Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Epistemic/ontological: ontological questions relate to the existence of entities that cause perceptions - epistemic questions reflect their recognizability. The question of a principal recognizability itself is ontological and metaphysical. See also metaphysics, ontology, existence, realism, reality, perception.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Hartry Field on Epistemic/ontologic - Dictionary of Arguments

II 102
Behavioral explanation/real possibility/epistemic/Stalnaker: behavior must be explained in terms of genuine (non-epistemic) possibility.
Intelligent behavior/Stalnaker: may only be explained in terms of possibilities that represent these possibilities.
Field: without using the concept of "meaning".
>Meaning
.
II 105
Epistemic/Field: E.g. epistemic term of truth conditions: "is verified in the long term".
FieldVs: this is not a good definition of truth conditions. With this, truth is defined in terms of verification.
>Truth conditions, >Verification.
II 286
Epistemic Theory/Vagueness/Field: Epistemic Theory: accepts facts.
>Facts.
Non-epistemic theory: can assert that it is conceptually impossible in certain cases that we can decide. - For example, if something is a borderline case of a property. >Vagueness, >Sorites.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994


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