Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Dualism: the idea that the entities in a considered domain cannot be unified. In philosophy e.g. spirit and matter. Monism in contrast, confirms that unity is possible and that a separateness can not be claimed. Sie also property dualism, monism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Gerhard Vollmer on Dualism - Dictionary of Arguments
II 86 Split-Brain/VsDualismVollmer: shows that consciousness is divisible! And this unit is the main argument of dualism - for the identity theory it is not a problem. >Identity theory, >Consciousness. VsDualism: how should the surgeon’s scalpel double a supposedly intangible consciousness? II 88 No matter how many equivalences, matches, correlations we will find, the will never decide between monism and dualism. >Monism, >Property dualism, >Equivalence, >Equality, >Similarity, >Comparisons, >Comparability._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
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