Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Functionalism, philosophy of mind: the thesis that mind states are functional states that can be described by input and output. See also identity theory, mind-body-problem, materialism, physicalism, mental states._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Michael Pauen on Functionalism - Dictionary of Arguments
Pauen I 67 Multiple realizability: a variety of neural activity can cause one and the same mental state. (E.g. Split Brain: takeover by other areas). This is a problem for the identity theory and materialism. >Identity theory, >Materialism, >Brain states. I 130 Def Semantic functionalism/Lewis/Pauen: semantic functionalism reverts exclusively to everyday language behavioural vocabulary. >Everyday language, >Everyday psychology, >Explanation, >Behavior. I 132 Functionalism/Lewis/Pauen: Vs multiple realization (if the roles are determined accurately enough.) - That distinguishes him from most other functionalists. >D. Lewis. I 135f Psycho-functionalism/Pauen: responds to the shortcomings of everyday language in determining mental states. - The functional description can be pushed to an individual neuron. Representative: Dennett. Dennett: VsEveryday psychology: Problem: how to recognize simulation. >Simulation, >D. Dennett, >Psycho-functionalism._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
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> Counter arguments in relation to Functionalism
