Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Anti-dumping policy: An anti-dumping policy is a trade defense measure used to protect domestic industries from foreign companies selling goods below fair market value (dumping). It involves imposing duties or tariffs on such imports to level the playing field and prevent market distortion. See also Tariffs, Import surveillance, International trade, Trade policy, Strategic trade policy._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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L. Alan Winters on Anti-dumping Policy - Dictionary of Arguments
Krugman I 217 Anti-dumping policy/Winters: It is virtually impossible to assess whether firms do see surveillance as the precursor to antidumping actions, but several factors suggest that it may not be a very plausible view: the frequency with which antidumping actions are introduced without previous surveillance, which suggests no constraint on the European Community to introduce the policies in sequence, the separate legislative bases of the two approaches, and the fact that antidumping actions entail more detailed information collection than surveillance. (…) in only one of our cases below have antidumping actions followed the imposition of surveillance, in three cases anti-dumping actions have preceded surveillance (by several years), and in a number of cases antidumping actions have been taken against closely related but not identical products to those suffering surveillance. All this seems to indicate a substantial degree of independence between the two forms of trade policy. >Import surveillance, >Trade policy, >Strategic trade policy, >International trade, >Tariffs, >Optimal tariffs, >Sales ban. If surveillance is seen as the harbinger of inevitable quantitative restrictions, no firm will have an incentive to reduce its exports and most will wish to expand them immediately. Expansion may merely reflect an intertemporal shift in sales-an attempt to get the goods in before the door is shut or before tariffs are imposed. It may also, however, have a strategic dimension. Quantitative restrictions(QR) /voluntary export restraint (VER): The rents which quantitative restrictions (QRs)-especially voluntary export restraints (VERs)-create are proportional to sales, and sales quotas for individual firms are more often than not related to past sales. >Voluntary export restraint(VER). Thus a firm expecting to face a QR will believe itself likely to do better the higher its base-year exports. Moreover, this is likely to be so regardless of whether the quota allocation is made by the importing or the exporting countries. Given that the majority of new protectionism has taken the form of discriminatory QRs, this jockeying for position seems a strong possibility. Yoffie (1983)(1), for example, reports such behavior on the part of Taiwanese and Korean exporters of footwear to the United States in 1976: protection seemed inevitable, but a principal policy objective was to postpone it long enough to build up base levels from which to negotiate. Yoffie tells the story more from the point of view of the trade associations and governments than from that of individual firms, but the principle is the same. Under these circumstances surveillance is likely to be greeted by booming import volumes and stable or decreasing import unit value from the surveyed sources.* >Prisoner‘s dilemma/Winters, >Cooperation. * Since nearly completing this work, I have seen Hoekman and Leidy (1989)(2) and Anderson (1989)(3) which formalize some of the ideas of this paragraph. The latter, which my discussant is too modest to mention below, shows that if the probability of a VER is exogenous any industry will seek to increase its exports while it has the chance. If, on the other hand, the probability is endogenous and the industry is imperfectly competitive, self-restraint may be optimal. 1. Yoffie, D. 1983. Power and protectionism. New York: Columbia University Press. 2. Hoekman, B. M., and M. P. Leidy. 1989. Dealing with “market disruption”: Designing a system of emergency protection. Geneva: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Mimeograph. 3. Anderson, J. E. 1989. Domino dumping, I: Competitive exporters. Worlung Paper no. 186, Department of Economics, Boston College. L. Alan Winters. „Import Surveillance as a Strategic Trade Policy.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Winters, L. Alan EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 |
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