Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Law: Law is a set of rules that are created and are enforceable by social or governmental institutions to regulate behavior. Law helps to maintain and protect people's rights. See also Rights, Society, State, Jurisdiction._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Positive Political Theory on Law - Dictionary of Arguments
Parisi I 222 Law/Positive Political Theory/Tiller: The Law and PPT (Positive Political Theory) movement is now mainstream as it engages legal scholars, political scientists, and economists in their research on how public policy emerges and under what conditions it changes. Parisi I 223 “Softer “law” features”: (…) the softer, micro-analytic, aspects of decision-making such as legal doctrines (Cohen and Spitzer, 1994)(1); Tiller, 1998(2); Lax, 2007(3), 2012(4); Jacobi and Tiller, 2007(5)), decision instruments (Tiller and Spiller, 1999(6); Smith and Tiller, 2002(7); Schanzenbach and Tiller, 2007(8) 2008(9)), case and legislative history citations (Rodriguez and Weingast, 2003(10); Abramowicz and Tiller, 2009(11)), and word choice in judicial legal opinions (Hinkle et al., 2012)(12) - features more commonly understood as "the law," at least in the judicial sense. To be sure, these softer "law" features are embedded in the more formal rules of the game; but law also has its own, often dominant, role in the institutional game over policy, especially for judges and courts who view these law features as the primary apparatus for judicial policymaking within the competitive institutional environment. >Positive Political Theory/Tiller. Strategies: The more recent work in Law and PPT invites an analysis of "law as strategy" that is, how law is activated as a strategy in the competitive institutional game over policy. In the context of policy competition, "strategy" is easier to characterize. It is the plan of action taken by one institutional actor, with limited resources, to best secure an enduring policy outcome - one that best maximizes the actor's own preferences, while surviving potential responses by other institutional actors. Strategy is an essential feature of positive political theory generally, a feature that distinguishes it from other (normative and attitudinal) theories of institutional behavior. Law: The "law" part has played a more ambiguous role within the Law and PPT movement. a) At times "law" appears to be a policy that emerges within the political-institutional competition between courts, agencies, and legislatures (Ferejohn and Shipan, 1990(13); Spiller and Gely, 1992)(14); b) at other times "law" appears to be something more akin to legal precedent, doctrines, legal grounds (instruments), or other features more closely associated with the craft of judging (Cross and Tiller, 2006)(15). Parisi I 224 Law and PPT rests on some basic key elements: (1) there is a defined set of institutional rules for interaction among and within policymaking institutions, (2) institutional actors have varying policy preferences, and (3) these actors are willing to behave strategically - that is, make their choices in reference to how other competing actors are likely to respond - to achieve their most favored policy outcome. Strategy/equilibrium:. To the extent possible, Law and PPT models examine subgame perfect equilibrium, using backward induction from the various ultimate outcomes of the policy game, to understand the strategic choices made by judicial institutions. Much of the Law and PPT movement is engaged with empirical verification of this last element (Spiller, 1992(14); Cross and Tiller, 1998(16); Smith and Tiller, 2002(17); Kim, 2009(17); Kastellec, 2011)(18). >Competition/Positive Political Theory, >Legal doctrine/Positive Political Theory, >Positive Political Theory/Tiller. 1. Cohen, Linda R. and Matthew L. Spitzer (1994). "Solving the Chevron Puzzle." Law & Contemporary Problems 57: 66—110. 2. Tiller, Emerson H. (1998). "Controlling Policy by Controlling Process: Judicial Influence on Regulatory Decision Making." Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 14: 114—13 5. 3. Lax, Jeffrey (2007). "Constructing Legal Rules on Appellate Courts." American Political science Review 101: 591—604. 4. Lax, Jeffrey (2012). "Political Constraints on Legal Doctrine: How Hierarchy Shapes the Law." Journal ofP01itics 74:765-781. 5. Jacobi, Tonja and Emerson H. Tiller (2007). "Legal Doctrine and Political Control." Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 23:326—345. 6. Tiller, Emerson H. and Pablo T. Spiller (1999). "Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political Games in Administrative Law." Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 15: 349-377. 7. Smith, Joseph L. and Emerson H. Tiller (2002). "The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law." Journal of Legal Studies 31:61—82. 8. Schanzenbach, Max M. and Emerson H. Tiller (2007). "Strategic Judging Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence." Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 23:24—56. 9. Schanzenbach, Max M. and Emerson H. Tiller (2008). "Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines: Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform." University of Chicago Law Review 75: 715-760. 10. Rodriguez, Daniel B. and Barry R. Weingast (2003). "The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 151: 1417—1542. 11. Abramowicz, Michael and Emerson H. Tiller (2009). "Citation to Legislative History: Empirical Evidence on Positive Political and Contextual Theories of Judicial Decision Making" Journal of Legal Studies 38: 419—443. 12. Hinkle, Rachael K., Andrew D. Martin, Jonathan D. Shaub, and Emerson H. Tiller (2012). "A Positive Theory and Empirical Analysis of Strategic Word Choice in District Court Opinions." Journal of Legal Analysis 10:407—444. 13. Ferejohn, John and Charles Shipan (1990). "Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy." Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 6: 1-20. 14. Spiller, Pablo T. and Rafael Gely (1992). "Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949—1988." Rand Journal of Economics 23:463—492. 15. Tiller, Emerson H. and Frank B. Cross (2006). "What is Legal Doctrine?" Northwestern University Law Review 100: 517—534. 16. Cross, Frank B. and Emerson H. Tiller (1998). "Essay, Judicial Partisan and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals." Yale Law Journal 107: 2155-2176. 17. Kim, Pauline T. (2009). "Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Court of Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 15 7: 1319-1381. 18. Kastellec, Jonathan (2011). "Hierarchical and Collegial Politics on the U.S. Court of Appeals." Journal of Politics 73:345—361. Tiller, Emerson H. “The “Law” and Economics of judicial decision-making. A Positive Political Theory Perspective.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Positive Political Theory Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
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