Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Desert theories: Desert theories in economics advocate for a link between one's input or productivity and the rewards or benefits they receive, promoting incentives for work and productivity. See also Justice, Labour._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Julian Lamont on Desert Theories - Dictionary of Arguments
Gaus I 227 Desert Theories/Lamont: Desert theories differ about what should be the basis for desert claims. The three main categories are: Gaus I 228 1) Productivity: people should be rewarded for their work activity with the product of their labour or value thereof (Gaus, 1990(1): 410—16, 485-9; Miller(2), 1976; 1989(3); 1999(4); Riley, 1989(5)). 2) Effort: people should be rewarded according to the effort they expend in contributing to the social product (Sadurski, 1985)(6). 3) Compensation: People should be rewarded according to the costs they voluntarily incur in contributing to the social product (Carens, 1981(7); Dick, 1975(8); Feinberg, 1970(9); Lamont, 1997(10)). Desert theorists in each category also differ about the relationship between luck and desert. All desert theorists hold that there are reasons to design institutions so that many of the gross vagaries of luck are reduced, but theorists diverge with respect to luck in the genetic lottery. >Desert/Political philosophy, cf. >Inequlities/Resource-based view (RBV), >Distributive Justice/Resource-based view (RBV). Desert theorists, because of their emphasis on outcomes being tied to people's responsibility rather than their luck, view with concern how much people's level of economic benefits still depends significantly on factors beyond their control. UtilitarianismVsDesert theories: By contrast, utilitarians consider this of no moral consequence since, for them, the only morally relevant characteristic of any distribution is the utility resulting from it. This gap between the desert and utilitarian theorists, and hence between the general public and utilitarian theorists, is partly attributable to differences in empirical views. Desert theoriesVsUtilitarianism:. Desert theorists are much more likely to view people as signifi- cantly responsible for their actions and want to give effect to that responsibility by reducing the degree to which people's life prospects are influenced by factors beyond their control. Utilitarianism: Utilitarians are more likely to see people as largely the products of their natural and social environment, and so not responsible for many of their actions in the first place. On the latter view, the point of reducing the effect of luck is less attractive. Scheffler: But, as Scheffler (1992)(11) points out, the general population has a noticeably more robust view of the responsibility of people than many academic theorists. >Distributive Justice/Libertarianism. 1. Gaus, Gerald F. (1990) Value and Identification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Miller, David (1976) Social Justice. Oxford: Clarendon. 3. Miller, David (1989) Market, State, and Community. Oxford: Clarendon. 4. Miller, David (1999) Principles of Social Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 5. Riley, Jonathan (1989) 'Justice under capitalism'. In John H. Chapman, ed., NOMOS xrxl: Markets and Justice. New York: New York University Press, 122—62. 6. Sadurski, Wojciech (1985) Giving Desert Its Due. Dordrecht: Reidel. 7. Carens, Joseph (1981) Equality, Moral Incentives and the Market. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 8. Dick, James C. (1975) 'How to justify a distribution of earnings'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4: 248—72. 9. Feinberg, Joel (1970) Doing and Deserving. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 10. Lamont, Julian (1997) 'Incentive income, deserved income, and economic rents'. Journal of Political Philosophy, 5 (1): 26-46. 11. Schemer, Samuel (1992) 'Responsibility, reactive attitudes, and liberalism in philosophy and politics'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21 (4): 299-323. Lamont, Julian, „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lamont, Julian Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
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> Counter arguments against Lamont
> Counter arguments in relation to Desert Theories
