Economics Dictionary of Arguments

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Moral hazard: Moral hazard refers to the tendency of individuals or entities to take on higher risks or behave irresponsibly when they're insulated from the potential negative consequences of their actions. This behavior arises due to the presence of insurance, guarantees, or bailouts that mitigate the fallout of risky decisions, leading to increased recklessness or less cautious behavior. See also Insurances, Risks, Investments.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Economic Theories on Moral Hazard - Dictionary of Arguments

Mause I 540f
Def Moral Hazard/Health Policy/Economic Theory: (moral hazard is usually translated as "moral temptation") It is about the fact that an opportunism for the use of contractual services arises after the conclusion of a contract.
Health policy: Important work on ex post moral hazard behavior comes from Nyman (2004 (1), 2008(2)) and Zweifel and Manning (2000 (3)). Based on the microeconomic demand model, these studies show that the incentives for (insured) demanders change with the introduction of health insurance.
As a result, the introduction or extension of insurance cover increases health expenditure ceteris paribus.
For empirical results: Newhouse 1993 (4).
The use of health services decreases when payments have to be made. (Brook et al. 2006).(5)
>Free rider.

1. Nyman, John A. 2004. Is ‚Moral Hazard‘ inefficient? The policy implications of a new theory. Health Affairs 23( 5): 194– 199.
2. Nyman, John A. 2008. Health insurance theory: The case of the missing welfare gain. European Journal of Health Economics 9( 4): 369– 380.
3. Zweifel, Peter, und Willard G. Manning. Moral hazard and consumer incentives in health care. In Handbook of health economics, Hrsg. Anthony J. Culyer und Joseph P. Newhouse, Bd. 1, 409– 459. Amsterdam 2000.
4Newhouse, Joseph P. Free for all? Lessons from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment. Cambridge 1993
5. Brook, Robert H., Emmett B. Keeler, Kathleen N. Lohr, Joseph P. Newhouse, John E. Ware, William H. Rogers, Allyson Ross Davies, Cathy D. Sherbourne, George A. Goldberg, Patricia Camp, Caren Kamberg, Arleen Leibowitz, Joan Keesey und David Reboussin. 2006. The Health Insurance Experiment: A classic RAND study speaks to the current health care reform debate. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Economic Theories
Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018


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