Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Consciousness, philosophy: consciousness ist the experience of differences along with a knowledge about alternatives as opposed to purely automatic responses. See also Intentionality, Identity theory, Other minds, Self-consciousness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Ferdinand de Saussure on Consciousness - Dictionary of Arguments
Dummett I 117 Content of consciousness: private: fragrance, melody, name, "idea" (no background necessary) -but not: concepts, thoughts, sense (public). VsBritish empiricists: (concepts, no "ideas") British Empiricism: equates concepts with imagination. DummettVsSaussure: mimics this by mechanistically describing the transmission of sound - language as code. I 118 Meaning/Grasping/DummettVsSaussure: too simple explanation, like periodic pain. - We would then also need an explanation of what it means to use this concept. - E.g. if someone knows nothing about trees, it does not help to say that every time he heard the word concept would enter his mind. I 120 Thoughts can only be grasped as a complex. >Holism, >Complex, >Compositionality. What someone thinks about an object must be able to apply to other objects. Generality Condition/Evans: the object must also be able to have other predicates. >Generality Condition/Evans._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F. de Saussure I Peter Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 (Junius) Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 |
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