Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Propositional knowledge, philosophy: the knowledge of whether certain propositions are true or false in contrast to a knowledge-how or possessing an ability. A problem with propositional knowledge are indexical theorems because the determination of the truth value (true or false) is context-dependent and situation-dependent here. See also propositions, opacity, example of the two omniscient Gods._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Michael E. Dummett on Propositional Knowledge - Dictionary of Arguments
II 69ff Propositional Knowledge/Meaning Theory/Dummett: even representation of a practical ability is propositional knowledge. >Representation, >Propositions. - - - III (b) 62f Knowledge/Dummett: That the murderer is on the roof, is not knowledge-who. - All predictive knowledge is based on propositional knowledge, because all theoretical knowledge is propositional. - Attribution of knowledge never grasps the whole knowledge of the subject. Difference: to know the truth of a sentence/knowledge of the corresponding proposition. ((s) the fact). E.g. "That the earth is moving is true" is not the knowledge that the earth rotates. - Reason: there is also simple translation knowledge: the Earth moves = "la terra si muove". III (b) 68 Language/Propositional Knowledge/Dummett: usually there is little difference between knowledge of the proposition and knowledge of the truth of the sentence. - But propositional knowledge is not sufficient for language proficiency. - Propositional knowledge is not sufficient for word understanding. - Knowledge of a single proposition is not sufficient for understanding of words. - ((s) The word must be able to appear in several contexts.) - ((s) That is the converse to the substitution principle.) - - - III (c) 106 Propositional Knowledge/Dummett: propositional knowledge is necessary to explain what the knowledge of the meaning consists of. - Knowledge that ... "the earth moves". III (c) 109 But also the proposition as such cannot play a role in the explanation of understanding (circular). III (c) 108 Understanding/Meaning/Propositional Knowledge: E.g. Kripke: "horses are called horses": those who know how to use "being called" must know that the sentence is true, even if he does not know what horses are. - However, then he would not know what truth is expressed by this; he does not know the proposition, he has no propositional knowledge. Understanding: not only knowledge that a sentence is true, but knowledge of the proposition - (but not necessary for knowing the truth). III (c) 111 Meaning theory/Dummett: the sense of it to show the correct derivation of consciousness of a truth. III (c) 112 Davidson: from capturing the axioms. Special case: "Homer denotes Homer": here one has to know that Homer refers to something. III (c) 113 DummettVs: not in order to know the meaning of "Homer" in our language. III (c) 117 Propositional Knowledge/DummettVsDavidson: Those who do not know what "the Earth" means learn something from the postulate "the Earth denotes the Earth": they learn that "the Earth" is a singular term. - But for meaning it is not sufficient to say that this is an axiom of English. - You need knowledge of the proposition. >Knowledge. III (c) 133 Propositional Knowledge/Dummett: logical form: "X knows that b is F" or "X knows that the Gs are F" - here the subject of the that-sentence stands within the opaque context of the that-sentence itself. >That-Clauses._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 |
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> Counter arguments in relation to Propositional Knowledge
