Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Corporations: Corporations in economics are legal entities separate from their owners, created to conduct business. They can own assets, incur liabilities, and enter contracts. Shareholders own corporations, but their liability is limited to their investment. Corporations aim to generate profit, often providing benefits like easier capital accumulation, perpetual existence, and limited personal financial risk for owners. See also Business, Economy, Cartels._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Guido E. Tabellini on Corporations - Dictionary of Arguments
Mokyr I 25 Corporations/Mokyr/Tabellini: The evolution of corporations from informal voluntary associations to corporate organizations with specific legal features was important for several reasons. First, this evolution clarified that the corporation was a separate legal entity, distinct from its members. By implication, corporations acquired a permanent status, unlike the transient status of individual members. Guilds, universities and other associations were meant to last generations. This can be inferred from membership rules, that spelled out how to arrange successions within the organization and sometimes even allowed for inheritance clauses. It can also be inferred from the high observed survival rates of corporations for several centuries and well into the eighteenth century (De Moor 2008(1), p. 196). Second, thanks to the legal revolution, corporations became the holders of specific rights and responsibilities. This enabled them to enter into long term contracts, to sue and be sued, to issue debt that was an exclusive liability of the corporation and not of its administrators nor of its members, and to engage in a variety of contractual arrangements that enabled corporate organizations to fulfill new and important economic roles. Corporations were not responsible for the liabilities of its members or vice versa. >Rule of law/Mokyr/Tabellini. 1.De Moor, Tine. 2008. “The Silent Revolution: A New Perspective on The Emergence of Commons, Guilds, and Other Forms of Corporate Collective Action in Western Europe". International Review of Social History, Vol. 53, No. S16, pp. 179-212._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
EconTabell I Guido Tabellini Torsten Persson The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Mokyr I Joel Mokyr Guido Tabellini Social Organizations and Political Institutions: Why China and Europe Diverged CESifo Working Paper No. 10405 Munich May 2023 |
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