Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Morality: Morality generally refers to the collective principles, values, or codes of conduct defining right and wrong within a society or group. Morals, on the other hand, are individual beliefs or principles regarding what's right or wrong, guiding personal behavior. See also Morals, Ethics, Behavor._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Adam Smith on Morality - Dictionary of Arguments
Otteson I 16 Morality/Adam Smith/Otteson: Morality on Smith’s account is (…) an earthly, grounded affair. Although Smith makes frequent reference in TMS(1) to God and the “Author of Nature,” the actual process Smith describes develops as a result of our lived experiences as we seek to achieve mutual sympathy of sentiments, and avoid antipathy of sentiments, with the other people we actually encounter. >Sympathy/Adam Smith, >God. Sympathy: The fundamental building block of Smith’s moral anthropology is the desire for mutual sympathy of sentiments, which, because Smith believes all humans have it, thus acts like a centripetal social force, drawing us into community with others. Although there are other needs and desires that can be satisfied only by interacting with other human beings - like goods and services produced and exchanged in economic markets, for example - nevertheless the desire for mutual sympathy, and the pleasure it affords when it is achieved, is, for Smith, the glue that holds human society together. >Society, >Economy, >Exchange, >Desire. Otteson I 17 Thought example/Adam Smith: Smith asks us to imagine a person who had grown up entirely outside of human society, With no contact with other humans - a solitary islander, perhaps (TMS(1): 110 - 11 ). Would such a person, were he able to survive on his own, have any sentiments we could call properly "moral"? Intersubjectivity/objectivity: Smith's answer is no: he might develop likes or dislikes (this tastes good, this doesn't; this hurts, this doesn't; and so on), but such a person, Smith contends, would not develop notions of propriety or impropriety - no "I should not have done that," or "I acted unjustly." The reason, Smith thinks, is because he has not had experience with the "mirror" on his own conduct that society with others provides. He has thus never had the feedback, both negative and positive, from the judgment of others, (…).(…) just as unmerited disapproval is unpleasant, so is unmerited approval: an "ignorant and groundless praise can give no solid joy" (TMS(1): 115). Why? Because we know that a properly informed impartial spectator would not in fact praise us. When we imagine how such an impartial spectator would judge us, and we realize he would not praise us as much as actual spectators might, we realize a failure to achieve mutual sympathy of sentiments with the impartial spectator. >Ideal observer/Smith. Thus the desire for mutual sympathy of sentiments, which on Smith's view accounts for so much of our moral personalities, functions here too: it endows us "not only with a desire of being approved of, but with a desire of being what ought to be approved of; or of being what [we ourselves] approve of in other men" (TMS(1): 117). >Recognition. Why is this important? Smith is trying to reconcile two claims about human morality that otherwise seem to fit ill with one another. 1) First, his observations have led him to believe that an individual's moral sentiments develop over time as an interaction between his own motivations - including in particular his desire for mutual sympathy of sentiments - and the experiences he has with others With whom he has come in contact. On this account, one's mature moral sentiments are dependent on one's experiences and environment. 2) Second, however, Smith has also observed that on a few specific matters there seems to be significant overlap across cultures about what constitutes the core ofhuman virtue. Moreover, while some of our moral sentiments seem variable across cultures and over time, some of them we hold with an almost unshakeable certainty. The first point suggests a kind of moral relativism; the second, a moral objectivity. How can both be true? >Relativism, >Objectivity, >Objectivism, >Intersubjectivity, >Community/Adam Smith. Otteson I 18 Solution/Smith: the community with others. 1. Smith, Adam (1982) [1759]. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie, eds. Liberty Fund._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Otteson I James R. Otteson The Essential Adam Smith Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2018 |
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