Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Trade wars: Trade wars in economics are economic conflicts where countries impose protectionist measures (like tariffs, quotas, or subsidies) against each other. This often happens in a "tit-for-tat" manner, with each nation retaliating against the other's trade barriers. They aim to protect domestic industries but typically lead to higher costs, reduced trade, and slower economic growth for all involved. See also Sanctions, Sanctions effectiveness, Sanctions debate, Sanctions consequences, Sanctions objectives._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Robert A. Pape on Trade Wars - Dictionary of Arguments
Pape I 94 Trade Wars/Pape: A trade war is when a state threatens to inflict economic harm or actually inflicts it in order to persuade the target state to agree to terms of trade more favorable to the coercing state.(1) Because trade wars seek to redirect the course of ongoing trade relations, they typically occur between established trade partners. Unlike economic sanctions, trade wars do not seek to influence the target state's political behavior but rather its international economic policies, and those only to the extent that they affect the wealth of the coercing state. >Sanctions. When the United States threatens China with economic punishment if it does not respect human rights, that is an economic sanction; when punishment is threatened over copyright infringement, that is a trade war. Accordingly, the most important measure of the pressure of a trade war is the change in the price that the target state receives (or must pay) for an affected good or service. Economic warfare seeks to weaken an adversary's aggregate economic potential in order to weaken its military capabilities, either in a peacetime arms race or in an ongoing war. This strategy assumes that the greater a state's overall productive capacity, the greater its ability to produce technologically sophisticated weapons and to mobilize people and wealth for military use. Unlike the first two strategies, economic warfare does not seek to coerce the target by inflicting economic pain. To the extent that it coerces at all, it does so by persuading the target state that its reduced military strength makes certain political objectives unattainable.(2) As a result, the most important measure of the pressure of economic warfare is the change in military production.(3) Pape I 96 Trade wars should not be counted as support for the proposition that economic sanctions can achieve more ambitious political objectives because the basis of target state decision making is different. States involved in trade disputes decide whether to make concessions depending on which choice they expect would maximize their wealth. Targets of economic sanctions, on the other hand, understand that they would be better off economically if they conceded to the coercer's demands, and made their decision based on whether they consider their political objectives to be worth the economic costs. Trade wars should also be excluded, because including them would eliminate the distinction between purposes for which economic sanctions are a possible alternative to the use of force and those for which force would never be considered. In addition, taking into account trade wars would expand the sanctions' universe to include virtually every international economic negotiation of any kind, a universe so large as to be practically uncountable. >Sanctions, >Sanctions consequences, >Sanctions debate, >Sanctions effectiveness, >Sanctions evasion, >Sanctions history, >Sanctions policies, >Sanctions theory, >Trade sanctions, >Financial sanctions, >Trade wars, >Payment systems. 1. On the definition of trade wars, see John C. Conybeare, Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 3-6, 21-28. 2. On the difference between coercion through punishment and denial, see Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), chap. 3. A fourth strategy, strategic embargo, is a special case of economic warfare; rather than attacking the entire target economy, a strategic embargo denies an adversary specific critical commodities in order to prevent or delay improvements in its military capabilities. For a comparison of economic warfare and strategic embargo, see Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment: CoCom and the Politics of East-West Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 39-52._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Pape I Robert A. Pape Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work International Security, Volume 22, Issue 2 (Autumn, 1997), 90-136. 1997 |
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> Counter arguments against Pape
> Counter arguments in relation to Trade Wars
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