Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Clans: A clan is a group of people united by real or perceived kinship and common descent. In economics, especially economic history, the clan is studied as an informal institution or social organization. It promotes cooperation, trust, and risk-sharing among members, often serving to enforce agreements and provide public goods where formal markets or state institutions are weak. See also Cooperation, Organisation, Clubs, Family.
_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Guido E. Tabellini on Clans - Dictionary of Arguments
Mokyr I 6 Clans/corporations(Mokyr/Tabellini: Clans and corporations relied on different methods of enforcement. Cooperation within a clan was sustained by repeated interactions over several domains. >Cooperation. Deviant behavior in one domain was punished through ostracism and exclusion from future interactions in all domains. Cooperation among kin was also sustained by bonds of kin loyalty, the worship of common ancestors, and internalized social norms. China: In China, although clans had legal authority over their members, clan rules rarely specified punishments for transgression but relied on moral and social sanctions and rewards. Clan rules in China had primarily a moral rather than a formal legal character: they mostly admonished members to behave in ethical ways, and protect the weak and the poor (Ruskola, 2000(1), p. 1660). As one clan book rule states, “a clan without rules leaves its members with no moral standard of conduct to follow” (Liu, 1959(2), p. 22). The frequent interactions among kin-related individuals, clearly facilitated the operation of reputation mechanisms, and the threat of ostracism or even expulsion from the clan was a key deterrent against rule violations. Many of the rights and duties between family members did not even have to be written down, as they simply followed Confucian philosophy of filial piety and clan solidarity. Moreover, even when formal and explicit, most internal enforcement systems were extrajudicial. Violators of clan rules and of internal agreements could in principle be reported to the authorities for punishment, but generally this happened only as a last resort, after the clan had exhausted its internal procedures for enforcement and dispute resolution. The Chinese word for civil lawsuit was xishi, meaning “minor matter”, which is informative about how imperial officials tended to see civil lawsuits (Ruskola 2000(1), p. 1659, Huang 2010(3), p. 21-22). At the highest level of abstraction this reflects the Confucian ideals that viewed formal law as redundant in a society in which wise men realized the unity of their interests. Mokyr I 8 [Difference to Europe]: Differences in enforcement methods between clans and corporations (particularly cities) are also evident from their sources of revenues. European cities depended on taxes and fees levied on the local population, whereas Chinese clans provided similar public goods often by relying on voluntary contributions and donations by members. Of particular importance were so-called lineage trusts, which owned assets (primarily land) that were earmarked for an endowment that could pay for the rites of the clan. The status of these trusts was enforced mostly by custom and self-regulation (Zelin,2007(4), pp. 9-10; see also McDermott(5), 2013, pp. 148-149). 1. Ruskola, Teemu. 2000. "Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective". Stanford Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 6, pp. 1599-1729. 2. Liu, Hiu-Chen Wang. 1959. The Traditional Chinese Clan Rules. New York: J.J. Augustin. Maddicott, John Robert. 2004. The Origins of the Early English Parliament 924-1327. Oxford: Oxford University Press 3. Huang, Philip C. 2010. Chinese Civil Justice, Past and Present. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 4. Zelin, Madeleine 2007. “Informal Law and the Firm in Early Modern China.” Unpublished ms., Columbia University, downloaded at https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?repid=rep1&type=pdf&doi=083e4b7a695da0d13775 8845fb6cb1d1ed148676 5. McDermott, Joseph P. 2013. The Making of a New Rural Order in South China: Vol. 1, Village, Land, and Lineage in Huizhou, 900-1600. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
EconTabell I Guido Tabellini Torsten Persson The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Mokyr I Joel Mokyr Guido Tabellini Social Organizations and Political Institutions: Why China and Europe Diverged CESifo Working Paper No. 10405 Munich May 2023 |
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