Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Noema: The noema in philosophy is the object or content of a thought, judgment, or perception. It is what is intended or meant by an act of consciousness. The noema is not the same as the object itself, but is rather the way that the object is presented to consciousness. See also Way of givennes, Thoughts, Objects of thought, Objects of belief, Mental objects, Intensions, Representation, Thought content._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Edmund Husserl on Noema - Dictionary of Arguments
Dummett I 52 Noema/Husserl/Dummett: Husserl generalizes the concept of meaning and transfers it from expressing acts to all acts of consciousness. For this generalized term Husserl uses the term "noema". Def Noema 1: the object of the act of consciousness is given by its noema, it is in the nature of noema that it is directed towards an object and this explains the intentionality of the act of consciousness. Every act of consciousness must have a noema. >Intentionality/Husserl, >Consciousness/HUsserl. Dummett I 95 Def Noema 2: new explanation of sensory perception: it is filled with a noema. (This definition was introduced by Husserl in the "Ideas"). Dummett I 96 Def Noema/Husserl: a noema is the generalization of the concept of meaning; it is nothing more than the generalization of the idea of meaning to the whole field of acts. FregeVsHusserl: Husserl's concept of meaning, on the other hand, does not permit any generalization. Thoughts are different from everything else, because they allow the distinction true/false, and their components as well. Everything that serves the same purpose as meaning, i.e. everything that gives off a specific means of determining an object or function, is in turn meaning and forms a component of various thoughts. Husserl: distinguishes two components of the noema of an act of consciousness: a) the part that can be expressed by words, "noematic sense", "central core of noema", b) the outer layers that cannot be expressed in such a linguistic way. The core of the different sensory experiences may be the same, but the different experiences have different layers within the full noema. Every intended thing as such (as a noematic core) is expressable by "meanings" (here obviously linguistic meanings). According to this, the noema consists in its innermost part of a sense that is linked to a linguistic expression, but in which consciousness acts without this link. Furthermore, the noema consists of further layers that cannot be expressed linguistically. Dummett: what is actually the noema of sensual perception? Wrong: to equate the noema with the sensory impressions. Dummett I 101 For Husserl (...) causality does not seem to be important. His interest in discussing noema is only in the way the perceiver perceives the object not only as an external object but as something that has certain general characteristics. >Noema/Dummett._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 |
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