Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Propositional attitudes, philosophy: A propositional attitude is the attitude of a person in relation to an object, often expressed in the form of a that-clause. Paul, for example, believes that Elmer believes the same as himself. For propositional attitudes, special identity conditions apply because one has to take into account what is known to the person and what language use they have. See also propositions, identity conditions, opacity._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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John R. Searle on Propositional Attitudes - Dictionary of Arguments
II 28f Propositional attitudes/Searle: conditions of satisfaction of propositional attitudes are fixed by the propositional content. There is no desire or belief without satisfaction conditions (i.e. there is no regress). >Propositional content, >conditions of satisfaction. II 244 Propositional attitude/Searle: special cases: "know that", "prove that", "see that" are intentional verbs, but also "success verbs". II 260 Searle: I do not know any convincing distinction de re/de dicto in application to propositional attitudes. II 270/271 SearleVsQuine: (SearleVs attitudes, which are allegedly irreducible de re): the belief in such settings stems from a Wittgenstein diagnosis. Our language provides two ways to report propositional settings: with de re reports or with de dicto reports. Example Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is a spy (de dicto). Or: of the man with the brown hat Ralph believes that he is a spy (de re). Since these two reports may even have different truth values, we believe that there must also be a difference in the phenomena (erroneously). The following dialogue is completely absurd: Quine: As for the man with the brown hat, Ralph, do you think he's a spy? Ralph: No, Quine. You asked me if I had one of the re-beliefs, but it's not the case that I think the man with the brown hat is a spy. Rather, I have the de dicto belief. I believe that the man with the brown hat is a spy._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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