Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Sanctions evaluation: Sanctions evaluation in economics assesses the effectiveness and impact of economic sanctions. It analyzes whether sanctions achieve their stated foreign policy goals (e.g., changing a target country's behavior or destabilizing a regime) and quantifies their economic consequences on both the sanctioned and sanctioning parties. See also Sanctions, Sanctions effectiveness, Sanctions debate._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Dictionary of Arguments. | |||
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Robert A. Pape on Sanctions Evaluation - Dictionary of Arguments
Pape I 97 Sanctions evaluation/Pape: Evaluating the record of economic sanctions requires a standard of success. Given their coercive purpose, economic sanctions should be credited with success if they meet three criteria: (1) the target state conceded to a significant part of the coercer's demands;(1) (2) economic sanctions were threatened or actually applied before the target changed its behavior; and (3) no more-credible explanation exists for the target's change of behavior. The most common alternative explanations involve the use of force (including military conquest), coercion by the threat of overwhelming military force, and covert use of force, such as foreign-sponsored assassinations and coups. Determining rules for how much credit for the outcome should be assigned to economic sanctions in these mixed cases depends on the type of military force that determined the outcome. Military conquest, when it occurs, is always a more credible explanation than economic sanctions because the target state's failure to concede before military defeat is in itself evidence of the failure of coercion.(2) >Coercion. Showing that economic pressure weakened the target's military capability and thus accelerated military conquest would count as a success for economic warfare; however, it does not count as evidence that the target state would have conceded had force not been used or if just a little more economic pain had been inflicted. Such cases may tell us that economic pressure can make military force more effective, but they do not imply that economic sanctions alone can achieve comparable goals. Change of government by assassination or military coup is also evidence of the failure of coercion against the deposed government. Deciding if economic sanctions should be assigned any causal weight depends on whether economic sanctions led to a change in the target state's regime without the sanctioning state either making other, more direct assurances to the coup plotters to inspire them to act or providing them the necessary means to succeed. Pape I 98 Distinguishing coercion by military threat from economic coercion is the most difficult task, because it requires assessing how the target weighed both pressures. >Sanctions, >Sanctions consequences, >Sanctions debate, >Sanctions effectiveness, >Sanctions evasion, >Sanctions history, >Sanctions policies, >Sanctions theory, >Trade sanctions, >Financial sanctions, >Trade wars, >Payment systems. 1. Trivial gestures that do not actually change the target state's behavior in the direction demanded by the coercer do not qualify. For example, in 1956 Gamal Abdel Nasser rejected Britain and France's demand for international control of the Suez Canal and its toll revenue. His only "concession" was that foreign ships could use their own pilots, subject to the ultimate authority of an Egyptian pilot. 2. On the distinction between coercion and military victory, see Pape, Bombing to Win, chaps. 1 and 2._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. "Vs" indicates differences in content, not necessarily the chronological progression of a controversy. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Pape I Robert A. Pape Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work International Security, Volume 22, Issue 2 (Autumn, 1997), 90-136. 1997 |
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