Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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Richard Titmuss on Incentives - Dictionary of Arguments
Parisi I 475 Incentives/norms/Titmuss/Carbonara: legal norms and sanctions especially are often proven to curb cooperative behavior and destroy social norms of cooperation. >Social Norms. Frey and Jegan (2001)(1) and Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997)(2) argue this might occur because the law crowds out intrinsic motivation, by hitting on individuals’ self-determination and self-esteem. Somehow, the legal rule is perceived as a lack of acknowledgment of individuals’ intrinsic motivation and as a lack of trust. It may also happen that individuals adopt cooperative behaviors and comply with social norms of cooperation when they want to signal their trustworthiness and intrinsic motivations to others. If a law prescribes cooperation, it becomes impossible to distinguish whether somebody is being cooperative for fear of sanction or for intrinsic motivation. This might discourage their cooperation. >Sanctions, >Motivation. Titmuss: In his famous example of blood donors, Titmuss (1970)(3) argues that providing incentives to blood donors may reduce blood supply, as purely altruistic donors are demotivated by the reward. It may also reduce the quality of the donated blood. Hepatitis rates from blood transfusions significantly decreased when the blood was donated rather than purchased. When monetary incentives are not involved, people supplying blood are donors who have no reason to hide an illness. Interestingly, Costa-Font, Jofre-Bonet, and Yen (2011)(4) find that the nature of the rewards matters. They collected data on blood donations in fifteen European countries in 2002, showing that monetary rewards may indeed crowd out blood donations, whereas non-monetary rewards do not. 1. Frey, B. S. and R. Jegan (2001). “Motivation Crowding Theory.” Journal of Economic Surveys 15: 589–611. 2. Frey, B. S. and F. Oberholzer-Gee (1997). “The Costs of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding Out.” American Economic Review 87: 746–755. 3. Titmuss, Richard M. (1970). The Gift Relationship. London: Allen and Unwin. 4. Costa-Font, J., M. Jofre-Bonet, and S. Yen (2011). “Not all incentives wash out the warm glow: The case of blood donation revisited.” CESifo working paper: Public Finance, No. 3527. Emanuela Carbonara. “Law and Social Norms”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Titmuss, Richard Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
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> Counter arguments against Titmuss
> Counter arguments in relation to Incentives
