Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Predicates, philosophy, logic: predicates are symbols that can stand in logical formulas for properties. In fact, not every predicate stands for a property, since it has contradictory predicates, but no contradictory properties. For example, one can think of a predicate "squaround" for "square and round", that is, two properties that exclude each other. One can then truthfully say "Nothing is squaround". There are therefore more predicates than properties. See also round square, scheme characters, quantification, 2nd level logic, predication, attributes, adjectives._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Gottlob Frege on Predicates - Dictionary of Arguments
II 47 Frege: e.g. a sentence about a unicorn is a sentence without truth value; predicates cannot be assigned or denied. (>Nonexistence - thought: is the same whether the expression has a reference ("meaning") or not. Berka I 87 Predicate/Frege: one could live with a single predicate, "is a fact". Then there is no question of subject/predicate.(1) 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 - - - Brandom I 943 Frege: (great discovery): there must be complex predicates in this sense: so that the inferential role of sentences, e.g. "anyone who admires someone who admires themselves", can be recognized. (x)(y)[Rxy > Rxx]. (Can also occur in a language without quantification)- Strawson: this is the second distinguishing feature of singular terms and predicates: terms can be quantified. Singulär terms, >Quantification. - - - EMD II 226ff Predicate/Frege: Function: takes objects as arguments and provides truth values as a value. - - - Frege II 71 Predicate/Frege: e.g. "falling under the concept of human" - which means the same as "a human". ((s) Later authors: "is a human being". "Is" belongs to the predicate. - - - Tugendhat I 192 Predicate/Frege/Tugendhat: with Frege the predicate also stands for something, but something non-objective: the concept ("to stand for") - (VsObject Theory). Tugendhat I 193 Predicate/Frege: the predicate has no reference - not because it were contradictory, but because of indeterminacy. >Reference, >Indeterminacy._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
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