Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Predicates, philosophy, logic: predicates are symbols that can stand in logical formulas for properties. In fact, not every predicate stands for a property, since it has contradictory predicates, but no contradictory properties. For example, one can think of a predicate "squaround" for "square and round", that is, two properties that exclude each other. One can then truthfully say "Nothing is squaround". There are therefore more predicates than properties. See also round square, scheme characters, quantification, 2nd level logic, predication, attributes, adjectives._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Peter F. Strawson on Predicates - Dictionary of Arguments
I 134 M-predicates/Strawson: predicates that can be also correctly applied to purely mathematical bodies: E.g. "weighs 5 kg" "is in the living room". P-predicates: applicable to persons: E.g. "smile", "suffer pain", "go for a walk", "believe in God". I 135 Condition: logical criterion for the application, not only observation. I 137 P-predicates/Strawson: a) the same for internal or external attribution: e.g. skills, character b) different: E.g. pain, fatigue, depression. I 138 StrawsonVs(s): but not a process in which we first learn internal- and then external ascription - not vice versa. >Attribution, >Self-ascription. I 207ff Thing/predicate/singular term/introducing/Strawson: the reason for the distinction between A (Noun-) and B-expressions (predicate) is to distinguish between different things: between particular and universal, not between object and term or singular term and predicate. >Introduction/Strawson, >Singular terms, >Predicates. I 210 StrawsonVsTradition: is already presupposing the distinction - external reason: might be the tense function of the verb - Vs: this could also be expressed with two nouns and arrow notation. Socrates (Wisdom), then arrow either above Socrates or Wisdom, depending on whether Socrates died or became stupid._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
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