Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Electoral systems: Electoral systems, also known as voting systems, are the set of rules that determine how elections are conducted and how their results are translated into the allocation of seats or other power. They encompass various methods, including majoritarian systems, proportional representation, and mixed systems. See also Electoral rules, Political Elections, Democracy, Parliamentary system, Democracy._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Torsten Persson on Electoral Systems - Dictionary of Arguments
Mause I 286 Majority Election/Proportional Representation/voting system/fiscal policy/Persson/Tabellini: in a simplified probabilistic model of Persson and Tabellini (Persson & Tabellini 1999)(1) (Persson & Tabellini 2000) (2), the main difference between the electoral systems was in the election programmes of the parties. Idealization adopted only one constituency for the proportional representation system. Proportional Representation: Here, the fiscal policy programmes are designed to address at least 50% of the voters necessary to win the election. Here the model predicts higher expenditure on public goods and redistribution. Majority voting: only 50% of the votes are required in a relative majority of constituencies. Therefore, a party can theoretically win a majority of seats in parliament by as little as 25% of all votes. Therefore, the election campaign here focuses on a few constituencies. As a result, public expenditure on public goods, which actually benefits a majority of voters, will be reduced. The predictions of the model of Persson and Tabellini were empirically confirmed in the following period.(3)(4) >Political elections, >Electoral rules, >Democracy, >Parliamentary system. 1. Torsten Persson &Guido Tabellini. 1999. The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians. European Economic Review 43( 4– 6): 699–735. 2. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini. 2000. Political economics. Explaining economic policy. Cambridge 2000. 3. Torsten Persson, Torsten, und Guido Tabellini, The economic effects of constitutions. Cambridge 2003. 4. Lorenz Blume, Jens Müller, Stefan Voigt, und Carsten Wolf. 2009. The economic effects of constitutions: Replicating – And extending – Persson and Tabellini. Public Choice 139: 197– 225._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
EconPerss I Torsten Persson Guido Tabellini The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
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