George Tsebelis on Fiscal Policy - Dictionary of Arguments
Mause I 285f
Fiscal Policy/Tsebelis: with his veto-player theorem, which initially referred to political decision-making, Tsebelis later (1) showed that fiscal policy can also be explained by corresponding behaviour: Tsebelis chose budget policy as an important empirical test and was able to show for 19 Western industrialised countries in the period 1973-1995 that the expenditure structure of state budgets is significantly explained by the ideological distance of the veto players. See Veto Player/Tsebelis: Thesis: political changes are only possible if all veto players agree.
1.George Tsebelis & Eric C.C. Chang. 2004. Veto players and the structure of budgets in advanced industrialized countries. European Journal of Political Research 43( 3): 449– 476._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Veto Players: How political institutions work Princeton 2002
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018