Daniel Kahneman on Ambiguity - Dictionary of Arguments
Norvig I 620
Ambiguity/Kahneman/Tversky/Norvig/Russell: One explanation for (…) apparently irrational preferences (>Allais paradox/Norvig) is the certainty effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)(1): people are strongly attracted to gains that are certain. >Certainty effect/Kahneman/Tversky.
Ambiguity aversion: It seems that people have ambiguity aversion: A gives you a 1/3 chance of winning, while B could be anywhere between 0 and 2/3. Similarly, D gives you a 2/3 chance, while C could be anywhere between 1/3 and 3/3. Most people elect the known probability rather than the unknown unknowns. >Ellsberg paradox/Norvig, >Allais paradox/Norvig, >Rationality/AI research, >Preferences/Norvig, >Utility/AI research.
1. Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. econometrica, pp. 263–291._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Schnelles Denken, langsames Denken München 2012
Stuart J. Russell
Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010