Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Appearance, Philosophy: Apart from logical insights we receive all our insights through our senses. Therefore, it is believed that this knowledge is not only fundamentally fallible, but is more or less pre-structured by the nature of the sense organs. This structure is not necessarily so in the world outside the perceiving subjects. Because of the linguistic prestructuring of our approach to ourselves the inner life of the subjects is also not unfailingly recognizable. See also appearance, truth, certainty, knowledge, epistemology, introspection, incorrigibility._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Christopher Peacocke on Appearance - Dictionary of Arguments
I 29 Being/seeming/appearance/Sellars: seeming red is more fundamental than being red. >Appearance/Sellars, >Psychological nominalism. PeacockeVs: "looks red" is not semantically unstructured in contrast to "red". - Therefore it should not be the fundamental concept. >Basic concepts, >Simplicity, cf. >Complexity, >Explanation. Three solutions: 1) physically red as fundamental (anti-perception theory / representative: Shoemaker). >S. Shoemaker. 2) "No priority theory": nothing is fundamental. 3) Red must be explained in terms of perception (perception theory). >Perception, >Perception theory._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 |
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> Counter arguments against Peacocke
> Counter arguments in relation to Appearance
