Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Coercion: Coercion is the act of using force, threats, or intimidation to compel someone to act against their will or interests, often to achieve a particular outcome or compliance._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Political Philosophy on Coercion - Dictionary of Arguments
Gaus I 200 Coercion/Political philosophy/Morris: State power is closely associated with force, as we see from the popularity of the Weberian definition. >State/Weber. Many theorists think states are necessarily or essentially coercive. 'States are ' 'grounded" in force in the sense that, by definition, they are coercive: they coordinate behavior through the use or threat of force' (Levine, 1987(1): 176); 'State-power is in the last analysis coercive power' (Geuss, 2001(2): 12); 'political power is always coercive power backed up by the government's use of sanctions, for government alone has the authority to use force in upholding its laws' (Rawls, 1996(3): 136). The view that governments must wield force or that their power is necessarily coercive is widespread in contemporary political thought. State/Coercion/MorrisVsWeber: The incompleteness of Weberian definitions of the state is only part of my objection to them. >MorrisVsWeber; >State/Morris) The second concern is about understanding coercion or force to be part of the concept of the state. >Coercion/Morris. MorrisVsRawls: Why might we think, with Rawls, that 'political power is always coercive power backed up by the government's use of sanctions'? Perhaps because of the conjunction of law and sanction. But that connection is not necessary. >J. Rawls. Some laws are not enforced by sanctions (for instance, laws governing the obligations of officials, laws establishing powers, constitutional laws). Attempts to understand the law in terms of the coercive commands of a sovereign are implausible (see Austin, 1885(4), for the classic formulation of this position; and Hart, 1994(5), for the classic refutation). >Command/Hart. 1. Levine, Andrew (1987) The End of the State. London: Verso. 2. Geuss, Raymond (2001) History and Illusion in Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Rawls, John (1996) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 4. Austin, John (1995 t 18851) The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 5. Hart, H. L. A. (1994) The Concept of Law, 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Morris, Christopher W. 2004. „The Modern State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Political Philosophy Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
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