Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Court proceedings: Court proceedings are the formal process of resolving a legal dispute in a court of law. They involve the presentation of evidence, the examination of witnesses, and the arguments of attorneys. The goal of court proceedings is to reach a fair and just resolution of the dispute. See also Rights, Law, Justice._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Social Psychology on Court Proceedings - Dictionary of Arguments
Parisi I 125 Court proceedings/juror decision-making/Social psychology/Nadler/Mueller: (...) each individual juror hears the evidence and arguments presented by lawyers, as well as the judge's instructions. Story model: According to the Story Model of Juror Decision-Making (Bennett, 1978(1); Pennington and Hastie, 1981(2)) jurors make sense of the evidence at trial by organizing it in a narrative fashion. Instead of passively absorbing verbatim the enormous amount of complex, Parisi I 126 ambiguous information given in a trial, jurors actively process the information using the framework of their existing knowledge to fill in gaps and construct stories from the evidence. Jurors create a story narrative that explains the different pieces of reliable evidence, and then reach a decision by matching the best-fitting story to the verdict categories. Criteria/eveluation: In order to evaluate competing stories, jurors use several criteria. The most preferred story will account for the greatest amount of evidence, will be internally consistent and leave no gaps in the causal chain of events, and will be plausible in light of what the juror believes about the world (Pennington and Hastie, 1981)(2). „Thinking aloud“: This model has been supported by "think aloud" observations of mock jurors (Pennington and Hastie, 1986)(3), as well as experiments examining judgments in mock criminal and civil trials (Huntley and Costanzo, 2003(4); Pennington and Hastie, 1992(5)). Decision-making: More recent experimental research on coherence-based reasoning has stablished that the process of reaching a decision is often bi-directional (Holyoak and Simon, 1999)(6). The decision task faced by jurors is cognitively complex because it requires consideration of information that is voluminous, contradictory, and ambiguous (D. Simon, 2004)(7). Information processing: To process the large amount of complex information presented in a trial, jurors reconstruct the information into simpler mental representations, upon which their cognitive system imposes coherence (D. Simon, 2004)(7). Schemas/beliefs: (...) jurors bring with them into the courtroom commonsense notions of legal categories like insanity, self-defense, and intent, and those existing schemas influence how jurors evaluate evidence and make legal judgments (Finkel, 2005(8); Finkel and Groscup, 1997(9); Robinson and Darley, 1995(10)). Even after receiving instructions about the definitions of crimes like burglary or robbery, jurors import their commonsense notions of these offenses into their decisions. Parisi I 127 Prediction: (...) (Kalven and Zeisel, 1966)(11) (...) found that a majority jury vote on the first ballot predicted the final verdict in over 90% of the cases, and they hypothesized that deliberation often focused on convincing the members of the minority to change their vote. Subsequent research set out to investigate more precisely the relationship between pre-deliberation preference and final verdict. In fact, immediate votes prior to deliberation seem to occur in only a small minority of cases (Devine et al., 2004(12); Diamond and Casper, 1992(13); Diamond et al., 2003(14); Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington, 1983(15); Sandys and Dillehay, 1995)(16). When the first ballot does occur, if each juror expresses their preference verbally, the early preferences can influence those voting subsequently (J. H. Davis et al., 1988)(17). Jurors' certainty and confidence in their views can be weak before deliberations begin, such that some do not begin leaning strongly toward one side until after substantial deliberations have taken place (Hannaford-Agor et al., 2002)(18). To understand the influence of the jury deliberation process, it is therefore important to measure pre-deliberation preferences of individual jurors prior to deliberation. >Negotiation/Social psychology. 1. Bennett, W. L. (1978). "Storytelling in Criminal Trials: A Model of Social Judgment." Quarterly Journa1 ofSpeech 64(1): 1-22. doi:10.1080/0033563 7809383408. 2. Pennington, N. and R. Hastie (1981). "Juror Decision-making Models: The Generalization Gap." Psychological Bulletin doi: 10.103 7 3-2909.89.2.246. 3. Pennington, N. and R. Hastie (1986). "Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51 (2):242-258. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.2.242. 4. Huntley, J. E. and M. Costanzo (2003). "Sexual Harassment Stories: Testing a Story-me- diated Model of Juror Decision-making in Civil Litigation." Law and Human Behavior 27(1): 29-51. 5. Pennington, N. and R. Hastie (1992). "Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 62(2): 189—206. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.62.2.189. 6. Holyoak, K. J. and D. Simon (1999). "Bidirectional Reasoning in Decision Making by Constraint Satisfaction." Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 128(1): 3-31. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.128.1.3. 7. Simon, D. (2004). "A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making." University of Chicago Law Review 71(2): 511-586. 8. Finkel, N. J. (2005). Commonsense Justice: Jurors' Notions of the Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 9. Finkel, N. J. and J. L. Groscup (1997). "Crime Prototypes, Objective versus Subjective Culpability, and a Commonsense Balance." Law and Human Behavior 21 (2):209-230. 10. Robinson, P. H. and J. M. Darley (199 5).Justice, Liability, and Blame: Community Views and the Criminal Law. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 11.Kalven, Harry, jr. And Hans Zeisel (1967). „The American Jury“. In: 24 Wash. & LeeL. Rev. 158 (1967),https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol24/iss1/18 12. Devine, D. J., K. M. Olafson, L. L. Jarvis, J. P. Bott, L. D. Clayton, and J. M. T. Wolfe (2004). "Explaining Jury Verdicts: Is Leniency Bias for Real?" Journal of Applied social Psychology 34(10): 2069-2098. 13. Diamond, S. S. andJ. D. Casper (1992). "Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury." Law and society Review 26(3): 513 - 563. doi:10.2307/3053737. 14. Diamond, S. S., N. Vidmar, M. Rose, and L. Ellis (2003). "Juror Discussions during Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation." Arizona Law Review 45: 1. 15. Hastie, R., S. Penrod, and N. Pennington (1983). Inside the Jury. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 16. Sandys, M. and C. Dillehay (1995). "First-ballot Votes, Predeliberation Dispositions, and Final Verdicts in Jury Trials." Law and Human Behavior 19(2): 175-195. doi:10.1007/ BF01499324. 17. Davis, J. H., M. F. Stasson, K. Ono, and S. Zimmerman (1988). "Effects of Straw Polls on Group Decision Making: Sequential Voting Pattern, Timing, and Local Majorities." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 5 5(6): 918—926. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.55.6.918. 18. Hannaford-Agor, P., V. Hans, N. Mott, and T. Munsterman (2002). "Are HungJuries a Problem National Center for State Courts, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdfilesl/ nij /grants/1993 72.pdf Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press - - - Parisi I 131 Court Proceedings/racial bias/Social Psychology/Nadler/Mueller: (...) many attorneys try to (...) select jurors based on their assumptions that Black jurors are less likely to find defendants, especially Black defendants, guilty (Bonazzoli, 1998(1); Kerr et al., 1995(2)). In fact, behavioral and neuroimaging research provide some support for these intuitions, suggesting that we may be more able to empathize or take the perspective of individuals who are similar to ourselves (Cialdini et al., 1997(3); M. H. Davis et al., 1996(4); N. Eisenberg and Mussen, 1989(5); J. P. Mitchell, Macrae, and Banaji, 2006(6); but see Batson et al., 2005(7) for an alternate behavioral mechanism). Black sheep effect: However, there is evidence that in some situations, people may want to distance themselves from ingroup members who have committed bad acts, that is, the "black sheep" effect (J. Marques et al., 1998(8); J. M. Marques, Yzerbyt, and Leyens, 1988)(9). >Capital Punishment/Social Psychology. 1. Bonazzoli, M. J. (1998). "Jury selection and Bias: Debunking Invidious Stereotypes through Science." Quinnapiac Law Review 18:247. 2. Kerr, N. L., R. W. Hymes, A. B. Anderson, and J. E. Weathers (1995). "Defendant-Juror Similarity and Mock Juror Judgments" Law and Human Behavior 19(6):545-567. doi:10.1007/BF01499374. 3. Cialdini, R. B., S. L. Brown, B. P. Lewis, C. Luce, and S. L. Neuberg (1997). "Reinterpreting the Empathy-Altruism Relationship: When One into One Equals Oneness." Journal of Personality and social Psychology 73(3): 481-494. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.73.3.481. 4. Davis, J. H. (1996). "Group Decision Making and Quantitative Judgments: A Consensus Model," in E. H. Witte andJ. H. Davis, eds., Understanding Group Behavior, Vol. 1: Consensual Action By Small Groups, 35—59. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 5. Eisenberg, N. and P. H. Mussen (1989). The Roots of Prosocial Behavior in Children. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Mitchell, J. P., C. N. Macrae, and M. R. Banaji (2006). "Dissociable Medial Prefrontal Contributions to Judgments of Similar and Dissimilar Others." Neuron 50(4): 655-663. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2006.03.040. 7. Batson, C. D., D. A. Lishner, J. Cook, and S. Sawyer (2005). "Similarity and Nurturance: Two Possible Sources of Empathy for Strangers." Basic and Applied social Psychology 2 15-25. 8. Marques, J., D. Abrams, D. Paez, and C. Martinez-Taboada (1998). " The Role of Categorization and In-group Norms in Judgments of Groups and their Members." Journal of Personality and social Psychology doi:10.1037/0022-3514.75.4.976. 9. Marques, J. M., V. Y. Yzerbyt, andJ.-P. Leyens (1988). "The 'Black Sheep Effect': Extremity of Judgments Towards Ingroup Members as a Function of Group Identification." European Journal of Social Psychology 18(1): 1—16. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420180102. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Social Psychology Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
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