Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Asymmetry: Asymmetry in science refers to a constraint on the reversibility of operations._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Experimental Economics on Asymmetry - Dictionary of Arguments
Parisi I 86 Information asymmetry/Experimental economics/Sullivan/Holt: [a] popular hypothesis for the failure of litigants to achieve efficient settlement posits that verdict-relevant information is asymmetrically distributed between the parties to a legal dispute. Settlement inefficiencies are then explained by the strategic attempts of litigants to signal or extract private information during the litigation process (e.g. Bebchuk, 1984(1); Reinganum and Wilde, 1986(2)).* Economic models of settlement bargaining under asymmetric information predict both settlement failure (i.e. trials) and settlement delay (i.e. late settlement) under appropriate conditions (see e.g. Spier, 1992(3), 1994(4)). A recent experiment on settlement bargaining clearly demonstrates both predictions of the asymmetric information hypothesis (Sullivan, 2016(5)). >Settlement bargaining/Experimental economics, >Experiments/Experimental economics, >Jurisdiction/Experimental economics; cf. >Strategic voting/Experimental economics. * Kennan and Wilson (1993)(6) provide a detailed treatment of the role of asymmetric information in general bargaining models. For a survey of economic experiments on bargaining under asymmetric information, see Roth (1995)(7). 1.Bebchuk, L. A. (1984). “Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information.” RAND Journal of Economics 15(3): 404–415. 2. Reinganum, J. F. and L. L. Wilde (1986). “Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs.” RAND Journal of Economics 17(4): 557–566. 3. Spier, K. E. (1992). “The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation.” Review of Economic Studies 59(1): 93–108. 4. Spier, K. E. (1994). “Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules.” RAND Journal of Economics 25(2): 197–214. 5. Sullivan, S. P. (2016). Why Wait to Settle? An Experimental Test of the Asymmetric Information Hypothesis, Journal of Law & Economics, forthcoming. 6. Kennan, J. and R. Wilson (1993). “Bargaining with Private Information.” Journal of Economic Literature 31(1): 45–104. 7. Roth, A. E. (1995). “Bargaining Experiments,” in J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth, eds., Handbook of Experimental Economics, 253–348. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Sullivan, Sean P. and Charles A. Holt. „Experimental Economics and the Law“ In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Experimental Economics Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
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