Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Existence statement, existence assertion, philosophy, logic: the simple assertion of the existence of an object is problematic because it cannot be empirically refuted. In contrast, quantification is the attribution of properties, not of "naked" existence. E.g. "Socrates exists" is considered by some authors as senseless. See also bare particulars, predication, existence, quantification, existence predicate, iota operator._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Existence Statements - Dictionary of Arguments
VIII 24ff Existence Statement/Quine: special: "There is one thing that is so and so" (mentions the name) - general: "There is a thing that is so" (specifies a variable instead of names) - E.g. Pegasus: is a sense equivalent to description. >Descriptions, >Pegasus example, >Non-existence, >Unicorn example. XII 27 Object/Translation/Indefiniteness/Expression Conditions/Language Learning/Radical Interpretation/Quine: the expression conditions are not sufficient to be able to say with certainty what a speaker of a foreign language regards as objects. Problem: how can assertions of existence (theorems of existence) ever be empirically invalidated? Solution: the knowledge of the conditions of utterance does not ensure the reference to the subject, but it does help to clarify what serves as empirical confirmation of the truth of the whole sentence. XII 28 We then project our own acceptance of objects onto the indigenous language. We can be sure that the assumed object is an observed object in the sense that the amplified stimuli emanate quite directly from it. XII 33 Abstract/abstract object/existence/coherence/Quine: Existence assertions about abstract objects can only be judged by their coherence or by simplicity considerations. Example: to avoid paradoxes with classes. Property/Quine: the law of education for properties states that every statement that speaks about a thing ascribes a property to it (predication). This is a cultural heritage. VII (i) 167 Existence/Logic/Quine: we can dispense with such confusing notations as "a exists" because we know how to translate singular sentences of existence into more basic expressions if the singular term is contained in a description. Observation sentence: is meaningless in the past, since it is assumed that it was learned by direct conditioning. Theorem of Existence/Russell: For this reason, Russell declares singular theorems of existence pointless if their subject is a real proper name. ((s) Real proper name: "this". No, not only!"Nine" too: are names whose reference is saved. So from acquaintance, which corresponds to a descriptions. For fake names, the description corresponds to what a fiction says about it: e.g. Pegasus. "winged horse". Name/identification(s): each name corresponds to a description because no thing in the world can only be referenced by a name and for each description a name can be invented but not every description is fulfilled by an object. ((s) Precisely because of the necessary acquaintance the question whether the theorem of existence is true is pointless.) Quine: the reason is the same here. ((s) Theorem of existence (s): Example "There is Napoleon": can only refer to one learning situation. Circular, so to speak, from the very beginning. Exactly the same: e.g. "There are daisies". Davidson/(s): One could also not say meaningfully: Example: "It has turned out that this and that does not exist": because then one says only that one has learned a word wrongly. >Reference, >Learning._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Existence Statements
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