1.1 96 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Authors/Titles Dennett D.C. Dennett<br /> I D. Dennett,Darwins gefährliches Erbe, Hamburg, 1997 <br /> II D. Dennett, Spielarten des Geistes, Gütersloh, 1999 1 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Intentions Dennett 2 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Abstractness Dennett 3 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Similarity Dennett 4 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Actualism Dennett 5 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Generality Dennett 6 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML As if Dennett 7 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Anthropic Principle Dennett 8 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Species Dennett Species/Dennett: Dennett discusses several authors:<br /> I 48<br /> Natural Kinds/Philosophy/Quine/Dennett: Quine distinguishes between good and bad scientific categories.<br /> ><a href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-list.php?concept=Categories">Categories</a>.<br /> Art/Darwin/Dennett: Darwin doesn't mention species formation at all! But: "Descent with variation"!<br /> Adaptation/Darwin/Dennett: Natural selection inevitably leads to adaptation.<br /> Species/Darwin/Dennett: Splitting by different abilities and characteristics.<br /> Genetics/Dennett: Genetics was not yet known at Darwin's time. Mendel researched 50 years later.<br /> Species/Darwin/Dennett: is actually arbitrary! The term is applied to a number of individuals out of convenience! ><a href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-list.php?concept=Conventions">Conventions</a>.<br /> I 56<br /> Species/Dawkins: There is nothing that wants the formation of species! Before the separation there must be a phase of "temporary separation"!<br /> I 56<br /> Species/Dennett: question: Do individuals belong to different kinds if they cannot cross, or if they just don't do it?<br /> ><a href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-list.php?concept=Evolution">Evolution</a>, ><a href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-list.php?concept=Selection">Selection</a>, ><a href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-list.php?concept=Darwinism">Darwinism</a>. 9 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Meaning Dennett 10 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Concepts Dennett 11 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Evidence Dennett I 244<br /> Evidence/Dennett: E.g. assuming there is someone who promises to give magical powers in the competition of coin tosses. Those who were cheated on meet up, and there will certainly be a winner. He will then have evidence that there are supernatural forces.<br /> I 424<br /> Coincidence/Evidence/Dennett: e.g. a geyser suddenly erupts on average every 65 minutes. The form of the suddenness is no evidence of randomness. <br /> Context: abruptness of the Cambrian evolution.<br /> ><a href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-list.php?concept=Coincidence">Coincidence</a>, ><a href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-list.php?concept=Method">Methods</a>, ><a href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-list.php?concept=Theories">Theories</a>. 12 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Consciousness Dennett Rorty VI 161<br /> Consciousness/Dennett: it is an illusion to believe that consciousness is the exception to the rule that everything can be explained by its relations to other things. It is no exception.<br /> - - - <br /> Dennett I 534<br /> Consciousness/DennettVsMcGinn: apart from problems that cannot be solved in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness will develop in a way that we cannot even imagine today. <br /> - - - <br /> Dennett II 23ff<br /> Language/Animal/Consciousness/Dennett: since there is no limit to consciousness (with or without speech), since it has gradually emerged, the question which animals have consciousness is undecidable - "a matter of style" - consciousness is not the same as thinking! Dennett: no thought works without language but consciousness does work without thinking. ><a href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/search.php?x=0&y=8&volltext=thinking+without+language">Thinking without language.
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Rosenthal I 430
Consciousness/Dennett: not even for the first person it is always clear what conscious is and what it is not - e.g. becoming aware of the inventory of a room - E.g. wallpaper pattern: Completion by judgment, is not sensory!
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Metzinger I 475
Consciousness/Dennett: consciousness is like a simulation of the world. It relates to the brain as flight simulations relate to the processes in the computer.
Metzinger I 555
Consciousness/Dennett: 1) cultural construction - 2) you cannot have consciousness without having the concept of consciousness - BlockVsDennett: Incorrect fusion of p-consciousness and a-consciousness. (phenonmenal consciousness and access-consciousness). >Consciousness/Block.
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Chalmers I 113
Consciousness/Cognition/Dennett/Chalmer: Dennett (1978c)(1) brings a cognitive model of consciousness consisting of the perception module, short-term memory, memory,
I 114
control unit and module for "public relations": for the implementation in everyday language.
ChalmersVsDennett: that shows us something about information processing and the possibility to report about it, but not why there should be a way for such a model "how it is" to be this model.
Later, Dennett introduced a more elaborate model (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991)(2) without a central "headquarter".
ChalmersVsDennett: this also brings a possible explanation of attention, but not a better explanation of conscious experience.
Consciousness/DennettVsNagel/DennettVsChalmers: thesis: what he shows, is nevertheless everything it takes to explain consciousness. As soon as one has explained the various functions, one has explained everything (Dennett, 1993a(3), p.210) and (FN9/Chapter 3)
Cognitive Models/Chalmers: there are also models by Churchland, (1995)(4), Johnson-Laird (1988)(5), Shallice (1972(6), 1988a(7), 1988b(8)). ChalmersVs: my criticism VsDennett from above applies to all.
Chalmers I 229
Consciousness/Dennett/Chalmers: (Dennett 1993b)(9) Consciousness is what stands out in the brain processes. ("Cerebral celebrity"). Such content is conscious that fix resources themselves and monopolize them. (P. 929).
Chalmers: that is close to my approach, only that I speak of potential standing out, it must only be possible that a content can play this role.

1. Dennett, D. Toward a cognitive theory of consciousness. In: D. Dennett, Brainsorms, Cabridge 1978.
2. Dennett, D. Consciousness explained. Little, Brown and Co., Boston 1991
3. Dennett, D. Back from the drawing board. In: B. Dahlbom (Ed) Dennett and His Critics, Oxford 1993.
4. Churchland, P. M. The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain. Cambridge 1995.
5. Johnson-Laird, P. A computational analysis of consciousness. Cognition and Brain Theory 6, 1983: pp. 499-508
6. Shallice, T., Dual funtions of consciousness. Psychological Review 79, 1972: pp. 383-93; Information-precessing models of consciousness: Possibilities and problems. In: A. Marcel and E. Bisach (Eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Science, Oxford 1988.<br /> 7. Shallice, T. Information-precessing models of consciousness: Possibilities and problems. In: A. Marcel and E. Bisach (Eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Science, Oxford 1988.<br /> 8. Shallice, T. From Neuropsychology toMental structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.<br /> 9. Dennett, D. The message is: there is no medium. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53:919-31
info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Darwinism Dennett I 262<br /> The "Rule of the Local" is a basic principle of Darwinism. It corresponds to the principle that there is no Creator, no intelligent foresight. 14 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Thinking Dennett 15 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Forms of Thinking Dennett 16 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Properties Dennett 17 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Sensations Dennett 18 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Experience Dennett 19 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Explanation Dennett 20 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML First Person Dennett Rosenthal II 430<br /> Consciousness/Dennett: even for the first person it is not always clear, what is conscious and what is not. Example: to become aware of the inventory of a room - e.g. Wallpaper design: completion by judgment, not by sensory! ><a href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-list.php?concept=Consciousness">Consciousness</a>. 21 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Ethics Dennett I 636<br /> Ethics/Morality/Dennett: Question: did it also arise evolutionarily? One would expect that a very long time ago, there was no moral, but not more than a distinction between a good and a bad spear or a good or bad dinner. These are not concepts of "right" and "wrong" but of dangerous and not dangerous. <br /> I 657<br /> Ethics/Dennett: must somehow be based on human nature. If this is naturalism, then there is no ><a href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-list.php?concept=Naturalistic+Fallacy">naturalistic fallacy</a>. <br /> II ~ 199<br /> The terrible thing is not the suffering, but the event which caused it. 22 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Evolution Dennett I 101<br /> Evolution/Justification/Dennett: The advantages of sexuality cannot be taken as a justification. Evolution cannot foresee its path! Whatever it produces must pay off immediately and make up for the effort. <br /> I 213<br /> Problem: There must have been a first living creature, but there cannot have been a first living creature. <br /> I 591ff<br /> E.g. freezing/Dennett: E.g. assuming you have yourself frozen in order to be unfrozen in the 25th century. Upon whom can you rely? The example imitates the whole evolution. <br /> II 36<br /> Evolution/Dennett: There is only one family tree. It encompasses all creatures that have ever lived. 23 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Forgeries Dennett 24 info:srw/schema/1/dc-v1.1 XML Forms Dennett 25