Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 16 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Competence Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 307
Competence/ChomskyVsHarman: I do not claim that they consist in "knowing-that", that language is described by the rules of grammar - Competence/ChomskyVsHarman: not a number of habits, no reference to the ability of the cyclist - instead the mastery of generative grammar - (non-formulated knowledge) - less than the ability to speak a language. ---
Searle VIII 404
Competence/performance/Chomsky: Thesis: performance is just the peak of the iceberg of competence. ---
VIII 437
SearleVsChomsky: the distinction is wrong: he assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more like a theory of performance than one of competence - he does not see that ultimately competence is a performance competence - ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: suspects behaviorism behind it. SearleVs: not true, because speech act theory involves intention. ---
Searle VIII 409
Chomsky: new: object of study is the language skills - old: random number of sentences, classifications. ChomskyVsStructuralism: a theory must be able to explain which chains represent sentences and which do not. ---
VIII 414
SearleVsChomsky: not clear how the grammatical theory provides the knowledge of the speaker.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006


S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Competence Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
VIII 404
Competence/Performance/Chomsky: Thesis: Performance is just the tip of the iceberg of competence. ---
VIII 437
SearleVsChomsky: the distinction is misled: he assumes that a theory of speech acts must be rather a theory of performance than one of competence - r does not see that competence is ultimately performance competence - ChomskyVsSpeech Act Theory: suspects behaviorism behind it. SearleVs: this is not true, because Speech Act Theory involves intention. ---
VIII 409/10
Chomsky: new: object of study is language skills - old: indiscriminate sets of sentences, classifications. ChomskyVsStructuralism: a theory must be able to explain which chains represent sentences and which do not. ---
VIII 414
SearleVsChomsky: not clear how the grammatical theory provides the knowledge of the speaker.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Deep Structure Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
VIII 418
Deep structure/Chomsky: determines the meaning. - Surface structure: determines the phonetic form. (Late work: sometimes the meaning) - Syntax/Chomsky: is inseparable from semantics. - (According to Searle): a human is a syntactic creature, the brain is syntactical. ---
VIII 421
SearleVsChomsky: It would follow that if one day man would have syntactically modified forms, he would have no more language, but something else.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Epistemology Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
III 87
Interest/knowledge/epistemology/recognition/Putnam: recognition is driven by interests (ChomskyVs) - but VsChomsky: that does not mean that we are free to choose our interests - or that interests were not open to criticism - also reasonableness depends on the circumstances - the claim that a term is relative to interests does not mean that all interests were equally reasonable. ---
I 200
Kripke/Putnam: assumes that we have something like "intellectual intuition" - PutnamVsKripke - that should correspond to a "transcendental correspondence"?

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Forms Pinker
 
Books on Amazon
I 218
Design/shape/Evolution/Chomsky: It is wrong to make selection responsible for all design - often there is simply a physical explanation - explanation/selection/PinkerVsChomsky: Selection is usually not needed to explain utility, but something improbable. ---
I 219
Definition design/Pinker: if the function cannot be described more economical than the structure, it is no design - the term function will not add anything new.

Pi I
St. Pinker
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998

Grammar Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
Searle VIII 414
ChomskyVsStructuralism: phrase structure rules alone cannot resolve ambiguities - e.g. Active/Passive - Solution/Chomsky: transformation rules, transformation phrase markers by permutation, insertion, eradication of elements in other phrase markers - then the syntax consists of two components: base and transformation. ---
VIII 418
Deep structure/Chomsky: determines the meaning - Surface structure: determines the phonetic form (late works: sometimes the meaning) - Syntax/Chomsky: is to be separated from semantics - (according to Searle): man is a syntactic creature, the brain is syntactic. ---
VIII 421
SearleVsChomsky: from this it would follow that if one day we had syntactically modified forms, we would have no language anymore, but something else. ---
VIII 421
Generative grammar/NeogrammariansVsChomsky: semantics crucial for the formation of syntactic structures.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006


S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Ideas Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
VIII 430
Judgment/idea/SearleVsEmpiricists: what makes the idea in mind become a judgment? - Dilemma: if understanding of ideas = judgment, then circularly - b) when ideas come in the form of a judgment, then only series of ideas in the mind, not sentences (inadequate) - SearleVsChomsky: same dilemma: a) if different readings of a sentence are only paraphrases, then circularly: skills for understanding paraphrases presuppose what they want to explain - b) if readings are only lists of items, then it is inadequate.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Language Harman
 
Books on Amazon
Chomsky I 306
Language / Harman: because it is obviously not a knowledge-that, it must be a knowledge-how
I 308
HarmanVsChomsky: the internal system for the selection of a grammar should be presented in a more fundamental language that would already have to be understood by the child - ChomskyVsVs: there is perhaps a more fundamental language, but the child does not have to speak it - the child has to learn the native language, but maybe it already actually masters a grammar.

Harm I
G. Harman
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995


Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006
Language Evolution Gärdenfors
 
Books on Amazon:
Peter Gärdenfors
I 71
Sprachentstehung/Evolution/Sprache/Sprachevolution/Gärdenfors: These: in frühen Formen der Kommunikation war der kommunikative Akt selbst wichtiger als seine expressive Form. (Vgl. H. Clark, 1992; Winter, 1998; Gärdenfors, 2010). Daher ist die Pragmatik der natürlichen Sprache evolutionär gesehen das grundlegende. Später, wenn die Kommunikationsakte vielfältiger und vom unmittelbaren Kontext unabhängig werden, tritt die Semantik in den Vordergrund. Syntax wird gebraucht, wenn die Kommunikation noch später konventioneller wird: Marker werden gebraucht, um Eindeutigkeit herzustellen. Dann wird Syntax nur für die subtilsten Aspekte der Kommunikation gebraucht. VsGärdenfors: Das steht im Gegensatz zu den meisten zeitgenössischen Autoren in der Linguistik.
ChomskyVsGärdenfors: für Chomskys Schule steht Syntax am Anfang der Untersuchung, semantische Merkmale werden erst hinzugefügt, wenn Grammatik nicht ausreicht.
GärdenforsVsChomsky.
I 72
Pragmatik/GärdenforsVsChomsky/Gärdenfors: Für Chomsky ist die Pragmatik nur der Abfallkorb für die Reste: Kontext, Deixis, usw.). Gärdenfors: für eine Theorie der Evolution der Sprache müssen wir anders vorgehen: Pragmatik vor Semantik vor Syntax.
I 73
Sprachentstehung/Gärdenfors: so wie das Geld erst später zur Tauschwirtschaft hinzukam und diese effizienter machte, trat die Sprache zur bereits bestehenden Kommunikation unter Menschen hinzu. Analogie/sprachliche Kommunikation/Geldwirtschaft/Gärdenfors: man kann die Analogie weitertreiben: so wie das Geld ein stabiles Preissystem ermöglicht, bildet sich durch Sprache ein relativ stabiles System von Bedeutungen aus.
Spieltheoretische Erklärung/Analogie: so wie Preise sind auch sprachliche Bedeutungen Gleichgewichtspunkte in einem System. (>Meeting of minds).
I 78
Sprachentstehung/Kommunikation/Gärdenfors: These: wachsende semantische Komplexität wird durch Ausdehnung der Bereiche im geteilten Begriffsraum erreicht. Dabei kann man das verknüpfen verschiedener Bereiche als Schaffung von Produkträumen verstehen. ((s) Produktraum: Kartesisches Koordinatensystem, bei dem eine Achse einer Begriffsdimension entspricht.) So werden Bereiche kombiniert.

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Method Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 278
Method/theory/Chomsky: requirement; we must be able to describe what the person receives - the percept itself is a construction of the first order - its properties are determined experiment. Grammar: construction of the second-order - for this one must abstract from the other factors involved in the use and understanding of language and refer to internalized knowledge of the speaker - VsBehaviorismus: excludes the concept of "what is perceived" and "what is learned" from the outset. ---
I ~ 297ff
Method/theory: PutnamVsChomsky: certain ambiguities can only be discovered through routine, therefore their postulated explanation by Chomsky's grammar is not that impressive - ChomskyVsPutnam: he misunderstands it, in fact this refers to competence and not to performance - routine does not matter here, but the inherent correlation between sound and meaning. ---
I 303
Chomsky: my universal grammar is not a "theory of language acquisition", but one element of it - my thesis is an "all-at-once" proposal and does not try to capture the interplay between the tentative hypotheses constructed by the child and new data interpreted with them. ---
I 316
Method/theory/Chomsky: "association", "reinforcement", "random mutation ": hide our ignorance - (s) something dissimilar may also be associated. ---
I 321
Method/theory/ChomskyVsQuine: his concept of "reinforcement" is almost empty - if reinforcement is needed for learning, it means that learning cannot happen without data. ---
I 323
Language Learning/ChomskyVsQuine: he does not explain it: if only association and conditioning, then the result is merely a finite language. ---
I 324
VsQuine: concept of probability of a sentence is empty: the fact that I utter a particular German sentence is as unlikely as a particular Japanese sentence from me.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Omniscience Hintikka
 
Books on Amazon
I XV
Logical omniscience/Hintikka: Thesis: is only a supposed problem. ChomskyVsHintikka: he has given the alleged paradox as the reason for his rejection of any model-theoretical semantics for propositional attitudes.
HintikkaVsChomsky: his problem has been solved long ago.
---
I 21
Omniscience/Solution/Hintikka: we must allow individuals to not exist in every possible world. Otherwise, all world lines would have to be ad libitum extendable, then everyone would have to know what an individual would be in any world (in whatever disguise), namely on the basis of the form of knowledge + indirect W-question. ---
I 23
Logical omniscience/epistemic logic/model theory/Hintikka: Problem: Suppose (S1> S2). That is, all S1 models are S2 models. Then all the epistemic alternatives in which S1 is true are those in which S2 is true.
Problem: it follows that for each knowing person b and every scenario applies:
(3.1) {b} KS1> {b} K S2.
That is, one must also know all the logical consequences of one's knowledge.
This has led some to reject model theory.
Model theory/HintikkaVsVs: this follows only if one cannot avoid omniscience, and one can avoid it.
Solution: one can find a subset of logical consequences (S1 > S2) for which (3.1) applies.
(i) This subset can be restricted syntactically. The number of free individual symbols together with the number of layers of quantifiers limit the number of individuals that can be considered in a set S (or in an argument).
Solution: this number (parameter) should not be greater than the one in S1 or S2 at any point in the argument.
Problem: there is no simple axiomatic-deductive system for this.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Pragmatics Gärdenfors
 
Books on Amazon:
Peter Gärdenfors
I 72
Pragmatik/GärdenforsVsChomsky/Gärdenfors: Für Chomsky ist die Pragmatik nur der Abfallkorb für die Reste: Kontext, Deixis, usw.). Gärdenfors: für eine Theorie der Evolution der Sprache müssen wir anders vorgehen: Pragmatik vor Semantik vor Syntax. Gärdenfors: die Pragmatik eines Kommunikationssystems wird die semantische Struktur nicht festlegen. Der Bedeutungsraum kann auf viele verschiedene Weisen aufgeteilt werden. Auch bestimmt die Semantik nicht die Syntax. Dennoch werden die semantischen Strukturen Beschränkungen dafür liefern, welche syntaktischen Strukturen möglich oder wahrscheinlich sind.


Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Semantics Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 272
Semantics/Chomsky: here the surface structures hardly help, the deep structure helps even more. ---
Strawson V 393
StrawsonVsChomsky: hardly deals with semantics - its lexicon contains much fewer entries than our dictionaries.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006


Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Speech Act Theory Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
II 25
Sincerity condition: internal to the speech acts. ---
IV 251
Speech act/Searle: rule-determined actions - has always constitutive (not regulatory) rules - Searle: speech act: is key to the meaning - VsSearle: controversial because language rules for e.g. singular term have fundamentally different nature than for actions. ---
V 68
Speech act is unequal game. - Explanation must presuppose rules - rules are not equal Convention: speaking rule-governed behavior - rules, not behavior is crucial.
---
V 207
Traditional speech act theory/Austin/Strawson/Hare: word W is needed to perform speech act A - then e.g. "good" recommends, "true" reaffirms, "knowledge" guarantees something - SearleVs: this only works with performative verbs such as "promise" but not with judgmental ones - does not satisfy the adequacy condition for semantic analysis: a word must mean in all grammatically different sentences the same - it cannot, if the meaning is supposed to be the execution of various acts. ---
V 213
Wrong: to assume that the conditions for the execution of a speech act follow from the meanings of the words. ( "fallacy of assertiveness") ---
IV 27
Speech act theory/SearleVsAustin: accepts verbs for acts - but one has to differentiate this - E.g. announcement of a command is not the command. ---
IV 78
Speech act theory/Searle: differs from other philosophical approaches in that it gives no set of logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the explicable phenomenon - (E.g. linguistics: structural rules). ---
VI 86
The illocutionary act is the function of the meaning of the sentence. ---
IV 86
Fiction/speech acts/Searle: fiction has no other speech acts but is a predetermined act - in literature, no other act than in newspaper - no semantic or syntactic property proves a text as fictional. ---
IV 204
Speech Act TheoryVsChomsky, VsRules, instead of semantics/pragmatics. ---
VII 99
Speech act/proposition/Searle: difference: from the propositional content does not follow that the assertion conditions are satisfied - the proposition rather implies that the speaker implies within the act that they are satisfied. ---
VIII 435
Speech act/Searle: is hold together by the semantic intentions of the speaker - VsChomsky: does not see the essential connection of meaning and speech acts.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Syntax Cresswell
 
Books on Amazon
I 47
Syntax/Cresswell: The modal operator belongs to the syntax. - Semantics: possible worlds belong to semantics. ---
I 161
Syntax/Semantics/HintikkaVsChomsky: Syntax depends on semantics - (In the context of the game theoretical semantics GTS, it is about the order of the applied rules) - Cresswell: Thesis: Syntax first generates a large class of structures, this is then reduced by semantics, and then again syntactic principles reduce the class of grammatically acceptable chains. /Every/any/Hintikka/Cresswell: the thesis that a sentence with "any" is unacceptable if "any" can be replaced by "every" without changing the meaning. ---
II 95
Semantic category/Cresswell: E.g. 0: Proposition - Corresponding syntactic category: sentence.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Transformational Grammar Strawson
 
Books on Amazon
VI 386
Transformational grammar/Chomsky/Strawson: 1. lexical formativ: do names and general terms correspond, whose meaning is not somehow syntactically derived E.g. "singing", "red", "Mary" - 2. non-lexical: heterogeneous group E.g. "past" for past tense - there is no mechanical process to find the deep structure - "internal representation" not sufficient for the explanation of the skills - transformational grammar provides the basis for determining the grammatical relation for the semantic interpretation of sentences.
---
VI 390
Grammar not circular, because it contains a lexicon - StrawsonVsChomsky: no general theory about the connections of grammatical categories and formatives - only a list of elements without principles of allocation - no transparency.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981


The author or concept searched is found in the following 20 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Bloomfield, L. Chomsky Vs Bloomfield, L.
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
Lyons I 237
ChomskyVsBloomfield: speaks of creation. Generative method > generative grammar. BloomfieldVsChomsky: speaks of analysis (classification).
generative grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: sets limits to the classification. E.g. longlegs/Bloomfield: are exocentric so that they can occur both as singular as well as plural. However, this shows that these forms are no constructions. They must rather be registered in the lexicon as not further analyzable entities. Distribution: of E.g. longlegs is different from that of long legs. BloomfieldVsChomsky: this cannot be accounted for with a productive formation rule.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Ly I
J. Lyons
Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995

Ly II
John Lyons
Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977
Chomsky, N. Dennett Vs Chomsky, N.
 
Books on Amazon
I 513
Chomsky: early thesis the brain works in a way that ultimately defies scientific analysis. Even Fodor. Also McGinn. DennetVsChomsky / DennettVsFodor: this is a kind saltationist view about the mind: they postulated cracks in the design space, and is therefore not Darwinian.
Dennett: Chomsky actually represents quite a Darwinian view of the theory of language, but he has always shunned these views, like Gould.
I 533
Cognitive lock / DennettVsMcGinn: the situation for the monkey is different: he can not even understand the question. He is not even shocked! Neither Chomsky nor Fodor can cite cases from animals to which certain matters are a mystery. In reality, not as they represented a biological, but a pseudo-biological problem. It ignores even a biological accident: we can certainly find an intelligence scale in the living world.
I 534
Consciousness / DennettVsMcGinn: apart from problems that are not solvable in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness is still developing as we can not even imagine today.   Why Chomsky and Fodor do not like this conclusion? They hold the means for unsatisfactory. If our mind is not based on skyhook but on cranes, they would like to keep it secret.
I 556
DennettVsChomsky: he is wrong if he thinks a description at the level of machines is conclusive, because that opens the door for "strong AI".

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Chomsky, N. Dummett Vs Chomsky, N.
 
Books on Amazon
I 187
DummettVsChomsky: much too complicated theory actually about brain processes.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
Chomsky, N. Harman Vs Chomsky, N.
 
Books on Amazon
I 306
Competence/Performance/ChomskyVsHarman: competence as "knowledge that language is described by the rules of grammar". And that "grammar specifies this competence". ChomskyVsHarman: I have not only never asserted this, but also repeatedly rejected it publicly. It would be absurd if the speaker had to know the rules explicitly.
Knowledge/Language/Harman: a) knowing that b) knowing how. Since language is obviously not "knowing that", it must be "knowing how". The speaker knows "how he has to understand other speakers." Analogous to the ability of the cyclist.
I 307
ChomskyVsHarman: he uses "competence" very different than me. I see no relation to the "ability of the cyclist", not a "set of habits," or something like that.
I 308
HarmanVsChomsky: the internalized system (that limits the choice of grammars) must be represented in a more fundamental language, and the child must have understood the latter already, before it can apply this schematism a) this leads to a circle: If you said that the child mastered the "more fundamental language" "directly", without having learned it, then why do you not also say that it mastered the actual language "directly" without learning it. Or: b) Regress: If, however, you said that it has to learn the more fundamental language first, then the question is how this fundamental language is learned itself. ChomskyVsHarman: even if you assume that the schematism must be represented at an "innate language", it does not follow what Harman sees: the child may need to master the "more fundamental language", but it does not have to "speak and understand" it. We just have to assume that it can make use of it. ad a): the assumption that the child masters its native language without learning it is wrong. It is not born with perfect knowledge of German. On the other hand, nothing speaks against the assumption that it is born with perfect knowledge of a universal grammar.
HarmanVsChomsky: in a model, conclusions from the given data on a grammar can only be made, if detailed information on a theory of performance is included in the model. Chomsky: interesting, but not necessary.
I 310
Empiricism/Theory/HarmanVsChomsky: calls Chomsky’s strategy "inventive empiricism", a doctrine that uses "induction principles". Such "inventive empiricism" is certainly not to be refuted, "no matter how the linguistic data look". ChomskyVsHarman: empiricism is not so important. I’m interested in the question of whether there are "ideas and principles of various kinds" which "determine the form of the knowledge acquired in a largely defined and highly organized manner" (rationalist variant) or whether on the other hand "the structure of the appropriation mechanism is limited to simple and peripheral processing mechanisms..." (empiricist variant). It is historically justified and makes heuristic sense to distinguish that.

Harm I
G. Harman
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995
Chomsky, N. Luhmann Vs Chomsky, N.
 
Books on Amazon
AU Kass 5
Self-organization/Luhmann: a system can only operate with self-assembled structures. No import of structures! Strange: E.g. language learning: it is almost incomprehensible how fast children learn languages.
LuhmannVsChomsky: its deep structures were never discovered.
Instead: modern communication research: rather in the communication itself the language is learned through use, through assumption of understanding the habit to develop asigning sounds.
This does not contradict the thesis of self-organization. Otherwise, one would think that the learner is trained in a specific sequence, instead of starting to speak by himself.
E.g. dyslexia: the tendency to make mistakes, is extremely variable from person to person.
This makes switching to self-organization unavoidable. That does not mean that an external observer might not notice that these are the same words as they appear in the dictionary. But that cannot be explained by structural import, but by structural coupling (s.u.).

AU I
N. Luhmann
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Chomsky, N. Maturana Vs Chomsky, N.
 
Books on Amazon
I 128
Syntax / Grammar: If recursion is possible, a closed area can be made ​​of behavior: E.g. dance, human language. Within such a range, the syntactic or grammatical surface structure may be only the description of regularities.   In principle, the surface structure can be arbitrary! Reason: its training is consensual coupling is dependent on the history and not a necessary result of any necessary physiology.
I 129
Conversely, the "universal grammar" of linguists (MaturanaVsChomsky) is recursive only in the universality of the process of coupling structures. The causes of the ability to recursive structures coupling are not self-consensually. They are structurally and depend exclusively on the operations of the nervous system together as a closed neuronal network.

Mat I
U. Maturana
Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000
Chomsky, N. Pinker Vs Chomsky, N.
 
Books on Amazon
Dennett I 545/546
Steven PinkerVsChomsky: specialization to the grammar is a conventional neo-Darwinist process. The majority of the most interesting properties of the "language organ" must have evolved through adaptation.   Pinker: the objections to this position are mostly ridiculous - e.g. the structure of the cell should be "purely physical" and explained without evolution - e.g. language were not designed to communicate, etc.
- - -
Pinker I 218
Design/Chomsky: It is wrong to make selection responsible for all design: E.g. the fact that I have a positive mass prevents me from eloping into outer space, but has nothing to do with selection. Simple physical explanation. Explanation/Selection/PinkerVsChomsky: you usually do not refer to selection to explain utility, but to explain something improbable. E.g. eye. If we calculate the parts of the universe with a positive mass and those equipped with an eye, we need an explanation for this difference. Vs: one might reply: the criterion: seeing/not-seeing was only introduced in retrospect, after we knew what animals are capable of. I 219 Most clusters of matter cannot see, but most cannot "fle" either, and I define that now as the composition, size and shape of the stone, on which I'm sitting now.
Def Design/Pinker: If the function cannot be described more economically than the structure, no design is present. The concept of function adds nothing new.
Design/Pinker: should not serve the harmony of the ecosystem or the beauty of nature. After all, the replicator must be the beneficiary.

Pi I
St. Pinker
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Chomsky, N. Putnam Vs Chomsky, N.
 
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I 293
PutnamVsChomsky: Putnam assumes for phonetics in the universal grammar, that it only has a single list of sounds. This did not require a sophisticated explanatory hypothesis. Only "memory span and powers of recollection". "No upright behaviorist would deny that these are innate properties." ChomskyVsPutnam: but there have been set up very strong empirical hypotheses about the selection of the universal distinctive features, none of which seems to be explained on the basis of restrictions of memory.
I 298
PutnamVsChomsky: Thesis: instead of an innate schematism, "general multipurpose strategies" could be assumed. This innate base would have to be the same for the acquisition of any knowledge, so that there is nothing special about language acquisition.
I 299
ChomskyVsPutnam: with that he is no longer entitled to assume something is innate. Furthermore, it only shifts the problem. PutnamVsChomsky: the evaluation functions proposed in the universal grammar "the kind of facts is constituted which tries to explain the theory of learning, but not the required explanation itself".
ChomskyVsPutnam: E.g. no one would say that the genetic basis for the development of arms instead of wings was "the kind of fact that attempts to explain the theory of learning". Rather, they are the basis for an explanation of other facts of human behavior.
Whether the evaluation function is learned or is the basis of learning, is an empirical question.
PutnamVsChomsky: certain ambiguities can only be discovered by routine, therefore their postulated explanation by Chomsky's grammar is not very impressive.
ChomskyVsPutnam: he misunderstands it, in fact that refers to competence and not to performance (actual practice).
What the grammar explains is why e.g. in "criticism of students" "student" can be understood as subject or object, whereas e.g. "grain" in "the growing of the grain" can only be subject.
The question of routine does not matter here.
I 300
Innate Ideas/ChomskyVsPutnam: the innate representation of universal grammar indeed solves the problem of learning (at least partly) if it is really true that this is the basis for language acquisition, which may very well be the case! - - -
III 87
Putnam/Chomsky: Putnam proposes: correctness in linguistics is what the currently available data best explain about the behavior of the speaker under a current interest. What is true today, will be false tomorrow. PutnamVsChomsky: I never said that what is right today, will be wrong tomorrow.
Putnam: Chomsky's hidden main theses:
1) the we are free to choose our interests at will,
2) that interests themselves are not subject to normative criticism.
E.g. Hans' heart attack lies in the defiance of medical recommendations. Other explanation: high blood pressure. It may be, in fact, that on one day one fact is more in the interests of the speaker, and the next day another one.
III 88
PutnamVsChomsky: 1) we cannot just pick and choose our interests. (>Schopenhauer). 2) It sometimes happens that the relevance of a particular interest is disputed. How can it be, however, that some interests are more reasonable than others? Reasonableness is supposed to depend on different conditions in different contexts. There is no general answer.
III 88/89
The assertion that a concept is interest relative does not come out at the same as the thesis, all interests are equally reasonable.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Chomsky, N. Quine Vs Chomsky, N.
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
XI 71
QuineVsChomsky: he is wrong if he suggests to him that sentences are learned only through conditioning. - - -
Searle VIII 427
Innate Ideas/QuineVsChomsky: "The behaviorist is knowingly and willingly up to his ears in innate mechanisms of willingness to learn." Innate ideas and inclinations are the cornerstone of behaviorism ".

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Chomsky, N. Searle Vs Chomsky, N.
 
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John R. Searle
SearleVsChomsky: he went a step too far: he should deny that the speech organ has any structure that can be described as an automaton. So he became a victim of the analytical technique.
Dennett I 555
Language/SearleVsChomsky: One can explain language acquisition this way: there is actually an innate language acquisition device. Bat that will ad nothing to the hardware explanation assuming deep unconscious universal grammatical rules. This does not increase the predictive value.   There are naked, blind neurophysiological processes and there is consciousness. There is nothing else. ((s) otherwise regress through intermediaries).
- - -
Searle I 273
SearleVsChomsky: for universal grammar there is a much simpler hypothesis: there is indeed a language acquisition device. Brings limitations, what types of languages can be learned by human being. And there is a functional level of explanation which language types a toddler can learn when applying this mechanism.
By unconscious rules the explanatory value is not increased.
- - -
IV 9
SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsRyle: there are neither alternative deep structures nor does is require specific conversations potulate.
IV 204
Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: it is often said folllowing Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms).
VI 205
This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Their unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we go from sounds to files.
- - -
VIII 411
Grammar/language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's students (by Searle called "Young Turks") pursue Chomsky's approach more radically than Chomsky. (see below). Aspects of syntactic theory/Chomsky: (mature work, 1965) more ambitious targets than previously: Statement of all linguistic relations between the sound system and the system of meaning.
VIII 412
For this, the grammar must consist of three parts: 1. syntactic component that describes the internal structure of the infinite number of propositions (the heart of the grammar)
2. phonological component: sound structure. (Purely interpretative)
3. semantic component. (Purely interpretive),.
Also structuralism has phrase structure rules.
VIII 414
It is not suggested that a speaker actually passes consciously or unconsciously for such a process of application of rules (for example, "Replace x by y"). This would be assumed a mix of competence and performance. SearleVsChomsky: main problem: it is not yet clear how the theory of construction of propositions supplied by grammarians accurately represents the ability of the speaker and in exactly what sense of "know" the speaker should know the rules.
VIII 420
Language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's conception of language is eccentric! Contrary to common sense believes it will not serve to communicate! Instead, only a general function to express the thoughts of man.
VIII 421
If language does have a function, there is still no significant correlation with its structure! Thesis: the syntactic structures are innate and have no significant relationship with communication, even though they are of course used for communication.
The essence of language is its structure.
E.g. the "language of the bees" is no language, because it does not have the correct structure.
Point: if one day man would result in a communication with all other syntactic forms, he possessed no language but anything else!
Generative semantics/Young TurksVsChomsky: one of the decisive factors in the formation of syntactic structures is the semantics. Even terms such as "grammatically correct" or "well-formed sentence" require the introduction of semantic terms! E.g. "He called him a Republican and insulted him".
ChomskyVsYoung Turks: Mock dispute, the critics have theorized only reformulated in a new terminology.
VIII 422
Young Turks: Ross, Postal, Lakoff, McCawley, Fillmore. Thesis: grammar begins with a description of the meaning of a proposition.
Searle: when the generative semantics is right and there is no syntactic deep structures, linguistics becomes all the more interesting, we then can systematically investigate how form and function are connected. (Chomsky: there is no connection!).
VIII 426
Innate ideas/Descartes/SearleVsChomsky: Descartes has indeed considered the idea of a triangle or of perfection as innate, but of syntax of natural language he claimed nothing. He seems to have taken quite the contrary, that language is arbitrary: he assumed that we arbitrarily ascribe our ideas words!
Concepts are innate for Descartes, language is not.
Unconscious: is not allowed with Descartes!
VIII 429
Meaning theory/m.th./SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsQuine: most meaning theories make the same fallacy: Dilemma:
a) either the analysis of the meaning itself contains some key elements of the analyzed term, circular. ((s) > McDowell/PeacockeVs: Confusion mention/use).
b) the analysis leads the subject back to smaller items, that do not have key features, then it is useless because it is inadequate!
SearleVsChomsky: Chomsky's generative grammar commits the same fallacy: as one would expect from the syntactic component of the grammar that describes the syntactic competence of the speaker.
The semantic component consists of a set of rules that determine the meanings of propositions, and certainly assumes that the meaning of a propositions depends on the meaning of its elements as well as on their syntactic combination.
VIII 432
The same dilemma: a) In the various interpretations of ambiguous sentences it is merely paraphrases, then the analysis is circular.
E.g. A theory that seeks to explain the competence, must not mention two paraphrases of "I went to the bank" because the ability to understand the paraphrases, just requires the expertise that will explain it! I cannot explain the general competence to speak German by translating a German proposition into another German proposition!
b) The readings consist only of lists of items, then the analysis is inadequate: they cannot declare that the proposition expresses an assertion.
VIII 433
ad a) VsVs: It is alleged that the paraphrases only have an illustrative purpose and are not really readings. SearleVs: but what may be the real readings?
Example Suppose we could interpret the readings as heap of stones: none for a nonsense phrase, for an analytic proposition the arrangement of the predicate heap will be included in the subject heap, etc.
Nothing in the formal properties of the semantic component could stop us, but rather a statement of the relationship between sound and meaning theory delivered an unexplained relationship between sounds and stones.
VsVs: we could find the real readings expressed in a future universal semantic alphabet. The elements then stand for units of meaning in all languages.
SearleVs: the same dilemma:
a) Either the alphabet is a new kind of artificial language and the readings in turn paraphrases, only this time in Esperanto or
b) The readings in the semantic alphabet are merely a list of characteristics of the language. The analysis is inadequate, because it replaces a speech through a list of elements.
VIII 434
SearleVsChomsky: the semantic part of its grammar cannot explain, what the speaker actually recognizes when it detects one of the semantic properties. Dilemma: either sterile formalism or uninterpreted list.
Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: Solution: Speech acts have two properties whose combination we dismiss out of the dilemma: they are regularly fed and intentional.
Anyone who means a proposition literally, expresses it in accordance with certain semantic rules and with the intention of utterance are just to make it through the appeal to these rules for the execution of a particular speech act.
VIII 436
Meaning/language/SearleVsChomsky: there is no way to explain the meaning of a proposition without considering its communicative role.
VIII 437
Competence/performance/SearleVsChomsky: his distinction is missed: he apparently assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more a theory of performance than one of competence. He does not see that competence is ultimately performance skills. ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: Chomsky seems to suspect behaviorism behind the speech act.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Chomsky, N. Strawson Vs Chomsky, N.
 
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VI 386
Transformational grammar: two kinds of formative: 1. lexical: correspond to names and general terms whose meaning is not somehow derived syntactically: e.g. "to sing", "to love", "red", "Mary".
2. non-lexical: heterogeneous group: e.g. the formative "pret" for the past tense.
There is no mechanical process to find the deep structure.
VI 389
Thesis: "Unconscious mastery" or "internal representation" is not enough to explain the linguistic abilities. The rules of transformational grammar provide the basis for the determination of those grammatical relations which are decisive for the semantic interpretation of sentences though not alone determining.
VI 390
Grammar not circular, because it contains a lexicon. StrawsonVsChomsky: there is no general theory of the decisive class of compounds (of grammatical categories and formatives).
VI 391
There is only the list of items in the dictionary without any representation of general principles of the allocation. But we should expect just such a theory if the grammar is to satisfy the conditions of transparency.
Because we define with the grammatical categories the functions and relations of the sentence elements. That is what everyone understands without having explicitly learned grammar. We combine obvious semantic and syntactic considerations.
VI 392
Explanation/Chomsky: this one admits that a "descriptively adequate" grammar must not be "explanation adequate". We need a theory of linguistic universals.
In addition, it must be explained how our grammar was selected from other possible grammars.
It must be explained:
1. Why do we understand infinitely many new propositions? (> Language infinite). 2. The connection of semantics and syntax.
VI 393
StrawsonVsChomsky: comments only expressly reserved on semantic considerations. Dictionary/Chomsky: is part of the base and contains far fewer entries than our ordinary dictionary.
VI 395
Transformation grammar Vs traditional grammar: it was too unsystematic, no explanation of the traditional terms "verb", "noun", "object" possible.
VI 396
PhilosophyVsGrammar/Strawson: is first freed from "empirical" requirements, does initially not need to cope with the actual formal requirements He has just like the grammarian a conception of meaning elements and a conception of semantically significant combination modes of these elements, to which the vocabulary is available in a transparent relationship.
With these transparent relations he can consider possible formal arrangements by whom the combining functions could be dispensed.
This is reminiscent of the construction of ideal languages.
VI 397
Quine: (anywhere): "Do not show more structure than necessary". Grammar/Strawson: one must always distinguish between the actual (essential, crucial) and possible grammars.
E.g. the essential grammar must show what elements belong to which, all combinations must be shown and be possible to distinguish.
E.g. it must be possible to show when an element describes a non-symmetric relation.
But the essential grammar determines in no way how these requirements are to be fulfilled.
VI 398
We can choose one of several grammars. If it fulfills the requirements, we have a complete and totally transparent grammar. (Only idealized simplified, that is the price). Vocabulary/Strawson: we need a completely elaborate vocabulary or a set of related vocabularies.
1. Ontological vocabulary e.g. space, time, thing, gen. characteristics
2. Semantic V., for types and individual (abstract) elements, proper names for things,
3. Functional V. for combination or relation types. Deictic elements.
4. Vocabulary of the formal apparatus.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Chomsky, N. Loar Vs Chomsky, N.
 
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EMD II 158
Komplexität/Sprache/Loar: These: es ist nicht allzuweit hergeholt zu fordern, daß "unbegreiflich" komplexe Sätze nicht Teil unserer Sprache sind! So könnten wir das Englische auf ein endliches Fragment reduzieren der Sprache, die wir beherrschten, wenn unsere Gehirne größer wären. Dann gibt es kein Problem für KD. Vs: diese ist äußerst kontrovers, und überdies vermeidbar.
Lösung/Loar: zwei Stadien:
1. Sprache/unendlich/Loar: These: die Zahl der Sätze die wir verstehen ist enorm, aber immer noch endlich! (LoarVsChomsky: auch Zahl der verstehbaren Sätze endlich).
II 159
2. Stadium der Lösung: keine Sprache, die dadurch erweitert (erzeugt) wird, daß zufälliges Nicht Englisch hinzugefügt wird, (Sätze cum Bedeutung), wird durch diese Bedingung ausgeschlossen.

Loar I
B. Loar
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Chomsky, N. Hintikka Vs Chomsky, N.
 
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I XV
Logical Omniscience/Hintikka: Thesis: is only an alleged problem. ChomskyVsHintikka: he has quoted the alleged paradox as a reason for his rejection of any model-theoretical semantics for propositional attitudes.
HintikkaVsChomsky: his problem has already been solved long ago. (Essay 5)

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Disposition Theory Verschiedene Vs Disposition Theory Stegmüller IV 34
Disposition/Geist/Ryle: Meinen, Bedeutungserfassen, Intentionalität: sind nicht Vorkommnisse im Bewusstsein, sondern Fähigkeiten, eben Dispositionen.
IV 35
D.h. im Fall von plus/quus wie von glau läuft haargenau die gleiche geistige Geschichte nebst identischen mentalen Zuständen und Bewusstseinsvorgängen ab. Fazit: die entscheidenden Dispositionen wurden in der Vergangenheit erworben.
Der Unterschied besteht dann auch nicht erst in der Gegenwart, er bestand schon in der Vergangenheit!
RyleVsKripke: dann hätte ich eben auch schon in der Vergangenheit die Standard Funktion der Addition benutzt.
IV 35/36
KripkeVsRyle: dreifache Kritik: 1. externe Kritik: bestreitet, dass überhaupt irgendwelche Annahmen über Dispositionen relevant sind. Das Problem ist gar nicht kapiert. Wie kann er sich auf Disposition als Rechtfertigung berufen? Eine Weisung an mich selbst zeigt gar nichts.
VsVs: a) ich habe eben eine Hypothese über mich selbst.
VsVsVs: wieso soll gerade diese Hypothese von zahllosen anderen möglichen die richtige sein?
IV 37
VsVs: b) wir lassen die Vergangenheit ruhen. Richtig ist, was mir jetzt richtig erscheint! WittgensteinVsVsVs: das führt dazu, dass man hier nicht mehr von "richtig" reden kann!
2. interne Kritik: (manche meinen fälschlich, Wittgenstein selbst habe sie vertreten): besteht in der Angabe eines Kriteriums für eine Funktion F, die ich mit einem solchen Symbol meine.

Def "Endlichkeitsproblem"/Stegmüller: Endliches kann nicht einfach auf Unendliches übertragen werden. (Nicht nur Erfahrungen, sondern auch Dispositionen sind endlich).
IV 38
Def "quus"/glau/Kripkes Wittgenstein/Stegmüller: Neudefinition: das skeptische Problem reproduziert sich: diejenige Funktion sei die Quaddition, die für alle Paare, die hinreichend klein sind, um von mir addiert zu werden mit der Addition übereinstimmt, und für die übrigen das Ergebnis 7 liefert. Damit habe ich immer dieselben Dispositionen gehabt. VsDispositionstheorie.
Dispositionstheorie/Stegmüller: a) kann sich zu verteidigen versuchen, indem sie Disposition nicht wörtlich versteht, sondern als eine Idealisierung der tatsächlichen Praxis. Ceteris paribus Disposition.
KripkeVs: dann müsste ich immer phantastischere Annahmen darüber machen, was ich täte, wenn mir dies und das passierte.
IV 39
b) Die Idealisierung könnte anders interpretiert werden: "wenn ich die Fähigkeit hätte..." KripkeVs: das wird zirkulär. Es setzt voraus, dass die von mir gemeinte Funktion etwas Festliegendes sei. Die "Tatsache" müsste vorausgesetzt werden, dass ich eine ganz bestimmte Intentin habe!.
Dilemma für die Dispositionstheorie:
a) entweder nur Disposition für endlich viele Fälle, oder
b) Idealisierung der Reaktion. Problem:
ba) bei genauer Spezifikation dieser Bedingungen kann man nichts über meine Reaktion sagen.
bb) eine Tatsache wird voraussetzt.
IV 40
KripkeVsDispositionstheorie: sie räumt keinen Platz für immer mögliche Fehler ein! Der Dispositionstheoretiker kann sich hier nicht damit verteidigen, dass es hier eben eine Kluft gibt zwischen dem, was er meinte, und dem, was er "meinen sollte".
Denn die "Funktion, die er tatsächlich meint" steht für ihn ja nicht durch eine von der Disposition unabhängige Tabelle von vornherein fest.
IV 41
Vielmehr ist nach Ansicht des Dispositionalisten die Funktion aus der Disposition abzulesen. Daher muss für ihn die Disposition, Fehler zu machen Teil der Gesamtdisposition sein!
def "Skaddition"/Kripke: wäre die Disposition unserer Person einschließlich der Disposition, Fehler zu machen.
IV 42
Regel/Kompetenz/Kripke: Kompetenz kann Regeln nicht erklären, weil sie Regeln voraussetzt. (Das richtet sich nicht VsChomsky).
VsDispositionstheorie: Übereinstimmungen können auch lediglich darauf beruhen, dass uns zuweilen Fehler unterlaufen.
IV 47
Addition/Dispositionstheorie/Kripkes Wittgenstein: (s.o. "externe Kritik (1)"): Angenommen, es träfe zu, dass ich mit "+" die Addition meine. Problem: was für eine Relation besteht zwischen dieser Annahme und der Art von Antwort, die ich auf die Frage nach !117 + 159" geben werde?
Dispositionstheorie: alle Varianten geben fälschlich an, es sei diese und jene deskriptiv faßbare Relation.
Meinen/Intention/normativ: wenn man aber Meinen so versteht, dass das, was ich jetzt meine, das bestimmt, was ich künftig sagen sollte, ist das normativ, nicht deskriptiv.
Das ist der Hauptpunkt VsDisposition.




Goodman, N. Chomsky Vs Goodman, N.
 
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Noam Chomsky
I 287
Language learning/language acquisition/Goodman: Second language is not problematic because the acquisition of the first language is the acquisition of a "secondary symbolic system". ChomskyVsGoodman: that could have some weight if it could be shown. (For example, for the distinction of surface structure and depth structure).
But we have no empirical evidence.
---
I 288
ChomskyVsGoodman: Acquisition of first and second language: Fallacy: If we learn the second language easier by means of explanations from the first language, we would have had to acquire a language before the first language in order to acquire the first language (which is particularly easy). (Regress). Goodman: Acquisition of the first language is acquisition of a "secondary symbolic system" and therefore corresponds to the acquisition of the second language.
Chomsky's: the primary symbolic systems that he has in mind are rudimentary and cannot be used in the same way as a first language in acquiring the second language.
GoodmanVsChomsky: his theses cannot be checked because we do not have examples of "bad languages".
---
I 289
ChomskyVsGoodman: There are dozens of books in which features of a universal grammar are formulated and their empirical consequences are examined, whereby each such property specifies "bad" languages. ---
I 290
Grue/ChomskyVsGoodman: affects more of a border problem. The initial question is too vague. You can easily find a property, even a fairly general one, of the language "grue bleen", which is not the property of a "language like German".
E.g. Chomsky: the predicate "be equal" (Structure of Appearance) applies only to objects instead of to Qualia.
Now the language grue bleen has the peculiar property: "If an object A before t and an object B after t are examined, and if both are determined to be grue (or bleen), then we know that they are not like each other.
But there is no such t that we could predict of these objects that they will not be equal. They could just as well be equal if both are grue (or bleen).
Chomsky: it is undoubtedly a general property of natural languages that they behave more like German than "gruebleen".
Thus, there is no difficulty in establishing a distinction between such languages as grue bleen and such as German.
This would not suffice Goodman, of course, because one could still construct more refined examples.
As long as it is only about vague terms like "like German" or "like Gruebleen", Goodman's requirement is impossible to fulfill.
---
I 291
ChomskyVsGoodman: It may be relevant to induction, but not to linguistics, just as little as for any other science, such for the question of why embryos get arms and no wings within a given framework of conditions. ((s) is irrelevant because once conceptual, once empirical.)
Chomsky: with this we cannot explain at all why the learner does not acquire grue as a generalization basis. Undoubtedly this follows from certain properties of the sensory system.
Congenital ideas/ChomskyVsGoodman: it does not seem incomprehensible to me that any aspect of the "final state" of an organism or automaton is also an aspect of its "initial state". And this before any interaction with his environment!
---
I 292
Innate ideas/ChomskyVsGoodman: in his essay, Goodman at least once admits that the mind contains ideas in some sense. Then it is obviously not incomprehensible that some of these ideas are "implanted as an original equipment" to the mind.

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006
Harman, G. Putnam Vs Harman, G.
 
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Horwich I 421
Truth/HarmanVsPutnam: it is not merely idealized rational acceptability. It involves a relationship between a remark or a thought and the way how things are in the world.
Putnam/Harman: is right when he equates the decisive point with a determination to the localization of all the facts in a world.
Harman: when I suppose, thesis, there is one clear causal physical order, I ask myself the following questions: "What is the place of the mind in the physical world?", "What is the place of values in the world of facts?" I believe that it is a serious philosophical error, if we believe we can avoid these issues.
PutnamVsHarman: a position as Harman's leads to two implausible conclusions:
1. Identity thesis of body and mind. (HarmanVs! I do not think that it follows from the assumption of a single causal order, rather to functionalism, that Putnam himself represented)
2. moral relativism. (Harman pro! There is nothing problematic).
---
I 428
Truth/HarmanVsPutnam: I do not think that he would consider it as a good argument for the conclusion that truth is the same as consistency: Problem: but then his argument does not show that truth is an idealization of rational acceptability.
---
I 434
Competence/Chomsky/Putnam: (Chomsky Syntactic Structures) promised us that there would be a normal form for grammars and a mathematical simplicity function that would explain everything precisely. Here you would have to look at various descriptions of the speaker's competence, which are given in the normal form, and measure the simplicity of every description, (with the mathematical function) in order to find the easiest. This would be "the" description of the speaker's competence. Putnam: actually Chomsky owes us also a mathematical function with which one measures the "goodness", with which the competence description fits with the actual performance.
Chomsky/Putnam: the idea of ​​mathematization has since been abandoned. The idea currently rests that the speaker's competence could be given by an idealization of the actual speaker's behavior, on an intuitive notion of a "best idealization" or "best explanation".
Justification/PutnamVsChomskyPutnamVsHarman: to assume that the concept of justification could be made physicalistically through identification with what people should say in accordance with the description of their competence, is absurd.
---
I 435
Harman/Putnam: but would say that there is a difference whether one asks if the earth might have emerged only a few thousand years ago, ---
I 436
or whether one asks something moral, because there are no physical facts, which decide about it. PutnamVsHarman: if the metaphysical realism with Harman (and with Mackie) has to break, then the whole justification of the distinction facts/values is damaged.
Interpretation/explanation/Putnam: our ideas of interpretation, explanation, etc. come from human needs as deep as ethical values.
Putnam: then a critic might say of me, (even if he remains metaphysical realism): "All right, then explanation, interpretation and ethics are in the same boat" ("Companions in Guilt" argument).
Putnam: and this is where I wanted it to be. That was my main concern in "truth, reason and history." (Putnam thesis explanation, interpretation and ethics are not in the same boat" ("companions in guilt" argument: in case of partial relativism the total relativism is near. PutnamVsHarman).
Relativism/Putnam: There is no rational reason to support ethical relativism, but not at the same total relativism.
Reference/Harman/Putnam: Harman's answer is that the world has a unique causal order.
---
I 437
PutnamVsHarman: but that does not help: if my linguistic competence is caused by E1, E2 ... , then it's true that it was caused* by E*1, E*2 ... whereby* the corresponding entity designates in a non-standard model. ((s)>Löwenheim) Problem: why is reference then determined by cause and not by cause*?
Reference/Physicalism/Putnam: the only answer he could give, would be: "because it is the nature of reference". This would mean that nature itself picks out objects and places them in correspondence to our words.
David Lewis/Putnam: has suggested something similar: ... + ...

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Lakoff, G. Searle Vs Lakoff, G.
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
IV 199
Conversational Postulates/To mean/Gordon/Lakoff: SearleVs: represents the phenomena that require explanation is as if they themselves were already the explanation. Problem: how can the speaker say something and still mean something else? (to mean)
IV 201
Conversational Postulates: shall additional rules be known in addition to the three rules (the introduction, the seriousness and the propositional content): for example, to conclude from one speech act to another. Searle: they assume that the patterns are the solution itself.
IV 202
They reveal a pattern, according to which for example a speaker asks the listener for something, by asking the listener if he can do something. E.g. "Can you pass me the salt?". To explain this, they simply give a new description, they say, the speaker knows a rule.
Searle: as with Ross, an unnecessary assumption is made to explain the data. It is completely ad hoc to say, in addition to all the knowledge conversational postulates would still have to exist. In reality, it would then be such conversational postulates that would have to be explained.
IV 203
Searle: what the listener needs is speech act theory, a theory of conversation, background information and rationality and reasoning skill. Each of these components is independently motivated, that means apart from whatever theory of indirect speech acts, we have evidence that the speaker/listener has these features.
IV 204
SearleVsGordon/SearleVsLakoff: their rules do not work that way! They call it "failed" that no question is meant. (E.g. "Can you pass me the salt?").
Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: is often said following Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms).
IV 205
This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Its unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we come from sounds to acts.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Malcolm, N. Rorty Vs Malcolm, N.
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
Frank I 610
Knowledge/Certainty/MalcolmVsIncorrigibility: (a propos Wittgenstein's "certainty"): we cannot claim any knowledge, e.g. in cases of pain. It is pointless to say, "I know that I am in pain." RortyVsMalcolm: intends to maintain incorrigibility.
- - -
Rorty I 238
MalcolmVsChomsky/Rorty: internalized control system is a typical error of the traditional "theory of ideas". It is wrong to assume that a person must be guided when speaking. But no explanations are to be found here.
I 239
RortyVsMalcolm/Rorty: Fallacy (goes back to Wittgenstein): 1) meaning cannot be explained by internal ostension but only by behavior.
I.e. applies
2) psychology can only be dealing with empirical correlations between behavioral dispositions and external circumstances. VsRyle/Rorty: this is wrong, as critics of Ryle have shown; too operationalist. There may also be a plethora of equally necessary "internal" conditions.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Quine, W.V.O. Chomsky Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 319
Language/Quine: interweaving of sentences. Theory/Language/ChomskyVsQuine: Quine himself must even presuppose that both are separated here: he certainly does not believe that two monolingual speakers of the same language can have no differences of opinion.
((s) If language and theory were identical, one could not argue, since even according to Quine the theories must have a certain unity.
Chomsky: otherwise, according to Quine, every dispute would be completely irrational, as between two speakers of different languages.
---
I 320
Definition Language/Quine: "Complex of present dispositions to verbal behavior, in which speakers of the same language have necessarily corresponded to one another." (W + O, 27) Language/ChomskyVsQuine: then our disposition would have to be explained to a certain verbal behavior by a certain system. This is certainly not the case.
---
I 321
Reinforcement/ChomskyVsQuine: his concept of "reinforcement" is almost empty. If reinforcement is needed to learn, this means that learning cannot go without data. This is even more emptier than with Skinner, who, unlike Quine, does not even require that intensifying stimuli influence. It is sufficient here that the reinforcement is merely imagined.
---
I 324
Language learning: behavioristic/Quine: conditioning, association ChomskyVsQuine: additional principles, only so endlessly many sentences explainable. Probability/Language/ChomskyVsQuine: the concept of the "probability of a sentence" is completely useless and empty:
---
I 325
Translation indeterminacy, indeterminacy: ChomskyVsQuine: disposition either with regard to stimulus, or with regard to the total body of the language: then all sentences are equally probable (reference classes). ---
I 326
Logical truth/Quine: is derived by him by conditioning mechanisms that associate certain sentence pairs with each other, ---
I 327
so that our knowledge of the logical relations can be represented as a finite system of linked propositions. ChomskyVsQuine: it remains unclear how we distinguish logical from causal relations.
Truth functions/Quine: allow a radical translation without "non verifiable analytical hypotheses", so they can be directly learned from the empirical data material (W + O § 13)
ChomskyVsQuine: his readiness to settle these things within the framework of the radical translation may show that he is ready to regard logic as an innate experience-independent basis for learning.
Then it is, however, arbitrary to accept this framework as innate, and not much else that can be described or imagined.
---
I 328
ChomskyVsQuine: his narrowly conceived Humean frame (Chomsky pro) with the language as a finite (!?) interweaving of sentences is incompatible with various triusms, which Quine certainly would accept. ---
I 329
Analytical hypothesis/stimulus meaning/Quine: stimulus meaning invloves, in contrast to the analytical hypothesis only "normal inductive uncertainty". Since the corresponding sentences can contain truth functions, they lead to "normal induction". This is not yet a "theory construction" as in the case of analytical hypotheses.
ChomskyVsQuine: the distinction is not clear because the normal induction also occurs within the radical translation.
---
I 330
ChomskyVsQuine: Vs "property space": not sure whether the terms of the language can be explained with physical dimensions. Aristotle: more connected with actions. VsQuine: not evident that similarities are localizable in space. Principles, not "learned sentences". ---
I 333
VsQuine: cannot depend on "disposition to reaction", otherwise moods, eye injuries, nutritional status, etc. would be too authoritive. ---
I 343
Language may not be taught at all. ---
I 335
Synonymy/ChomskyVsQuine: (he had suggested that synonymy "roughly speaking" exists in approximate equality of situations, and approximately equal effect). Chomsky: there is not even an approximate equality in the conditions that are likely to produce synonymous utterances.
ChomskyVsQuine: Synonymy can thus not be characterized by means of conditions of use (conditions of assertion) or effects on the listener. It is essential to distinguish between langue and parole, between competence and performance.
It is about meaningful idealization, Quine's idealization is meaningless.
---
I 337
Translation indeterminacy/ChomskyVsQuine: the reason for the thesis is, in a psychological context, an implausible and rather contentless empirical assertion, namely, which innate qualities the mind contributes to language acquisition. In an epistemic-theoretical context, Quine's thesis is merely a version of the well-known skeptical arguments, which can equally well be applied to physics or others.
---
I 337
Inconsistency/indeterminacy/theory/ChomskyVsQuine: any hypothesis goes beyond the data, otherwise it would be uninteresting. ---
Quine V 32
Definition Language/Quine: "Complex of dispositions to linguistic behavior". ((s) that could be called circular, because "linguistic" occurs. Vs: then it should be expressed by the fact that there is not yet a language besides the behavior.)
Disposition/ChomskyVsQuine: such a complex can presumably be presented as a set of probabilities to make an utterance under certain circumstances.
Vs: the concept of probability fails here: the probability with which I utter a certain English sentence cannot be distinguished from the probability with which I express a particular Japanese sentence.
QuineVsChomsky: one should not forget that dispositions have their conditions.
---
V 33
We find this through the procedure of question and consent. ---
Quine XI 115
Language/Theory/ChomskyVsQuine/Lauener: the language of a person and their theory are in any case different systems, even if one would agree with Quine otherwise. ---
XI 116
Quine: (dito). Indeterminacy of the translation: because of it one cannot speak of an invariant theory opposite translations.
Nor can we say that an absolute theory can be formulated in different languages, or vice versa, that different theories (even contradictory ones) can be expressed in one language.
((s)> Because of the ontological conclusion that I cannot argue about ontology, by telling the other that the things that exist with him are not there, because I then make the self-contradiction that there are things that do not exist).
Lauener: that would correspond to the error that the language contributes the syntax, the theory but the empirical content.
Language/Theory/Quine/Lauener: that does not mean that there is no contradiction between the two: insofar as two different theories are laid down in the same language, it means then that the expressions are not interchangeable in all expressions.
But there are also contexts where the distinction language/theory has no meaning. Therefore, the difference is gradual. The contexts where language/theory are interchangeable are those where Quine speaks of a network.

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Tradition Chomsky Vs Tradition
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
Lyons I 136
Grammar/Modern/Lyons: is often referred to as "formal" today in contrast to the traditional "content-related" grammar. ((s) stock: Lyons pro formal grammar, partial VsChomsky).
---
I 137
Interposition: some grammarians assume that there are extralinguistic categories independent of the random facts of existing languages. Jespersen: Thesis: there are universal grammatical categories (tradition). For example, "parts of speech", "tense", "mode", etc.). (see below, the question is whether there is any at all).
Formal grammar/Lyons: does not exclude that there are no such universal grammatical categories. The structure of each language should be described individually.
---
Quine X 38
ChomskyVsTradition/Quine: Trees of educational rules are not enough, you also need grammatical transformation. Some compositions can best be understood by looking back and forth between different trees of the educational rules. Transformations allow this lateral movement. Quine: this is superfluous for the artificial expressions of logic.
---
Searle VIII 407
ChomskyVsTradition: most famous example "John is easy to leave" - "John is eager to leave". The (structuralist) tradition treats both sentences as grammatically equal. However, the VP(Verb Phrase) and NP(Noun Phrase) are grouped differently.

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Ly I
J. Lyons
Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995

Ly II
John Lyons
Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
"any" Hintikka, J.
 
Books on Amazon
Cresswell I 161
-žany-Theses/jeder/irgendein/Hintikka/Cresswell: die These, daß ein Satz mit -žany-œ unakzeptabel ist, wenn -œany-œ darin durch -ževery-œ ersetzt werden kann, ohne daß sich die Bedeutung ändert. Deshalb:
Syntax/Semantik/HintikkaVsChomsky: Syntax hängt von der Semantik ab. (Im Zusammenhang mit GTS geht es um die Reihenfolge der angewendeten Regeln).
Cresswell: These Syntax generiert zuerst eine große Klasse von Strukturen, diese wird dann durch die Semantik reduziert und danach reduzieren nochmals syntaktische Prinzipien die Klasse der grammatisch akzeptablen Ketten.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Deep Structure Luhmann, N.
 
Books on Amazon
AU Cass 5
LuhmannVsChomsky: its deep structures were never discovered.
  Instead: modern communication research: in the communication itself the habit is developed to assign sounds and thus the language is learned.
  This does not contradict the thesis of self-organization.
Speech Act Searle, J.R.
 
Books on Amazon
IV 251
Searle: speech acts are governed by constitutive rules that define the social institutions.
V 29
Searle: speech is rule-governed behavior.
VI 205
Speech act / Searle: The purpose of language is communication - its unity is the illocutionary speech act - VsChomsky: it s not about rules - S.Th. includes everything that used to be called semantics and pragmatics.