Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Positive Political Theory: Positive Political Theory applies economic models and empirical methods to analyze political behaviors, institutions, and outcomes. It seeks to explain and predict political phenomena by examining individual incentives, strategic interactions, and rational decision-making within the political realm. This approach uses formal models and data-driven analysis to understand political processes and behavior. See also Political Theory, Political Philosophy, Economic theories, Economic behavior, Politics, Rational choice, Decisions, Decision-making processes, Decision theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Emerson H. Tiller on Positive Political Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
Parisi I 222 Positive Political Theory/PPT/Tiller: (…) the economics of judicial behavior has revealed itself most prominently in the field now known as Law and Positive Political Theory ("Law and PPT"). Instead of the traditional focus of "law and economics" on the normative efficiency of legal rules, Law and PPT identifies the role of competition among legal and political institutions for policy outcomes, with these outcomes usually taking the form of legislative enactments, executive action, judicial opinions, or administrative agency pronouncements (regulations).* PPT/Methods: Insights and methodologies from the broader field of law and economics - including those from institutional economics, principal—agent theory, empiricism, and game theory - all contribute to the operation of Law and PPT as a field and mode of inquiry informing us about how political institutions interact and compete for policy. Law: The Law and PPT movement is now mainstream as it engages legal scholars, political scientists, and economists in their research on how public policy emerges and under what conditions it changes. Parisi I 223 “Softer “law” features”: (…) the softer, micro-analytic, aspects of decision-making such as legal doctrines (Cohen and Spitzer, 1994)(8); Tiller, 1998(9); Lax, 2007(10), 2012(11); Jacobi and Tiller, 2007(12)), decision instruments (Tiller and Spiller, 1999(13); Smith and Tiller, 2002(14); Schanzenbach and Tiller, 2007(5) 2008(6)), case and legislative history citations (Rodriguez and Weingast, 2003(15); Abramowicz and Tiller, 2009(16)), and word choice in judicial legal opinions (Hinkle et al., 2012)(17) - features more commonly understood as "the law," at least in the judicial sense. To be sure, these softer "law" features are embedded in the more formal rules of the game; but law also has its own, often dominant, role in the institutional game over policy, especially for judges and courts who view these law features as the primary apparatus for judicial policymaking within the competitive institutional environment. >Law/Positive Political Theory, >Competition/Positive Political Theory, >Legal doctrine/Positive Political Theory. * The insights from the Law and PPT movement have also underpinned normative analyses (Eskridge and Ferejohn, 1992(1); McNollgast, 1994(2); Spitzer and Talley, 2013(3)) and innovative policy prescriptions (Tiller and Cross, 1999(4); Schanzenbach and Tiller, 2007(5), 2008(6); Miles and Sunstein, 2008(7)) relating to court structure and judicial decision-making. 1. Eskridge, William N. and John Ferejohn (1992). "Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State." Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 8: 165—189. 2. McNollgast. “Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation.” Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 57, no. 1, 1994, pp. 3–37. JSTOR, ww.jstor.org/stable/1191982. Accessed 31 Jan. 2021. 3. Spitzer, Matthew and Eric Talley (2011). "Left, Right, and Center: Strategic Information Acquisition and Diversity in Judicial Panels." Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 13: 101-126. 4. Tiller, Emerson H. and Frank B. Cross (1999). "A Modest Proposal for Improving American Justice." Columbia Law Review 99: 215—234. 5. Schanzenbach, Max M. and Emerson H. Tiller (2007). "Strategic Judging Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence." Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 23:24—56. 6. Schanzenbach, Max M. and Emerson H. Tiller (2008). "Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines: Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform." University of Chicago Law Review 75: 715-760. 7. Miles, Thomas J. and Cass R. Sunstein (2008). "The Real World of Arbitrariness Review." University of Chicago Law Review 75: 761—814. 8. Cohen, Linda R. and Matthew L. Spitzer (1994). "Solving the Chevron Puzzle." Law & Contemporary Problems 57: 66—110. 9. Tiller, Emerson H. (1998). "Controlling Policy by Controlling Process: Judicial Influence on Regulatory Decision Making." Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 14: 114—13 5. 10. Lax, Jeffrey (2007). "Constructing Legal Rules on Appellate Courts." American Political science Review 101: 591—604. 11. Lax, Jeffrey (2012). "Political Constraints on Legal Doctrine: How Hierarchy Shapes the Law." Journal ofP01itics 74:765-781. 12. Jacobi, Tonja and Emerson H. Tiller (2007). "Legal Doctrine and Political Control." Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 23:326—345. 13. Tiller, Emerson H. and Pablo T. Spiller (1999). "Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political Games in Administrative Law." Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 15: 349-377. 14. Smith, Joseph L. and Emerson H. Tiller (2002). "The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law." Journal of Legal Studies 31:61—82. 15. Rodriguez, Daniel B. and Barry R. Weingast (2003). "The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 151: 1417—1542. 16. Abramowicz, Michael and Emerson H. Tiller (2009). "Citation to Legislative History: Empirical Evidence on Positive Political and Contextual Theories of Judicial Decision Making" Journal of Legal Studies 38: 419—443. 17. Hinkle, Rachael K., Andrew D. Martin, Jonathan D. Shaub, and Emerson H. Tiller (2012). "A Positive Theory and Empirical Analysis of Strategic Word Choice in District Court Opinions." Journal of Legal Analysis 10:407—444. Tiller, Emerson H. “The “Law” and Economics of judicial decision-making. A Positive Political Theory Perspective.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Tiller, Emerson H. Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
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