Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Consent: Consent is the voluntary approval or permission given by an individual, acknowledging and agreeing to a specific action, idea, or request. See also Agreement, Consensus, Conflicts._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Christopher W. Morris on Consent - Dictionary of Arguments
Gaus I 204 Consent/consensus/legitimacy/state/justification/Morris: Consent can be a necessary condition for legitimacy or merely a sufficient one (or both). Assuming that consent could suffice to legitimate only (reasonably) just governments or states, we should think of consent theory as affirming both the necessity and the sufficiency of consent to legitimacy. The claim that consent is sufficient is the less controversial of the two (see Simmons, 1979(1): 57; 1993(2): 197—8; Green, 1988(3): 161—2; Beran, 1987(4)). Consent theory: Consent theory is a normative account, and it is posSible that all actual states fail to satisfy its conditions for legitimacy. This is what many contemporary consent theorists in fact claim. Consensus/Morris: Consent is to be distinguished from consensus or general agreement. Most forms of political organization depend to some degree on consensus or agreement. But the latter have to do largely with shared beliefs (or values). Sometimes terms like these are used to suggest more, but they essentially refer to agreement in belief or thought (or value).* >Agreement/Habermas. Consent/Morris: Consent, by contrast, involves the engagement of the will or commitment. Something counts as consent only if it is a deliberate undertaking. Ideally, an act is one of consent if it is the deliberate and effective communication of an intention to bring about a change in one's normative situation (i.e. one's rights or obligations). It must be voluntary and, to some degree, informed. Consent can be express (direct), or it can be tacit or implied (indirect). Both are forms of actual consent. By contrast, (non-actual) 'hypothetical consent' is not consent. Consent theory should be seen as a distinctive philosophical position, one standing in opposition to other traditions which find the polity or political rule to be natural or would see government and law as justified by their benefits. The mutual advantage, Paretian tradition and different types of consequentialism seek to base full legitimacy in what the polity does for its subjects and others (for the former see J. Buchanan, 1975(5); Gauthier, 1986(6)). Other, more 'participatory' traditions might require active involvement by citizenry for legitimacy. Political consentualism should not be conflated with these other traditions, however closely associated they may be historically (...) and it should certainly not be Gaus I 205 confused with other allegedly 'consensual' theories that base legitimacy on consensus or agreement. >Consensus. Morris: The conclusion of contemporary consent theorists seems to be that virtually no states satisfy the account's conditions for full legitimacy. It is simply that few people, 'naturalized' citizens and officials aside, have explicitly or tacitly consented to their state. It is implausible to interpret voting in democratic elections as expressing the requisite consent, and mere residence and the like do not seem to be the sort of engagements of the will required by consent theorists for obligation. Consequently, most people may not have the general obligation to obey the laws of their states that they are commonly thought to have. VsConsent theories: The adjudication of the challenge posed to state legitimacy by consentualism is a complicated matter (...). Minimal legitimacy: Supposing reasonably just and efficient states to be justified and thus to be minimally legitimate, something more seems required for full legitimacy and obligations to obey the law. The literature on this question is substantial (see Edmundson, 1999(7)), (...) >Legitimacy/Morris, >Citizenship/Morris. * Consent in this sense should also be distinguished from 'endorsement consent' in Hampton (1997(8): 94—7). 1. Simmons, A. John (1979) Moral Principles and Political Obligations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Umversity Press. 2. Simmons, A. John (1993) On the Edge of Anarchy: Locke, Consent, and the Limits of Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Umversity Press. 4. Green 1988 3. Green, Leslie (1988) The Authority of the State. Oxford: Clarendon. 4. Beran, Harry (1987) The Consent Theory of Political Obligation. Beckenham: Croom Helm. 5. Buchanan, James (1975) The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 6. Gauthier, David (1986) Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon. 7. Edmundson, William A., ed. (1999) The Duty to Obey the Law: Selected Philosophical Readings. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 8. Hampton, Jean (1997) Political Philosophy. Boulder, CO: Westview. Morris, Christopher W. 2004. „The Modern State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Morris, Christopher W. Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
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