bar magnet: then it generates electromagnetic waves, but no light - wrong to conclude, therefore light would not be electromagnetic waves - Extrapolation: then at higher frequencies there is no light. Analogy: Searle has slowed down computing so that you do not take it anymore as understanding - Pinker: if someone used all of the rules from the translation manual applying them in a matter of seconds, we would not say that he could not speak Chinese - PinkerVsSearle: he examines only the meaning of the word understanding - but you need not to use the word.

Pi I
St. Pinker
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998

Chinese Room Poundstone
 
Books on Amazon
I 353f
Chinese Room/PoundstoneVsSearle: some: a book "What to do if a Chinese note...". Cannot exist, it would have to include all libraries - ((s) because it would not be a dictionary, but a book of responses) Searle: semantic understanding essential for consciousness - PoundstoneVsSearle: even without knowing what numbers are (missed first day in school) you can do maths. - We all do not know what numbers are - I 357 "System Response": the one person does not speak Chinese, but the system as a whole does - I 365 the levels book/user need to be separated.
W. Poundstone
I W. Poundstone Im Labyrinth des Denkens, Reinbek 1995
Chinese Room Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
VI 161
Chinese Room / DennettVsSearle: inverted spectra (Jackson): these examples are intended to tap our intuitive notions, strengthen or weaken the feeling of the importance of qualia, phenomena or intrinsic properties.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Chinese Room Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 323
Chinese Room/Searle/Chalmers: Searle's argument is directed against the possibility of understanding or intentionality. ChalmersVsSearle: we separate intentionality and understanding from the possibility of having conscious experiences. We split Searle's argument into two parts:
(1) No program achieves consciousness.
(2) No program achieves intentionality (understanding).
Searle believes that (1) implies (2), others doubt that.
Strong artificial intelligence: if (1) is true, the strong Artificial Intelligence thesis fails, but if (1) can be refuted, even Searle would accept that the Chinese Room argument failed. The connection of consciousness and understanding can be set aside, it is not a decisive argument against artificial intelligence.
FodorVsChinese Room: (Fodor 1980): Fordor considers the connection to the environment of the system.
ReyVsChinese Room: (Rey 1986) dito.
BodenVsChinese Room: (Boden 1988) Boden shows functional or procedural approaches of intentionality.
ThagardVsChinese Room: (Thagard 1986) dito.
Chalmers: it is about intentionality (understanding) and does not refute the possibility of consciousness (conscious experiences).
Chinese Room/Chalmers: the argument states that a program is not sufficient, e.g. for the experience of a red object when implemented in a black and white environment. Then consciousness needs more than one relevant program.
Strong Artificial IntelligenceVsChinese Room/Strong Artificial IntelligenceVsSearle: it is the whole system to which you have to attribute consciousness, not the individual elements.
SearleVsVs: that is implausible. Chalmers: in fact, it is implausible, if the inhabitant of the room should have no consciousness, but the inhabitant together with the paper.
---
I 324
Disappearing Qualia: the argument can also be applied to the Chinese Room (... + ...) ---
I 325
Dancing Qualia: dito (... + ...) Conclusion/Chalmers: a system of demons and paper snippets both of which can reduce the number of demons and snippets, has the same conscious experiences as e.g. to understand Chinese or to see something red.
Chinese Room/Chalmers: 1. As described by Searle, the stack of paper is not a simple stack, but a dynamic system of symbol manipulation.
2. The role of the inhabitant (in our variant: the demon, which can be multiplied) is quite secondary.
When we look at the causal dynamics between the symbols, it is no longer so implausible to ascribe consciousness to the system.
---
I 326
The inhabitant is only a kind of causal mediator.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Competence Katz
 
Books on Amazon
Cresswell I 12
Kompetenz/linguistische/Sprachkompetenz/Chomsky/Cresswell: (Chomsky 1965, 3 – 15): die Diskussion darüber hält bis heute an (1974). Def linguistische Kompetenz: ist eine Fähigkeit, die der sprachlichen Aktivität zugrunde liegt. Es geht um die Klasse der Sätze, die der Sprecher grammatisch akzeptabel findet.
Semantische Kompetenz/Cresswell: (darum geht es mir hier):dabei favorisiere ich eine wahrheits-konditionale Semantik (> Wahrheitsbedingungen). Diese möchte ich unterscheiden von zweierlei:
a) CresswellVsKatz/CresswellVsFodor/Terminologie/KF/Cresswell: „KF“ (Katz/Fodor-Semantik): ist unvollständig, wenn auch nicht unkorrekt.
b) CresswellVsGrice/CresswellVsSearle/CresswellVsSprechakttheorie: ist eher eine Theorie der semantischen Performanz als der semantischen Kompetenz.
Cresswell I 12
Def Kompetenz/Sprachkompetenz/semantisch/Katz/Nagel/Cresswell: (Katz und Nagel, 1974): erklärt die Fähigkeit eines Sprechers, Urteile über folgende Eigenschaften abzugeben: Synonymie, Redundanz, Widersprüchlichkeit, Entailment (Beinhalten), Mehrdeutigkeit, semantische Anomalien, Antonymie und Übergeordnetheit (superordination).

Katz
J. J. Katz
The Metaphysics of Meaning


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Consciousness McGinn
 
Books on Amazon
I 49
Consciousness/mind-body problem/McGinn: there seem to be no properties of physical organisms from which consciousness could arise under certain circumstances. Now, it is also difficult to specify exactly which property of consciousness ensures that it refuses a physical explanation.
---
I 52
Consciousness/McGinn: Problem: what is the real hallmark of a state of consciousness? Where is the problem located? "What is it like to be a K?" ---
I 56
Consciousness/McGinn: Problem: how is it possible that states whose condition is associated with "being-like" emerge from states where there is no "being-like"? ---
I 68
Consciousness/McGinnVsSearle: states of consciousness do not allow emergence-theoretical explanations with mereological terms. We are unable to reduce pain to the underlying neural units. On the contrary to that it is quite possible to explain the higher-level properties of liquids in this way. (s) because all levels are easily accessible to us. States of consciousness can therefore not be explored according to Combinatorial Atomism with lawlike mappings. We can well understand higher-level brain functions from their constituents, but if we start with consciousness, this explanation fails.
---
I 74
Mind/brain/meaning/reference/McGinn: so according to this view, there is no referent that would ever raise a philosophical problem of its own, because the objective world is not a problem from a philosophical point of view. Philosophical problems arise from the meanings in the light of which we understand the world.
It is not the soul as a referent to which the mystery clings.
Consciousness/McGinn: is theoretically unfathomable, because we do not understand what kind of relationship would be capable of linking experience with the world in a way that is given by our imagination when we talk about knowledge.
---
I 192
What does it really mean for my mind to put itself in the position of the world? Since we receive no response, there is the notion that our cognitive powers are directed entirely inwards. However, this retreat is a deception according to transcendental naturalism.
---
II 68
If the only thing on which we had relied was brain research, we would never even have got the idea that the brain houses a consciousness at all. ---
I 86 ~
Knowledge/awareness/McGinn: even complete knowledge of ourselves would not let us look better in terms of consciousness. ---
II 216
Consciousness is not a property that depends on its origin.

McG I
C. McGinn
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McG II
C. McGinn
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001

Consciousness Block
 
Books on Amazon:
Ned Block
Metzinger II 458
Consciousness/Block: is a mixed concept of "phenomenal consciousness" (P consciousness/terminology) and "access consciousness" (Z consciousness). Def Z Consciousness/Terminology/Block: Being aware of a fact z means that the information for rational inferring is available. (Functional concept)
Consciousness/Burge: (VsBlock): P consciousness Prerequisite for Z Consciousness.
Phenomenality is not the same as consciousness! Phenomenal states can also be unconscious.
II 524
Blindsight/Block: Patients who cannot see in part of their visual field can still give true verbal descriptions upon request.       This suggests that consciousness must have a function that is effective in survival, reporting, and behavioral control.
II 530
Access Awareness/Block: I call its basis the information-processing function of the phenomenal consciousness in >Schacter's model. (s) part or basis as a counterpart).
II 531
Def P Consciousness/Phenomenal Consciousness/Block: experience. It cannot be described non-circularly! But that's no shortcoming! P-conscious properties are distinguished from any cognitive, intentional, or functional property. Although functionalism is wrong with respect to P consciousness, functionalism can accept many of my points.
II 535
Def Z Consciousness/Access Consciousness/Block: a state is z conscious if by virtue of being in the state a representation of its content 1) is inferentially unbound, i.e. is available as a premise for considering
2) is available for rational control of actions
3) is available for rational language control (not necessary, even chimpanzees can be p conscious).
      P consciousness and Z consciousness interact: Background can become foreground. E.g. feeling the shirt feels at the neck.
Fallacy/Block: it is a mistake, however, to go unnoticed from one consciousness to the other.
Mistake: To conclude from the example blindsight that it is the function of the P consciousness to enable rational control of action.
P Consciousness/Block: not functional! Sensations.
Z Consciousness/Block: functional. Typical: "propositional attitudes".
Pain/Block: its representational content is too primitive to play a role in inferring. Pain is not conceptually mediated, after all, dogs can also feel pain.
Summary: P Consciousness can be consciousness of and consciousness of does not need to be Z consciousness.
II 555
Consciousness/Dennett:
1) Cultural construct!
2) You cannot have consciousness without having the concept of consciousness. 3) Consciousness is a "cerebral celebrity": only those contents are conscious that are persistent, that monopolize the resources long enough to achieve certain typical and "symptomatic" effects.
BlockVsDennett:
Ad 1) this is a merging of several concepts of consciousness. 2) Consciousness cannot be a cultural product.
Also probably not the Z consciousness: many lower creatures have it, even without such a concept.
Ad 3) But that is a biological fact and not a cultural one.
II 568
Fallacy/BlockVsSearle: Question: why the thirsty blindsight patient in the example does not reach for the water: he lacks both P consciousness and Z consciousness. That's right. But it is a mistake to go from a function of the machinery of Z consciousness to any function of P consciousness.
     Fallacy: to prematurely draw the conclusion that P consciousness has a certain function from the premise that "consciousness" is missing (without being clear what kind of consciousness).


Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007


Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996
Descriptions McDowell
 
Books on Amazon
I 132
Theory of Descriptions/SearleVsRussell/McDowell: here it is easy to be on the side of Searle (i.e., to assume intentionality). ---
I 132/33
McDowellVsSearle: it is better to give up Searle's desire and clarify what the non-obvious descriptions are. (With Evans): the conceptual area should not be regarded as a "predicative", but as "belonging to the area of Fregean sense".
---
I 210
McDowell Thesis: Fregean sense is effective in the area of reasons. Because rationality is a condition in the community, we do not distinguish between different senses. But in order to attribute rationality to a subject, we must distinguish between senses (rational and irrational).
VsMcDowell: but then we need some theory of descriptions.
Theory of Descriptions/Russell/McDowell: Indirect relation to the world.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Extensions Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
II 248f
Extension: Tradition: Meaning has to do with mental state - Tradition: intension fixes extension - PutnamVsSearle: intension does not firmly attach meaning.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Folk Psychology Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
I 64f
ChurchlandVsFolk Psychology: the entities such as beliefs, hopes, etc. do not exist in reality, but are only brain states that still await a perfect neuroscience - SearleVs: then there are no farmhouses - ((s) VsSearle: confusion of levels: a farmhouse as a material object is at a different level than the desire for a house.) ---
I 79
Folk Psychology: (pro): what empirical evidence should refute the conclusion that pain is often uncomfortable?

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Functionalism Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
Dennett I 557
Function/Searle: (according to Dennett): only products that were produced by a real human consciousness, have a function (> objet ambigu, P. Valéry). DennettVsSearle: therefore the wings of the aircraft serve to fly, but not the wings of the eagle.
---
I 19
SearleVsFunctionalism (SearleVsPutnam) relationships between mind states are not only causal. Otherwise stones would have the same mind states like us with the right causal relations. ---
I 59 ff
VsFunctionalism: eliminates qualia - imitation of a functional organization does not result in pain sensation. ---
I 233f
Machine is defined by effects, cannot be recreated from cheese - Computer: is syntactically defined, can be rebuild by anything (cats, mice, cheese) - Syntax is always relative to the observer. Not intrinsical - but heart is an intrinsical pump - also water is describable as intelligent (lowest resistance). ---
I 266F
Intentional phenomena: rule consequences: genuine causal phenomena - Functional explanation: only bare physical facts, causality only through interest-oriented description here - rules are no cause for action. ---
I 266
Function/Searle: has no separate layer. ---
I 269
Pattern: plays a causal role in functional terms, but does not guarantee unconscious representation. (Intentionality) ---
III 24
SearleVsMillikan: function is always relative to the observer (only "flow" immanent) - Millikan: function arose evolutionary.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Identity Theory Churchland
 
Books on Amazon:
Patricia Churchland
II Patricia Smith Churchland Die Neurobiologie des Bewusstseins - Was können wir von ihr lernen? In Hügli/Lübcke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993
472
Identity Theory/Brain/Consciousness/Searle: Vs Identification of conscious states with brain states. Instead: the brain causes these states.
Correlations can be an indication of causality, but they are not a reference to identity.
ChurchlandVsSearle: he does not see why scientists advocate identity: depending on the data situation, it is more plausible than the assumption that a is caused by a different b.
(But Searle is not a dualist).
Identity instead of causation: e.g. Identity: Current is electron flow, it is not the causation of this flow.
E.g. genes are not caused by base pairs of DNA, they are these base pairs.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Imagination Holenstein
 
Books on Amazon
Münch III 324
Denken/Holenstein: es ist keineswegs so, wie man im Anschluss an Aristoteles jahrhundertelang geglaubt hat, dass Denken ohne bildliche Vorstellung als Fundament nicht möglich sei. Sie sind nicht nur epistemologisch entbehrlich, sondern auch beim psychologischen Entstehen von Denkleistungen.
Münch III 331
Bild/Holenstein: bei einer bildlichen Repräsentation (Vorstellung) brauchen die räumlichen Verhältnisse nicht material, sondern nur funktional realisiert zu sein.
Münch III 332
Homunculi/bildliche Vorstellung/HolensteinVsSearle: es ist ein beliebtes Argument gegen bildliche Repräsentation von mentalen Bildern, dass sie von Homunculi betrachtet werden müssten, die das Problem der Kodierung bloß verschieben. Holenstein: das ist eine ontologische Voraussetzung, die nicht den wissenschaftlichen Standards entspricht! Die Annahme von Homunculi bedarf einer besonderen Begründung!
Statt Regress ist außerdem einfach ein geregelter Gebrauch einer physikalischen Struktur des Gehirns möglich.
Münch III 336
Vorstellung/Holenstein: was wie Vorstellungen kausal auf Physikalisches einwirkt, ist per definitionem ebenfalls als "physikalisch" anzunehmen. Von mentalen Strukturen ist so anzunehmen, dass sie als funktionale Strukturen in physikalischen Strukturen verwirklicht sind.
Münch III 338
Vorstellung/Holenstein: der Prozess findet "im Geist" statt, das Resultat wird in eine Welt hineinprojiziert, die sich entweder mit der Wahrnehmungswelt deckt, oder eine Alternative bildet.


Mü I
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Intentionality Dennett
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 27
Rorty: "intentional stance"/Intentional position/Dennett: is made possible through the detection of a Davidson pattern. The pattern of this rationality is the same as that of the truth. Neither language without rationality, nor one of them without truth.
I 316f
SearleVsDennett: "as-if intentionality". Intentionality/DennettVsSearle: but you have to start somewhere (if you want to avoid metaphysics). The first step in the right direction is hardly recognizable as a step towards meaning.
Def intentional position/Dennett: an attempt to determine what the designer (or Mother Nature) had in mind.
II 46
He often allows large jumps in the conclusions without the ignorance of the underlying physics disturbing them. E.g. Antikythera mechanism. the fact that he was a planetarium results from the fact that it was a good planetarium!
E.g. Martians wonder why there is so much excess capacity in the computer: Reason: chips became so cheap. This is a historical explanation, but it emanates from the intentional stance.
E.g. Flog Archaeopteryx? They are not sure, but found that his claws were ideal for sitting on tree branches! So how did he get up there ...? I 321
Def design stand point/Dennett: eg an alarm clock is (as opposed to stone) a designed object and is accessible to a sophisticated kind of predictions. (According to the design standpoint). When I press the buttons, something will happen a few hours later.
But I do not need to know the laws of physics for that.
Intentional position/Dennett: E.g. chess computer. Nothing in the laws of physics forces the chess computer to make the next move, but nothing in its design either.
Brandom I 109
Intention/Intentionality/Dennett: stance-stance: asserts that one cannot distinguish whether something really is an intentional system and whether it is being treated as such appropriately.
The I 592ff
Intentionality/Real/Derived/Dennett: E.g. freezing: robot must be able to act independently - must believe in reward, but develops self-interest - Question: intentionality still derived? - If so, then our own is also merely derived - but that s splitting hairs - Important Argument: we ourselves are only those survival machines for our genes
I 596
Intentionality/SearleVsDennett: no machine, no vending machine either. Freezing/DennettVsSearle: at some time intentionality is no longer derived, but real!.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Intrinsicness Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
VI 106
intrinsic/observer-relative/RortyVsSearle: Searle’s distinction serves no useful purpose -" Searle says: essential -" Rorty: we ask: essential what for -"?
VI 126
: Intrinsic/extrinsic: we cannot decide which description applies to the intrinsic characteristics.
VI 146 f
intrinsic/extrinsic/RortyVsSearle: one can only defend intrinsic characteristics if one can claim that knowledge of these characteristics is not identical with the knowledge on how to use the words used to describe these characteristics!

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Language Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
III 78
Language/language-dependent/Searle: some things can be viewed independent of language: E.g. that the man crossed the line - but not that he makes 6 points with this - institutional facts are never language independent - e.g. there is no pre-verbal way to represent the pawn as king - (game) points are not "out there" like men and balls - Searle:> meaning in the head. ---
III 79
Reasons only work because people accept them as reasons - language independent: are status functions: e.g. one can think that this is a screwdriver because one has seen many times that things are screwed with it - (s)Vs - QuineVsSearle? Network of our beliefs thoroughly language-dependent? ---
III 82
Searle: language is necessary if the status changes without a change of the physical state of an object. ---
Perler/Wild I 143
Language/Searle: Language is needed for: 1. Intentional states that deal with language - 2. that deal with facts, e.g. that this is a dollar note - 3. representation of spatially and temporally distant facts - 4. complex states - 5. formulations that contain descriptions, e.g. instead of "today it is warm" the date.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Language Rules Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
J. Husted "Searle" aus: Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993, p. 253
Language rules/Searle: - doubted by many authors - they are actually rules for speech acts - in any case rules for singular terms are of a very different kind - VsSearle: then the relations between the analysis of speech acts and of the meaning are not clarified at all.
---
IV 84
Language rules/Searle: E.g. who makes a assertion, commits himself to the truth. - ((s) > Brandom).

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Lemons Example Bennett
 
Books on Amazon
I 190
Lemon-Example/Searle/Bennett: Grice: Conditional / intend p)> (mean p) - SearleVsGrice: it is possible (intend p) and not (mean p) - BennettVsSearle: he has not refuted Grice - the antecedent is not satisfied - S does not literally mean what it says.
Jonathan Bennett
I Bennett Die Strategie des Bedeutungs-Nominalismus aus Meggle (Hrsg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Frankf/M 1979
Meaning Dennett
 
Books on Amazon
I 565
Example Vending Machine: Thesis: The environment creates meaning / function / evolution / Dennett: the importance is how the function at the moment of their creation is still nothing definite! Example accepted zoo of fregs exclusively with flying dummies, but adequate replacement diet for Frogs: What do the eyes tell the brain then?
I 281
Meaning / Dennett: origins, birth of meaning: thesis: the nucleotide sequences, initially purely syntactically, take "semantics" - that "quasi-importance": e.g. mode of action of macromolecules - SearleVsDennett: just as-if intentionality - DennetVsSearle: ewe must start somewher - the first steps are not to be seen as steps towards significance - 282 I also parts that have only half-intentionality belong to us.
Brandom I ~ 110
Meaning / Dennett: that something is a piece of copper means nothing else than that it is appropriate to treat it as such.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Mental States Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
I30
Twin earth/Davidson: Subjective states do not arise as a consequence of the state of the brain or the nervous system.
---
II 154
False theory: the objects would be the meanings of sentences (Vs), that is, the propositions. DavidsonVs: with this, it would be so arranged that, e.g. if a Frenchman attributed the same state of consciousness to Paul as I do, the same subject would be named by us both, whereas this would not be the case in the theory under consideration, for the sentence in question of the Frenchman would not be the same as mine. (Falsely).
It should not concern us that the Frenchman and I use different words, it is similar to ounces and carats. (> measuring)
My monism is ontological: it asserts that mental events and objects can also be described as physical.
---
I 99
Mind/Davidson: if we consider the subjective or mental exclusively as a consequence of the physical characteristics of a person, meanings cannot be something purely subjective or mental. (Putnam: Meanings ain't in the head). ---
Frank I 626
Mind/Davidson: not without language, both equal. ---
Frank I 657ff
Mental states/external attribution/Davidson: "narrow" state/twin earth: "inner", is solipsistic, as with Descartes. The narrow states are the same for the twin earth. - BurgeVsPutnam: they do not exist. - SearleVsPutnam: narrow states are unnecessary, ordinary propositional attitudes suffice - DavidsonVsSearle/VsBurge: ordinary mental states are narrow (internal) and at the same time "non-individualistic", i.e. externally identifiable.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Naturalistic Fallacy Hume
 
Books on Amazon
Stegmüller IV 186
Being/Should/fallacy/Hume: Thesis: it is impossible to derive a should-sentence solely from is-sentences. - ((s)> Moore: naturalistic fallacy) - Stegmüller: when non-moral use there is no problem because of the hypothetical imperative: E.g. In chess, there is no problem of the transition from "is" to should. Reason: there is no expression of any new relationship! Implicit: what you want, you should. Solution/SearleVsHume: Attach premises with obligations.
Solution/Searle: institutional fact.
MackieVsSearle: confusion of inside/outside. - We cannot step outside of internalized rules.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997
Pain McGinn
 
Books on Amazon
I 65
McGinnVsSearle: We are not able, to lead back pain to the underlying neural entities. ---
I 71
Pain/McGinn: can only be determined by introspection. We are unable to change the focus, or apply a different meaning. ---
I 226f
Brain/Mentalesic/McGinn: the brain is not subject to the same limitations as the conscious reason. E.g. pain: there may be a subsystem for self-monitoring, which prescribes the pain centers to change the fibers when overloaded. Here, semantically mediated feedback loops would obviously be highly useful, the more clever, the better. The dimensions of this cleverness do not coincide with the consciousness. ---
II 34
Pain/McGinnVsReductionism: pain cannot be reduced to the firing of C fibers, how water cannot be reduced to H2O. But phenomena are what makes the mind. So mind cannot be reduced to the brain.

McG I
C. McGinn
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McG II
C. McGinn
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001

Physical/Psychic Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 139
Mentally/physically/VsEliminative materialism / Rorty: one can hardly say, "mentally" mean in reality something "that could turn out to be something physical."
I 140
Mental/mind /mental/brain / RortyVsSearle: you could say, "sensation" and "brain process" are simply two ways to talk about the same thing - two sides of what? - Something of the mental or something physical? Or from a third element?

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Propositional Content Tugendhat
 
Books on Amazon
I 74
Propositional content/Tugendhat: E.g. what is common of: "he comes", "he would come"," "if he would come", "does he come?" - Understanding: has always the structure of yes/no responses to propositional content - no propositional content: E.g. "hurray", "thank you", "good day". ---
I 241
Propositional content/Searle/Tugendhat: Searle uses "p" not for the assertoric sentence, but for the propositional content (Tugendhat: just as I used [p]) - who uses 'p' according to Searle wants to say that the fact that p really exists. - TugendhatVsSearle: unclear what facts actually are and how to recognize them - Tugendhat instead: the question of what is an assertion may be nothing more than the question according to which rules this action is completed. ---
I 290
Propositional content/Tugendhat. = Alleged - has no truth condition- propositional content is not the sentence.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Reality Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
III 168
Reality/Maturana: nervous systems (autopoietic) creates reality - SearleVsMaturana: genetic fallacy: from the fact that our image is constructed, it does not follow that reality is constructed. ---
III 179
"In reality everything is different"/Berkeley: - (Berkeley claims anyway, that matter does not exist) if the matter does not exist, everything stays the same. - - -
III 185
Truth/reality/Searle: cannot coincide because each (true or false) representation is bound to certain aspects, but not to others -> conceptual scheme - ontology/Searle: an ontologically objective reality seems to have no point of view - PutnamVsSearle: no "Ready World". ---
III 194
Background/Searle: Moore's hands belong to the background. They are not in a safe deposit box - the background helps us to determine the truth conditions of our utterances.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Reductionism Churchland
 
Books on Amazon:
Patricia Churchland
II Patricia Smith Churchland Die Neurobiologie des Bewusstseins - Was können wir von ihr lernen? In Hügli/Lübcke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993
II 464
Reductionism/Churchland: Thesis: I am a reductionist. This does not mean that a pure bottom up strategy should be pursued.      I also do not mean that descriptions of higher levels would be dubious in themselves.
There are clearly higher-level properties, and so there is a need for corresponding descriptions.
Definition Bottom up/Churchland: is the opinion according to which one must first know everything about the molecular basis before the psychological processes can be achieved.
But this is not a reductionism either.
---
II 468
VsReductionism/other authors: A) The goal is absurd. Stereotype critique: "I cannot imagine that pain should consist of any activity patterns of neurons"
ChurchlandVsVs: that is nothing more than the impotence of the imagination.
---
II 470
Vs Reductionism: if a macro-phenomenon can be the result of more than one mechanism (organization and dynamics of the components), then it cannot be identified with one of these mechanisms. The reduction of the macro-phenomenons on a single micro-phenomenon is then not possible. (> "Multiple realizability").
ChurchlandVsVs.
---
II 471
Reductionism/Churchland: when the mechanism of a biological process has been discovered, it may be possible to invent devices that mimic these processes. The reductive success is not denied. Just as little, perhaps, that there might be DNAs in other parts of the universe.
Reductionism/Churchland: It is not easy to argue VsReductionism and not to fall into dualism. (VsSearle).

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Reference Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 395
Theory of reference/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: might refute that - (but not a theory of meaning). ---
Putnam III 52f
Counterfactual Conditional/reference/Representation/Fodor: Thesis: to explain the actual nature of the reference by means of counterfactual conditionals. Asymmetric dependence - Cat token expressions are triggered by cats, but also by many other things. ---
III 54
Reference by causal attachment to the world. So also through images and mockups. - If not by cats, then not by pictures of cats. ---
III 56
Then (counterfactual) law: pictures of cats trigger "cat". - N.B.: ultimately dependent on real cats. ---
III 57 Fodor: if not pictures, then also not cats as a trigger. - PutnamVs.
---
III 61
Reference/Hermeneutics: there cannot be necessary and sufficient conditions for the reference of a word to individual x - FodorVs. that leads to meaning-holism, which in turn is followed by a meaning-nihilism. ---
III 64
PutnamVs: E.g. witch, perhaps analytically female, nonetheless there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for "witch". - A witch-law would be wrong because of non-existence - because there is no world with witches - however, appropriate counterfactual conditionals could be true. - N.B.: their truth is not explained by the law. - (Armstrong: anyway vice versa). ---
III 65
PutnamVsFodor: for correct asymmetric dependence (the word through the trigger) this counterfactual conditional has to be wrong: if conmen cannot trigger any statement, then soldiers cannot either. ---
III 69
Reference/PutnamVsFodor: previous speech behavior of previous generations is a contributing cause - otherwise "backward law": false: if cats do not trigger, then there is also no previous behavior - but right vice versa - (but only if the cause is interpreted as a causal factor). - FodorVs: its causality underlies the colloquial cause-term (direct response? behaviouristic?) - PutnamVs: that is interest-relative. ---
III 78
Reference/PutnamVsFodor: cannot reduce them with the help of the terms law, counterfactual conditionals, causality. ---
III 133
Reference/Fodor. according to Quine's criticism of the inscrutability of reference: individual sciences or everyday language causality. ---
III 140
Refernce: the fundamental physics, cannot explain the possibility of referring to something or the assertion of something. It cannot even do it when it comes to their own territory. ---
III 208
Reference: from the fact that some words do not refer without causal link it does not follow that reference itself would be causal. - It is only subject to causal restrictions. ---
V 75
Reference: Thesis: Input is shaped by concepts. - There are no inputs that allow only a single description that would be independent of all conceptual decisions. ---
V 79
Reference/externalism: (external, divine position): Problem: what actually is reference - Reference cannot be causal because "alien" always refers to aliens. ---
I 34
Reference: if it is fixed, you can come up with any theories on the subject. ---
I 35
Physical broadband concepts such as size and cause allow also to formulate failed markings - Kripke: then names are usable without having true beliefs about the referent. ---
I 65
Reference: in logic: that what corresponds to the description - Field: has shown that this does not fulfill the task. ---
I 67ff
Primitive Reference/Putnam: E.g. creatures that can distinguish 17 properties and number them: "Pee-sevunteen-this" (sic): in fact, feelings of the beings themselves - amounts to causal theory of reference - when expanded to absent, past, future objects not necessary and sufficient conditions are introduced. ---
I 69
Semantic rise: one day the mass introduces the concept of a reference: "Uk-ook reefur-this" (sic) - that would not be our reference, otherwise paradoxes arise. - It only becomes a correct language with quantifiers - N.B.: with quantifiers the causal connection between X and the reference to X is dissolved. ---
I 70
Field: Tarski has shown how reference to primitive reference (show plus noise) can be traced back. - +> Gricean intention> Intention. - - -
Rorty I 312
(According to Rorty): Putnam: a "causal" theory of reference cannot help: because the question of how the term "cause" can clearly relate to something is just as mysterious as the question, how the term "cat" has done this.
---
Rorty IV 20 ff
Rorty: relation/Putnam: early: only causal theory of reference (not intentional). Can save us from relativism. ---
Rorty VI 123
Rorty: causal theory of reference: PutnamVsKripke, also self-criticism on earlier writings: The description of the causal relationships between a something and other things is nothing more than the description of characteristics that neither in a greater nor lesser extent stand in an "intrinsic" or "extrinsic" relationship. So also the feature "to be described by a human being". PutnamVsSearle: Vsdifferentiation "Intrinsic"/"relational".

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Sentence Meaning Cresswell
 
Books on Amazon
I 24
Illocutionary force / meaning / Searle / Cresswell: Thesis: sentence meaning is the illocutionary force (acting force) - Cresswell: then it must be possible that the same sentence occurs with a different illocutionary force (on another occasion) - The best thing you could then say is that sentence meaning is a function of usage contexts (conditions of use) on the force that the sentence had if it was used in the situation - CresswellVsSearle: but only the truth conditional semantics takes the problem of embedding seriously.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Sentences Sellars
 
Books on Amazon
II 307
Sentence / Name: SellarsVsSearle: sentences (clauses) can be names (like Frege): Carnap:   S (inL) means Chicago is great: ("Chicago is great" = name).

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sentences Millikan
 
Books on Amazon
I 22
Sentence/Millikan: Sentences are reproduced units. A sentence usually has several role models. Syntactic rules: are the reproductively determined character of the sentence. They copy the grammar.
---
I 53
Sentence/Millikan: a sentence is never a simple element of a reproductively determined family, at least the syntactic form of words belongs to different families. Syntax: can be assumed as a large superordinate family, the individual forms belong to different families.
Direct eigenfunction/sentence/Millikan: the direct eigenfunction of a sentence is derived from the stabilization functions of the elements.
---
I 90
Sentence/belief/language/thinking/Millikan: it seems clear that if we had no beliefs, we would stop talking or expressing sentences with meaning. But why is it clear? We need a different explanation. Sentence/Intentionality/Millikan: Thesis: a sentence (and any other typically intentional pattern) is intentional because of the eigenfunctions and normal relations that this pattern has for a producer and an interpreter. These two are cooperating units in this process.
N.B.: then sentences are fundamentally intentional and have no derived intentionality. (MillikanVsTradition, MillikanVsSearle).

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Speech Act Theory Cresswell
 
Books on Amazon
I 12
CresswellVsGrice / CresswellVsSearle / CresswellVsSpeech Act Theory: is more of a theory of semantic performance than of semantic competence.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Speech Act Theory Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
Dum I ~ 26
DavidsonVsFege / DavidsonVsSearle: Theory of force unnecessary - description of speech acts not necessary - (concept of truth required).

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Speech Act Theory Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
II 25
Sincerity condition: internal to the speech acts. ---
IV 251
Speech act/Searle: rule-determined actions - has always constitutive (not regulatory) rules - Searle: speech act: is key to the meaning - VsSearle: controversial because language rules for e.g. singular term have fundamentally different nature than for actions. ---
V 68
Speech act is unequal game. - Explanation must presuppose rules - rules are not equal Convention: speaking rule-governed behavior - rules, not behavior is crucial.
---
V 207
Traditional speech act theory/Austin/Strawson/Hare: word W is needed to perform speech act A - then e.g. "good" recommends, "true" reaffirms, "knowledge" guarantees something - SearleVs: this only works with performative verbs such as "promise" but not with judgmental ones - does not satisfy the adequacy condition for semantic analysis: a word must mean in all grammatically different sentences the same - it cannot, if the meaning is supposed to be the execution of various acts. ---
V 213
Wrong: to assume that the conditions for the execution of a speech act follow from the meanings of the words. ( "fallacy of assertiveness") ---
IV 27
Speech act theory/SearleVsAustin: accepts verbs for acts - but one has to differentiate this - E.g. announcement of a command is not the command. ---
IV 78
Speech act theory/Searle: differs from other philosophical approaches in that it gives no set of logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the explicable phenomenon - (E.g. linguistics: structural rules). ---
VI 86
The illocutionary act is the function of the meaning of the sentence. ---
IV 86
Fiction/speech acts/Searle: fiction has no other speech acts but is a predetermined act - in literature, no other act than in newspaper - no semantic or syntactic property proves a text as fictional. ---
IV 204
Speech Act TheoryVsChomsky, VsRules, instead of semantics/pragmatics. ---
VII 99
Speech act/proposition/Searle: difference: from the propositional content does not follow that the assertion conditions are satisfied - the proposition rather implies that the speaker implies within the act that they are satisfied. ---
VIII 435
Speech act/Searle: is hold together by the semantic intentions of the speaker - VsChomsky: does not see the essential connection of meaning and speech acts.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Supervenience Armstrong
 
Books on Amazon
II 132
"cum" instead of supervenience - MartinVsArmstrong / VsPlace: properties are qualitative-cum-dispositional (or vice versa) - not dispositionality supervening on the categoric property and not vice versa - rather than "inert", i.e., unable to make a difference or effect to be - solution / Martin: reciprocal partners for mutual manifestation: E.g. salt dissolves in water, which both are subject to change.
II 167
Supervenience / Searle: strength supervenes causally on microstructure - no epiphenomenon - causal sufficiency of the microstructure makes the concept of supervenience superfluous - ((s) even doubling) - MartinVsSearle: how can things that are identical to parts of the whole, have a causal effect on the whole which consists of them? Absurd.

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Supervenience McGinn
 
Books on Amazon
I 68
Consciousness/Supervenience/McGinnVsSearle: conscious states do not allow an emergence theoretical explanation using mereological terms. We are unable, to trace back pain to underlying neural entities. ---
I 68
In contrast to that, it is quite possible to explain the higher level properties of liquids in this way. ((s) Because all levels are easily available to us.) ---
I 69
States of consciousness are therefore not to be explored according to CAlM (combinatorial atomism with lawlike mappings). We can probably grasp higher order brain functions of their constituents, but if we start from the consciousness, this explanation fails. Therefore, we do not have a model for a possible emergence relation. We do not see an obvious consequence relation. (> Supervenience)
---
I 98
I/McGinn: is subject to a kind of physically induced consequence relation: are two bodies physically identical, and if one of them is a person, the other one must be a person, too. Because in terms of person-likeness there can be no difference, which would not be based on a physical difference.

McG I
C. McGinn
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McG II
C. McGinn
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001

Thinking Nagel
 
Books on Amazon
I 63
Thought/Nagel: one cannot escape it - that is different than making marks on paper - I 65 therefore "add two" cannot be considered a naturalistic event - it cannot be considered separately from its contents - thinking is something else than making signs on paper. A naturalistic analysis of intentionality is not possible. (NagelVsSearle). The fallacy lies in the idea that one could escape the thought "add two" and comprehend it as naturalistically describable event.
I 93 ff
Thinking: thinking takes precedence over its description, because its description necessarily presupposes thinking.
I 101
Nagel: our thinking always inevitably leads to a view point where "I" is no longer relevant. One cannot consider any thought type to be merely personal, unless one assumes a non-personal view point.
Rorty VI 147
Language/thinking/Nagel: NagelVsWittgenstein/Rorty: the limits of language are not the limits of thought.

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

The author or concept searched is found in the following 50 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Analytic Philosophy Derrida Vs Analytic Philosophy
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty III 218
DerridaVsanalytic Philosophy/Rorty: "Ich bete diese oxfordische Subtilität an, ebenso sehr wie ihre unerschütterliche Arglosigkeit. Sie werden immer dem Gesetz der Anführungszeichen vertrauen." (DerridaVsSearle).

De I
J. Derrida
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Block, Ned Searle Vs Block, Ned
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
Metzinger II 561
SearleVsBlock: it is not legitimate to use "conscious" in the meaning of z-aware.   Searle: A total zombie can have no consciousness at all.
BlockVsSearle: he packs P-consciousness and Z-consciousness together. (But there is a difference whether Armstrong s truck driver does not notice what is going on, or if he avoids accidents.)
 He also tried to replace the Z-consciousness by the idea of degrees of P-consciousness.
  Block: in reality, these are degrees of Z-consciousness.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996
Bundle Theory Newen Vs Bundle Theory
 
Books on Amazon
New I 233
Def Reference/Newen: Relation between the occurrence of a singular term and the object thus designated. ((s) i.e. general terms do not refer?).
Names/Proper Names/Newen: two problems:
1) Reference definition: how is the reference determined
2) Meaning: what is the meaning of a name.
Names/Description Theory/Newen: E.g. "Aristotle": the meaning would then be "student of Plato".
Vs: Problem: it could be that someone does not know that Aristotle was a student of Plato, but otherwise uses the name correctly.
Bundle Theory/Solution/Searle/Newen/(s): it should not happen that a single failure refutes the entire theory, therefore, a bundle of descriptions should be decisive, not a single description.
I 234
Bundle Theory/Reference Definition/Searle/Newen: Searle's bundle theory simultaneously regards itself as a theory of reference definition. Names/Proper Names/KripkeVsBundle Theory/KripkeVsDescription Theory/KripkeVsSearle/Kripke/Newen: (modal argument): there is a necessary condition for Def meaning equality/Kripke:

(meaning equality) if two expressions a1 and a2 have the same meaning, they are mutually replaceable in sentences that are introduced by the modal operator "It is necessary that", without changing the truth value.
I 235
E.g. It is necessary that Aristotle is K. Here, "student of Plato" is not usable. Hence the name "Aristotle" (quotation marks by Newen) cannot have the same meaning as "student of Plato".
Description Theory/Meta-Linguistic/Names/Newen: special case description theory of proper names: the so-called meta-linguistic description theory:
E.g. the meaning of the name Aristotle can be specified with the description "The bearer of the name "Aristotle"."
Point: this description captures the context-independent knowledge of a speaker with respect to the name.
KripkeVs/Newen: if the modal argument is also true for the meta-linguistic theory, it cannot be right: it is indeed necessary that Aristotle is Aristotle, but not necessary that Aristotle is
I 236
the bearer of the name "Aristotle". He could have been given a different name. Object Theory/Meaning/Names/Proper Names/Newen: Thesis: The meaning of a name is the designated object.
A variation of this theory is Russell's theory of the meaning of logical proper names. ("dis", etc.)
Epistemology/VsRussell/Newen: Russell's epistemology proved untenable.
Solution/Newen: Reference definition by a description: "The only object that satisfies the description associated with the concept "E" (quotation marks by Newen)".
Frege: was the first to specify this (in his theory of sense and meaning)
Names/Frege/Newen: the Fregean meaning of a name is the designated object.
Reference Definition/Frege/Newen: through description. This is Frege's theory of sense.
Sense/Frege/Newen: through description (= reference definition for proper names).
Names/Frege/Newen: Frege combines an object theory of meaning with a description theory of reference definition.
I 237
((s) KripkeVsFrege/KripkeVsDescription Theory/Newen/(s): Kripke also criticized the description theory of reference definition: E.g. Schmidt was the discoverer of the incompleteness theorem, not Gödel. Nevertheless, we refer with "Gödel" to Gödel, and not to an object which is the singled out with a description that can be true or not.) Solution/Kripke: causal theory of proper names.

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005
Chinese Room Pauen Vs Chinese Room
 
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Pauen V 150
Chinese Room/Searle/Pauen: (1980) would mean that verbal behavior as a criterion for the attribution of consciousness is fundamentally unsuitable! Significant consequences: not only additional argument VsTuring test.
Can be transferred to all verbal utterances, and eventually to the entire functionalism. Functional features would not guarantee meaning.
VsChinese Room/VsSearle/Pauen: 1) it is possible that computers fulfill other sufficient conditions for instantiating consciousness.
V 151
2) (more important): even his own argument requires the condition which he denies at the same time. When searching for the neural conditions of consciousness, one must first make sure that the organisms studied have consciousness! (Circular!). This security can only be gained through behavior. 3) The situation differs in many aspects not mentioned by Searle from the usual speaker situation.
The occupant has no opportunity to respond to the speaker situation!
He cannot take into account any previous questions.
He cannot detect any repetitions.
Variant: should it be possible to take several steps into account, a combinatorial explosion threatens. Only a much more complex system would have the necessary skills to cope with that. But it is precisely in such a case that it would no longer be plausible that the system has no awareness!
Even then the system would be neither flexible nor trainable.
The slightest deviation or spelling errors have devastating effects.
V 152
Meaning-relevant distinctions are inseparable from irrelevant ones. ((s) These are arguments in the sense of Searle insofar as real consciousness must have just these properties.)
VsSearle/(s): the arguments are directed against Searle insofar as the fiction of the Chinese Room could not go undetected.
- - -
Lanz I 296
VsSearle/VsChinese Room: (Lanz): the brain is also a purely syntactic machine. I.e. in the end, the approach taken by cognitive science is the only way: to look out for subpersonal cognitive processes under as many realistic assumptions as possible.

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Deconstructivism Searle Vs Deconstructivism
 
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John R. Searle
Rorty VI 118
Deconstruction/SearleVsDeconstructivism/Rorty: suppose I catch a deconstructionist car mechanic who tells me, the carburetor is anyway only text and there was nothing to talk about except on the textuality of this text, then the communication has collapsed. RortyVsSearle: the deconstructionist intellectuals who with happiness found a job as an auto mechanic, it is not difficult to specify where their work ends and philosophy begins.
The Deconstructivism has not changed his life, as atheism the lives of his ancestors. The difference relates to the atmosphere and the mental element.
Rorty VI 120
Description/action/understanding/Searle: Our practices are incomprehensible if we describe our actions in various ways, SearleVsDavidson/SearleVsDerrida: especially with not realistic or non representational terminology. (RortyVsSearle). Searle: some propositions may not be questioned without considering the practices themselves in doubt. They are a condition of intelligibility.
RortyVsSearle: rhetorical flourishes that will give the practice the appearance to maintain a huge thing, namely, the metaphysical reality.
Rorty VI 120
RortyVsSearle: Hard realism leads to metaphysics.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Dennett, D. Nagel Vs Dennett, D.
 
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Rorty VI 144
Explanation/Dennett/Rorty: it is sufficient to explain why there seems to be something phenomenological, i.e. why it seems to be true "that there is a difference between thinking... that something seems to be pink, and the fact that something really appears to be pink. (!) VsDennett: his critics believe that his book is merely good for explaining away consciousness.
Belief/Existence/Dennett/Rorty: should reply that it is a good thing to explain something away, i.e. to declare that we do not have to make room for this something in our image, but only for the belief in that something.
NagelVsDennett/Rorty: Procrustes-like adaptation to objectivity. Instead, we should seek an objectivity which connects the position of the first person with that of the third person.
First Person/Nagel/Searle/Rorty: (inter alia): knowledge of intrinsic, non-relational properties of mental events.
RortyVsNagel/VsSearle: if they accept the maxim: "if all the relational properties are explained (all causes and effects), then the thing itself is explained", they will realize that they lose out here.
I 145/146
Nagel: (according to Rorty) therefore he must insist that non-relational properties are impossible reduce to relational ones. Consciousness/Nagel/Rorty: that a human has consciousness is not merely a belief, but a conclusion from evidence.
      I.e. there is a gap (according to Rorty) between the evidence and the conclusion from the evidence, the gap between the totality of the relations between the consciousness and the rest of the world, and the intrinsic nature of consciousness on the other ahnd.
VI 147
NagelVsDennett/Rorty: his "hetero-phenomenology" is not sufficient. Nagel Thesis: the sources of philosophy are pre-linguistic, their problems are not dependent on culture.
VI 149
Hetero-Phenomenalism/DennettVsNagel: he should accept the "hetero-phenomenalism" as a neutral description. RortyVsDennett, RortyVsNagel: both missed! Hetero-phenomenalism claims to speak that which Nagel thinks unspeakable. Nagel is right here in accusing him of a petitio principii, because this anticipates the decision about all the interesting questions.
DennettVsNagel: perhaps we are only now unable to describe certain things and later we will be!
NagelVsDennett: something "else, describable" does not interest me! The indescribable should not be replaced with something describable.
VI 150
That would be like trying to ask Kant to recognize the thing as such after the reception of Hegel.
VI 151/152
Def Hetero-Phenomenology/Rorty: claims for himself to tell the other what "he actually spoke about". VsQualia, VsUnrecognizable Nature, VsKnowledge that cannot be influenced by way of speaking, (reductionism). (RortyVsDennett: he falsely believes he is neutral).

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Dennett, D. Searle Vs Dennett, D.
 
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John R. Searle
Dennett I 558
Intentionality/SearleVsDennett: cannot be reached by the composition of equipment or the construction of ever-improving algorithms. DennettVsSearle: this is the belief in sky hook: the Spirit shall not be created, it is not designed, but only (unexplained) source of design.
SearleVsDennett: the view that one can look for "floating grounds" for a selection process for the mind, is a caricature of Darwinian thinking.
- - -
Searle I 179
We can understand the concept of an unconscious mental state only so that it was about a real content of consciousness. Def "compound principle": the idea that all unconscious intentional states in principle consciousness are accessible.
1. SearleVsDennett: there is a difference between intrinsic intentionality and as if intentionality. If one wanted to give up this difference, one would have to accept the fact that everything is about something mental, because relative to any purpose can be anything and everything treated as if it were something intellectual.
E.g. Running water could be described as if it had intentionality: it is trying to get down, by visiting clever way the line of least resistance, it processes information, the calculated size of rocks, etc .. (> laws of nature) , But if water is something mental, then everything is something mental.
2. Unconscious intentional states are intrinsic.
I 180
3. intrinsic intentional states, conscious or unconscious, always have an aspect shape. Someone may want a glass of drinking water without wanting to drink a glass of H2O. There is an indefinite number of true descriptions of the evening star or a glass of water, but if someone wants a glass of water, this will only happen under certain aspects and not others.
I 181
4. The aspects feature can not be exhaustively or fully characterized alone with the help of third person predicates. There is always an inference gap gape between the epistemological reasons that we can gain from the behavior that the aspect is present, and the ontology of the aspect itself. A person may well create a behavior of the water searching on the day, but each such conduct will also be a search of H2O. There is no way exclude the second.
I 182
E.g. assumed we would have a brain o Skop to look into the skull of a person, and see that she wants water, but no H2O, then still a conclusion would play a part! We then would still have a law-like link that puts us in a position to conclude from our observations of the neural architecture that in this case the desire for water, but not the desire for H2O is realized. The neurophysiological facts are always causally sufficient for any amount of mental facts.
5. But the ontology of unconscious mental states is solely in the existence of purely neurophysiological phenomena.
E.g. we imagine someone fast asleep and dreamless. Now it is so that he believes that the capital of Colorado is Denver. Now, the only facts that may exist while he is completely unconscious are neurophysiological facts.
I 183
That seems to be a contradiction: the ontology of unconscious intentionality consists entirely of objective, neurophysiological third person phenomena, yet these states have an aspect shape. This contradiction is resolved when we consider the following: 6. The concept of an unconscious intentional state is the concept of a state which is a possible conscious thought.
7. The ontology of the unconscious consists in objective characteristics of the brain that are capable of causing subjective conscious thoughts.
I 184
The existence of causal features is compatible therewith that their causal powers may be blocked in each case due to confounding factors. An unconscious intentional state may be such that it could simply not be brought to consciousness by the person concerned. However, it must be a thing of the kind that, in principle, can be brought to consciousness. Mentalism: the naive mentalism leads to a kind of dispositional analysis of unconscious mental phenomena. The idea of a dispositional theory of mind has been introduced precisely for the purpose of getting rid of the appeal to the consciousness. (> Ryle).
- - -
III 156
Rule/VsSearle: one might say, "is it not simply so, "as if" we followed the rules?" As if/intentionality/Searle: "As if-Intentionality" explains nothing if there is no real intentionality. She has no causal power.
SearleVsDennett: it is as empty as the "intentional attitude".

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Derrida, J. Habermas Vs Derrida, J.
 
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Derrida I 95
Derrida: no distinction between everyday language and specialist languages. (DerridaVsSearle).
I 196
HabermasVsDerrida: there are differences. Derrida over-generalizes poetic language. There has to be a language in which research results can be discussed and progress registered. HabermasVsDerrida: he does not wriggle out of the restrictions of the subject-philosophical paradigm. His attempt to outbid Heidegger does not escape the aporetic structure of the truth events stripped of truth validity.
I 211
Subject-Philosophy/Derrida: Habermas: he does not break with her at all. He falls back on it easily in the style of the original philosophy: it would require other names than those of the sign and the re-presentation to be able think about this age: the infinite derivation of the signs who wander about and change scenes. HabermasVsDerrida: not the history of being the first and last, but an optical illusion: the labyrinthine mirror effects of ancient texts without any hope of deciphering the original script.
I 213
HabermasVsDerrida: his deconstructions faithfully follow Heidegger. Involuntarily, he exposes the reverse fundamentalism of this way of thinking: the ontological difference and the being are once again outdone by the difference and put down one floor below.
I 214
Derrida inherits the weaknesses of the criticism of metaphysics. Extremely general summonings of an indefinite authority.
I 233
DerridaVsSearle: no distinction between ordinary and parasitic use - Searle, HabermasVsDerrida: there is a distinction: communication requires common understanding
I 240
Derrida’s thesis: in everyday language there are also poetic functions and structures, therefore no difference from literary texts, therefore equal analysability. HabermasVsDerrida: he is insensitive to the tension-filled polarity between the poetic-world-opening and the prosaic-innerworldly language function.
I 241
HabermasVsDerrida: for him, the language-mediated processes in the world are embedded in an all prejudicing, world-forming context. Derrida is blind to the fact that everyday communicative practice enables learning processes in the world thanks to the idealizations built into communicative action, against which the world-disclosing power of interpretive language has to prove itself. Experience and judgment are formed only in the light of criticizable validity claims! Derrida neglects the negation potential of communication-oriented action. He lets the problem-solving capacity disappear behind the world-generating capacity of language. (Similarly Rorty)
I 243
HabermasVsDerrida: through the over-generalization of the poetic language function he has no view of the complex relationships of a normal linguistic everyday practice anymore. - - -
Rorty II 27
HabermasVsDerrida, HabermasVsHeidegger/Rorty: "subject philosophy": misguided metaphysical attempt to combine the public and the private. Error: thinking that reflection and introspection could achieve what can be actually only be effected by expanding the discussion frame and the participants.
II 30
Speaking/Writing/RortyVsDerrida: his complex argument ultimately amounts to a strengthening of the written word at the expense of the spoken.
II 32
Language/Communication/HabermasVsDerrida: Derrida denies both the existence of a "peculiarly structured domain of everyday communicative practice" and an "autonomous domain of fiction". Since he denies both, he can analyze any discourse on the model of poetic language. Thus, he does not need to determine language.
II 33
RortyVsHabermas: Derrida is neither obliged nor willing to let "language in general" be "determined" by anything. Derrida could agree fully with Habermas in that "the world-disclosing power of interpretive language must prove itself" before metaphors are literarily absorbed and become socially useful tools. RortyVsHabermas: he seems to presuppose that X must be demonstrated as a special case of Y first in order to treat X as Y. As if you could not simply treat X as Y, to see what happens!
Deconstruction/Rorty: language is something that can be effective, out of control or stab itself in the back, etc., under its own power.
II 35
RortyVsDeconstruktion: nothing suggests that language can do all of this other than an attempt to make Derrida a huge man with a huge topic. The result of such reading is not the grasping of contents, but the placement of texts in contexts, the interweaving of parts of various books. The result is a blurring of genre boundaries. That does not mean that genera "are not real". The interweaving of threads is something else than the assumption that philosophy has "proven" that colors really "are indeterminate and ambiguous."
Habermas/Rorty: asks why Heidegger and Derrida still nor advocate those "strong" concepts of theory, truth and system, which have been a thing of the past for more than 150 years.
II 36
Justice/Rawls Thesis: the "just thing" has priority over the "good thing". Rawls/Rorty: democratic societies do not have to deal with the question of "human nature" or "subject". Such issues are privatized here.
Foundation/Rorty Thesis: there is no Archimedean point from which you can criticize everything else. No resting point outside.
RortyVsHabermas: needs an Archimedean point to criticize Foucault for his "relativism".
Habermas: "the validity of transcendental spaces and times claimed for propositions and norms "erases space and time"."
HabermasVsDerrida: excludes interaction.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

De I
J. Derrida
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Derrida, J. Rorty Vs Derrida, J.
 
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Richard Rorty
III 222
Deconstruction/RortyVsDerrida: not a new procedure. One can learn deconstruction just as one can learn to discover sexual symbols, bourgeois ideology etc. in texts. Reading did not become easier or harder, just as cycling does not become easier or harder if one makes discoveries about the nature of energy during it. Recontextualisation/RortyVsDerrida: has existed for a long time: Socrates recontextualised Homer, Augustine the pagan virtues, Hegel Socrates and Augustine, Proust himself, and Derrida all.
Why does it sound so frightening when Derrida does it as opposed to Hegel? Because Derrida uses the "accidental" material form of words while Hegel no longer wanted to abidy by the rule that the "opposition" relation applies only to sentences, and not to cconcepts, but nevertheless subjugated to the other rule that no weight has to be attached to the sound and form the words.
Derrida: in communicating with other people one has to comply to these rules, of course, but not when communicating with other philosophers.
IV 9
Metaphysics/RortyVsDerrida: too dramatic s presentation of the role played by metaphysics in our culture. He puts too much emphasis on the particular kind of centripetal thinking that ends in philosophizing that is oriented towards justification.
IV 118
Scripture/Derrida/Rorty: we should "think about a writing without presence and without absence, without history, cause
IV 119
arché telos which deranged the entire dialectic, theology and ontology (sic)." Such scripture would be literature, which no longer would be contradictory to philosophy. Scripture/Text/RortyVsDerrida: dilemma: either he can forget about philosophy
IV 120
and the What of scripture would lose its wit, or he must accept the dependence of the text of philosophy on its edges. When Derrida recounts such tragicomedy he shows himself at his best. His weakest points are the ones where he begins to imitate what he hates and claims he would offer "rigorous analyses".
IV 121
SearleVsDerrida/Rorty: his arguments are simply awful. Rorty: that's right! RortyVsSearle: underestimates Derrida; he does not even seek knowledge bases!
RortyVsSearle: the idea that there were such a thing as an "intellectual content" measurable by general and ahistorical standards links him with Plato and Husserl, but separates him from Derrida. The weakness of his arguments Derrida is that he believes that he would be pursuing amateurish philosophy of language. He did not notice that Derrida poses metaphilosophical questions about the value of such a philosophy.
IV 122
RortyVsDerrida: every new type of scripture that can do without arché and without telos is also left without object!
IV 123
RortyVsDerrida: Dilemma: another meta vocabulary is a) either prudocing a further philosophical seclusiveness or b) more openness than we can handle.
Derrida is aware of that. Therefore, he distances himself from Heidegger who has failed to write about philosophy unphilosophically.
DerridaVsHeidegger: "there will be no unique name, even not of existence".
IV 125
Heidegger never goes beyond a set of metaphors that he shares with Husserl. These metaphors suggest that deep down we all possess the "truth of being"! Calling and listening also do not escape the circle of mutually explicable concepts. (so.).
IV 126
Scripture/dialectic/RortyVsDerrida: "primacy of scripture" not much more than a cricket: not more than the assertion that certain features of discourse are more evident in the case of writing, as in the spoken language.
IV 127
This is no more than a stale dialectic of reversal that Hegel disproved already in his phenomenology and that Kierkegaard called "tricks of a dog".
IV 129
RortyVsDerrida: the distinction between relationships contitioned by conclusion and associations not conditioned by conclusion is just as unclear and blurred as the one between word and sentence or between the metaphorical and the literal.
IV 130
But Derrida has to do something with all these distinctions. He must ensure that they look distinct enough. He is concerned about being the first to turn to this issue, while all previous authors have done nothing more than to build the same old building again and again.
IV 129
sentence/Rorty: the distinction between sentence and non-sentence is blurred. ((s) But supra.
IV 49
World/Rorty: amount of non sentences. - This presupposes a clear distinction.).
IV 131
Text/scripture/RortyVsDerrida: it is simply not true that the text sequence that makes up the canon of tradition is trapped in a metaphor that has remained unchanged since the Greeks. The procedure to speak multiple languages at the same time and to write several texts at the same time is exactly what all important, revolutionary, original thinkers have practiced.
IV 135
Text/RortyVsDerrida: virtually all thinkers have written several texts simultaneously. Also "glass" is not new, but the realistic representation of a site on which we have lived for some time.
IV 136/137
RortyVsDerrida: he can not perform an argumentative confrontation without turning into a metaphysician. Being/DerridaVsHeidegger: Being has always only had "meaning" as something hidden in the being. The "differance" is in a certain and very strange way "older" than the ontological difference or than the truth of being.
IV 138
Trace/Derrida: neither a reason nor a justification nor an origin. (Claimed to have "proven" that. RortyVsDerrida: how can he prove it? > Proof.)
IV 139
"Differance"/Derrida: "neither a word nor a concept". RortyVsDerrida: First of all it was a typo. That it is not anymore is because it has actually become a word. Also, any word that has a use refers to a concept.
IV 140
Concept/Wittgenstein/Rorty: we have learned from Wittgenstein that every word is interwoven with others. RortyVsDerrida: Opposition: Derrida is trying to utilize the explanation of the language game of the concept of meaning and to grant some magic words privileges at the same time.
RortyVsDerrida: does nothing more than to avoid simply neutralizing the binary oppositions of metaphysics.
IV 142
RortyVsDerrida: that all does not mean that the word games are not funny, but only that the accompanying sound of urgency is inappropriate. - - -
VI 475
Order/Searle: a blurred distinction can still be useful. VsDerrida, who makes no distinctions in his opinion.)
VI 476
Sign/RortyVsDerrida: should not depict concepts as quasi People. ((s) that bring concepts mischief). Sign/Derrida: would have given us transcendental pseudo-problems. E.g. how intentionality were possible in a world of atoms and of empty space.
RortyVsDerrida: should not even ask the question "What is the Political?". Just as the "piety" of Euthyphro it presumes sime kind of being of which one would assume that it would only be of interest to Phallogozentristen!
Concept/Derrida: wants to write without concepts as "agents".
VI 477
RortyVsDerrida: one should not write about the adventures of concepts, but about the adventures of people. He should not argue frequently used words stood for incoherent concepts, because there is no better proof for the consistency than the use, that this language game is actually being played.
Derrida is itself quite transcendental, while he criticized others for ot.
VI 480
Shine/to seem/appearance/RortyVsDerrida: in accordance with Wittgenstein and Davidson we can do our work without even mentioning this dubious distinction (Being/appearance)!
VI 500
Text/Concept/RortyVsDerrida: if there really is a world in which concepts live and weave and exist regardless of the language behavior of word users, namely that world which is the transcendental condition of the possibility of transcendental philosophy, the question arises: Why can it also be an empirical fact that a concept is nothing more than the use we miserable existing individuals make of a word. If the world in which a concept is nothing more than this use is real, the question is: How is it possible that that other world is also real?

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Derrida, J. Searle Vs Derrida, J.
 
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John R. Searle
Rorty III 218
Derrida/"Fido": brings associations with the "loyalty" (fidere). SearleVsDerrida: he did not regard Austins distinction between utterance and use. But if he regarded, his critics would not grasp.
DerridaVsSearle: E.g. to say the name "Fido" was chosen, "so that the example was docile" is a failure to observe the distinction between utterance and use! The distinction is perhaps not useful.
- - -
Searle III 169
Derrida: "In n’y pas de "hors texte"." SearleVsDerrida: is simply asserted without argument. In a subsequent polemical response to me he seems in any case to take back everything. He claims there that the whole only meant the banality that everything exists in one or another context.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Dummett, M. Tugendhat Vs Dummett, M.
 
Books on Amazon
I 253
Bedeutung/Behauptung/Dummett/Tugendhat: Bsp Spiel: Behauptungshandlung, Behauptung und Gegenbehauptung, "ja"/"nein" entspricht "wahr"/"falsch" einer gewinnt, einer verliert. Dieses Schema soll jeder Äußerungen jedes assertorischen Satzes zugrunde liegen!
I 254
Der Sprecher übernimmt eine Garantie, die vom Hörer in Zweifel gezogen wird. (Searle so ähnlich, s. o.).
I 255
Neu: es wird umgekehrt gesagt: wenn der Ausdruck verwendet wird, welches dann die Bedingungen sind, unter denen er richtig ist. Das setzt voraus: 1. dass die Bedingungen, in denen der Ausdruck verwendet wird für die Richtigkeit der Verwendung gleichgültig sind.
2. dass die Bedingungen von denen die Richtigkeit abhängt, solche sind, deren Erfülltsein von der Verwendung des Ausdrucks selbst garantiert wird. Was der Ausdruck garantiert, ist, dass die Bedingungen seiner Richtigkeit (Wahrheit) erfüllt sind!
Die Äquivalenz "p equi dass p ist wahr" gründet darin, dass derjenige, der etwas behauptet, immer schon die Richtigkeit mitbehauptet.
I 256
Sprecher: Bedingungen und Vorhandensein zusammen garantiert. Hörer: trennt beides und stellt es getrennt in Frage. (Asymmetrie).
I 256/257
TugendhatVsDummett/TugendhatVsSearle: unbefriedigend: 1. Es ist noch nichts darüber gesagt worden, welches die Wahrheitsbedingungen einer Behauptung bzw. eines Satzes sind. Eine Möglichkeit wäre zu sagen, dass die Wahrheitsbedingungen eines Satzes ihrerseits durch einen Satz angegeben werden. Das setzt natürlich voraus, dass für die Erklärung eines Satzes immer schon ein anderer Satz zur Verfügung steht. Metasprache. (TugendhatVs). Die Erklärung muss in einer Verwendungsregel liegen.
Es genügt nicht, zu zeigen, dass der erste Satz wie der zweite verwendet wird, es muss gezeigt werden, unter welchen Bedingungen der eine Satz gebraucht wird.
2. Jedes Übernehmen einer Garantie setzt seinerseits die Verwendung eines assertorischen Satzes voraus, das ist also eine Pseudoerklärung.
- - -
II 231
TugendhatVsDummett: "Bedeutung" bei Frege sollte man nicht mit "Referenz" übersetzen!
II 232
Gerechtfertigt nur dort, wo Frege Sätze als Eigennamen auffasst!
II 247
Referenz/Tugendhat: durch meine Kritik an der Übersetzung Bedeutung = Referenz habe ich nicht den Primat der Wahrheit vor den Gegenständen in Frage gestellt. DummettVsTugendhat: es genügt nicht, die Bedeutung von Namen lediglich als truth-value potential zu erklären: 1.die Bedeutung könnte dann als bloße equivalence set von Ausdrücken aufgefasst werden.
TugendhatVsDummett: richtig bei Sätzen und Prädikaten, bei Namen muss man sich nicht damit begnügen.
DummettVsTugendhat: 2. Dass zwei Namen "a" und "b" dieselbe Bedeutung haben, wenn sie dasselbe truth-value potential haben, gilt nur bei extensionalen Prädikaten. Aber mit welchem Kriterium kann man extensionale von intensionalen Prädikaten unterscheiden? Es setzte voraus, dass wir ein Kriterium für die Bedeutungsgleichheit von Namen hätten, das nicht erst durch das leibnizsche Gesetz festgelegt wird.
II 248
Leibnizsches Gesetz/Dummett: kann nicht als Definition von "=" aufgefasst werden, sondern gründet darin, dass, wenn wir etwas von einem Gegenstand prädizieren, der Wahrheitwert der Behauptung unabhängig sein muss von der Gegebenheitsweise!. TugendhatVsDummett: nicht so bei Frege: Dummett weist selbst darauf hin, dass er das Leibnizsche Gesetz als Definition von "=" aufgefasst hat.
Tugendhat: wir können, was wir mit Identität meinen, nicht mit dem Gesetz erklären. Tugendhat pro Dummett.
TugendhatVsDummett: mit Sätzen als Äquivalenzklassen hat man nicht den Bezug zur Welt verloren: es geht nur um ganz bestimmte equivalence sets, die natürlich durch die Beschaffenheit der Welt bestimmt sind.
Dummett: Sätze nicht gleich Namen! (VsFrege).
II 249
Referenz/Dummett: semantische Rolle. Tugendhat: das ist genau dasselbe wie mein "truth-value potential". ((s) > semantischer Wert?).
II 250
Referenz/Frege: er hat nie von Referenz gesprochen Prädikate/Frege: er hat nie davon gesprochen, dass die Bedeutungen von Prädikaten als "quasi-objects" verstanden werden müssten.
Dummett/Tugendhat: der berechtigte Kern an Dummetts Kritik: aus dem truth-value potential folgt noch nicht, dass die Bedeutung eines Namens ein Gegenstand sei.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Dummett, M. Stalnaker Vs Dummett, M.
 
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II 1
"Linguistic image"/terminology/Stalnaker: Dummett's thesis that language goes before thinking.
StalnakerVsDummett.
II 2
The linguistic image even disturbed our understanding of the language. StalnakerVsDummett: I reverse Dummett's axiom: the philosophy of language can only be achieved through a philosophy of thinking.

Def language/Grice/Stalnaker: is an instrument in order to achieve certain goals. (Stalnaker ditto)
Stalnaker: we should distinguish means and purposes here.
Def speaking/Stalnaker: is essentially a distinguishing of possibilities. Dummett also says so because to know under what truth conditions (tr.cond.) a proposition is true is to know which possibilities it excludes.
II 74
Fatalism/Dummett: (Dummett "Bringing about the past"): either I will be killed in this attack or I will not be killed. Suppose I will. Then I would be killed even if I took precautions. Therefore, the precautions will be in vain. But suppose I will not be killed even if I did not take any precautions then precautions are not necessary. logic form/Stalnaker:
K: I will be killed
P: I take precautions
Q precautions are useless R: precautions are unnecessary.
1. K v ~K - 2. K - 3.P >K - 4. Q - 5. ~K - 6.~P >~K - 7. R 8. Q v R
Stalnaker: it is not sufficient to say that a particular step is not valid and leave it at that.
Fatalism/DummettVsFatalism/Dummett: any sense of conditional making the step from 2 to 3 and from 5 to 6) valid must be too weak to make the conclusion of 3 to 4 valid.
Therefore the whole argument cannot be valid no matter how the conditional is analyzed.
Stalnaker: that is convincing but it would only be a complete solution if it also showed that there are at all in our language different senses (senses) of the conditional justifying each of these steps.
StalnakerVsDummett: this will not work because the strength of his argument is based on a confusion between two senses (senses) of the conditional. (Semantic meaning and pragmatic meaning of the conditional).
a) according to the semantic and pragmatic analysis (see above) there is a sense of the conditional, after the inference from
II 75
2 to 3 is reasonable and also strong enough to justify the conclusion from 3 to 4. Fatalism/StalnakerVsDummett: the fallacy is not in what Dummett believes but both sub-arguments are good arguments. Namely, in the sense that anyone who is in a position to accept the premise, while it remains open whether the antecedent of the conditional is true, would be in a position to accept the conclusion.
That means that if I were in a position to accept that I would be killed even if I had not yet decided whether I take precautions it would be reasonable to conclude that provisions are useless. ((s) before I decided: that means if the premise would be without truth values (tr.val.)).
Accordingly, if I were in the position to know that I will not be killed.
Fatalism/Stalnaker: the problem is the final step: a conclusion which seems to be of a valid form: the
Constructive dilemma: has nothing substantial to do with conditionals. Step 8 is then justified like this:
A v B; C follows from A, D follows from B
So: C v D.
Problem: this is not a reasonable inference even if one assumes that the subarguments are reasonable.
Fatalism/Stalnaker: the subarguments are reasonable but not valid. Therefore, the whole argument fails.
- - -
I 174
Reference/sense/Searle/Stalnaker: if a statement has no descriptive content there may be no connection to an object. Reference/Dummett/Stalnaker: ... the object must be somehow singled out.
Stalnaker: so in both cases it is about skills, use, habits, practices or mental states.
Searle/Dummett/Stalnaker: So both appear to take the view that a fundamental semantics (see above which fact makes that a statement has its semantic value) cannot be given satisfactorily.
StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: but the two do not say that because they do not separate the two questions.
a) what is the semantics e.g. for names
b) what facts cause that this is our semantics.
Stalnaker: if we separate them we can no longer rule out the possibility that any language could be a spoken language by us. Then the community can also speak a Mill's language.
((s) "Direct Reference": without intermediary sense, VsFrege). ((s) "Direct Reference": is an expression of Kaplan, it is here not used by Stalnaker).
- - -
I 179
Propositional knowledge/StalnakerVsEvans/StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: even if this is correct – what I do not believe – there is no reason to believe that it is impossible to know singular propositions. E.g. Suppose we concede that you cannot know of a certain individual x that it is F if you cannot identify for G ((s) a second property) x than that the G that is F.
Furthermore suppose the fact that x knows of y that it is based on F and is included by the allegation that y knows that G is F. ((s) identification by specific description).
That means that certain conditions are necessary and others sufficient to have knowledge of a certain kind.
I 180
Content/knowledge/Stalnaker: but nothing follows from these conditions for knowledge for the content of knowledge. Mere knowledge/mere reference/mere knowing/Dummett/Stalnaker: if isolated knowledge is meant by that we can admit that it is impossible but that does not imply that knowledge of x that refers a to x is not knowledge of a particular proposition.
singular proposition/StalnakerVsDummett: e.g. "a refers to x". Dummett did not show that it is not possible to know such a singular proposition (to have knowledge of it).
StalnakerVsDummett: it is difficult to say what conditions must be fulfilled here but the specification of the contents of a ascription is not the same as to say what it is that this knowledge ascription is true.
Solution/Stalnaker: both for the problem at the level of the philosophy of mind as well as the semantic problem. A causal theory.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Folk Psychology Functionalism Vs Folk Psychology
 
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Schwarz I 147
analytischer Funktionalismus/Terminologie/Schwarz: so wird Lewis’ Position manchmal genannt, wegen der holistischen Charakterisierung. (Block, 1978, 271ff).
Schw I 148
„analytisch“: weil die Charakterisierung der kausalen Rollen bei Lewis analytisch sein soll. Wenn Funktionalismus aber als Vs Identitätstheorie verstanden werden soll, dann ist Lewis kein Funktionalist, sondern Identitätstheoretiker.
Standardeinwände Vs Funktionalismus betreffen Lewis auch gar nicht: Bsp mentale Zustände:
mentale Zustände/Lewis: für ihre Charakterisierung braucht es auch wesentlich Verbindung zur wahrgenommenen Umgebung usw. Deshalb besteht keine Gefahr, dass wir Bsp der chinesischen Volkswirtschaft Gefühle zuschreiben müssten. (>DennettVsSearle?).
Andererseits kommt es nicht nur auf Input Output Relationen an, so dass Maschinen, die sich zwar äußerlich verhalten wie wir, aber intern völlig anders sind (Bsp Blocks (1981) „Blockhead“, Searle: Bsp Chinese Room (1980), Wünsche, Schmerzen und Meinungen hätten (> Bsp Marsmenschenschmerz).
Schmerz/VsLewis/Vs Volkspsychologie: wenn wir wissen wollen, was Schmerz ist, sollten wir Schmerzforscher fragen und nicht den Mann auf der Straße.Theorie Theorie/Philosophie des Geistes/Schwarz: These: dass wir das Verhalten unserer Artgenossen mit Hilfe eines internalisierten Satzes an Regeln und Prinzipien interpretieren und nicht z.B.: durch mentale Simulation. Das wird Lewis völlig fälschlich zugeschrieben. Dieser hat sich dazu nie geäußert. Alltagspsychologie/Lewis: ist keine besondere „Theorie“. Sie setzt nur voraus, dass wir Meinungen und Erwartungen über mentale Zustände haben nicht unbedingt bewusste. (1997c: 333, früh: „Sammlung von Platituden“ (1972,§3).
LewisVs Psychologie: das wäre ein Wechsel des Themas. Wir wollen doch wissen, ob ein biologischer Zustand die Rolle spielt, die wir mit „Schmerz“ assoziieren.
Schw I 149
SchwarzVsLewis: der Gegensatz ist vielleicht weniger stark, manche Schmerzforscher könnten besser wissen, was Schmerz ist. Bsp Depression.

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Frege, G. Kripke Vs Frege, G.
 
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Cresswell II 151
Pierre-E.g../Kripke/Cresswell: (Kripke 1979) Cresswell: if de re interpreted, is the belief about London. Description Theory/Cresswell: For this, the example is not a problem ((s) Londres and London are different for Pierre because of different descriptions).
((s) causal theory/(s): the case is a problem for them because they have to assume that the meaning of the name is the carrier and must therefore be the same carrier and therefore contradictory predicates are attributed.)
Description Theory/Cresswell: Here the description is relative to Pierre, but it is not his private matter!
Def "Extreme Fregeanism"/KripkeVsFrege/KripkeVsRussell/Cresswell: (he attributes this disposition to these two): Thesis: that name in general belong to idiolects.
Problem: Then the Pierre-E.g. is not about Pierre but about the speaker, who is reporting this case, and his idiolect.
Cresswell: Unfortunately it is not so simple: e.g. an ancient Greek could have been arrived from the ancient to us. He is initially going to use "Φωσφόρος" instead of "Phosphorus". His disposition towards it will as different from ours, as the Pierre-example demonstrates the different dispositions of "London" and "Londres".
Ambiguity/Cresswell: is caused here because a name can stand for numerous descriptions. The latter allow in most cases that "London" can be translated as "Londres". The only case in which it does not work is the example of Pierre.
- - -
Stalnaker I 172
Name/reference/meaning/sense/Stalnaker: 1. Mill/KripkeVsFrege: Thesis: Names are directly addressing the referent without the mediation of an intermediary meaning
Frege/Dummett/Searle: Thesis: The meaning of the name must be adopted in-between the name and his referent.
a) otherwise the object cannot be identified or we cannot explain how it is identified,
b) (DummettVsKripke)since we cannot learn the language.
I 174
Reference/meaning/Searle/Stalnaker: When a statement does not possess a descriptive content, it cannot be linked to an object. Reference/Dummett/Stalnaker: .. the object must be singled out somehow. Stalnaker: in both cases, it comes to skills, use, habits, practices or mental states.
Searle/Dummett/Stalnaker: So both seem to be of the opinion that a satisfactory fundamental semantics (see above that as a fact an expression has its semantic value)cannot be given.
StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: Both, however, do not state this since they do not separate those two issues.
a) what is the semantics, e.g. for names
b) what circumstances lead to those semantics.
Stalnaker: if we separate them, we can no longer rule out the possibility that each language could be a language spoken by us. Then the community could very well speak a Mill’s language.
Frege’s language/Meaning/Reference/Denotation/Stalnaker: We would need them if these questions were not separate, e.g. if we needed to explain those at the same time.
a) why a name has these referents and
b) what the speaker communicates with his statement (which information, content).
Meaning/ KripkeVsFrege: (1972:59) The latter should be criticized for using "meaning" in two different ways.
a) as meaning
b) as the way how the reference is determined.
By identifying the two, he assumes that both are created by specific descriptions.that both are given by specific markings.
I 192
Causal chain/Historic chain/Semantics/Metasemantics/Presemantics/Kaplan/Stalnaker: (Kaplan 1989a, 574 ("pre-semantics")
Question: Are causal chains a part of semantics or a part of metasemantics?
Semantics: states, which semantic values hold the expressions of a language.
Metasemantics: what circumstances determine the semantic values.
Presemantics/Kaplan: concerns those who believe that a name signifies something laying at the other end of a historical chain.
Semantics/Kaplan: gives us rather the meaning than explaining how to find it.
Similar to Kripke:
Reference/Meaning/Kripke/Stalnaker: Kripke distinguishes between what the reference fixes (the causal chain) and it signifies.
KripkeVsFrege: he has mixed up those two things.
Name/Kaplan/Stalnaker: he asks whether names are like index words.
I/Kaplan/Stalnaker: Is a rigid designator: The truth conditions (WB) of what is said (propositional content) depend on the actual referent. Contrary to:
Meaning/I/Stalnaker: One indicates the significance by stating how the referent is determined in the context. That would belong to a theory of e.g. the English language.
E.g. "I refer to the speaker" . Who knows this will be taken for someone who knwos the significance of"I", even if
Important Argument: he does not know who was the speaker at a particular occasion.((s) Difference between significance/reference > "whoever was the speaker")
Def Character/Kaplan: = significance. Function of possible contexts of use for referents.
- - -
Tugendhat I 440
KripkeVsFrege: Primacy of descriptions not anymore(TugendhatVs). Kripke/Tugendhat: Actually, he is not particularly interested in the definition of the proper name but in the rigid designator.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Kripke, S. A. Putnam Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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I 35
Names/Kripke/Putnam: central point: you can use a proper name to refer to a thing or a person, without having true beliefs regarding X.
---
I 36
The use of the name includes the existence of a causal chain. PutnamVsKripke: right: knowledge of a speaker does not have to set the reference in his idiolect.
The use of names is common.
Now you might say that terms of physical quantities are also proper names, not of things but of quantities.
----
I 189
Nature/essence/Kripke: E.g. Statue: The statue and the piece of clay are two items. The fact that the piece of clay has a modal property, namely, "to be a thing that might have been spherical", is missing to the statue.
VsKripke: that sounds initially odd: E.g. when I put the statue on the scale, do I measure then two items?
E.g. Equally strange is it to say, a human being is not identical with the aggregation of its molecules.
Intrinsic properties/Putnam: E.g. Suppose there are "intrinsic connections" of my thoughts to external objects: then there is perhaps in my brain a spacetime region with set-theoretical connections with an abstract object which includes certain external objects.
Then this spacetime region will have a similar set-theoretical connections with other abstract entities that contain other external objects.
Then the materialist can certainly say that my "thoughts" include certain external objects intrinsically, by identifying these thoughts with a certain abstract entity.
Problem: but if this identification should be a train of reality itself, then there must be in the world essences in a sense that cannot be explained by the set theory .
Nature/essential properties/PutnamVsKripke: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot serve to justify him.
Modal properties are not part of the materialistic establishment of the world..
But Kripke individuates objects by their modal characteristics.
Essential properties/Possible Worlds/Putnam: I, myself,(1975) spoke of "essential properties" but not in parallel worlds, but in other possible states of our world.
Example: We can imagine another "possible world" (not parallel), in which a liquid other than water has the taste of water, but none, in which H2O is not water.
This is insofar a kind of essentialism, as we have thus discovered the nature of water.
We just say water should not be anything else.
---
I 192
And that was already our intention, when we did not know the composition of H2O. Nature/essence/Putnam: is in this sense, however, the product of our use of the word. It is not "built into the world".
Nature/Kripke/Putnam: so it is also justified by Kripke.
Putnam: both our conception of "nature" does not help the materialists.
This purely semantic interpretation presupposes the reference. It cannot support the reference as an "intrinsic correlation" between thought and thing".
---
I 246
Truth/legitimate assertibility/Kripke Wittgenstein: that would only be a matter of general agreement. PutnamVsKripke: then this would be a wrong description of the terms that we actually have. And a self-confuting attempt to take an "absolute perspective".
---
Rorty VI 129/130
Causal theory of reference: PutnamVsKripke/Rorty, self-criticism, PutnamVsPutnam: the description of the causal relationships between a something and other things is nothing more than the description of characteristics that are neither in a greater nor lesser extent in a"intrinsic" or in an "extrinsic" relationship with it. So also the feature "to be described by a human being". PutnamVsSearle: Vs distinction "intrinsic"/"relational".

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Mill, J. St. Searle Vs Mill, J. St.
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
V 144
SearleVsMill: it is wrong, that proper names were "meaningless characters" that they were "denotative" but not "connotative".
V 247
Names/SearleVsMill: (Mill: proper names have no sense). E.g. Everest = Tschomolungma can be used to make geographical, not only lexicographical assertions.
Had proper names however no sense, no information could be transmitted by that! Then there were no more information than in the sentence Everest = Everest. (This is Frege's argument against Mill).
- - -
Stalnaker I 181
SearleVsMill/Stalnaker: (1969, 163ff) Mill's theory ((s) "direct reference" without intermediary sense) leads us into a "metaphysical trap": his view of proper names requires a metaphysical distinction between object and it's properties. Metaphysics/Searle: their original sin: the attempt, real or alleged characteristics to transmit a language to the world. ((s)> also Kant like Searle).
Searle: you cannot derive any ontological conclusions from linguistic theories.
StalnakerVsSearle: but Searle does that himself by using Mill's allegedly implicit requirement against him.
Stalnaker: there can be no good argument against a semantic access that someone drew illegitimate metaphysical conclusions from. ((s) No argument against a theory that someone abused it).

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Millikan, R. Verschiedene Vs Millikan, R. Millikan I 90
Satz/Überzeugung/Sprache/Denken/Millikan: es scheint klar, dass wenn wir keine Überzeugungen hätten, wir aufhören würden, zu sprechen bzw. Sätze mit Bedeutung zu äußern. Aber warum ist das klar? Wir brauchen eine andere Erklärung (s.u.).
Satz/Intentionalität/Millikan: These: ein Satz (und jedes andere typisch intentionale Muster) ist intentional wegen Eigenfunktionen und Normalen Relationen, die dieses Muster zu einem Produzenten und einem Interpreten hat. Diese beiden sind kooperierende Einheiten in diesem Prozess.
Pointe: dann sind Sätze doch grundlegend intentional und haben keine abgeleitete Intentionalität. (MillikanVsTradition, MillikanVsSearle).
((s) Intentionalität/Millikan/(s): muss sich dann nicht mehr auf das Mentale berufen. )
VsMIllikan: man könnte einwenden, dass Intentionalität doch mit dem Mentalen verbunden sein muss, weil die Analyse der Intentionalität von Gedanken oder innerer Repräsentationen wenigstens im Einklang mit Prinzipien geschehen müsste, nach denen Bewusstsein und das Mentale selbst analysiert werden muss.
Relation/VsMillikan: die von Millikan angebotenen Relationen seien bloß externe. Bestenfalls korrelieren sie Veränderungen des Bewusstseins mit Veränderungen in der externen Welt. Sie liegen selbst außerhalb des Geistes und außerhalb des Bewusstseins.
Bewusstsein/Tradition: sei aber ein Bewusstsein der Welt, nicht bloß Bewusstsein der Veränderungen seiner selbst.
I 91
Tradition: wir erfahren unser Bewusstsein direkt. MillikanVsTradition: was soll das für eine Erfahrung der Intentionalität sein? Was für eine Kraft soll dieses Argument haben?
Die Kraft müsste epistemisch und rational sein.
Unkorrigierbarkeit/MillikanVsTradition: die Erfahrung des Bewusstseins (Erfahrung der Intentionalität) müsste etwas Unfehlbares haben. Wir müssten dann auch ein unmittelbares Verstehen haben. Es müsste auch die Existenz von Intentionalität und Bewusstsein annehmen, denn sonst könnte die Erfahrung ja nicht „in“ ihr sein.
Bewusstsein/Tradition: nimmt an, dass das Bewusstsein durchsichtig (transparent) sei. Und daher könne sie nicht allein aus externen Relationen zur äußeren Welt bestehen, und seien diese naturnotwendig.
MillikanVsVs: Angenommen, wir lehnen dieses epistemisch rationalistische Bild ab, d.h. wir leugnen, dass es „epistemisch Gegebenes“ gibt. Dann könnten wir zugeben, dass sich Leute manchmal ihrer Gedanken bewusst sind. Aber wir könnten aufrechterhalten, dass dieses Bewusstsein (awareness) teilweise eine externe Relation ist. Die „Innenseite“ dieses Gefühls (Bewusstsein, awareness)
I 92
gibt keine Garantie dafür, dass es die Innenseite einer echten Bewusstseinsrelation (awareness Relation) ist. Bewusstsein/Millikan: selbst Bewusstsein von Bewusstsein ist kein unmittelbares Objekt. Es gibt nichts durchsichtiges am Bewusstsein.
Pointe/Millikan: das ist beunruhigend, weil daraus folgt (negative These), dass es möglich ist, dass wir nicht wissen, was wir denken! ((s) DavidsonVsHume: dito). D.h. aus dem Akte des Bewusstseins selbst heraus ist nichts garantiert.
Rationalismus/rationalistisch/Intentionalität/Bewusstsein/MillikanVsRationalismus/Millikan: die traditionelle rationalistische Sicht des Bewusstseins und der Intentionalität führt ein eine Sackgasse nach der anderen.




Place, U.T. Searle Vs Place, U.T.
 
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John R. Searle
I 287
Note: occasionally my views are not accepted due to a misguided conception of the relationship between cause and identity: so writes PlaceVsSearle: (1988): "According to Searle states of mind are both identical with, and causally dependent on the corresponding brain states. I say: you cannot have it both ways. Either they are identical or there is a causal relationship between them."
SearleVsPlace: he is thinking of cases such as the following: e.g. these footprints may causally depend on the shoes of the intruder; but they cannot at the same time be identical to these shoes.
But how about this one: e.g. the liquid state in which the water is there, may be causally dependent on the behavior of the molecules; and it can also be a property of the system, which consists of these molecules. There is something going very well. And so my present state of consciousness may be caused by the behavior of the neurons in my brain. This condition itself is simply a higher-level property of my brain. You can after all have both.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Platonism Searle Vs Platonism
 
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John R. Searle
V 170
SearleVsPlatonism/SearleVsQuine: simple proof: E.g. "q" is the proper name of the proposition, which is formed by the conjunction of all known true propositions. Then all the knowledge can be symbolized as follows (while for 'p' propositions are to be entered):
(Ep)(p = q . p is true)
According to Quine's criterion therefore the only thing we would have to assume would be one single proposition.
2. VsSearle: These arguments are based on the concept of synonymy that Quine rejects.
SearleVsVs: 1. No, because then the supposedly neutral criterion is drawn into the dispute.
2. More important: No, because the only synonymies here have been introduced by an explicit setting. Thus Quine's objections do not apply here.
3. VsSearle: Such "predicates" as "P" are illogical and nonsensical.
V 170/171
SearleVsVs: Quine himself could not make such an objection. He himself used such means against the modality.
V 245/246
SearleVsPlato: this is the basic error of metaphysics, the attempt to project real or imagined properties of the language in the world. The usual reply VsPlato:
1. That objects are merely complexes of properties. (Distinction between referencing and predicting).
2. Tautology that everything that can be said about an object, can be said in descriptions of the subject.
SearleVs: both are useless. It is absurd to assume that an object is a combination of propertyless being and properties. Equally absurd: group of properties.
- - -
IV 80
Fiction/literature/Searle: not all fiction is literature (> Comic), not all literature is fiction. I do not consider it possible to study literature as I'm going to do it with fiction.
IV 81
There is no common feature of all literary forms or works. By contrast, a continuous transition from literary to non-literary. SearleVsPlato: it is wrong to take fiction for a lie.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996
Rorty, R. Searle Vs Rorty, R.
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
Rorty VI 92
SearleVsRorty/Rorty: Searle considers relativism, which he attributes to Rorty, as a threat to the freedom and sovereignty of the American universities.
Rorty VI 105
World/knowledge/language/human being/reality/SearleVsRorty: this one seems to deny that there were mountains before there were people or before the word "mountain" appeared in the language. RortyVsVs: that is not disputed by anyone. No one believes that there is a causal chain that ensures that mountains become an effect of thoughts or words.
In fact, we believe (Kuhn, Derrida, Rorty): that it is pointless to ask whether there really are mountains, or whether it is only appropriate to talk about mountains.
Rorty VI 110
SearleVsRorty/RortyVsSearle: Searle would like to convince all concerned parties that the preservation of the "Western Rationalistic Tradition" requires them to cut or cancel funding for those that contradict this tradition. (In his opinion, Derrida, Kuhn, Rorty).
Rorty VI 117
SearleVsRorty: "General atmosphere of vague literary frivolity of which the Nietzschian Left is penetrated." - - -
Searle I 168
Incorrigibility: It is often said, we could not be mistaken about the contents of our mind. This is the authority of the 1st person. It has even been argued this incorrigibility was a sure sign that we are dealing with something mental (Rorty). SearleVsRorty: E.g. Sally might discover later that she was simply mistaken when she thought she loved Jimmy.
I 169
By this it only follows that the standard model of error, models whose basis are the distinction between appearance and reality, do not work with the existence or characterization of mental states. We all know from personal experience, how often it occurs that we can judge somebody else better than he can judge himself, if we are for example really jealous or angry, or whether we just seem to us very generous.
Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations (PU 1953): bold attempt to tackle the idea of my in the 1st person drafted statement on Intellectual were after all reports or descriptions. He suggested to understand such comments in an expressive sense, so that they are no reports or descriptions and that the question after any authority was not asked at all. When I cry out in pain, then it raises no question of my authority.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Searle, J.R. Armstrong Vs Searle, J.R.
 
Books on Amazon
Searle: Lemon-Example: Searle says himself, he is not willing to admit that the American soldier means with the words "Do you know the land where the lemon trees bloom" "I am a German officer".
I 128
ArmstrongVsSearle: his reasoning is begging the question: that the uttered expression itself means something else.

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Searle, J.R. Bennett Vs Searle, J.R.
 
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2. Würde Searle in Situationen ohne Konvention sagen, daß die primäre Sprecherabsicht ist, eine Überzeugung hervorzurufen?
BennettVsSearle: Das Problem bleibt das gleiche. Falls ein Verstehen das Erfassen von Konventionen involviert, kann die primäre Sprecherabsicht nicht sein, verstanden zu werden. I 189
Searle: Zitronen-Bsp: eine Geschichte, bei der folgen Form vorliegt: (beabsichtigen p) und ~(meinen p).
BennettVsSearle: Ich behaupte, daß das nicht hinhaut. Das ist für Grice nur relevant, wenn der Sprecher beabsichtigt, daß die Hörer genau in die umgekehrte Richtung gehen, d.h. ihre Überzeugung, der Sprecher sei ein deutscher Soldat aus ihrem Verständnis des Satzes erschließen.
BennettVsSearle: er hat den Griceschen Konditional nicht widerlegt: (beabsichtigen p) > (meinen p). Er hat keine Geschichte vorgelegt, in der das Antecedens erfüllt ist. S meint eben gar nicht wörtlich was er sagt. Er meint ja selbst nicht, daß er deutscher Soldat sei. Daher ist das Gegen-Bsp gar nicht treffend gegen Grice. I 190
BennettVsSearle: das ist zwar sicherer als sein ursprüngliches Zitronen-Bsp, aber weniger klar. Die konventionelle Bedeutung ist nicht einfach irgendein anderer Umstand, sondern ein ungleich wirkungsvollerer! I 192
Jonathan Bennett
I Bennett Die Strategie des Bedeutungs-Nominalismus aus Meggle (Hrsg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Frankf/M 1979
Searle, J.R. Block Vs Searle, J.R.
 
Books on Amazon:
Ned Block
Metz II 560
SearleVsBlock: it is not legitimate to use "conscious" in the definition of z-aware. Searle: A total zombie can have absolutely no consciousness.
Metz II 561
BlockVsSearle: he puts p-consciousness and z-consciousness together. (But there is a difference between whether E.g. Armstrong truck driver notices nothing, or whether he avoids accidents.) Also, he tries to replace the z-consciousness by the idea of ​​degrees of p-consciousness. Block: in reality they are degrees of Z-consciousness.
Metz II 568
Fallacy/BlockVsSearle: question: E.g. why the thirsty Blindsight patient does not reach for the water: he lacks both p-consciousness and z-consciousness. That’s right. But it’s a mistake to move from one function of the machinery of the z-consciousness to any function of p-consciousness. Fallacy: drawing the premature conclusion that p-consciousness has a certain function from the premise that "consciousness" is absent (without being clear what kind of consciousness).

Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007
Searle, J.R. Brandom Vs Searle, J.R.
 
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Searle: it is virtually impossible that if derived intentionality is to be understood, also a kind of "intrinsic" intentionality must be provided by the interpreter.
Brandom I 114
BrandomVsSearle: he overlooks the possibility that such content can be transferred by the fact that states, actions and expressions implicitly are practically considered as intentionally rich.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Searle, J.R. Churchland Vs Searle, J.R.
 
Books on Amazon:
Patricia Churchland
Metz II 472
Gehirn/Bewußtsein/Searle: Vs Identifikation von bewußten Zuständen mit Gehirnzuständen. Statt dessen: das Gehirn verursacht diese Zustände. DF. Korrelationen können ein Hinweis auf Kausalitäten sein, aber sie sind kein Hinweis auf Identität.
ChurchlandVsSearle: er sieht nicht, warum Wissenschaftler für Identität plädieren: sie ist je nach Datenlage plausibler als die Annahme von Verursachung von a durch ein unterschiedliches b.
(Aber Searle ist kein Dualist).

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014
Searle, J.R. Danto Vs Searle, J.R.
 
Books on Amazon:
Arthur Danto
Searle: denies that in terms of linguistic competence no distinction is possible. Chinese room: the person in the room does not speak the language, but proceeds according to established rules. The output is indistinguishable from language skills.
I 273
DantoVsSearle: but maybe the brain makes not more than to respond to electrical pulse with electrical reactions.

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Searle, J.R. Davidson Vs Searle, J.R.
 
Books on Amazon
Davidson I 36
John Searle: It is incomprehensible that two different interpretations could each serve to interpret one and the same thought or utterance of a person properly.
I 36
DavidsonVsSearle: indeterminacy of translation does not mean that the thoughts themselves are somehow vague or unreal.
I 37
The threat which Searle and Fodor believe to recognize is a completely different one: one with regard to the condition according to which the meanings intended for the identification of thoughts used entities are somehow "captured" by consciousness so that they themselves would have to point out the thoughts as different, as long as these entities are different. DavidsonVsSearle: E.g. as if the difference between 1 meter and 100 centimeters was a difference in tape measure itself.
Searle II 149
Causality/Searle: From this follows that causal laws express contingent truths!. DavidsonVsSearle: therefore, it depends only on the description whether events are logically linked or not.
Searle VI 98
Metaphor/Searle: Problem: that with some metaphors such as: E.g. "Sally is a block of ice" we know exactly what is meant, but for others E.g. "Sally is a prime number 17-23" we know it less. Question: how can speakers saying something if they do not say what they mean? And why do some metaphors work and others do not?.
Divergence of utterance meaning and word meaning. Recognized by speaker and listeners. (DavidsonVsSearle).
VI 99
Even the relation between word and sentence meaning plays a role. Metaphorical meaning is always the utterance meaning.
VI 116
Metaphor/Cavell: E.g. "Juliet is the sun": the day begins with Juliet: Searle: here, background knowledge about the work is necessary. Similarity/Searle: meaningless predicate: all objects are similar in one respect or another.
VI 117
There are many metaphors in which similarity does not play a role at all: sun gas ball, block of ice human Nevertheless, E.g. "Sally is a bonfire" is a very different statement than "She’s a block of ice".
VI 118
Comparison theoryVsSearle: "cold" is also metaphorical. SearleVsVs: this does not sting, the difficulty is that there are apparently no literal similarities between unfeeling humans and cold objects.
VI 120
The sole fact that theory is so difficult to explain makes it implausible. Nevertheless, it is no difficulty for a native speaker to understand "Sam is a pig". It does not help to say that sweet things and sweet people are pleasant.
Searle VI 107
SearleVsComparison theories: allegedly, metaphors contain a comparison or a similarity between objects which is alluded to.
VI 109
Searle: absurd question: E.g. "With which block of ice do you compare Sally?".
VI 110
Searle: although similarity plays a role in understanding, the metaphor is not a finding about a similarity. A metaphor can remain true, even if the similarity turns out to be wrong. (for example, because gorillas are gentle).
VI 111
Solution: The statement is only about Richard. The truth conditions are not helpful either if gorillas are gentle and Richard is cold.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Searle, J.R. Dennett Vs Searle, J.R.
 
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I 282
Intentionality/Darwin/Dennett: Darwin turns it all around: intentionality is secured from bottom to top. The first meaning was not a fully developed meaning, it certainly does not show all ’essential’ properties (whatever they may be). "Quasi-meaning", half semantics.
I 555
SearleVsDennett: "as-if intentionality". Intentionality/DennettVsSearle: But you have to start somewhere (if you want to avoid metaphysics). The first step in the right direction is hardly recognizable as a step towards meaning.
SearleVsArtificial Intelligence: Computers only possess "as-if intentionality".
DennettVsSearle: then he has a problem. While AI ​​says we are composed of machines, Darwinism says we are descended from machines!.
I 557
You can hardly refuse the first if you agree with the second statement. How can something that has emerged from machines be anything other than a much, much more sophisticated machine?. Function/Searle: (according to Dennett): Only products that have been produced by a real human consciousness have a function ((s)> objet ambigu, Valéry).
DennettVsSearle: I.e. the wings of the aircraft, but not the wings of the eagle serve for flying!.
I 558
Intentionality/SearleVsDennett: cannot be achieved by the composition of machines or the ever better structure of algorithms.
I 569
DennettVsSearle: this is the belief in sky hooks: the mind is not supposed to emerge, it is not created, but only (inexplicable) source of creation. Intention/DennettVsSearle: (E.g. Vending Machine): Those who select its new function perhaps do not even formulate any new intention. They only fall into the habit of relying on the new useful function. They do not perceive that they carry out an act of unconscious exaptation.
Parallel: >Darwin: There is an unconscious selection of properties in pets.
II 73
Searle: In the case of the artifact the creator must always be asked. Intrinsic (original) intentionality/DennettVsSearle: is metaphysical, an illusion. As if the "author would need to have a more original intention".
Dennett: but there is no task for that. The hypothetical robot would be equally capable of transfering derived intentionality to other artifacts.
Intentionality/DennettVsSearle: there certainly used to be coarser forms of intentionality (Searle contemptuously "mere as-if intentionality").
Dennett: they serve both as a temporal precursors as well as current components.
We are descended from robots and consist of robots (DNA, macromolecules). All intentionality we enjoy is derived from the more fundamental intentionality of these billions of systems.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Searle, J.R. Derrida Vs Searle, J.R.
 
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Derrida: keine Unterscheidung zwischen Alltagssprache und Spezialsprachen. (DerridaVsSearle). I 95
Streit DerridaVsSearle: Habermas I 229 ++
Austin: Sprachhandlungen von Schauspielern: »auf eine eigentümliche Weise hohl und nichtig«.
Searle: solche Fälle sind parasitär zum alltäglichen Gebrauch.
DerridaVsSearle: wie die Unmöglichkeit einer solchen Unterscheidung zwischen fiktiver, und alltäglicher, gewöhnlicher und parasitärer Redeweise zeigen.
HabermasVsDerrida: (DerridaVsSearle): a) wenig einleuchtende Verbindung zwischen Zitierbarkeit und Wiederholbarkeit auf der einen, Fiktionalität auf der anderen Seite: Zitat sei immer nur etwas Sekundäres. Zu jeder Äußerung gehört angeblich, daß sie wesentlich zitiert, weil sie Konventionalität, d. h. Wiederholbarkeit nach einer Regel voraussetzt.
Damit setzt Derrida voraus, was er beweisen möchte, daß jede Konvention nicht nur symbolischen sondern von Haus aus fiktiven Charakter besitzt.
Austin:Alltagssprache ist anderen Beschränkungen unterworfen als Bühnenhandlung . DerridaVs. Habermas I 230 ++

De I
J. Derrida
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993
Searle, J.R. Grice Vs Searle, J.R.
 
Books on Amazon
I 32
GriceVsSearle: I want to see such a correlation only as a possibility. - Searle wanted to say with the example that the Italians should think the meaning of the sentence "Do you know the land where the lemon trees bloom", is "I am a German officer".
I 35
E.g. "Lemon: The guards will not come to their belief, the prisoner was German because of the sentence, but because of the whole situation. Here, there is no feature.

Gri I
H. Paul Grice
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Hg. Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1993
Searle, J.R. Hofstadter Vs Searle, J.R.
 
Books on Amazon
II 707
Thoughts / cognition / Hofstadter: Thoughts are themselves causes of their flux. HofstadterVsSearle: there are no "volatile causal powers of the brain" that cannot be detained by calculation".
  Hofstadter: I myself consider "strong AI" (Searle) possible.
II 721
HofstadterVsSearle: I can not see that there is an unbridgeable gulf between computer and mind.   Per Searle: Computers use symbols or words with no real meaning.
Searle, J.R. Kripke Vs Searle, J.R.
 
Books on Amazon
I 88
Searle: It is not a necessary but a contingent truth that Aristotle has ever operated as an educator. He concludes that it is necessary to use the paradigm of a bundle. KripkeVsSearle: Speaks of logical sum. Kripke: That’s what’s wrong.
None of the properties is likely analytical. Hitler could have spent his life quietly in Linz. But then we would not say that this man would not have been Hitler because we use the name "Hitler" as the name for the man, even if we describe other possible worlds. (Rigid designator).

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984
Searle, J.R. Luhmann Vs Searle, J.R.
 
Books on Amazon
Language / Luhmann: language is not eo ipso communication. This has to do with the fact that it takes two parties and understanding.
  The concept of communication just tries to bring together the parts.
LuhmannVsSearle: parlance is no action, no plot! Because it always requires indeed an understanding, so that it can go on! Cass. 12 (see also Vsspeech act theory)

AU I
N. Luhmann
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Searle, J.R. McDowell Vs Searle, J.R.
 
Books on Amazon
I 132/133
Theory of Designations/SearleVsRussell: McDowell: here it is easy to be on the side of Searle. (Intentionality). McDowellVsSearle: it is better to give up this wish and to relaize what non-obvious descriptions are about.
(With Evans): the conceptual area should not be construed as "predicative" but as "belonging to the area of the Fregean sense."

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
Searle, J.R. McGinn Vs Searle, J.R.
 
Books on Amazon
I 68
Consciousness/McGinnVsSearle: conscious states do not allow for a emergentist explanation using mereological terms. We are unable to attribute the pain to its underlying neural entities. But in contrast, it is quite possible to explain the higher level properties of liquids in this way. ((S) Because all levels are readily available to us.
States of consciousness are therefore not to explored according to CALM (combinatoric atomism with lawlike mappings). We can well understand higher-level brain functions from its constituents, but if we start from the consciousness this explanation fails. Therefore, we do not have a model for a possible relation of emergence. We see no obvious causal relation.

McG I
C. McGinn
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McG II
C. McGinn
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
Searle, J.R. Rorty Vs Searle, J.R.
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
VI 109
Correspondence Theory/Searle: is of moral or social importance. RortyVsSearle: that amalgamates the philosophical with the non-philosophical meaning of the term "exact representation".
VI 110
SearleVsRorty/RortyVsSearle: Searle would like to satisfy all competent bodies that the preservation of the "Western Rationalistic Tradition" requires them to cut or cancel funding that contradict this tradition. (In his opinion, Derrida, Kuhn, Rorty).
VI 118
Deconstruction/SearleVsDeconstuctivism/Rorty: let us assume I happened upon a deconstructionist car mechanic who tells me that the carburetor is only text anyway and there was nothing to talk about except the textuality of this text, then communication has collapsed. RortyVsSearle: for the deconstructionist intellectuals who were lucky enough to find a spot as auto mechanics it is not difficult to specify where their work ends and philosophy begins.
The deconstruction has not changed his life than atheism changed the lives of his ancestors. The difference relates to the atmosphere and the spiritual element.
Description/Action/Understanding/Searle: Our practices become incomprehensible if we describe our actions in various ways, SearleVsDavidson/SearleVsDerrida: especially with non-realistic or non-representational terminology. (RortyVsSearle).
      Searle: some sentences cannot be questioned without questioning the practices themselves. They are a condition of intelligibility.
RortyVsSearle: rhetorical frills that are supposed to give practice the appearance of holding on to a huge thing, namely metaphysical reality.
VI 121
Intrinsic/Extrinsic/RortyVsSearle: if this distinction is abolished, we can dispense with the idea of ​​there being a difference between the pursuit of happiness and the pursuit of truth in nature or humanities. - - -
VI 140
RortyVsSearle: our approach to the world is not the frame (Searle: background) which allows mapping (VsRepresentation). Language/Representation/Rorty: Thesis: language and knowledge have nothing to do with mapping, but rather with "getting along". (Taylor: "Handling").
Representation/Taylor/Rorty: Thesis: handling the world more original than representation.
VI 141
Rorty: no break between the non-verbal and the verbal interactions between organisms (and machines) and the world. - - -
VI 157
RortyVsSearle: we must separate two distinctions: physical/non-physical objects us/"the world" E.g. Sherlock Holmes, the number 17, the rules of chess: it is not a matter of them not having a "place in the world", but of us not expecting that our relevant beliefs will change by physics (as "cultural overall activity").

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Searle, J.R. Seel Vs Searle, J.R.
 
Books on Amazon:
Martin Seel
Die ZEIT (Issue missing)
Realism / Searle: "... the world independent of us": SeelVsSearle: the concept of independence is part of our world.

Se I
M. Seel
Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997

Se II
M. Seel
Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000

Se III
M. Seel
Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001
Searle, J.R. Sellars Vs Searle, J.R.
 
Books on Amazon
II 307
Proposition/name/SellarsVsSearle: propositions (subordinate clauses) can be named (as Frege): Carnap: S (in L) means Chicago is large: ("Chicago is large" = name).

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999
Searle, J.R. Tugendhat Vs Searle, J.R.
 
Books on Amazon
I 256/257
TugendhatVsDummett/TugendhatVsSearle: unbefriedigend: 1. Es ist noch nichts darüber gesagt worden, welches die Wahrheitsbedingungen einer Behauptung bzw. eines Satzes sind. Eine Möglichkeit wäre zu sagen, dass die Wahrheitsbedingungen eines Satzes ihrerseits durch einen Satz angegeben werden. Das setzt natürlich voraus, dass für die Erklärung eines Satzes immer schon ein anderer Satz zur Verfügung steht. Metasprache. (TugendhatVs). Die Erklärung muss in einer Verwendungsregel liegen.
Es genügt nicht, zu zeigen, dass der erste Satz wie der zweite verwendet wird, es muss gezeigt werden, unter welchen Bedingungen der eine Satz gebraucht wird.
2. Jedes Übernehmen einer Garantie setzt seinerseits die Verwendung eines assertorischen Satzes voraus, das ist also eine Pseudoerklärung.
I 258
TugendhatVsSearle: an diesem Punkt wird deutlich, dass sein Regelsystem dort endet, wo es anfangen müsste. Verstehen/Tugendhat: wer eine Behauptung versteht, weiß zwar nicht, ob sie wahr ist, aber er weiß, wie es sich feststellen lässt.
Behaupten/Meinen: der Hörer kann die Rede so aufnehmen: »er behauptet, "dass p, aber er meint nicht, dass p".
Andererseits kann der Sprecher nicht von sich selbst sagen: "p; aber ich meine nicht, dass p". Searle: sincerity rule.
TugendhatVsSearle: der Zusammenhang mit dieser Regel und der Hauptregel essential rule, (an deren Stelle wir hier die These (7) (Eröffnungszug) gesetzt haben) wird bei Searle nicht klar.
- - -
I 504
Modaladverbien: Bsp "Peter rennt schnell". Analoges Problem: Autos sind in jedem Fall schneller. Wie also wird das "schnell" erklärt? Es hängt davon ab, 1. dass sich der Gegenstand, für den der sing Term steht, sich in einem bestimmten Zustand befindet und dass 2. dieser Zustand in bestimmter Weise klassifizierbar ist. Tugendhat: 1976: hier hat die Forschung gerade erst begonnen.
I 507
TugendhatVsSearle: er ist dort stehengeblieben, wo das Problem erst beginnt
I 512
TugendhatVsSearle: falsch: Sätze des Versprechens (für Searle zentral) als auf einer Ebene wie Aussagensätze zu behandeln.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Searle, J.R. Wittgenstein Vs Searle, J.R.
 
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Esfeld I 76
Use theory/Esfeld: does not imply that beliefs to statements can be reduced in a public speech or can be replaced by statements. Otherwise one would have to develop a theory of meaningful statements that is not referring to believe states of people.
SearleVsWittgenstein: Thesis: believe states have priority of linguistic expressions.
WittgensteinVsSearle: instead: thesis: to have beliefs and to master a public language is equally original.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Searle, J.R. Verschiedene Vs Searle, J.R. Lanz I 296
VsSearle / VsChinese Room: (Lanz): das Gehirn ist ebenfalls eine rein syntaktische Maschine. Also bleibt am Ende doch nichts anderes übrig als der von der Kognitionswissenschaft eingeschlagene Weg: unter soviel realistischen Annahmen wie möglich Ausschau nach subpersonalen kognitiven Prozessen zu halten! - - -
Münch III 332
Homunculi/bildliche Vorstellung/HolensteinVsSearle: es ist ein beliebtes Argument gegen bildliche Repräsentation von mentalen Bildern, daß sie von Homunculi betrachtet werden müßten, die das Problem der Kodierung bloß verschieben. Holenstein: das ist eine ontologische Voraussetzung, die nicht den wissenschaftlichen Standards entspricht! Die Annahme von Homunculi bedarf einer besonderen Begründung!
Statt Regreß ist außerdem einfach ein geregelter Gebrauch einer physikalischen Struktur des Gehirns möglich.
- - -
Tetens IV 115
Def Bedeutung/Searle/Tetens: ein Ausdruck hat Bedeutung, wenn der Spreche damit etwas meint! (Mentaler Akt des "Verleihens der Bedeutung"). Künstliche Intelligenz/TetensVsSearle: eben das "Verleihen" der Bedeutung kann die Maschine mit Hilfe des Programmierers auch! Also nicht bloß "reine Syntax" in der Maschine, wie Searle meint, sondern auch durchaus Semantik.
Tetens IV 117
Tetens: angenommen, wir kämen eines zu der Ansicht, daß eine Maschine sich nur dann wie ein Mensch verhalten könne, wenn sie dem Organismus des Menschen vollkommen gleicht. Dann würden wir daraus gar nichts über den Menschen lernen, was wir nicht schon wüßten.
Insofern ist die KI philosophisch neutral.
- - -
Searle I 26
VsSearle: mir wurde vorgeworfen, ich verträte "Eigenschaftsdualismus" und "privilegierten Zugang", und glaubte an "Introspektion".
I 27
Das habe ich aber nirgends explizit vertreten. - - -
Searle I 126
Searle These: mein Ansatz in der Philosophie des Geistes: der biologische Naturalismus. VsSearle: dieser wird manchmal mit folgendem Argument konfrontiert: wenn wir uns vorstellen können, dass dasselbe Verhalten von einem Zombie ohne Bewusstsein produziert werden kann, warum hat dann die Evolution überhaupt Bewusstsein erzeugt?
I 127
Aber es ist eine falsche Annahme, jede biologisch ererbte Eigenschaft müsse dem Organismus einen Auslesevorteil verschaffen. Bsp die Leidenschaft für alpines Skifahren hat sicher eine biologische Basis, die nicht das Ergebnis von Übung oder Abrichtung ist.
Es kann sein, dass wir allgemeinere biologische Bedürfnisse haben, die durch diese Aktivitäten befriedigt werden
I 288
FN: Es gibt eine Unterscheidung zwischen dem, was selektiert wird, und dem, wofür selektiert wird. - - -
III 39
GiddensVsSearle: gegen die Darstellung der Unterscheidung zwischen regulativen und konstitutiven Regeln.





Mü I
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992

Te I
H. Tetens
Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994

W VII
H. Tetens
Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Searle, J.R. Poundstone Vs Searle, J.R.
 
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I 350
Chinese Room/Searle/Poundstone: Variant: E.g. book: "What to do if a text in Chinese is slipped under your door." The room is exhibited at fairs. It is claimed that there was a pig in the room that speaks Chinese. People assume that in reality a Chinese is locked in the room (this variant also expresses the belief in the behavior).
I 351
PoundstoneVsSearle: Problem: feasibility of the thought experiment. The algorithm must include commmon knowledge.
I 352
It must be able to answer questions like those from the short story: e.g. a guest gets scorched food. Furious, he leaves the restaurant without paying. Question: did he eat the food? E.g. "What's the red stuff called that some people put on their fries?" Here, the answer is not included in the question. And perhaps there is no Chinese word for ketchup.
SearleVsTuring: the Turing test is not very insightful, therefore Chinese Room. A computer that behaved exactly like a human would be situation a sensation, no matter if he possessed consciousness or not.
I 353
Searle: Surprising position: the brain is indeed something like a computer, but consciousness has something to do with the biological and neurological structure. A computer made of wires would therefore not make the experience of his own consciousness. And yet, it could pass the Turing test!
Artificial Intelligence/AI/Searle: compares it with photosynthesis: a computer program could create a detailed realistic illustration of photosynthesis, but it would not produce sugar! It would only deliver images of chlorophyll molecules on the screen.
I 354
VsSearle/Chinese Room: a book with the algorithm "What to do if a text in Chinese is slipped under your door" cannot exist: it would have to be larger than the largest libraries in the world.       We could depart from Davis' office simulation. E.g. the brain contains about 100 billion neurons. If every human drew 20 strings, all of humanity could simulate a single brain.
I 355
But no one would know what thoughts are going on! Consciousness/Searle: his followers resort to the distinction "syntactic/semantic". Semantic understanding seems essential for consciousness.
I 356
Meaning/PoundstoneVsSearle: VsSemantic Understanding E.g. you were ill on the first day of school and missed the lesson in which numbers were introduced. Later you never dared to ask, what numbers are. In spite of that, you can do maths quite passably. At the bottom of your heart, you have the feeling of being an impostor. In fact, actually we all do not know what numbers are.
I 357
Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde: Ex Chinese Room: Suppose that, due to brain damage, the person does not know that they speak Chinese. We all have many skills of which we know virtually nothing. (Involuntary muscle movements, metabolism).
I 358
Chinese Room/"System Response": the person himself does not speak Chinese, but the overall system: Person, plus room, plus manual, plus time, plus paper and pencil fulfill the condition.
I 359
SearleVsSystem Response: We tear down the walls and let the person learn the manual by heart. Does he speak Chinese? PoundstoneVsSearle/Thought Experiments: the risk with thought experiments is their convenience. One must make reassure oneself that the reason of only imagining the experiment is no reason that makes the experiment altogether impossible. Here: the manual would be to extensive to be written at all, let alone to be learned by heart.
((S) VsPoundstone: could construct a simpler example which is about fewer rules.)
I 364
Chinese Room/Poundstone: the room is not only extremely enlarged spatially but also timely. The person could also be a robot, that does not matter.
I 365
Consciousness/Hofstadter: E.g. conversation with Einstein's brain: book with answers that simulate exactly what Einstein would have said. Two levels that must be separated: the book and the user! Of course, the book itself has no consciousness!
Here, some hair-splitting questions about the "mortality" of Searles room arise: suppose the user goes on a 5-weeks holiday, is the book called "Einstein" dead in meantime?
I 366
The book itself could not notice the interruption. Variant: if the pace of work was reduced to one question per year, would that be enough to keep the book "alive"?
Time/Poundstone: we could not find that time had stopped if it did.
W. Poundstone
I W. Poundstone Im Labyrinth des Denkens, Reinbek 1995
Searle, J.R. Mackie Vs Searle, J.R.
 
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Stegmüller IV 188
Naturalistic Fallacy/SearleVsHume: one could formulate cautious assumptions to work around the problem: 1) Hans: "I hereby promise to pay you, Peter, 10 marks"
2. Hans promised, to pay 10 ...
3) Hans entered an obligation ...
4) Hans is obliged to ...
5) Hans shall ...
IV 189
It is assumed that there are no competing claims or excuses. Searle: Solution by "institutional fact".
institutional fact/MackieVsSearle: confused two perspectives on "institution":
a) externally: Ex. in chess the rules are not internalized for the context of life.
b) internally: here the rules are internalized, we cannot escape.
1. The five steps of Searle are only a description from the outside.
Proposition (5) is nothing but a description of the institution of the promise from the outside. (Descriptive).
IV 190
Nothing but the deduction of a statement of fact from other factual allegations. 2. Or, view it as a conclusion within the institution, then (5) is a normative statement. The difficulty then lies in the transition from (2) to (3).
Then (3) would be better: "Hans made an attempt to commit to Peter ..."
Yet, to get to (4) as a normative statement (3) would have would have to be available in the original version.
The problem stems from the fact that we do not learn about promises externally, but always in concrete, lived situations.


Stegmüller IV 188
Naturalistic Fallacy/SearleVsHume: man könnte vorsichtige Prämissen formulieren, die das Problem umgehen: 1) Hans: "Hiermit verspreche ich dir, Peter, 10 Mark zu zahlen"
2. Hans versprach, Peter 10...
3) Hans ging die Verpflichtung ein...
4) Hans ist verpflichtet...
5) Hans soll...
IV 189
Dabei ist vorausgesetzt, dass es keine konkurrierenden Ansprüche oder Entschuldigungen gibt. Searle: Lösung durch "institutionelle Tatsache".
institutionelle Tatsache/MackieVsSearle: verwechselt zwei Betrachtungsweisen von "Institution":
a) von außen. Bsp beim Schach sind die Regeln nicht verinnerlicht für den Lebenszusammenhang.
b) innerhalb der Institution: hier sind die Regeln verinnerlicht, wir können nicht heraustreten.
1. Die fünf Schritte von Searle sind nur eine Beschreibung von außen.
Satz (5) ist nichts als eine Beschreibung der Institution des Versprechens von außen. (deskriptiv).
IV 190
Nichts als Ableitung einer Tatsachenaussage aus anderen Tatsachenbehauptungen. 2. Oder man spricht von einer Konklusion innerhalb der Institution, dann ist (5) eine normative Aussage. Die Schwierigkeit liegt dann im Übergang von (2) nach (3).
Dann wäre (3) besser : "Hans machte den Versuch, sich Peter gegenüber zu verpflichten..."
Um zu (4) als einer normativen Aussage zu kommen, müsste (3) aber in der ursprünglichen Fassung zur Verfügung stehen.
Das Problem rührt daher, dass wir Versprechen nicht von außen lernen, sondern immer in Lebenssituationen.

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977
Searle, J.R. Stalnaker Vs Searle, J.R.
 
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I 178
Identification/reference/Searle: (1969,87): ultimately by description. (description). Stalnaker: and this must then be explained by the ability of the speaker to a certain behavior. Otherwise you need a magic intentionality.
StalnakerVsSearle: even if he was right, it would not provide additional premise that he needs to show the impossibility of Mill's semantics.
For he does not say that we cannot have intentions on certain individuals. He only says that we need a necessary condition for it.
Solution: he needs a restriction on the content of the attitudes that we can have
StalnakerVsSearle: he offers instead only a restriction of the conditions under which we may have attitudes with a specific content.
Mill/Stalnaker: as long as it is possible to have such intentions ((s) "direct reference") it is possible to speak and understand a corresponding language.
- - -
I 181
SearleVsMill/Stalnaker: (1969, 163ff) Mill's theory ((s) "direct reference", without interposed sense) leads us into a "metaphysical trap": his understanding of proper names requires a metaphysical distinction between object and its properties. Metaphysics/Searle: their original sin: the attempt to transmit real or alleged characteristics of a language to the world. ((s) > also Kant like Searle).
Searle: one cannot derive any ontological conclusions from linguistic theories.
StalnakerVsSearle: but Searle does that now himself by using Mill's allegedly implicit requirement against him.
Stalnaker: it cannot be a good argument against a semantic access that someone drew illegitimate metaphysical conclusions from it. ((s) No argument against a theory that someone abused it).

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Searle, J.R. Donnellan Vs Searle, J.R.
 
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II 287
Names/Searle: are correlated with a set of descriptions (descriptions). The one that best meets the description, because it has the properties that are designated by the predicate, is thus the object. ((s) E.g. "Hans comes": is coming a property then?). Donnellan: Searle’s view is weaker than that of Russell. (Theory of "identifying descriptions": the answer you get if you ask: what are you refering to"?.
II 288
DonnnellanVsRussell, DonnellanVsSearle: now it is possible that the properties do not apply to a substantial degreeto the object to which I refer or to another one. Names/KaplanVsRussell: the idea that the reference of a proper name is to be associated with it by the descriptions that are currently connected to it is not plausible! > historical explanation.
Searle, J.R. Zink Vs Searle, J.R.
 
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Wolf II 15
Namen/ZinkVsSearle: Bsp Angenommen, die meisten Beschreibungen von Aristoteles erwiesen sich als falsch und richtig in Bezug auf eine andere Person, dann sollte wir dennoch nicht sagen, dass "Aristoteles" der Name dieser anderen Person sei, es ist hinreichend, " wurde 384 v.Chr., in Stagira" geboren. Bedeutung des Eigennamens/Zink: "Die Person, die tatsächlich E.N" genannt wird. (Bestimmte Kennzeichnung, wie Burks).
ZinkVsBurks: nicht beliebige Eigenschaft, sondern ein Prädikat wie z.B. "Person" mit Identitätskriterien muss enthalten sein.
Wolf II 167
Namen/Bedeutung/Searle: ("Proper Names", Mind 67) keine Menge von Beschreibungen kann die Bedeutung angeben! Der Gebrauch setzt die Wahrheit einer bestimmten Menge von Beschreibungen voraus. Aber weder ist diese Menge genau festgelegt, noch besteht die Bedeutung in der Menge. Denn dann wäre jede wahre Beschreibung des Dings analytisch wahr! Keine Entdeckung über es wäre eine empirische Entdeckung!
mögliche Lösung/Searle: die notwendigen und hinreichenden Bedingungen für die Bedeutung des Namens: dass er identisch ist mit einem Gegenstand, der ursprünglich so getauft wurde.
II 168
SearleVs: "Aristoteles" kann auf jedes so getaufte Individuum angewendet werden. ZinkVsSearle: das läßt sich eben durch Lokalisierung beseitigen.

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Speech Act Theory Luhmann Vs Speech Act Theory
 
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AU Kass 12
LuhmannVsSprechakttheorie, LuhmannVsSearle, LuhmannVsHabermas: Vs Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns: Frage, ob man in die Einheit einer Kommunikation das Verstehen einschießt oder nicht.
Wenn man einen Handlungsbegriff von Kommunikation hat, also nur die Mitteilung, also nur das, was ich jetzt hier tue einbezieht, dann lässt man das Verstehen außen vor.
Dann muss man in der Theorie Korrekturmaßnahmen ergreifen: der Handelnde richtet sich, wenn er vernünftig agiert nach den Verstehensvoraussetzungen. Er sagt nicht etwas, wovon er weiß, dass es nicht verstanden werden kann.
Das würde aber bedeuten, daß der Empfänger aus dem Sprechakt (Luhmann: Sprachakt) oder der Kommunikation zunächst ausgeschlossen ist. Und nur als disziplinierendes Moment in die Theorie rückgeführt wird. Und zwar als Subjekt!
LuhmannVsSprechakttheorie: wenn Verstehen Teil der Kommunikation ist, braucht man auch keine verschiedenen Typen Sprechakten einzuführen (Bsp strategisch, kommunikationsorientiert usw)

AU I
N. Luhmann
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Universalism Verschiedene Vs Universalism Stegmüller IV 194
Universalization/Ethik/Stegmüller: nach Ansicht vieler Philosophen müssen moralische Urteile universalisierbar sein, "verallgemeinerungsfähig".
IV 195
MackieVsAnalytische Philosophie: das ist keine metaethische, sondern eine genuin moralphilosophische Frage. Drei Stufen der Universalisierung: Numerische Unterschiede (zwischen Personen) sind für die moralische Beurteilung irrelevant.
Das ist eine Feststellung 2nd order, über moralische Imperative erster Ordnung. (Erstmalig präskriptives Prinzip 2. Ordnung: soll extremen Egoismus ausschließen).
IV 196
Einige Autoren, das sei nicht nur eine notwendige, sondern sogar eine hinreichende Bedingung für Moralität. Es gebe nur formale, nicht aber materiale Beschränkungen. MackieVs: rein formale Betrachtungen können ein moralisches Urteil nicht angemessen analysieren.
U1/Universalization/Stegmüller: numerische Unterschiede sind irrelevant. Das schließt auch "umgekehrten Egoismus" aus, wo jemand an sich selbst viel höhere Anforderungen stellt als an seine Mitmenschen.
Auch die Berufung auf einen Religionsstifter. (Irrelevanzprinzip der numerischen Unterschiede zwischen Personen).
Es schließt aber nicht aus, dass jemand wegen seines Geschlechts oder seiner Hautfarbe diskriminiert wird!
U2/Universalization 2nd order/Mackie/Stegmüller: nicht nur numerische, sondern jetzt auch qualitative Unterschiede sind irrelevant. (Hautfarbe, Geschlecht, Rasse, Religion).
IV 198
Mackie: das ist dadurch charakterisiert, dass sich jemand in die Lage des anderen versetzt. Das ist präskriptiv, kann aber auch deskriptiv formuliert werden:
deskriptiv: moralischen Ausdrücken kommt eine solche Bedeutung zu, dass alle Urteile, sowohl im ersten als auch im zweiten Sinn universalisierbar sind.
U3/Universalization 3rd order/Mackie/Stegmüller: auch die Kulturform ist jetzt irrelevant. Man versucht, sich die inneren Einstellungen, sogar den Geschmack des anderen zu eigen zu machen.
IV 199
Die präskriptive Variante ist mit einer Form des utilitarianism identisch. (Und genauso illusionär). Universalization/Ethik/Stegmüller: deskriptiv: höchstens die 1. Stufe hat in die Bedeutung unserer Ausdrücke Eingang gefunden.
Präskriptiv: es gibt wohl keine Norm, die den Test der 3rd order bestehen würde.
VsUniversalization: wie VsSearle: Verwechslung von Innen- und Außenperspektive.
Fazit: man kann Moral nicht metaethisch begründen.




Use Theory Searle Vs Use Theory
 
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John R. Searle
III 64
Use theory of meaning/SearleVsSearleVsUse theory: E.g. it is said that in Muslim countries a man can divorce his wife by simply saying three times "I divorce myself from you," while throwing three white pebbles. This is obviously a deviating use of the word compared to the use of the word in our societies.
Anyone who thinks that meaning is use, would have to conclude that the word "divorce" has a different meaning for Muslims than for others. But that is not the case!
III 64/65
Solution/Searle: an existing proposition form has been assigned a new status function. The proposition form "I divorce myself from you," does not change its meaning when a new status function is added. Rather, it is now simply used to create a new institutional fact. (Declaration). E.g. that does not apply to every institutional fact: you cannot make a touchdown (baseball), by simply saying that you make it.
- - -
III 79
Causality/Status Function/Searle: Status functions differ from causal use functions in terms of their language dependency: E.g. one can think without all the words that this is a screwdriver because you can easily think that this thing is used to screw in these other things, because you may have seen it many times.
To treat an object as a screwdriver and to use it, no words are logically necessary! (> Use,> SearleVsUse theory)
There are structural properties available that may be perceived without using words.
Status: here no physical features are available.
V 221
Searle: the concept of use is too vague.
SearleVsUse theory:
1. no indication of the distinction between the use of a word and the use of a proposition! 2. false conviction: because we could not say this or that under certain conditions, it could under these conditions not be the case!
V 221/222
E.g. "under what conditions would we say that he can remember this or that or the act was carried out voluntarily?" False:
1. What does W mean?
2. How is W used? 3. How is W used in simple present indicative propositions of the form "X is W"? (Way too specific!).
4. how are such propositions used?
V 223
5. Which illocutionary act is performed? 6. When would we say such propositions?
The assumption that the answers to the fifth question represent necessary answers to the first leads to speech fallacy. ((s) as Tugendhat: meaning not from circumstances.)
Relation to the fallacy of criticism of the naturalistic fallacy:
V 224
SearleVsUse theory: "Use" is too vague to distinguish between the truth-conditions of the proposition expressed and the truth conditions of the illocutionary strength of the expression.
V 229
SearleVsUse theory: there is a difference between the question "What does it mean to call something good?" and "What is the meaning of" good "?"
V 234
SearleVsUse theory: E.g. obscenities: the use of obscenities is substantially different from that of the corresponding courteous synonyms. E.g. "He is not a nigger" is just as derogatory as "He is a nigger".

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Various Authors Rorty Vs Various Authors
 
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Richard Rorty
V 84
Englightenment/Rorty: religion, myth and tradition can be brought into contrast to an ahistorical Something that is common to all men. GadamerVsEnlightenment/HeideggerVsEnlightenment/Rorty: man himself is historical through and through.
IV 143
RortyVsSearle/RortyVsCuller: (like Derrida): both consider textbook distinctions to be terribly important. We should return to the ironic skepticism of the Phenomenology of Spirit.
III 180
RortyVsMann, Thomas: "Dr. Faustus" only frilly generality. - - -
VI 364
"Significance"/"Meaning"/Stag/Terminology/Rorty: differentiation by E. D. Hirsch: Def Significance/Hirsch: position of text in a different context.
Def "Meaning"/Hirsch: what is in line with the intentions of the author at the time of writing the text. (Rorty: VsHirsch But nothing depends on that).
Rorty: It's always about putting a statement into a context! We can go about it as anachronistically as we want as long as we are aware of it.
Truth/Interpretation/Rorty: the determination of the truth depends on that one puts this statement into the context of the allegations that we would be prepared to establish ourselves. Truth and meaning cannot be determined independently.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Mental State Davidson, D.
 
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Fra I 657
DavidsonVsBurge/DavidsonVsSearle: These gibt keinen Grund anzunehmen, dass gewöhnliche mentale Zustände nicht beide Bedingungen, (I) und (II) erfüllen. 1. Sie sind "innere" in dem Sinne, daß sie mit Zuständen des Körpers identisch sind und deshalb ohne Bezugnahme auf Objekte und Ereignisse außerhalb des Körpers identifizierbar sind.
2. Gleichzeitig sind sie "nicht-individualistisch", weil sie zum Teil durch ihre Kausalbeziehungen zu Objekten und Ereignissen außerhalb identifiziert werden können und gewöhnlich auch werden.

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Intentionality Dennett, D.
 
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I 281
Bedeutung/Dennett: Entstehung, Geburt der Bedeutung: These die Nucleotidsequenzen, zunächst rein syntaktisch, nehmen "Semantik" an . "Quasi-Bedeutung": Bsp Wirkungsweise von Makromolekülen - SearleVsDennett: nur Als-Ob-Intentionalität. DennettVsSearle: irgendwo muß man anfangen. die ersten Schritte sind aber nicht als Schritte in Richtung Bedeutung zu erkennen. I 282 auch zu uns gehören Teile, die nur Halb-Intentionalität haben.
II 147
Person/Intentionalität/Dennett: These Personwerdung ist der Übergang von einem intentionalen System 1. Ordnung (Überzeugungen und Wünsche, aber nicht über Überzeugungen und Wünsche) zu einem
intentionalen System 2. Ordnung (Überzeugungen über eigene und fremde Überzeugungen).
Intentionales System 3. Ordnung: ist in der Lage zu wollen, daß jemand glaubt, daß es etwas will.
Naturalism Millikan, R.
 
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Graeser I 125
Naturalism / MillikanVsSearle: everything - things like sentences, theories, thoughts and meanings - are part of a single world, and should be understood accordingly. It also includes an understanding of the evolution. Closely related to Searles lent (derived) intentionality. But: > representation.

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002
Repräsentation Millikan, R.
 
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Graeser I 125
Representation / VsSearle: are not "mental principles". This ignores not only the natural order, but also requires an "inner interpreter". (Regress). Graeser: from here the assumptions is near that intentionality is primarily basic to the mental. But Millikan sees alternatives.

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002
Thinking Nagel, Th.
 
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I 63
Thinking / Nagel: is something different than marks on paper. A naturalistic analysis of intentionality is not possible. (NagelVsSearle).
Correspondence Rorty, R.
 
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Horwich I 452
Korrespondenz/IdealismusVsKorrespondenztheorie//Rorty: These: es gibt keine Korrespondenz zwischen einer Überzeugung und einer Nicht-Überzeugung (Objekt) -
Rorty VI 96
RortyVsSearle: These: Philosophen, die bestreiten, daß es so etwas wie Übereinstimmung zwischen Meinung und Wirklichkeit überhaupt gibt, stellen sowenig eine Gefahr dar wie Theologen, die das Fegefeuer bestreiten. (VsSearle). ((s) Searle pro Korr, RrortyVsKorr).

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000