Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome![]() | |||
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Attributive/referential: difference in reference - attributive "whoever it is" (may not be identified) - referential the identified object._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Tyler Burge on Attributive/referential - Dictionary of Arguments
Frank I 702/703 Content/BurgeVsDonellan/intentionality/intentional Content/Reference/referential/attributive/Burge: E.g. If the person I regard as amiable is not my aunt, then I am not mistaken in what I think about the person, no mistake with regard to the intentional act and content. >Actions, >Content, >Intentions. The authority [of the first person] concerns those aspects of thought which have intentional qualities. For me, this is the only aspect of the content of a thought. Cf. >Incorrigibility. >First Person._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |