Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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Irreducibility | Chalmers | I 86 Irreducibility/Reduction/Reductionism/Consciousness/Causation/Chalmers: apart from consciousness, causation is the only irreducible. This raises questions about their metaphysical nature. >Reduction, >Reductionism, >Consciousness, >Causation, >Metaphysics. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
Irreducibility | Wolfram | Brockman I 282 Irreducibility/Wolfram: One of the things that might be true about our world is that maybe we go through all this history and biology and civilization, and at the end of the day the answer is “42,” or something. Nothing like that will happen, because of computational irreducibility. There are computational processes that you can go through in which there is no way to shortcut that process. Much of science has been about shortcutting computation done by nature. Brockman I 283 But even with a smart enough machine and smart enough mathematics, we can’t get to the endpoint without going through the steps. Some details are irreducible. We have to irreducibly follow those steps. That’s why history means something. If we could get to the endpoint without going through the steps, history would be, in some sense, pointless. ((s) The results without the calculations would be meaningless signs for us.) Wolfram: So it’s not the case that we’re intelligent and everything else in the world is not. There’s no enormous abstract difference between us and the clouds or us and the cellular automata. We cannot say that this brainlike neural network is qualitatively different from this cellular-automaton system. The difference is a detailed difference. This brainlike neural network was produced by the long history of civilization, whereas the cellular automaton was created by my computer in the last microsecond. >Purposes/Wolfram, >Artificial intelligence/Wolfram, >Understanding/Wolfram. Wolfram, Stephen (2015) „Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Civilization” (edited live interview), in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Analyticity | Fodor Vs Analyticity | IV 185 Analytic/synthetic/gradual analyticity/Block/Fodor/Lepore: some authors have concluded from "Two Dogmas" that a certain "gradual analyticity" is not excluded. IV 185 Fodor/LeporeVs: this then presupposes equality of meaning rather than identity of meaning. But we have already seen that for inferences analyticity and compositionality are the same. Then one must live with gradual compositionality as well. Question: is this also possible together with systematicity (systematics: believing related attitudes), isomorphism (see above), and productivity? Would gradual compositionality not only include a finite acquaintance with (infinite) language? So that you only "kind of" understand new concepts? E.g. if you understand aRb, then you "kind of" understand bRa. E.g. the constituents of the sentence S "kind of" express the constituents of the proposition P?. E.g. "John loves Mary" "kind of" expresses that John loves Mary, but only because "John" refers "approximately" to John? 29 IV 185 Analytic/synthetic/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: you may wonder how we agree with Quine about the a/s distinction (group), but still stick to compositionality including analyticity and that languages are compositional. This is not a paradox: compositionality licenses structurally determined analyticity: IV 245 E.g. "brown cow", "brown" but not "cow" >Animal. Quine: "Logic is chasing truth up the tree of grammar". IV 178 Fodor/Lepore/QuineVsKant/QuineVsAnalyticity/QuineVsCompositionality of Inference: (external): it must be possible for conclusions to turn out to be wrong. IV 178/179 VsFodor/Lepore: then one might have a reformulated CRT (conceptual role theory): this one has compositional meaning, but the inferential role is not compositional, only within analytical conclusions? Fodor/LeporeVsVs: there is a risk of circularity: if you assume analyticity at all, compositionality, analyticity and meaning spend their lives doing the work of the others. Quine would say: "I told you!". Inferential Role/Fodor/Lepore: the present proposal also threatens their naturalisability ((s) that they are ultimately explained in physiological categories): originally, their attractiveness was to provide a causal role as a basis for the solution of Brentano’s problem of irreducibility to the neurophysiological (>Computation). |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
Brentano, Fr. | Putnam Vs Brentano, Fr. | VII 435 "Companions in guilt"-Argument/Justification/Putnam: (Thesis: the question of what is a good explanation or not, what is a good interpretation or not, and what is justified and what is not, are in the same boat). ((s) "Companions in guilt"-Argument/(s): that interpretation, justification and explanation are in the same boat). E.g. Suppose we took the concepts "competence", or "best explanation" or "justification" as undefined basic concepts. Since these are not physicalist concepts, our realism would be no longer of the kind that Harman wants to defend. Why then not say that Brentano's right and there are irreducible semantic properties? >Irreducibility. PutnamVsBrentano: if there is nothing wrong about it, then the question why one is not an ethical non-cognitivist becomes a serious question. Harman/Putnam: would still say, however, that it makes a difference whether one asks if the earth might have emerged only a few thousand years ago, VII 436 or whether one asks something moral, because there are no physical facts that decide about it. PutnamVsHarman: if >moral realism has to break with Harman (and with Mackie), then the whole justification of the distinction facts/values is damaged. Interpretation/Explanation/Putnam: our ideas of interpretation, explanation, etc. come as deeply from human needs as ethical values. Putnam: then a critic of me might say (even if he remains moral realist): "All right, then explanation, interpretation and ethics are in the same boat" ("Companions in Guilt" argument). Putnam: and this is where I wanted him! That was my main concern in "Vernunft Wahrheit und Geschichte". (Putnam Thesis: explanation, interpretation and ethics are often not in the same boat" (companions in guilt" argument, cling together, swing together argument: in case of partial relativism total relativism threatens to ensue. PutnamVsHarman) Relativism/Putnam: There is no rational reason to support ethical relativism and not total relativism at the same time. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
Compositionality | Fodor Vs Compositionality | IV 64/65 Truth Conditions/tr.cond./holism/Fodor/Lepore: (Fodor/LeporeVsCompositionality as a solution:) "Snow is white", has the truth condition it has, because it belongs to a language that contains "This is snow" and "This is snow", and an indefinite number of other sentences with "is white" and "snow". Semantic Holism/SH: Now, of course, it would be a good argument for semantic holism if only compositionality were really necessary to exclude sentences such as W. Problem: if it is really only because of the structural similarity between "snow is white" and "This is snow" that the former means that snow is white (and not that grass is green), then it would look like an a priori argument against the possibility of non-compositional language, i.e. the expressions of such a language could not have truth conditions! But: Non-Compositional Language/non-recursive/recursive/Fodor/Lepore: e.g. suppose a child has mastered the entire non-recursive apparatus of German. It can say things like: "It’s raining, snow is white, grass is green, that’s snow, that is frozen, everybody hates me, I hate spinach etc.", but not: "Snow is white and grass is green" or "Everyone hates frozen spinach", etc. We assume that the dispositions of the child towards the sentences that it has mastered are exactly the same as those of a normal adult who uses these sentences. It is very plausible that this child, when it says "snow is white", it actually says that snow is white. So far, the compositionality principle of holism is not in danger if we assume that the child has "snow is white" and "this is snow" in its repertoire (idiolect). IV 66 E.g. suppose a second child who uses the unstructured expression "Alfred" instead of "Snow is white". For "This is snow": "Sam", and for "This is cold": "Mary". 1st child: infers from "this is snow" to "this is cold" 2nd child: infers from "Sam" to "Mary". We assume that the translated verbalizations of child two do not differ from the verbalizations of child 1. Nevertheless, if compositionality were a necessary condition for content, then there would be an a priori argument that child 2 could not mean anything specific with his/her statements. Meaning/Vs: what someone means with their statements depends on their intentions! ((s) and not on the sound clusters.) Which a priori argument could show that the child could not make its statement "Sam" with the intention to express that snow is cold? T-sentence: perhaps the T-sentence: "Alfred" is true iff. snow is white is to be preferred over the T-sentence "Alfred" is true iff. grass is green. Important argument: but this cannot be a consequence of the compositional structure of "Alfred", because it has none. It can also be doubted that compositionality is sufficient for the solution of the extensionality problem: IV 178 QuineVsKant/QuineVsAnalyticity/QuineVsCompositionality of Inference: (external): it must be possible for inferences to turn out to be wrong. IV 178/179 VsFodor/Lepore: then one might do with a reformulated CRT (conceptual role theory): the compositional meaning, but not the inferential role is compositional, only within analytical conclusions? Fodor/LeporeVsVs: there is a risk of circularity: if you assume analyticity at all, compositionality, analyticity and meaning spend their lives doing the work of the others. Quine would say: "I told you!" Inferential Role/Fodor/Lepore: the present proposal also threatens their naturalisability ((s) that they are ultimately explained in physiological categories): originally, their attractiveness was to provide a causal role as a basis for the solution of Brentano’s problem of irreducibility to the neurophysiological (>Computation). |
Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor IV Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Oxford GB/Cambridge USA 1992 |
Descartes, R. | Davidson Vs Descartes, R. | Frank I 629 Mental/Physical/DavidsonVsDescartes: from the nomological irreducibility follows no ontological separation of two areas. I 632 Token physicalism/Davidson: (pro) receives the authority of the first person, but he cannot guarantee that the content of thought as it is identified externalistically is conscious. Solution/DavidsonVsDescartes: this residual doubt is merely rest of the untenable Cartesian theory of consciousness as a place where the mind sees special objects. I 633 If the identity of consciousness objects were determined only through relations with objects outside of the consciousness, then it would be possible that one is not aware of the contents of consciousness. But that’s just the "myth of the subjective". I 634 DavidsonVsDescartes: Error: not considering the conditions that allow the substantial thoughts. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984), 101-111 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Reductionism | Poundstone Vs Reductionism | I 393 Brain/Reductionism/PoundstoneVsReductionism: irreducibility of the brain: of nothing that is easier than you yourself can you expect that it behaves just like you. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
Redundancy Theory | McGinn Vs Redundancy Theory | I 89 VsReductionism/McGinn: The concept of a person were not reducible. VsIrreducibility: not informative! VSVS: that's just the joke about the theory of irreducibility. The world is not obliged to appear interestingly. I 119 From not being able to make out a fact does not follow that that fact doesn't exist. Vagueness: it is not as if the meaning meant were objectively undetermined, but that whatever determines it is not part of our knowledge. Vagueness/blurriness/(S): Ex When one takes away the object that one sees blurred, it is not as if the blurriness remains. To mean sth./McGinn: Problem: different levels of description. The levels are clearly in systematic relations with each other, but we are unable to explain this relationship sufficiently. (Similar to consciousness). |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
Russell, B. | Hintikka Vs Russell, B. | II 165 On Denoting/Russell/Hintikka: (Russell 1905) Problem: with phrases that stand for genuine constituents of propositions. Problem/Frege: failure of substitutivity of identity (SI) in intensional contexts. Informative Identity/Frege: the fact that identity can even sometimes be informative is connected to this. EG/Existential Generalization/Russell: it, too, may fail in in intensional contexts, (problem of empty terms). HintikkaVsRussell: he does not recognize the depth of the problem and rather circumvents the problems of denoting terms. E.g. The bald king of France/Russell: Problem: we cannot prove by existential generalization that there is a present king of France. HintikkaVsRussell: But there are also other problems. (see below for ambiguity of cross world identificaiton). Description/Russell/Hintikka: Def Primary Description: the substitutivity of identity applies to them (SI) Def secondary description: for them, substitutivity of identity (SI) fails. II 166 Existential Generalization/Russell: two readings: (1) George IV did not know whether Scott was the author of Waverley. Description/Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: "the author of Waverley": (ix)A(x) primarily: the description has the following power: (2) (Ex)[A(x) & (y) A(y) > y = x) & ~ George IV knew that (Scott = x)]. ((s) notation: quantifier here always normal existential quantifier, mirrored E). I.e. the quantifier has the maximum range in the primary identification. The second reading is more likely, however: Secondary: (3) ~George IV knew that (Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x & (Scott = x)]. ((s) narrow range): Range/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not know that there is also a third option for the range of a quantifier ((s) >"medium range"/Kripke). (4) ~(Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x ) & George IV knew that (Scott = x)]. II 166 Existential Generalization/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not see that there was a reason for the failure of the existential generalization, which is not caused by the non-existence of the object. E.g. (5) George IV knew that the author of Waverley is the author of Waverley. a) trivial interpretation: I 167 (6) George IV knew that (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x)) everyday language translation: he knew that one and only one person wrote Waverley. I 166 b) non-trivial interpretation: (7) (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x) & George IV knew that (A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x))). ((s) no quantifier after "knew that everyday language translation: George knew of the only person who actually wrote Waverley, that they did. Because knowledge implies truth, (7) is equivalent to (8) (Ex) George IV knew that (Ez)(A(z) & (y)(A(y) > y = z) & x = z). this is equivalent to. (9) (Ex) George IV knew that (the author of Waverley = x) Here, the description has secondary (narrow) range. Everyday language translation: George knew who the author of Waverley is. I 167 Knowledge/Who/What/Where/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell cannot explicitly analyze structures of the form knows + W-sentence. General: (10) a knows, who (Ex x) is so that A(x) becomes (11) (Ex) a knows that A(x). Hintikka: this is only possible if we modify Russell’s approach: Problem: the existential generalization now collapses in a way that cannot be attributed to non-existence, and which cannot be analyzed by Russell’s Theory of Descriptions (ThoD). Problem: for every person, there are a lot of people whose names they know and of whose existence they know, but of who they do not know who they are. II 168 E.g. Charles Dodgson was for Queen Victoria someone of whom she had heard, but whom she did not know. Problem: if we assume that (11) is the correct analysis of (10), the following applies. (12) ~(Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x) But that’s trivially false, even according to Russell. Because the following is certainly true: (13) Victoria knew that Dodgson = Dodgson) Existential Generalization/EG: then yields (14) (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x) So exactly the negation of (12) contradiction. II 168 Descriptions/Hintikka: are not involved here. Therefore, Russell’s description theory cannot help here, either. E.g. we can also assume that Victoria knew of the existence of Dodgson. Empty Terms/Empty Names: are therefore not the problem, either. Ontology/Hintikka: so our problem gets an ontological aspect. Existential Generalization/EG/Being/Quine/Ontology/Hintikka: the question of whether existential generalization may be applied on a singular term "b", E.g. in a context "F(b)", is the same as whether b may be value of a bound variable. Existential Generalization/Hintikka: does not fail here because of non-existence. II 169 We are dealing with the following problems here: Manifestation used by a) no SI Frege, Russell b) no EG (i) due to non-existence Russell (ii) because of ambiguity Hintikka Ambiguity/Solution/Hintikka: possible worlds semantics. E.g. (12) - (14) the problem is not that Dodgson did not exist in the actual world or not in one of Victoria’s worlds of knowledge, but that the name Dodgson singles out different individuals in different possible worlds. Hence (14) does not follow from (13). II 170 Existential Generalization/EG/Ambiguity/Clarity/Russell/Hintikka: Which way would have been open to Russell?. Knowing-Who/Russell/Hintikka: Russell himself very often speaks of the equivalence of knowledge, who did something with the existence of another individual, which is known to have done... + ... II 173 Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: Important argument: an ingenious feature of Russell’s theory of denotation from 1905 is that it is the quantifiers that denote! Theory of Denotation/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") includes the reduction of descriptions to objects of acquaintance. II 174 Hintikka: this relation is amazing, it also seems to be circular to allow only objects of acquaintance. Solution: We need to see what successfully denoting expressions (phrases) actually denote: they precisely denote objects of acquaintance. Ambiguity/Clarity/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization. Existential Generalization/Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: his own example shows that only objects of acquaintance are allowed: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is in fact a primary incident i.e. his example (2). "Whether"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: wanted to know "if" instead of "did not know". (secondary?). Secondary Description/Russell: can also be expressed like this: that George wanted to know of the man who actually wrote Waverley whether he was Scott. II 175 That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (in the distance) and had asked "Is that Scott?". HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell select an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not usually deal with beings of flesh and blood whose identity is known to us, instead of only with objects of perception?. Knowing Who/Knowing What/Perception Object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely with perception objects it seems as if the kind of clarity that we need for a knowing-who, is not just given. Identifcation/Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in my approach Dodgson is a bona fide individual iff. he is one and the same individual in all worlds of knowledge of Victoria. I.e. identifiable iff. (15) (E.g.) in all relevant possible worlds it is true that (Dodgson = x). Problem: What are the relevant possible worlds?. II 178 Quantifier/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell systematically confuses two types of quantifiers. (a) of acquaintance, b) of description). Problem: Russell has not realized that the difference cannot be defined solely in terms of the actual world!. Solution/Hintikka: we need a relativization to sets of possible worlds that change with the different propositional attitudes. II 179 RussellVsHintikka: he would not have accepted my representation of his position like this. HintikkaVsRussell: but the reason for this merely lies in a further error of Russell’s: I have not attributed to him what he believed, but what he should have believed. Quantification/Russell/Hintikka: he should have reduced to objects of acquaintance. Russell believed, however, it was sufficient to eliminate expressions that seemingly denote objects that are not such of acquaintance. Important argument: in that his quantifiers do not enter any ontological commitment. Only denoting expressions do that. Variable/Russell/Hintikka: are only notational patterns in Russell. Ontological Commitment/Quine/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell did not recognize the ontological commitment that 1st order languages bring with them. Being/Ontology/Quine: "Being means being value of a bound variable". HintikkaVsRussell: he has realized that. II 180 Elimination/Eliminability/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in order to eliminate merely seemingly denoting descriptions one must assume that the quantifiers and bound variables go over individuals that are identified by way of description. ((s) Object of the >Description). Otherwise, the real Bismarck would not be a permissible value of the variables with which we express that there is an individual of a certain species. Problem: then these quantifiers may not be constituents of propositions, because their value ranges do not only consist of objects of acquaintance. Therefore, Russell’s mistake was twofold. Quantifier/Variable/Russell/Hintikka, 1905, he had already stopped thinking that quantifiers and bound variables are real constituents of propositions. Def Pseudo Variable/Russell/Hintikka: = bound variable. Acquaintance/Russell: values of the variable should only be objects of acquaintance. (HintikkaVsRussell). Quantifiers/HintikkaVsRussell: now we can see why Russell did not differentiate between different quantifiers (acquaintance/description): For him quantifiers were only notational patterns, and for them the range of possible interpretations need not be determined, therefore it makes no difference if the rage changes!. Quantification/Russell: for him, it was implicitly objectional (referential), and in any event not substitutional. Peacocke I 190 Possible Worlds/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: R. is unable to explain the cases in which we quantify in belief contexts (!) where (according to Hintikka) the quantifier over "publicly descriptively identified" particulars is sufficient. Hintikka: compares with a "roman à clef". Peacocke: it is not clear that (whether) this could not be explained by Russell as cases of general ideas, so that the person with such and such characteristics is so and so. Universals/Acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: we are familiar with universals and they are constituents of our thoughts. HintikkaVsRussell: this is a desperate remedy to save the principle of acquaintance. PeacockeVsRussell: his arguments are also very weak. Russell: E.g. we cannot understand the transitivity of "before" if we are not acquainted with "before", and even less what it means that one thing is before another. While the judgment depends on a consciousness of a complex, whose analysis we do not understand if we do not understand the terms used. I 191 PeacockeVsRussell: what kind of relationship should exist between subject and universal?. Solution: the reformulated PB: Here we can see to which conditions a term is subject, similar to the principle of sensitivity in relational givenness. I 192 HintikkaVsRussell: ("On denoting what?", 1981, p.167 ff): the elimination of objects with which the subject is not familiar from the singular term position is not sufficient for the irreducibility of acquaintance that Russell had in mind. Quantification/Hintikka: the quantifiers will still reach over objects with which the subject is not familiar. But such quantifiers cannot be constituents of propositions, if that is to be compatible with the PB. Because they would certainly occur through their value range Occur and these do not consist of particulars with which one is familiar. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
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Brentano: Irreducib. | Pro | Fodor / Lepore IV 128 Brentano: irreducibility of the menta l- Quine per Brentano! - Davidson ditto (because of holism). |
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Intension | Quine, W.V.O. | I 381 Brentano s thesis of the irreducibility of intensional expressions is fully in line with the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. - But you can understand Brentano s thesis shows the emptyness of a science of the intensions: Taking the intensional language at face value, ie, to postulate translation relations as objectively valid, although they are in principle indeterminate. But that will not do. |
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Brentano | Quine, W.V.O. | Fod / Lep IV 128 Brentano / Quine: Brentano was right with his thesis in terms of the irreducibility of the intentional on the physical states or properties. |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 |
Supervenience | Stalnaker, R. | I 87 Supervenience/Stalnaker: two types: a) Supervenience as a reductionist thesis, b) as a non-reductionist thesis. 1. Meteorology and geology supervene on physical processes. There are no cold fronts and tectonic plates beyond the physical conditions. 2. Example colours: it is controversial what they are - how they relate to physical properties of light, surfaces, physiology and perception. But it is not controversial that they supervene on some or all of these properties. There are no "other facts" about colors. Supervenience/Materialism/Stalnaker: can also be seen as a materialistic thesis beyond reductionism. Supervenience/Kim: Variant: can also be regarded as an irreducibility thesis, consistent with the irreducibility of supervenient properties to their basic properties. (1993, 140) Kim/Stalnaker: but he also argues against non-reductive materialism. Supervenience/non-reductive/Stalnaker: is then understood as metaphysical, not semantic theory: a relation between sets of properties or facts, not between theories. Thesis: each property of one set is determined by a property of the other set. I 91 Def Supervenience/Tradition/Stalnaker: it is always about two sets of properties A and B, all terms are modal, and a concept of necessity is assumed, respectively a set of all possible worlds. Rough idea: A supervenes on B if A necessarily depends on B. Def Weak Supervenience/Tradition/Stalnaker: individuals within any possible world can only differ with respect to an A property if they also differ with respect to a B property. Def Strong Supervenience/Tradition/Stalnaker: individuals within or in different possible worlds can only differ with respect to an A property if they also differ with respect to a B property. Def Global Supervenience/Tradition/Stalnaker: two possible worlds as a whole can only differ in the distribution of A properties of individuals if they I 92 also differ in the distribution of B properties. Def Strong Supervenience/Paull/Sider/Stalnaker: (1992, 834) ...iff for any two possible worlds w and z, for any two objects x and y, if x in w has the same B properties as y in z, then x in w has the same A properties as y in z. Def Weak Supervenience/Paull/Sider/Stalnaker: (1992, 834) ...iff for each ((s) single) possible world w and any individuals x and y in the range of w, if x has, in w has the same B properties as y in w, then x in w has the same A properties as y in w. Def Global Supervenience/Paull/Sider/Stalnaker: (1992, 834) ...iff any two possible worlds which are B indistinguishable, they are also A indistinguishable. I 104 Supervenience/Stalnaker: N.B.: with this they have separated semantic from metaphysical questions. Their argument is purely semantic: because supervenience assertion is the thesis that the facts about momentary states are all facts, the rest is a question of how to talk about these facts. I 10 Supervenience/Stalnaker: is a conceptual tool for the separation of the purely metaphysical part of a reductionist thesis. A set of facts or properties supervenes on another if possible worlds or possible individuals who are exactly the same in relation to one property are necessarily the same in relation to another property. I 11 Supervenience: should separate semantic from metaphysical questions. Property Space/Stalnaker: a most basic property space seems to have to be assumed. But if it is there, it is ultimately an empirical question as to what these properties and relations are. |
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