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George Tsebelis on Veto Players - Dictionary of Arguments

Mause I 285f
Veto player Theorem/Vetoplayer Thesis/Policy/Tsebelis: Tsebelis' thesis: a change in the status quo of a policy is only possible if all veto players agree.
Def Veto player/Tsebelis: all constitutionally legitimate actors who can block a change in the law. e.g. executive branch, chambers of parliament, constitutional court etc.
The greater the ideological instance of the players among themselves, the greater the number of actors and the greater the number of individuals that make up a "collective veto player", the less chance of change. (1)(2)
See also Fiscal Policy/Tsebelis.

1. George Tsebelis. 1995. Decision making in political systems: Veto players in presidentialism, parlamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism. British Journal of Political Science 25( 3): 289– 325.
2. George Tsebelis, Veto players: How political institutions work. Princeton 2002.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

PolTseb I
George Tsebelis
Veto Players: How political institutions work Princeton 2002

Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018

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