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Liberalism on Justice - Dictionary of Arguments

Gaus I 96
Justice/Liberalism/Waldron: we should not understand the strategy of the political liberal as a strategy of attempting to suppress all basis for disagreement about justice. Political liberals should think about justice as a topic that naturally evokes disagreement even when the influence of rival comprehensive conceptions is left out of account. ((s) For the distinction between political and comprehensive liberalism see >Liberalism/Waldron.)
Rights/law/society/Waldron: The fact that one major source of dissensus is removed should not lead us to assume - what many political theorists mistakenly assume about rights - that what is just and unjust can be determined in some realm of principle that is beyond politics, some arena of philosophical argument where political procedures like voting will not be necessary. Like individual rights, justice remains an intensely contested issue, and though the contestation may be diminished it is not eliminated by the strategies that the political liberal proposes.
Overlapping consensus/WaldronVsRawls: Social justice, after all, raises concerns that can hardly be dealt with by the strategy of vagueness or evasion associated with overlapping consensus – putting about a set of anodyne formulas that can mean all things to all people. >Overlapping consensus/Rawls, >Overlapping consensus/Waldron.
Gaus I 97
Justice/Waldron: A theory of justice (...) is not just some set of esoteric formulas; it is supposed to be something public, something shared among the citizens as a common point of reference for their debates about the allocation of rights and responsibilities. responsibilities. So political liberalism also has implications for what this sharing a conception of justice amounts to.
Example: (...) e.g., a left liberal like me ((s) Jeremy Waldron) may not say, for example, to a Social Darwinian that even the feeblest person is entitled to our compassion because he is created in the image of God. I must find some way of putting my point about equality that can be affirmed even by people who do not share my religious convictions. Equally a Christian conservative may not justify laws restricting abortion on the grounds that foetuses have souls, since this too is rooted in a comprehensive conception he cannot expect others to share.
Gaus I 98
(...) the dative element (...) - that political justification be understood as justification to each and every individual -can be understood in more than one way.
a) It may be understood as a requirement that the justificatation of political arrangements should be directed to the good or interests of each and every one who is subject to those arrangements. I shall call this the ‘interestregarding’ interpretation.
b) Or it may be understood as a requirement that the justification of a political decision be plausibly reckoned likely to persuade everyone who is subject to the arrangements. I shall call this the ‘premise-regarding’ interpretation, because it understands ‘justification to X’ as justification that seeks to hook up with premises to which X is already committed.
Rawls/Waldron: Clearly Rawls’s political liberalism assumes what I have called the ‘premise-regarding’ interpretation of the requirement that political justification must be justification to each and every individual. >Justice/Rawls.
Waldron: However it is also important to see that interestregarding interpretation of justifiability to all can be maintained even if the premise-regarding interpretation is given up. >Liberalism/Waldron.

Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004

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