Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Consciousness, philosophy: consciousness ist the experience of differences along with a knowledge about alternatives as opposed to purely automatic responses. See also Intentionality, Identity theory, Other minds, Self-consciousness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Marvin Minsky on Consciousness - Dictionary of Arguments
I 151 Consciousness/Minsky: We normally assume that consciousness is knowing what happens in our minds right at the present time. (…) [instead] consciousness does not concern the present, but the past: it has to do with how we think about the records of our recent thoughts. There is a simple sense in which thinking about a thought is not so different from thinking about an ordinary thing. We know that certain agencies must learn to recognize — and even name — the feel of touching a hand or an ear. Similarly, there must be other agencies that learn to recognize events inside the brain — for example, the activities of the agencies that manage memories. And those, I claim, are the bases of the awarenesses we recognize as consciousness. >Mental States/Minsky._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |