Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Universals: Universals are expressions for what objects can have in common, such as a particular color. Examples of universals are redness, roundness, value. The ontological status of universals as something independent of thought - that is, their existence - is controversial. What is undisputed is that we form terms to generalize and use them successfully. See also General terms, Generality, Generalization, Ontology, Existence, Conceptual realism, Realism, Ideas, Methexis, Sortals, Conceptualism, Nominalism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Saul A. Kripke on Universals - Dictionary of Arguments
I 134 KripkeVsGeach: a sortal is certainly not a priori true by the designated object. It may yet turn out that it is, e.g. Lot’s guests: even if he names them, they are not humans but angels. Then why should it belong to the meaning of the name? >Sense, >Names/Kripke, >Naming/Kripke, >Denotation/Kripke, >a priori/Kripke._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 |
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