Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Rule of Law: The rule of law is a legal principle that no one is above the law and that everyone is treated equally under the law. Key principles are supremacy of the law, equality before the law, due process of law, independent judiciary. See also Society, Law, Rights, Justice, Legislation, Democracy, State._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Guido E. Tabellini on Rule of Law - Dictionary of Arguments
Mokyr I 25 Rule of law/Mokyr/Tabellini: The fact that legal institutions emerged so early in Europe, and before the consolidation of other state institutions, exerted a key influence on the evolution of political institutions, and gave a particular prominence to the principle of the rule of law. Mokyr I 26 This principle says that legislative and executive sovereignty are limited by a pre-existing body of law. The notion of the rule of law is built on the logical distinction between new legislation and a pre-existing body of law. As stressed by Hayek (1973(1), p. 72), law is older than legislation. >A. Hayek, >Legislation, >Law. Existing legal rules also constrain how new legislation is written, and the sovereign cannot ignore them. Thus, the rule of law imposes binding constraints on the absolutist powers of the state. The concept of the Rule of Law was already recognized in antiquity (among others by Aristotle and Cicero). >Aristotle, >Cicero. However, the novelty that emerged in medieval Europe was that it became the foundation of the relationship between ruler and subjects. It was in that capacity that the principle became increasingly influential in Medieval Europe. Mokyr I 27 China/Mokyr/Tabellini: By contrast, no notion corresponding to the rule of law emerged in China. Chinese Emperors generally had absolute powers and the very idea of legal checks to their power was unfamiliar to them. During the Tang dynasty (618-907), the central bureaucracy could impose checks and balances on imperial authority, but in the later periods the Emperor had found ways to bypass them and its powers were only constrained by the limited state capacity and by the informal codes known as li. While it has been argued that such constraints might be seen as some form of the rule of law (Mei, 1932)(2), it was a very different idea from the one in Europe, where the principle of the rule of law had a prominent role in early state formation. The absence of a principle akin to the rule of law in China also reflects the features and evolution of its legal system. According to traditional historiography, the Chinese legal system was built primarily for vertical, not horizontal contacts. Bodde and Morris (1970)(3) stressthat Chinese law had little interest in defending the rights - including property rights - of individuals against others or against the state, and instead was above all interested in criminal acts. The emphasis on criminal acts was motivated not by their being a violation of someone’s rights, but because they disrupted social order - a subtle but important difference. The absence of a formal and codified civil code in China can be explained at least in part because China did not need one: individual economic and civil rights were protected by other (non-legal) means. >Chinese history/Mokyr/Tabellini. 1. Hayek, Friedrich. 1973. Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. I, Rules and Order. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 2. Mei, Ju-Ao. 1932. “China and the Rule of Law.” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 10 (Oct.), pp. 863-872. Myers, A. R. 1975. Parliaments and Estates in Europe to 1789. London: Thames & Hudson. 3. Bodde, Derk and Morris, Clarence. 1970. “Basic Concepts of Chinese Law.” in James T.C. Liu and Wei-Ming Tu, eds., Traditional China. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, pp. 92-108._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
EconTabell I Guido Tabellini Torsten Persson The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Mokyr I Joel Mokyr Guido Tabellini Social Organizations and Political Institutions: Why China and Europe Diverged CESifo Working Paper No. 10405 Munich May 2023 |
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