Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Basic Concept: theories differ in what terms they choose as the basic concepts, which are not further defined. A definition of these concepts within the theory would be circular and may cause > paradoxes. E.g. The theory of mind by G. Ryle is based on the concept of disposition, other theories presuppose mental objects. See also paradoxes, theories, terms, definitions, definability, systems, explanations._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Stephen Schiffer on Basic Concepts - Dictionary of Arguments
I 10 Basic concept/Schiffer: a theory cannot have an infinite number of basic concepts. - E.g. therefore "Kripke refers to Kripke" cannot be a primitive, naked fact. >Naked facts, >Bare facts, >Definitions, >Meaning theory, >Theories. I 216 Basic concept/Schiffer: for a basic concept there must be an axiom and a set of conditions. >Axioms, >Rules. Problem: therefore, "believes" cannot be a basic concept, because there are infinitely many conditional clauses or axioms needed. >Propositional attitudes/Schiffer. "Thinks" is not a basic concept, yet semantically simple, but does not fulfill certain conditions and denotes nothing. >Denotation, >Thinking._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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> Counter arguments against Schiffer
> Counter arguments in relation to Basic Concepts
