Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Strategic voting: Strategic voting happens when voters cast their ballots not based on their true preferences, but to influence the outcome. This may involve voting for a candidate perceived as more likely to win or against a candidate to prevent another from winning. It's a tactical approach aimed at maximizing the impact of one's vote beyond personal preference. See also Political elections, Electoral systems, Planning, Decisions, Decision-making processes, Decision theory, Preferences._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Experimental Economics on Strategic Voting - Dictionary of Arguments
Parisi I 88 Strategic voting/Experimental economics/Sullivan/Holt: To understand the possible effects of strategic voting under unanimity, note that a vote to acquit only matters if everyone else votes to convict, which might cause jurors to be reluctant to vote to acquit even if they personally believe the defendant is innocent. Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000)(1) test this surprising prediction using a series of experiments in which subjects were incentivized to make careful voting decisions in an environment analogous to jury deliberation in a criminal case. Results: The authors find strong experimental evidence that some jurors do vote strategically under a unanimity rule, but that the effect of such strategic voting is not strong enough to cause the rate of false convictions under unanimity to be higher than under a simple majority requirement. Strategic voting: Moreover, Goeree and Yariv (2011)(2) find evidence that strategic voting in a similar experimental setting may be substantially mitigated by opportunities for jury deliberation.* The implication of experimental results to date is that it could be a serious mistake to base policy recommendations on sharp theoretical predictions that have not been evaluated in the laboratory, especially when these predictions run counter to basic intuition. >Jurisdiction/Experimental economics, >Experiments/Experimental economics, >Preferences/Experimental economics. *Baddeley and Parkinson (2012)(3) use experiments to explore some of the individual and group dynamics that may influence jury deliberation, and also provide a thorough review of the relevant literatures. 1. Guarnaschelli, S., R. D. McKelvey, and T. R. Palfrey (2000). “An experimental study of jury decision rules.” American Political Science Review 94(2): 407–423. 2. Goeree, J. K. and L. Yariv (2011). “An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation.” Econometrica 79(3): 893–921. 3. Baddeley, M. and S. Parkinson (2012). “Group Decision-Making: An Economic Analysis of Social Influence and Individual Difference in Experimental Juries.” Journal of Socio-Economics 41(5): 558–573. Sullivan, Sean P. and Charles A. Holt. „Experimental Economics and the Law“ In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Experimental Economics Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
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