Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome![]() | |||
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Propositional attitudes, philosophy: A propositional attitude is the attitude of a person in relation to an object, often expressed in the form of a that-clause. Paul, for example, believes that Elmer believes the same as himself. For propositional attitudes, special identity conditions apply because one has to take into account what is known to the person and what language use they have. See also propositions, identity conditions, opacity._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Benson Mates on Propositional Attitudes - Dictionary of Arguments
I 101f Propositional attitudes / opaque context / meaning / significance / Frege / Mates: expression changes meaning depending on the context - after "believe that" an expression has as the meaning, which usually makes up his sense and any sense as something else (indirect meaning). >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Oblique meaning, >Oblique sense, >Citations, >Sense, >Meaning, >G. Frege, >Propositions, >That-clauses. Meaning: meaning is then the proposition (instead of a truth value) >Truth values. Sense: sense in a opaque context: an indirect sense corresponds to our "direct token", a name or identification. >Opacity, >Occurrence, >Names of sentences, >Descriptions._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |