Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Correspondence Theory: truth as correspondence of statements with objects resp. situations in the world. The correspondence theory is a thesis about truth, not about the world. See also mapping relation, representation, picture theory, coherence theory_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Hartry Field on Correspondence Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
I 229 Correspondence Theory/Truth/Field: correspondence theory needs an additional concept of the truth theoretical content of psychological states. - And it is used in a way that it cannot occur in the disquotation scheme. >Psychological states, >Tarski-scheme, >Disquotationalism. I 250 Correspondence Theory/FieldVsCorrespondence Theory: even for an inconsistent theory it is consistent when the the correspondence theory is assumed that it is true, because the logical words in it could have been used differently. >Logical constants, >Language use. Therefore, the truth of the correspondence theory should not be applied to disquotational truth, because it is a logical concept itself and the instances of disquotation scheme must be regarded as logical truths. - - - II 199 Correspondence Theory/ontological commitment/Quine/Field: the ontological commitment seems to exclude the correspondence theory. >Ontological commitment. FieldVsQuine: despite the uncertainty we should allow correspondence. - >Partial denotation. - - - IV 416 VsCorrespondence: which one is the right one? Field: which one is relevant may depend on epistemic values, but not on which values are "correct. Field pro "epistemic relativism". IV 419 RelativismVsSkepticism: the question of the "real" justification does not make sense. >Relativism, >Skepticism._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Field
> Counter arguments in relation to Correspondence Theory
