Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Chinese economy: China's economy is a developing mixed socialist market economy. It is the world's largest by purchasing power parity and second-largest by nominal GDP. Historically driven by exports and manufacturing, China is shifting towards domestic consumption and services. The government plays a significant role through industrial policies and five-year plans. See also China, Economy, Nations, International trade, Tariffs._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Guido E. Tabellini on Chinese Economy - Dictionary of Arguments
Mokyr I 43 Chinese Economy/Europe/Mokyr/Tabellini: The divergence in the political institutions of China and Western Europe was due to a plurality of complementary factors. Historical circumstances led to early centralization of state powers in China, vs prolonged fragmentation in Europe. But these initial differences between China and Europe were amplified by the internal structure of their societies. Social organizations shaped state institutions through multiple channels. Differences between China and Europe: First, European organizations were territorially based and some of them had exclusive control of their territory. This was true of landed élites during feudalism, but also of self-governing cities and of ecclesiastic structures when feudalism abated. These organizations created strong countervailing powers with which European rulers had to bargain in the early stages of state formation. China: Chinese society instead was organized around lineages, and several features of these dynastic organizations made them weaker than their European counterparts. Mokyr I 44 For this reason too, power relations between rulers and other social groups were more asymmetric in China compared to Europe. Second, the way in which cooperation was sustained in Europe created a demand for external legal enforcement, which in turn influenced the evolution of legal institutions. European state structures co-evolved with their legal institutions, giving prominence to the principle of the rule of law. China: In China, by contrast, lineage organizations were effective substitutes of the State in dispute resolution, and this was reflected in how the Chinese legal system evolved. Third, the governance principles used within social organizations shaped the evolution of political bodies. In Europe, procedures that had first emerged to regulate collective decisions within corporations were adapted and transplanted first to ecclesiastic organizations, and then to the emerging state institutions. These governance principles also shaped notions of fairness and legitimacy, which could not be ignored by European rulers. China: Chinese society was instead used to a very different set of governance principles in its internal social arrangements, which were more congenial to the consolidation of an autocratic regime. Finally, European state institutions were also shaped by their interaction with two specific organizations, the Western Church and self-governing towns, that were distinctive of Western Europe and did not have equivalent counterparts in the rest of the world. Economic development: At a more abstract level, the differences in social arrangements between China and Western Europe illustrate an important mechanisms through which culture interacts with institutions and with economic development. Europe and China relied on different social arrangements to sustain cooperation because they had different value systems - another crucial legacy of the Church. In other words, the influence of culture on institutions and on economic development is not only or primarily a direct influence, through beliefs and ideas. It is largely indirect, through the social arrangements that spread through society because of their complementarity with specific cultural traits. This also points to the importance of social organizations in the study of economic and political development. >Chinese history/Mokyr/Tabellini. [Some details]: Mokyr I 3 Nework homophily/Mokry/Tabellini: Social organizations can be viewed as social networks, i.e. as groups of people who interact regularly and cooperate on specific domains. Which social networks are more likely to form depends on prevailing homophily criteria, that is with whom people prefer to interact (Jackson 2008)(1). This in turn is shaped by value systems and cultural traits. Traditionally, strong ties between individuals related by kin have facilitated cooperation within extended families. As social interactions became more complex, however, cooperation within families was no longer sufficient, and inter-family arrangements had to emerge to sustain cooperation. The social arrangements that emerged in China vs Europe in the second millennium AD were very different in this respect. In China, inter-family cooperation was organized within clans - patrilineal alliances among families who traced their origin to a common ancestor. In Europe, associations of unrelated individuals became central to the way individuals cooperated outside the family. These different arrangements reflected differences in value systems. In China the Confucian tradition, encouraged by the imperial authorities during the Song and subsequent dynasties, emphasized ancestor worship and strong kinship ties. This in turn promoted extended family structures and facilitated cooperation between descendants of the same male ancestor. In Europe, the Catholic Church played a major role in reshaping family ties towards the nuclear family, and in diffusing a universalistic value system detached from one’s narrow community of friends and relatives. Mokyr I 4 Between the 6th and 11th centuries, the Church doctrine strongly discouraged marriage between cousins and other relatives, insisted on women’s consent to the marriage, dissuaded from adoptions and remarriage, prohibited all forms of polygamy (Henrich, 2020(2); Schulz, 2022(3)). As noted by Goody (1983)(4), these Church policies reduced the importance of unilineal descent and led to the dissolution of large kinship groups. This facilitated the emergence of the so-called European Marriage Pattern, namely late age of marriage, high rates of celibacy, neolocality (i.e. newly married couples living on their own), consensuality and bilineal descent customs (Hajnal 1982)(5). As pointed out by Roland (2020)(6), if ancestry is determined symmetrically from father and mother, the number of ancestors becomes quickly so large that common descent is no longer a viable criterion to organize social networks. As a result of these different traditions, after the first millennium AD, while in China the clan based on ancestry became the paramount form of social organization, in Europe cooperation was instead achieved through a variety of other organizational arrangements among unrelated individuals, that following Greif (2006a(7),b(8)), we call corporations. >Corporations, cf. >Chinese history, >Chinese Economy. 1. Jackson Matthew. 2008. Social and Economic Networks. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2. Henrich, Joseph. 2020. The WEIRDest People in the World: How the West Became Psychologically Peculiar and Particularly Prosperous. New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux. 3. Schultz, Jonathan F. 2022. “Kin Networks and Institutional Development.” The Economic Journal, Vol. 132, No. 647, pp. 2578-2613. 4. Goody, J. 1983. The Development of the Family and Marriage in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 5. Hajnal, John. 1982. “Two Kinds of Preindustrial Household Formation System.” Population and Development Review, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 449–494. 6. Roland, Gerard. 2020. “The Deep Historical Roots of Modern Culture: A Comparative Perspective.” Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 48, pp. 483-508. 7. Greif, Avner. 2006a. “Family Structure, Institutions, and Growth: The Origins and Implications of Western Corporations,” American Economic Review, Vol. 96, No. 2, pp. 308-312. 8. Greif, Avner. 2006b. “The Birth of Impersonal Exchange: The Community Responsibility System and Impartial Justice.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Spring), pp. 221–236._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
EconTabell I Guido Tabellini Torsten Persson The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Mokyr I Joel Mokyr Guido Tabellini Social Organizations and Political Institutions: Why China and Europe Diverged CESifo Working Paper No. 10405 Munich May 2023 |
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